DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 237 437 SO 015 193

AUTHOR	Bailey, Ann C., Comp.; And Others
TITLE	Teaching About China. A Collaborative Work of the Asia Society's Education and Communications Department and Its China Council.
INSTITUTION	ASIA Society, New York, N.Y.; China Council of the Asia Society, Washington, D.C.
SPONS AGENCY	Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	83
GRANT	G00-79-01699
NOTE	415p.
PUB TYPE	Guides - Classroom Use - Guides (For Teachers) (052)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Art History; *Asian History; *Asian Studies; *Cultural Education; Curriculum Enrichment; Foreign Countries; Human Geography; Language; Learning Activities; Literature Appreciation; Physical Geography; Secondary Education; *Social Studies; Teaching Guides; Teaching Methods; Units of Study
IDENTIFIERS	*China

ABSTRACT

Designed to supplement textbook study, this guide provides secondary school teachers with a compilation of recent scholarship on China. Eleven sections offer information, analysis, activities, and resources on Chinese geography, language, literature, art, and history to 1983. Sections 1 through 3 provide the following introductory information: rationale, various teaching strategies, and the Chinese romanization system. Sections 4 through 11 contain course materials. Section 4 discusses aspects of China's physical and cultural geography that have affected its historical development. Maps are included. In section 5, myths and facts about the Chinese language are presented and students practice calligraphy and interpret Chinese characters. Section 6 offers 2 essays on Chinese art. In section 7, 3 articles discuss techniques for using Chinese literature in the classroom. The remaining four sections provide a chronological treatment of the dynastic period, the decline of Imperial China, the revolutionary period, and the People's Republic. In each section, a critique of existing texts is followed by an essay which presents new scholarship and alerts teachers to misinformation and differences of opinion. Separate chapters then provide history, representative art and literature, activities, and teaching suggestions. The guide includes appendices concerning text evaluation, books and resources, and resource centers. (LP)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

TITLE VI, Sec. 605, HEA
G00-79-01699

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)
☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☑ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
● Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ED237437

TEACHING ABOUT CHINA

A Collaborative Work of The Asia Society's
Education and Communications Department
and its China Council

Compiled by: Ann C. Bailey
Richard C. Bush
Susan Williams O'Sullivan

SO 015 193

© Copyright, 1983, The Asia Society. All rights reserved.

TEACHING ABOUT CHINA

A Collaborative Work of The Asia Society's
Education and Communications Department
and its China Council

Compiled by: Ann C. Bailey
Richard C. Bush
Susan Williams O'Sullivan

The Asia Society wishes to thank the Office of Education, Washington, D.C., for its generous support in this project. We also would like to express our appreciation to Betty M. Bullard, University of South Carolina, under whose departmental direction this important grant was secured; Timothy Plummer, Director, Education and Communications Department, who has continued the administration of this grant; Susan L. Rhodes, Assistant Director, Education and Communications Department, for her editorial and content suggestions; and especially Stacy Luks, Washington Center of The Asia Society and Kathlin Smith, China Council, for long hours spent on manuscript preparation.

© Copyright, 1983, The Asia Society. All rights reserved. This working document is not for distribution. Xeroxing is permitted for classroom use only. The opinions expressed in Teaching About China are those of the authors and not necessarily The Asia Society. The Asia Society is a non-profit, non-political, educational organization dedicated to deepening American understanding of Asia and stimulating thoughtful trans-Pacific discourse.

TEACHING ABOUT CHINA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. FOREWORD

Teaching About China: Getting Through the Maze

II. STRATEGIES & PRIORITIES: TEACHERS' OPTIONS

Historical Approach

Cultural Patterns

General Categories

III. ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE WORDS

IV. CHINA'S GEOGRAPHY

A. Essay — Geography and its Relationship to China's Development, Jack Williams

B. Maps

V. THE CHINESE LANGUAGE

A. Essay — The Chinese Language: Myths and Facts, Timothy Light

B. Essay — Introduction to Chinese Calligraphy, Walter Hahn

C. Teaching Activity

VI. THE ARTS OF CHINA

A. Essay — The Arts in China, Michael Sullivan

B. Essay — Chinese Bronzes, Freer Gallery of Art

VII. CHINA THROUGH ITS LITERATURE

A. Essay — Basic Social Studies and Language Arts Skills: Using Chinese Literature in Translation, A. Elgin Heinz

B. Review Article -- The Dragon's Village: An Autobiographical Novel of Revolutionary China, Yuan-Tsung Chen. Review by A. Tom Grunfeld

C. Essay — Using Judge Dee in the Classroom, Sanford Stein

VIII. CHINA'S MAJOR DYNASTIES

Introduction

A. The Multi-State System
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
  - I. Chinese Chronology of Chinese Social History
  - II. Folksong on Life of the Common People from The Book of Odes

B. The Early Imperial System
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
  - I. "The Seven Feminine Virtues," Pan Ch'ao
  - II. A Brief Overview of Life in the Han Dynasty
  - III. "Seven Poems of Lament" -- One Selection, Wan Ts'an
  - IV. Schools of Contending Thought: A Teaching Suggestion

C. The Transition to Centralized Imperial Rule I
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
  - I. "A Letter of Warning to the King of Korea," Yang Chien
  - II. Poem: "A Woman's Hundred Years"
  - III. Poem: "Thoughts While Studying at Hanlin Academy," Li Po
  - IV. Poem: "Recruiting Officer of Shih-hao," Tu Fu
  - V. A Description of a Buddhist Festival

D. The Transition to Centralized Imperial Rule II
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
  - I. Treatise on Farming
  - II. Poems by Su Shih
  - III. Hangchow in the Late Thirteenth Century
  - IV. Simulation of The Chinese Civil Service Examination: A Teaching Suggestion

E. Yuan Dynasty
  - Essay

F. The Mature Imperial System
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
  - I. Ming Emperors and Their Ritual Duties
  - II. Matteo Ricci's Description of the Chinese World View
  - III. Social Disorder in 17th Century China: A Selection from The Death of Woman Wang, by Jonathan Spence

IX. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA, 1750-1911

Introduction

- A. The Initial Sino-Western Trading Relationship
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. *One Edict from the Emperor*, September 1793, on the Occasion of Lord Macartney's Mission to China
- B. Internal Seeds of Dynastic Decline
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Working Conditions in the Coal Mines of Hunan
- C. The Opium War (1839-1842)
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Letter to Queen Victoria, Lin Tse-hsu
    - II. British Views on the Opium War
    - III. China Prepares to Do Battle with the English
    - IV. Biographical Portrait, Lin Tse-hsu
    - V. Contemporary Perspective of The Opium War
- D. The Taiping Rebellion
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Official Text of the Taipings on Religious and Moral Principles
    - II. The Land System of the Taipings
- E. China's Foreign Relations After the Opium War
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Ch'i Ying's Views on Handling Foreigners
    - II. Robert Hart's *Guidelines to Foreign Employees of the Maritime Customs Service*
    - III. Description of Life Among the Foreign Residents of Hong Kong
- F. The Self-Strengthening Movement
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Li Hung-chang on Borrowing Western Military Technology
    - II. The Yung Wing Educational Mission to the United States
    - III. The Self-Strengthening Movement: Then and Now
- G. The 19th Century Missionary Movement
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. Young J. Allen, An Enlightened Missionary
    - II. Mutual Perceptions: Americans and Chinese

H. Foreign Encroachment in China and the Sino-Japanese War
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. Memorial Proposing Alliance with Russia, Chang Chih-tung
    II. Map Showing Foreign Sphere of Influence in 1911

I. Hundred Days of Reform
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. The Empress Dowager
    II. "The Nation is in Danger," K'ang Yu-wei
    III. "THe Oppression of Women," K'ang Yu-wei

J. The Boxer Rebellion
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. A Boxer Attack on Chinese and Western Christians

K. The United States' Open Door Initiative
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. Some Highlights of The Chinese in America, by Jack Chen

L. The Rise of Nationalism and the 1911 Revolution
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. "The Revolutionary Army," Tsou Jung
    II. A Case for A Colloquial Language Newspaper
    III. A Short Biography of Ch'iu Chin, a Woman Revolutionary

Bibliography

X. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION, 1911-1949

Introduction

A. Experiments with Constitutional Government
    Essay

B. Warlordism in 20th Century Chinese Politics
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. A Post Office Report Documenting Disruption Caused by the Warlord Armies
    II. Map: River Railway Grid of Pre-1949 Politics

C. The May 4th Incident and the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party
    Essay
    Enrichment
    I. "Call to Youth," Ch'en Tu-hsiu
    II. Eye-witness Description of the May 4th Incident

D. The First United Front and the Northern Expedition
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. A Western Woman Comments on Traditional Values
  II. Hsiang Ching-yu's Reflections on Women
  III. Kuomintang Frustration with Communist Organizing Tactics
  IV. Map of the Northern Expedition

E. Rural China in the Late 1920s and Early 1930s
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. A Drought in Szechuan
  II. Tobacco Farming in Shantung
  III. Road Building in Rural China

F. The KMT's Nanking Decade: Attempts at Reform
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. Marriage Customs
  II. Conditions in Futsing County
  III. Comments on the Failure of Reform Programs

G. The Shift to Rural Revolution
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. Voting for the First Time
  II. An American's Impressions of Mao
  III. "The Song of the Hoe," Yenan Period Music
  IV. "Mao Tse-tung: The Early Years": A Biographical Sketch

H. Japan's Aggression in China: Chinese Communist Response
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. Life in China Under the Japanese Occupation

I. The United States and China
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. General Stilwell's Relationship with Chiang Kai-shek
  II. The Marshall Mission
  III. Survey of the Chinese Communist Movement by the U.S. War Department
  IV. "Impression of the Leadership of the Chinese Communists at Yenan," John Service

J. The Civil War and the Victory of the Chinese Communist Party
  Essay
  Enrichment
  I. Organizing the Peasant
  II. Inflation during the Late 1940s

Bibliography

XI. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1983
- Introduction
- Chronology
- A. China in 1949
  - Essay
- B. Politics and Government
  - Essay
  - Enrichment
    - I. A Cultural Context for Chinese Law: A Teaching Suggestion
    - II. "My Neighborhood": A Teaching Suggestion
- C. Economic and Social Development
  - Essay (Includes Discussion of The Great Leap Forward, Women and Education in China)
  - Enrichment
    - I. A Chinese College Student's Letter: A Teaching Suggestion
    - II. Selections from a Chinese Text
    - III. Budget Comparisons: A Teaching Suggestion
- D. Foreign Relations
- E. Science and Technology
- F. Art and Culture
- G. Religion and Philosophy
- Bibliography

XII. APPENDICES
- A. Textbook Evaluation
- B. Suggested Books and Resources
- C. List of Resource Centers

Foreword I

I.

TEACHING ABOUT CHINA: GETTING THROUGH THE MAZE

How This Guide Came About

In 1971 President Richard Nixon surprised the world by announcing that he would soon travel to the People's Republic of China. This historic decision, and the 1972 visit that followed, set in motion a chain of events -- the admission of the PRC to the United Nations; the beginnings of tourism for Americans in China; scholarly exchanges between the two countries; tentative trade relations; and, ultimately, the official "normalization" of diplomatic relations between the United States and China (January 1979), symbolized by the visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) to the United States. In the course of less than a decade China had gone from "foe" to "friend."

Prompted by these significant events, The Asia Society's Education and Communications Department and China Council saw an increasing need to raise the level of public awareness and understanding of this ancient and complex society. The Asia Society has a long tradition of balanced and non-political education on all of Asia. It also has a history of offering teachers help in their presentation of Asian studies, based on our firm belief that there is no better place to start broadening public education than in the pre-collegiate classrooms of this country. To that end, this project was designed.

Evidence has overwhelmingly indicated that American teachers rely primarily on textbooks for information and teaching strategies, especially in those fields in which they feel a lack of expertise. Since few American pre-collegiate teachers are experts on China, textbooks are the source for most of the teaching about China in this country. Although the American scholarly community was racing to catch up with the times -- researching, revising, and updating its evaluations of China, past and present -- a careful look at pre-collegiate textbooks reflected little, if any, of this new scholarship. It is generally considered common wisdom that it takes a minimum of ten years for the new, university-level scholarship to permeate the pre-collegiate curriculum. The Asia Society's goal in initiating this publication was to bridge the gap and speed that process along. Spurred on by the conviction that a knowledge of China is essential for citizens of the 1980s, we have put together this manual. In it we hope to present some of the best, most recent scholarship on China -- in a format accessible to the pre-collegiate teacher.

The Assumptions on Which the Guide is Based

-- Teachers, however well motivated, have little time to do independent research. Yet they want and need to know more than is in the textbook supplied them.

-- Teachers may not have the necessary background to accurately evaluate the available teaching materials and books on China. They may not always recognize some of the underlying assumptions and biases which textbook authors incorporate into their work.

-- School systems have limited funds to buy new textbooks and audio-visual materials. At the same time, existing textbooks do not reflect the new scholarship and information about China.

-- Teachers need help identifying important topics and concepts and in establishing priorities when teaching about China.

-- Most teachers will have a limited time period -- perhaps only two weeks -- to teach about China. Such a study will probably be part of a general world history course.

-- Once the obvious superlatives -- China's age, early technological advances, population, "exotic" differences -- are out of the way, students lose interest in the study of China. What do they care about dynastic cycles, debates over imperialism or the structure of communes?

What the Guide is Designed to Do

-- Supplement existing textbooks. It is not a textbook nor does it stand on its own. In surveying the China-related material in existing world history texts (see list below), we were not surprised to find that all covered the same major topics: geography, language, the principle of dynasties, the Western penetration of China after 1750, the events leading up to the Communist victory in 1949, and the ensuing changes. Therefore, the structure of the guide follows from the organization of the textbooks.

In each of the historical sections we give a general critique of the texts and we present a general introduction alerting the teacher to major trends. In addition, the sections include essays which concentrate on material generally believed to be important to understanding Chinese history and civilization. They present new scholarship; alert teachers to differences of opinion; and correct misinformation in the text. They are not all-inclusive. For instance: if the texts generally cover a subject thoroughly we say so and leave it out.

-- Help secondary school teachers plan a course about China. In Section II we offer a variety of teaching options. We suggest "recipes" for teaching a two-week overview; a course on enduring concepts; or a course on revolution -- among others. In each case we indicate where in the guide the teacher will find the material.

-- Provide additional information for secondary school teachers. The guide is not addressed to a particular grade level and teachers will be required to adapt the material for classroom use. The material could, however, probably be handled by a good senior high school student.

-- Provide enough information to enable a student to pursue a topic on his/her own. For instance: by using the material in the guide to supplement the text, an upper-level high school student could prepare a class presentation on a particular subject, e.g. science and technology in China.

-- Alert teachers to key concepts in each historical period. By reading the introduction and the key concepts in each major section, a teacher will have the background to identify his/her teaching priority.

-- Provide "enrichment" material for each major historical section. Poetry, translations from primary sources, descriptive paragraphs, first-hand observations and brief analytical statements are all included to add depth, interest, color and vitality. These materials also suggest lesson plans, examination questions and discussion topics as well as providing good reading for teacher and student. In a few cases we include activities which seem particularly useful.

-- Suggest, in a few cases, outstanding audio-visuals or resources which the well-endowed school system might purchase. Once again, this list is selective and more complete information about resources and lesson plans can be obtained from the Outreach Center in your region. (See XII-C)

-- Provide an over-all evaluation of the texts. (See XII-A)

What the Teacher Has to Do

We do not assume the teachers will read or use all of this guide -- much as we hope they would. It requires selectivity and it must be used with the text. We suggest that all teachers read the Table of Contents, Section II - Strategies and Priorities; Section IV - Geography; and the Introductions to Sections VIII, IX, X and XI.

Our Methodology

After surveying the China-related material in each text we identified areas of concentration. We then read and wrote, drawing on our own teaching experience in our selection process. During the months we worked on the guide we were constantly and painfully reminded of the difficult choices teachers have to make.

A rough draft of Section VIII -- China's Dynastic Past -- was sent to Outreach Coordinators of the regional China Councils. Their response was the subject of a long and very useful discussion at the spring China Council meeting. We hope the finished product reflects their many helpful suggestions.

Thus this guide draws primarily on the work of others. . . scholars, travelers, journalists, translators and teachers. Our job was to organize their work into what we hope is a useful, coherent and accurate teaching tool.

List of Textbooks Referred to in this Project

Burton F. Beers. World History: Patterns of Civilization. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983.

Kolevzon, Edward R. The Afro-Asian World: A Cultural Understanding. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978.

Kownslar, Allan O. and Smart, Terry L. People and Our History: A Study of World History. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977.

Leinwand, Gerald. The Pageant of World History. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971.

Mazour, Anatole G. and Peoples, John M. Men and Nations: A World History. Third Edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.

____. Men and Nations: A World History. Fourth Edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983.

McNeill, William H. The Ecumene: The Story of Humanity. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Perry, Marvin. Unfinished Journey: A World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974.

____. Unfinished Journey: A World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983.

Roselle, Daniel. A World History: A Cultural Approach. Lexington: MA, 1976.

____. Our Common Heritage: A World History. Lexington, MA, 1981.

Wallbank, Walter T.; Schrier, Arnold; Maier, Donna; and Gutierrez-Smith, Patricia. History and Life: The World and Its People. Second Edition. Glenville, IL, 1982

Strategy II

II.

STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES: TEACHERS' OPTIONS

We hope the following suggestions will help teachers select material which will be most appropriate for their class. We emphasize that we do not expect teachers to use all the material in this guide. As we indicated in the Foreword, selectivity is essential to its effective use. We also remind teachers that the guide is supposed to complement the textbooks and, since the textbooks vary, it will be up to the teachers to ascertain how the guide can be best applied. The evaluation of the textbooks in Section XII should be of some help.

Before embarking on the selection process, we urge all teachers to read the introductions to each of the four major historical sections and the three essays in Section VII. We also suggest that they look over the enrichment materials included in each section. Only the most relevant selections are noted below.

There are obvious teaching options other than the ones suggested here. The organization of the guide makes it possible to quickly isolate material covering religion or art, for instance. Be sure to use the Table of Contents.

Historical Approach

1. A One-Week Study

    Section IV, Themes 1,2,6
    Section X-E
    Section XI-C (Agriculture — use those paragraphs which indicate how agriculture is organized today. Industry — use those paragraphs discussing the worker.)

2. A Two-Week Study

    Section IV, Themes 1,2,6,8
    Section VIII-F (Politics and Government, Economic and Social Development)
    Section IX-B, E and L
    Section X-C, E and H
    Section XI-B (particularly Citizenship and Chinese Political Life) and C (Agriculture and Industry.)

3. A Four-Week Study

    Sections III, IV and V
    Section VIII-B and F
    Section IX-B, C, E, F and L
    Section X-C, E, F, G, J
    Section XI-A, B and C

4. A Six-Week Study

    Sections III, IV and V
    Section VIII-A (Economic and Social Development) and B. Then select either C or D as a study of one dynasty. If you select C, be sure to include the description of the examination system found in D under Politics and Government. Also F in this section.

Section IX-B, C, E, F, I and L
Section X-A, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J
Section XI-A, B, C and D

5. U.S.-China Relations

Section IV, Themes 1, 3 and 4
Section IX-E, F (see particularly ENRICHMENT II and III), G, J and K
Section X-C (see section on Imperialism), F (particularly ENRICHMENT II), I and J
Section XI-D, E and G

Cultural Patterns

Here we identify the major trends in China's history. The introduction to Section XI has more to say about this.

1. The Individual and Groups

Section VIII-A (Economic and Social Development), B (Family System in Economic and Social Development in Part I; Confucianism in Religion and Philosophy in Part I. See the great families in Economic and Social Development in Part II and particularly ENRICHMENT I). See also D (description of elite in Economic and Social Development); F (description of rural China and social structure in Economic and Social Development; and legal system in Politics and Government)
Section VII- Sanford Stein's discussion of Judge Dee mysteries
Section X-C, E (see family description), F (see ENRICHMENT I)
Section XI-A (see Human Aspects), B (see Chinese Political Life and ENRICHMENT I) and C (see particularly The Worker in Industry and Women)

2. Perceptions and Role of the Government

Section VIII-A (Government), B (Religion and Philosophy in Part I), C (Politics and Government -- see ENRICHMENT III), D (see the examination system in Politics and Government and description of elite in Economic and Social Development) and F (Politics and Government and ENRICHMENT I and III)
Section VII- Sanford Stein's discussion of Judge Dee mysteries
Section X-A (see points 2 and 4 in particular), D (see Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles), F (see Political Institutions), G (see political aspects of land reform and cheng-feng movement) and J
Section XI-B

3. Foreign Relations

Section IV, Themes 1, 3 and 4
Section VIII-A ("Son of Heaven" concept in Politics and Government and Foreign Relations), B (Foreign Relations), C (Foreign Relations and ENRICHMENT I), E (discussion of cultural differences between Mongols and Han Chinese) and F (Foreign Relations and ENRICHMENT II)
Section IX-A, E, F, G, H and J
Section X-C (discussion of Imperialism)
Section XI-D

4. The Agricultural-Based Society

Section IV, Themes 1, 2 and 6
Section VIII A (Economic and Social Development, ENRICHMENT II), B (Foreign Relations in Part I, Social Organization in Part II), D (Economic and Social Development, Science and Technology, ENRICHMENT I) and F (Economic and Social Development and Science and Technology)
Section X-E, F (Reform Efforts, ENRICHMENT II and III), G
Section XI-C (Agriculture and the Great Leap Forward)

General Categories

1. Revolution or Reform

Section VII-B
Section VIII-B (Part I — see Mencius and Taoism in Religion and Philosophy), D (Religion and Philosophy) and F (Religion and Philosophy)
Section IX-B, F, G, I, J and L
Section X-C, D, E, F, G, I (ENRICHMENT IV) AND J
Section XI-A and B (see Cultural Revolution)

2. Women and Family

Section VIII-A (Economic and Social Development), B (Economic and Social Development and Confucius in Religion and Philosophy in Part I; ENRICHMENT I in Part II), C (Economic and Social Development, particularly ENRICHMENT II), D (Economic and Social Development) and F (Social Structure)
Section IX-G, I (see particularly ENRICHMENT III) and L (See ENRICHMENT III)
Section X-C (see Cultural Aspects), D (see ENRICHMENT I and II), F (ENRICHMENT I) and G
Section XI-C (see Women)

3. Developmental Economics

Section IV, Themes 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6
Section VIII — look at the Science and Technology sections in each historical period. F, particularly Economic and Social Structure
Section IX-B, F and L (ENRICHMENT II)
Section X-C (Imperialism), E, F, G and J
Section XI-A, C, E and G

4. Population Studies

Section IV, Themes 1, 2 and 8
Section VIII-F (Economic and Social Development, Science and Technology)
Section IX-B
Section X-E
Section XI-A, C (The Great Leap Forward and Women and the Family)

Romanization III

III.

ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE WORDS

Chinese is not a phonetic language as European languages are. Whereas it is possible to "read" French after a limited amount of instruction on how to pronounce the various vowels and consonants, it is impossible to figure out the sound associated with a written Chinese character.

Attempts have been made to bridge the gap between spoken and written Chinese ever since Chinese and Western civilizations began interacting with each other. Foreigners were the first to devise ways of rendering Chinese words into Roman script, so that they could write and otherwise communicate about China. The earliest attempt to romanize Chinese was made in 1605 by Matteo Ricci, the Italian Jesuit missionary who lived in China for many years. Since then, more than fifty systems have been devised; more than twenty are in use today.

Different Systems Two related systems have been the norm in the West for many years. One is called Wade-Giles, named after two diplomats, Thomas Wade, who invented the system and Herbert Giles, who revised it. Wade-Giles was used in all English-language materials on China published before 1979, and in some after that. It is also used in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The second system, a variant of Wade-Giles, is known as the Postal Atlas System. Developed by the Chinese Postal Administration after the turn of this century, it is used for place names only. Many names in the Postal System are different from the proper Wade-Giles renderings of the same characters (e.g. Peking in Wade-Giles is Pei-ching in Postal Atlas). To make matters even more complicated, many lesser geographic names were not included in the Postal System listing, and so are rendered in Wade-Giles.

Over the years, a number of irregular forms also emerged. These include the anglicized forms of loan words, such as kow-tow (Wade-Giles: k'ou-t'ou); Latinized forms of some Chinese personal names, the most famous being Confucius (instead of K'ung-fu-tzu as rendered in Wade-Giles); and the dialect readings of certain names, especially ones connected with South China (for example, Hong Kong [Wade-Giles: Hsiang-kang], Sun Yat-sen [Wade-Giles: Sun I-hsien], and Chiang Kai-shek [Wade-Giles: Chiang Chieh-shih]).

Four years after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese turned their attention to the problem of romanization. Motivated by the desire to make learning Chinese easier for large numbers of the population, the Chinese government adopted for internal use another system of romanization. Translated the name means "Chinese spelling"; in the West the system is known simply by the Chinese word for spelling, pinyin (P'in-yin in Wade-Giles). China retained a modified Wade-Giles for its English-language publications distributed abroad until January 1979, at which point it switched to pinyin. The U.S. government, American newspapers, and other publishers followed suit, though making exceptions for certain proper names.

The pinyin renderings for the words noted above indicate some of the differences between it and the other systems. Peking = Beijing. K'ou-t'ou = koutou. K'ung-fu-tzu = Kongfuzi. Hong Kong = Xianggang. Sun Yat-sen = Sun Yixian.

Problems of Usage Unfortunately, none of the systems in most common use is completely phonetic, thereby defeating the purpose of romanization in the first place. Each has its anomalies: in each system some Chinese words do not come out sounding like standard spoken Chinese when the standard rules for pronouncing written English words are used. Take the various spellings for the city Westerners usually call Canton as an example. The various romanizations and approximate pronunciations using the normal rules of English are as follows:

Romanization System	Rendering	Pure Phonetic Spelling-out
Postal system	Kwangchow	Kwayng (to rhyme with "twang")-chow
Wade-Giles	Kuang-chou	Kwang (short "a")-choe
Pinyin	Guangzhou	Gwang (short "a")-zjoe

The actual pronunciation in standard spoken Chinese is Gwang (with a short "a")-joe.

What, in this situation, is a teacher to do? The first thing is to know what romanization system is in use in the various materials available -- some materials use one romanization system and others use another. The same person or place name can be rendered in very different ways. For instance, the West China province famous for its spicy food can be spelled Szechuan, Ssu-ch'uan, or Sichuan depending on the system. Another example: Zhou Enlai is the pinyin for the more familiar Chou En-lai. The names do not refer to two different revolutionary leaders. (Keep in mind that there is only one Standard Chinese pronunciation for names. The difference comes with the romanization.)

The following rules of thumb are quite reliable:

Before 1979: all materials published in the West and Chinese English-language publications are in Wade-Giles and the Postal System.

After 1979: all English-language publications from China are in pinyin. American newspapers and newsmagazines are in pinyin, but retain old spellings for certain familiar place names (Peking, Canton, Tibet, Inner Mongolia).

Most books and journals published in the West are published in pinyin, but some retained certain conventional place-name spellings. Materials from or about Taiwan and Hong Kong are in Wade-Giles or variations thereof.

Most world history textbooks use Wade-Giles and the Postal System.

The second thing to know is that teachers can, without too much difficulty, learn the ways in which each romanization system is anomalous. For example, in Wade-Giles or the Postal System, and initial "k" without an apostrophe acts like a "g" while and initial "k" with an apostrophe acts like a "k". In pinyin, an initial "q" acts like a "ch" and an initial "zh" acts more or less like a "j". Below are guidelines on how to pronounce words rendered in pinyin. Wade-Giles equivalents are in parentheses. (Some textbooks to try to provide pronunciation help on selected words but often make mistakes. For example, one book suggested pronouncing the river Yangtse (Postal System) as "Yank-see." Though this is the way many foreigners pronounce the word it is incorrect. The correct pronunciation in "Yang-dz.")

Romanization Used in the Manual Although most American publications now use the pinyin system, we have decided to stick pretty much to Wade-Giles and the Postal System in this manual because the textbooks still use these two systems. In the sections that deal with pre-1949 China, the pinyin form of the word is added in parentheses the first time the word appears. In the section on post-1949 China, we use the pinyin form with the Wade-Giles in parentheses the first time the word is used. We retain the Cantonese renderings of Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek.

Pronunciation Guide

a (a):	as in far
b (p):	as in baby
c (ts):	as "ts" in its
ch (ch'):	as "ch" in church, strongly aspirated
d (t):	as in do
e (e):	1) as "er" in her, the "r" being silent 2) as in yes in the "ie" dipthong 3) as in way in the "ei" dipthong
f (f):	as in foot
g (k):	as in go
h (h):	as in her, strongly aspirated
i (i):	1) as in eat 2) as in sir in syllables beginning with c, ch, r, s, sh, z, zh
j (ch):	as in jeep
k (k'):	as in kind, strongly aspirated
l (l):	as in land
m (m):	as in me
n (n):	as in no
o (o):	as in "aw" in law
p (p'):	as in par, strongly aspirated
q (ch'):	as in "ch" in cheek
r (j):	as "r" but not rolled, or like "z" in azure
s (s, ss, sz):	as in sister
sh (sh):	as "sh" in shore
t (t'):	as in top, strongly aspirated
u (u):	1) as in too 2) as in the French "u" in "tu" or the German umlauted "u" in "Muenchen"
w (w):	as in want
x (hs):	as "sh" in she
y (y):	as in yet
x (ts, tz):	as in zero
zh (ch):	as "j" in jump

Geography IV

IV.

GEOGRAPHY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT: SOME KEY THEMES

Jack Williams
Michigan State University

Note to Teachers

The following section has been developed as an introduction to China's geography when only one or two classroom periods are available for its study thematically. It includes eight major themes of China's physical and human (cultural) geography that have played key roles in the historical development of China and that are still critical to an understanding of events taking place in China today.

If more time is available, the themes lend themselves to expansion and elaboration. The use of color slides, wall maps, or other visual aids is highly recommended. One useful approach is a comparison of China and the United States, in relation to: population size versus land area (man/land ratio); the impact of hostile as opposed to friendly international boundaries on each nation's development; access to the sea (two coasts for the United States, one for China) and the implications for climate, international linkages, settlement patterns; and so on.

There are two maps to supplement the text. One shows the internal political boundaries of China. The other shows the two-fold division of China into China Proper and Outer China.

Theme 1: Vast Size and Breadth

The sheer size of China is evident from a glance at a world map. China is the third largest country in the world (after the U.S.S.R. and Canada), and slightly larger than the United States, with 3.7 million square miles. China is the largest Asian country, nearly three times the size of second-largest India. Most of the remaining countries of Asia are no bigger than individual provinces of China.

China's land mass has great breadth. From the tip of Northeast China (former Manchuria) to the southern tip of Hainan Island, there are approximately 60 degrees of latitude. This is about the same distance (and roughly comparable in latitude locations) from Puerto Rico to Hudson's Bay, Canada. East-west, the distance from easternmost China (Heilungkiang Province) to westernmost China (western tip of Sinkiang at the Afghanistan border) is also about 60 degrees of longitude. This is somewhat broader than the 48 contiguous U.S. states.

There are several significant aspects of China's great size and breadth. For one thing, it means that China has within its borders a wide variety of climate and landscape regions -- from subarctic to tropical, from deserts to jungles. China thus has been a relatively self-sufficient civilization throughout its history. China has been able to produce virtually all the foodstuffs and other necessities for its people, with little need to import commodities from abroad. In addition, the country is relatively self-sufficient in mineral resources needed for modern industrialization. China has among the largest coal deposits in the world, is one of the leading petroleum producers, has vast hydroelectric power potential, and good to excellent reserves of most of the key minerals needed by modern industry.

It was this relative self-sufficiency that enabled the government of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) to pursue a 25-year policy of isolation. Mao's goal was to develop a modern China relatively free of foreign influences, foreign capital, and foreign goods.

China is still self-sufficient, although the development policies of the current government are significantly different from those followed during Mao's rule. The government today recognizes that even with basic self-sufficiency in agriculture and mineral resources, China still lacks modern technology to develop industry and to exploit its resources. If China wishes to develop at a faster pace it must have greater interaction with the outside world and accept help from the developed countries, especially the United States and Japan. The pressure of the population "time-bomb" (see Theme #8) -- putting pressure on agricultural and industrial resources -- is also a major factor in encouraging China to interact with the outside world in the post-Mao era.

An historical significance of China's great size, breadth, and geographical location is that China has had a commanding influence in much of Asia during its long history. It is a fact of world history and contemporary international politics that large countries tend to dominate regional and world affairs. One could argue that it is inevitable that China will play a key role in future Asian and world affairs.

Theme 2: Rugged Landscape

China also has a tremendous range of elevation and landscape regions. China shares the summit of Mt. Everest (29,028 feet) with Nepal, and also includes the second lowest elevation in the world, the Turfan Depression (-928 feet). Within this six-mile range of elevations, there is virtually every type of land surface to be found in the world. The only types missing are evidences of continental glaciation and active volcanoes. The most significant characteristic of China's topography, however, is the ruggedness of its landscape.

China has a severe shortage of lowlands. Barely 25 percent of China's territory consists of reasonably flat lands, and much of that is at high elevations or in arid regions that make them largely unusable. Only about 10-11 percent of the land can be cultivated, which is less than half that available in the United States. Most of China's cultivable land is located in the great river valleys of the east and south, especially the Yellow River (Huang Ho) of North China, the Yangtze River of Central China, and the Hsi (West) River of South China; and the Liao-Sungari valleys of the Northeast.

Virtually all of the cultivable land in China has been under intensive agricultural use for generations, if not centuries. There were historical implications of this relatively static land base. The decline of the Manchu

(Ching) Dynasty in the 19th century was partly attributable to the fact that population growth caught up with, and surpassed, agricultural productivity. The current implication is the presence of severe constraints on increasing agricultural production. Future increases in food production, needed to keep up with an ever-increasing population, must come from the same land. In fact, the cultivable land base of China is actually shrinking slightly each year.

Population growth has resulted in an expansion of urban areas and cultivable land has been sacrificed to industrialization, transportation routes, and reservoirs.

Hence, a critical problem in China since 1949 has been to produce enough food to feed the huge population. The fact that a billion people are being fed reasonably well today on a relatively small land area is testimony to the great efforts put into agriculture since 1949, but continued improvement in agricultural methods will be needed to keep food productivity apace with the growing population. Nonetheless, the government currently feels that greater liberalization of controls over agriculture, especially reducing the rigidity of the commune system, is essential to speeding up productivity increases in agriculture. This is being attempted through the Agricultural Responsibility System.

China's rugged topography also contributed to regionalism in China's history — that is, the tendency for areas of China to be relatively isolated and autonomous from one another. It is not surprising, therefore, that in South China especially, highly fragmented by mountains and rugged hills, a wide variety of spoken dialects, such as Cantonese, developed. These dialects are virtually mutually unintelligible, even though the Chinese people share the same written script. Indeed, it was the written script that helped offset the regional fragmentation of the country.

Regionalism reached its zenith in modern times with the warlord period of the early decades of this century. But even today regionalism remains a problem. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, Szechuan (Sichuan), long one of the most isolated regions because of mountain barriers on all four sides, went through a particularly severe period of disruption.

China's rugged topography has also presented problems in efforts to link the country together with modern transportation lines, such as railroads and roads. Access to modern transportation in Tibet and Sinkiang is still quite limited. Today, even in eastern China, the number of miles of railway lines is very low for a country of China's size and population. Transportation improvements remain one of the chief hurdles facing the government's efforts toward modernization.

Theme 3: Continentality and Isolation

China was once described by a famous geographer as a "huge oasis." This was an apt description, because it reflected the fact that China is surrounded on all sides by great physical barriers. To the east and south is the Pacific Ocean, no longer a significant barrier, but it certainly was so in historic times. To the southwest, between China and much of Southeast Asia, is a region of heavily folded mountains, giving rise to a series of deep valleys and high mountain ranges. Several of the major rivers of Asia run through these valleys, from their headwaters in the Tibetan highlands. The hot, humid river valleys are malaria-infested and the mountain sides heavily forested. This area was, and largely remains, a formidable barrier. To the west lies the vast Chinghai-Tibetan Plateau, occupying fully 1/6 of China's land area. The plateau lies at an average elevation of 16,000 feet, with east-west mountain ranges climbing to elevations well over 20,000 feet -- the highest of these is the great Himalayas along the border with Nepal. Because the region is what is termed a "cold desert" -- dry and cold almost the entire year -- the whole plateau has barely 2 million inhabitants. To the northwest lies Sinkiang, a complex region of deserts and basins separated by rugged high mountains. Although somewhat more populous than the Tibetan Plateau, Sinkiang still remains isolated and, historically, was difficult to traverse. To the north lies the huge Mongolian Plateau, another region of vast arid expanses and few people. To the northeast is the region once called Manchuria. The northern part of this region is very cold in winter, with rugged mountains and forests on three sides. Within these physical barriers, therefore, the mainstream of Chinese civilization developed as a sort of giant "oasis," largely isolated from other culture centers of the world.

A direct consequence of this sense of isolation was the name the Chinese chose for their country, "Chung Kuo" (Zhongguo), the Middle Kingdom; in their eyes the center of the civilized world. The Chinese developed a strong ethnocentrism -- a sense of cultural superiority as well as a geographic centrism.

This ethnocentrism, in turn, led to a role of hegemony within East and much of Southeast Asia; most of the states and peoples surrounding China developed a tributary status with China. These states recognized the cultural superiority of China; sent regular gifts or tribute to the Emperor and his court; and, in exchange, retained their political independence.

At certain periods of time, the Chinese physically expanded into new territory outside the Yellow River valley. Non-Chinese peoples encountered in this process of expansion generally had two choices. They either moved out of the path of the expanding Chinese nation; or else they were assimilated, or sinicized -- that is, they adopted various attributes of the Chinese culture, such as language, dress, and so on.

Whether justified or not, China's sense of cultural superiority proved disastrous by the time of the arrival of the West in the 19th century. China's leaders, sure they had nothing to gain from the West, resisted the foreign contact. The consequences are discussed in detail elsewhere in this manual.

A contemporary legacy of China's superior and commanding historical role in East Asia is the worry that China remains an expansionist power in the region today. This was the genuine fear of the United States and other countries during the Indochina conflict when the "domino theory" was widely accepted. Experts still disagree on this issue today. There are some indications that China desires to reassert its role in the region and to regain territory regarded as its own. These indications include: the claim over the islands of the South China Sea (especially the Spratlys), a claim disputed by other countries in the region; claims over oil reserves (potential or proven) under the continental shelf, claims not fully accepted by neighboring states of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan; and the unresolved dispute with India over the boundary between India and Tibet, which led to the 1962 conflict there.

One other consequence of China's continentality and inward-looking nature during most of its history is the fact that most of China's great traditional cities were interior, not port, cities. China had little need for, or interest in, foreign trade and foreign contacts. It was the forced intrusion of the West in the 19th century that led to the creation of the great coastal cities that are now so important in China's economy: Shanghai, Hong Kong, Luta, Chingtao (Qingdao), and others.

Theme 4: The Northern Border Problem

The longest border that China shares with any single country is that with the Soviet Union, approximately 4,150 miles. Adding the border to that of the Mongolian People's Republic, another 2,500 miles, the total length comes to 6,650 miles. Moreover, it is a hostile border and plays a key role in China's contemporary political geography.

The current northern border problem, however, is but the latest phase of a problem that has existed since early Chinese history. Throughout most of China's history, the country's main foreign relations problems were with the various nomadic tribes of the north that were periodically at war with China. In times of internal weakness in China they actually succeeded in taking over parts, and occasionally all, of China. (One of the most famous of these periods was the Mongol or Yüan (Yuan) Dynasty of the 12th century, which established the city of Peking as China's national capital.) It was in response to the northern border problem that China built what is probably its most famous man-made structure (and reportedly the only man-made structure visible from outer space), the Great Wall. Snaking some 2,500 miles from Shanhaikuan (Shanhai Pass) on Pohai (Po Sia) in the east, the Great Wall ended in far Kansu (Gansu) province -- more or less marking the westernmost extent of the traditional Chinese state, or China Proper (see Theme #7). Although built as a military barrier, the Great Wall proved more useful as a sort of boundary line or psychological dividing line between the Chinese state and civilization to the south and the nomadic "barbarians" to the north.

The northern border problem, never fully resolved down through the centuries, reemerged in recent times with the expansion of Czarist Russia into territory that had been occupied by China during the height the Ch'ing (Qing) Dynasty's power. China regards those takeovers as the result of unequal treaties forced upon a weakened China. China still does not officially recognize the legality of those losses, although it makes no public claims to them anymore. More serious and immediate an aspect of the northern border problem is the hostility between China and the U.S.S.R. since their split around 1960. During the brief period of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in the 1950s, much of China's economic development was in the regions bordering the Soviet Union. Such development projects included: the Trans-Sinkiang (Xinjiang) railway, which runs from Lanchou (Lanzhou) to Urumchi (Urumqi) and was originally planned to link up with Russia's Central Asian rail system across the border; the revitalization of Manchuria's industrial base, partly because of proximity to the Soviet Union; and the building of a rail line from Ulan Bator in Mongolia to North China. Since the split, however, proximity to the U.S.S.R. has become a major liability for China. Mongolia is a satellite of the U.S.S.R. and hence the entire 6,650 mile border constitutes a great threat to China's security. Large Soviet military forces are stationed in Mongolia and along the Soviet border. Border incursions and military clashes have occurred at irregular intervals in various places, since 1960.

The existence of this potential threat has obvious repercussions on China's development efforts. For one thing, it forces China to maintain a large defense establishment, diverting precious capital from other development needs. There is little question that the Soviet threat also encouraged the Chinese to seek rapprochement with the United States. From the point of view of the United States, normalization of diplomatic relations was not only to help revitalize the economy of China, but also to suggest U.S. political support for China's position (this in spite of the fact that the United States has no military alliance with China and publicly, at least, has disavowed any desire to play off one side against the other). Certainly, the existence of the northern border problem provided the United States with an excellent opportunity to seek an alliance with China against the U.S.S.R.

Theme 5: Proximity to Japan

In many ways, China's modern relations with Japan have been just the opposite of those with Russia. But the geographical proximity of China to Japan (as to Russia) has had both advantages and disadvantages over time.

In pre-modern (pre-19th century) times, it mattered little to China that Japan lay a few hundred miles east of the Middle Kingdom (although it was important to Japan, in that its culture was heavily influenced by China in its early development). The two countries had limited trade and contacts. Certainly, Japan was no threat to China during most of China's history.

With the modernization of Japan that got under way toward the close of the 19th century, however, the proximity of Japan took on new dimensions for China. Japan's rise as a militaristic and imperialistic power in Asia had direct and profound consequences for China (see the history section of this manual). Many experts maintain that China might never have become a Communist nation had not the Japanese started a war with China in 1937.

Later on -- especially in the post-Mao era after 1976 -- Japan's geographic closeness to China turned from a disadvantage to a decided advantage, for both parties. The two nations have developed a perfect case of economic complementarity. Japan is the overwhelmingly dominant industrial power of Asia and one of the leading economic powers of the world. However, Japan is nearly devoid of mineral resources and raw materials for industry, and hence must import just about everything it needs. By contrast, China is one of the most richly endowed nations in mineral resources, as noted in Theme #1. China's leadership is committed to making China a major industrial power, but is hampered by inadequate modern technology, capital, and general know-how. Hence the two countries are exchanging what each has in abundance for what each lacks. China sells coal, petroleum, and other raw materials to Japan; which in turn sells to China steel products, machinery, and whole industrial plants. Japanese companies are also involved in various joint-venture activities in China, and Japan is a major supplier of capital loans to China. As a result of this complementarity, Japan is China's largest foreign trade partner, accounting for one-quarter of total trade. China needs Japan more than Japan needs China, but the relationship is generally mutually advantageous. Moreover, it is likely that Japan will long remain China's principal economic partner -- a partner of greater importance than the United States.

Theme 6: Role of Water in China's Development

The most significant dividing line in China's climatic patterns is the 20" isohyet (rainfall line), which runs roughly from the northern tip of Burma (and skirts the northern slopes of the Himalayas) to a point where the Greater Khingan Range reaches the Amur River (Heilungkiang [Heilongjiang]) in the northeast. That line roughly divides China into two halves. To the north and west are the arid regions; to the east and south are the more humid, better-watered lands.

The cause of this pattern is the monsoon climate that dominates much of Asia. In the winter, cold dry air masses flow south and west, so that there is relatively little precipitation in most of China. In the summer, the air movements directly reverse, with warm, humid air masses moving north and east. These air masses drop much of their moisture on South China. By the time the air masses penetrate North China, there is not much moisture left. Moreover, the Himalayas almost completely block the air masses from reaching the Tibetan Plateau and areas to the north. Hence at least half of China gets less than 20" of precipitation a year. Non-irrigated agriculture is nearly impossible in this region. Unfortunately, even in North China, although there is generally 20" of precipitation a year, there is a high degree of variability of precipitation north of the Huai River (between the Yellow and Yangtze [Yangzi] Rivers).

As a result, the control of water has been a critical feature of China's development from earliest times. That control has included the building and maintenance of canals, reservoirs, drainage ditches, and wells, to provide water for the intensive agricultural system. It has also included dikes along the rivers to control floods. Building and maintaining these water control mechanisms required huge teams of laborers. In pre-modern times these were made up of conscripted labor and labor donated by peasants as part of their tax burden. In the Maoist era the commune system provided an effective means for mobilizing huge numbers of peasants for such vast public works projects.

The one river that has caused the most trouble for China, historically, is the Yellow River, dubbed "China's Sorrow," because of its propensity to overflow its banks and cause devastating floods. This river has been especially troublesome because of its high silt content, picked up by the river as it flows south between the provinces of Shansi (Shanxi) and Shensi (Shaanxi) in the famous loess plateau. This is a huge region of wind-deposited soil. Becuase the region is semi-arid, much of the loess gets washed or blown into the river. When the Yellow River turns east and flows into the lower plain, its gradient lessens markedly and hence the silt-carrying capacity of the river drops off sharply as well. Over the centuries the bed of the river has built up higher than the surrounding countryside. Thus maintenance of the dikes along the lower course, and control of erosion and silting in the middle reaches of the river, have been major priorities of the government since 1949. The development of the Yellow River basin has been one of the monumental projects of post-1949 China. Unfortunately, the problem is so huge that progress so far has been limited.

Theme 7: The Two Chinas -- China Proper vs. Outer China

Within the current political boundaries of China, one can delineate two segments, reflecting both historical and cultural divisions, as well as physical and environmental divisions.

One segment is known as China Proper. Originally, this referred just to the 18 provinces south of the Great Wall and east of Tibet. It was the heartland of the traditional Chinese civilization, the region with more than 20" of precipitation a year, where rice and wheat cultivation were dominant in agriculture. It was also the area in which the majority of the population lived, and where the dominant ethnic group, the Han Chinese, were concentrated.

The Han Chinese comprise about 95 percent of China's population. Although they have a number of spoken dialects, they share the heritage of a common written language and a common cultural tradition derived from Confucianism (see the history section of this manual). Since the 19th century, large numbers of Han Chinese have migrated to areas outside of the old China Proper, most significantly to the Northeast (Manchuria); so that, realistically speaking, we can include the Northeast as now part of China Proper.

Outer China is all the other territories within the national boundary but outside of China Proper. Thus, Outer China includes Tibet and Chinghai (Qinghai), Sinkiang (Xinjiang), and Inner Mongolia. This region is vast in size, but contains only about 5 percent of the total population. Even today, Outer China plays a relatively minor role in the national economy; but is of great strategic importance because of its location, especially those parts bordering on the Soviet Union and Mongolia (see Theme #4).

Although there are significant numbers of Han Chinese in these areas of Outer China, the population is dominated in most places by a variety of ethnic minorities. China's minorities include some 50 groups, totaling about 60 million in numbers. Only about 8-10 groups are really large in size, however, such as the Tibetans, Chuang (Zhuang), Uighurs, and Mongols. These peoples speak a variety of languages, practice various religions (many are Moslem), and have cultures distinctive from that of the Han Chinese.

During China's long history, the territories of Outer China were sporadically under the physical control of the Chinese state. It is not surprising that control tended to wane in periods of dynastic decline. It is really only since 1949 that the Chinese government has tried to bring these peoples and their territories completely and permanently under the control of the Chinese government and to integrate them into the modern life of China. In effect, this has been merely a continuation of the long-established tradition of assimilation and sinicization. These efforts have met with mixed results. The Tibetans have been among the most reluctant to be assimilated, cherishing instead their own rich cultural traditions and distinctiveness.

In the post-Mao era, the Chinese government has recognized the dangers of Han chauvinism in its relations with minority peoples. While not abandoning the firm intention of integrating the regions of Outer China into the modern Chinese nation once and for all, nonetheless, the government is attempting to develop more humane policies that will allow the minorities to keep more of their traditions and relative autonomy.

Theme 8: The Population Dilemma

With somewhat over one billion people, according to the 1981 national census, China is by far the most populous nation in the world; and indeed contains fully one-fifth of all the people in the world. The current total represents just about a doubling of the population since 1950. This vast population obviously has both a direct and an indirect influence on every aspect of contemporary China.

In many ways, China's population growth can be viewed as a great tragedy. During the Maoist years, the Chinese government failed to institute vigorous efforts at population control. This is partly because of Marxist dogma that contends a socialist-communist country can never have too many people, since the wealth of the state derives from the labors of its population. In the last decade, the government has realized the serious error of that line of reasoning and has developed what is now one of the world's strictest family planning programs. Many measures are being used, but most important is the policy of restricting families to one child only — with an absolute maximum of two. Various penalties are in force for families that exceed the limits.

There has been some success in bringing the population growth rate down, (currently it is somewhere between 1.2 to 1.6 percent a year). Unfortunately, even 1.2 percent means an additional 12 million people added each year, because of the huge base already established. Moreover, even the most optimistic projection possible is that China's population will reach 1.2 billion people by the year 2000. The goal of the Chinese government is subsequently to gradually bring the total population back down to around 700 million by the year 2080. These may be overly optimistic goals, however, because of difficulties in getting the rural population to cooperate with family planning limits. Economic liberalization in the post-Mao era also tends to encourage people to have more, not fewer, children. The Chinese government thus faces an Herculean task as it tries to bring the country's population growth under control. But it must succeed, or many if not most of the modernization goals for the country will prove elusive.

China's huge population inevitably dilutes whatever progress is made in economic development. For example, in spite of major agricultural advances since 1949, the total caloric intake per capita today remains just about where it was in the pre-communist period. There have been gains. The composition of the diet has improved and nearly everyone now has access to at least a minimum subsistence diet, in contrast to earlier times when millions died of famine at the same time that others dined on plenty. However a number of commodities remain in short supply and must be rationed. Production of industrial goods and energy supply has also increased tremendously in 30 years, but on a per capita basis the improvement for the average individual has been much less marked.

The government has liberalized economic controls in part to try to overcome this problem. Reversing an earlier commitment to egalitarianism, people are more free to advance economically as their abilities will permit. The government hopes that in the long run the wealth generated by the most capable workers will bring greater benefits to the rest of society by increasing the per capita supplies of goods and services.

Nonetheless, providing employment for the huge numbers entering the job market every year -- not to mention housing, access to education, and meeting all the other needs of the people -- remain huge tasks. As Chinese citizens come to view the fulfillment of these needs as their "right," meeting the tide of rising expectations of over a billion people will require all of China's resources.

Suggested References

1. Clifton W. Pannell and Laurence J.C. Ma, *China: The Geography of Development and Modernization*. V.H. Winston & Sons, 1983, 342 pp.
   This is an adequate, recent geography of China. It is a well-written, fairly simple overview of the main features of China's physical and cultural geography and the development efforts of China since 1949. Although written for adult audiences, secondary school students will also find it comprehensible.
2. Rhoads Murphey, *The Fading of the Maoist Vision: City and Country in China's Development*. Metheun, 1980. 169 pp.
   A broad overview of the philosophical basis of China's development under Maosim, especially the rural versus urban dichotomy, and the changes taking place in China's development approach in the post-Mao era. Well-written, in non-complex terms, this short volume is also well within the capabilities of even high school students.
3. *China in Maps*. Denoyer-Geppert Atlas (H306). 1968.
   Although showing its age, this small paperback atlas is still in print and still the cheapest and handiest atlas on China available. The economic maps and data age the fastest, but the historical and physical maps are still very useful.



CHINA

Produced by the Center for Cartographic Research, Michigan State University


Extent of concentration of Han Chinese
Extent of "China Proper"
Extent of irrigated farmland
20" rainfall line
Area under 3000 ft. elevation
0
Mi.
500
N

Produced by the Center
for Cartographic Research,
Michigan State University

Language V

V. A.

THE CHINESE LANGUAGE: MYTHS AND FACTS

Timothy Light
(Reprinted from Communicating with China, ed., Robert A. Kapp)

Few things in Chinese culture are more widely misunderstood outside of China than the Chinese language. The Chinese write very differently from us and indeed from all other literate societies in today's world except for Japan and Korea (which continue to make partial use of writing borrowed from China long ago). Even to the untutored eye, Chinese characters are not an alphabet, though many Americans who want to ask about them do not know what term to use for them, and questions are often asked such as, "Is it true that the Chinese alphabet . . . well, writing . . . I mean pictures, well . . . you know what I mean . . . they're very pictorial, aren't they?"

Because of the obvious radical difference between the way that the Chinese write and the way that we write, many myths have grown up, not just around China's writing system, but around its language as a whole and around China's people. Indeed, people often say that the Chinese write in pictures. Many believe that Chinese is a monosyllabic language, which presumably means that every word in Chinese consists of a single syllable, like the English words but, aim, quick, work, crime, laugh, and unlike the words although, goal, rapid, employment, transgression, guffaw. Many believe that, because they write similarly (in part), Japanese, Korean and Chinese people are related. Many assume that because of their language, the Chinese think in a way that is radically different from our way of thinking. Regarding modern Chinese, a common myth holds that the Communist government has done away with Chinese characters and has substituted a brand new alphabet that all people now use instead of characters. It is further believed that this supposed change has been tantamount to abandonment of the Chinese language itself. In addition, some believe that the Communist government has wiped out the various Chinese dialects.

Each of these beliefs and assumptions is false. Each of them is in its own way outrageous, since taken together they suggest that the capacity for language among the world's largest national-ethnic group is somehow different from that of all other human groups, a suggestion for which there is no evidence. To examine thoroughly these unhelpful myths would require greater scope than this short essay will permit. But in the following pages, I shall outline some basic facts about the Chinese language. In doing this, I shall try to correct the myths that I have just listed.

Chinese belongs to the Sino-Tibetan language group. Sino-Tibetan is a major genetic grouping of languages like the Indo-European family to which English belongs (along with German, French, Hindu, etc.). The Sino-Tibetan speech community stretches from northeastern India to northeastern China, and its billion-plus speakers are found in Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Asia. Chinese itself is not a single language, but a language family like the Romance language family to which French, Spanish, Italian, Romanian and Swiss Romansch belong. Like the Romance languages, the Chinese languages are mutually unintelligible (that is what makes them different languages). But, because they share a common history and a good deal of common vocabulary and grammar, it is much easier for a speaker of one Chinese language to learn another Chinese language than for a complete outsider to do so. Again, this is true of the Romance languages as well. The Chinese languages referred to here are the famous Chinese "dialects": Cantonese, Shanghai, Fukienese, etc. Because speakers of one of these "dialects" cannot understand speakers of another of them, the "dialects" are as much real languages as are the Romance languages.

There are two ways, however, in which the analogy to the Romance language family is inaccurate. Most of the Romance languages are identified with separate independent countries and bear a name related to their place of "origin." There is no such political identification of nation with language in China. Politically and ethnically, China has retained the ideal of unity for well over two millennia. Although at times China has been divided by external conquest and civil war, the divisions have never identified parts of China as separate nations, and the language groups of China have never been the rallying point for political or military separatism.

The other important difference between the Romance languages and Chinese lies in China's writing system. After the spread of Roman civilization during the expansionist years of the Roman Empire, Romance dialects grew to a position very much like that of the Chinese "dialects." Each region of the Roman world had a language that was Romance in origin and in vocabulary and grammar, but that had become incomprehensible to speakers of other Romance "dialects" through linguistic change and influence from the languages of the peoples who preceded the Romans in that area. Yet, although the languages of the various areas were so different, the written language was relatively uniform. That written language was, of course, Latin, the standard language of Rome. Latin retained its standard form for a very long time because of the prestige of Rome first as a political and then as a religious capital, and because of the low rate of literacy prevalent in pretechnical societies. Once Rome's power began to decline and the independence of the outlying areas increased, people more and more wrote as they spoke, using the symbols of the Roman alphabet to reflect their own pronunciations and way of forming words instead of those proper to Latin. Reflecting speech is a natural thing for an alphabet to do, since alphabets are a phonetic way of writing. Because Chinese is not alphabetic, its writing does not reflect differences and changes in speech. Even though two speakers of different Chinese languages cannot understand each other (and thus may have to resort to a foreign language such as English for oral communication), they can write to each other and thereby understand each other. The ways that they read aloud what they have written will differ almost completely, but the meaning of what has been written will be identically clear to each. Written Chinese reflects the vocabulary and grammar of the most broadly used Chinese oral language. Speakers of the nonstandard Chinese languages learn this vocabulary and grammar, often pronouncing the words in their own local ways when they learn to read and write. In short, the written language of China is uniform despite China's actual language diversity and the mutual unintelligibility of the several Chinese languages.

The earliest origin of this writing system was in fact pictorial. These early characters dating from perhaps three thousand years ago illustrate how Chinese writing began:



Blood (the picture is of a sacrificial vessel)

Sun

Moon

Water

Heaven (the picture is of an anthropomorpic deity)

Horse

But this early start with pictorial writing was quickly abandoned. It is difficult for pictures to represent abstract thoughts, and different people's drawings of the same object may differ greatly. It is simply cumbersome to express lengthy messages by pictures. As writing became more common and as the nature of written material became more diverse, Chinese writing grew more and more stylized and less pictorial. In the third century B.C., Chinese writing was officially standardized to a form that is not too distant from today's Chinese writing. Since that time, the pictorial origins of Chinese writing have been largely obscured by the uniformity imposed on the writing to make it more efficient. Here are the same characters given above, but now in modern form.

血 日 月 水 天 馬

The pictures are evident only to those who have been informed that pictures are present. Much more important than graphic representation in written symbols has been the combination of an element in a character that suggests the pronunciation at the time of the character's creation and the one that indicates something about the semantic category of the meaning (i.e., human, mechanical, liquid, insect, etc.). The following characters are made up of such combinations. In each of the four cases shown below, the category indicator lies to the left, and the pronunciation indicator to the right.

他	機	汁	蚊
He, she (human+pronunciation element)	**Machine** (wood+pronunciation element)	**Juice** (liquid+pronunciation element)	**Mosquito** (insect+pronunciation element)

Chinese characters in their modern form remain the only regular medium for writing standard Chinese in the world today. In the PRC, some of the most complex or frequently used characters have been simplified by reducing their number of "strokes," or lines, in order to make them easier to learn to read and write. Furthermore, some of the least frequently used characters have been merged into a single character. The reduction of strokes is exemplified in the following characters:

聽→听	萬→万	機→机
listen	**10,000**	**Machine**

This simplification of the writing in China has been accompanied by a massive effort at literacy training and an intensive campaign to promote Mandarin, the standard dialect, as the national language. The results of these campaigns have been outstanding. China's literacy rate has risen from between twenty and thirty percent to between eighty and ninety percent, a remarkable achievement for a nation with one of the most difficult writing systems to learn. Along with the spread of literacy in China has gone the extension of the use of Mandarin as the national spoken language and the adoption of a standard spelling system called pinyin that uses the Roman alphabet to spell the pronunciation of Chinese characters. Pinyin, replacing a variety of older, unstandardized romanization systems, is used as a reference tool in dictionaries, as a supplement to characters on signs and titles, and as the means of introducing standard pronunciation of characters to primary school first graders. In 1979, China's news agency began using the *pinyin* spellings of names and places in dispatches, and Americans had to get used to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai instead of the more familiar Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Some American newspapers mistakenly reported this adoption of the *pinyin* system as a decision to abandon characters for the alphabet. Although there are some in China who advocate such a move, and although such a change is contemplated by planners of very long-term policy, there is no likelihood of it occurring soon.

China has thus not followed the lead of Japan in reorganizing its writing system. Japanese writing incorporates both Chinese characters and symbols that have a sound value like an alphabet (called a syllabary). Because of their syllabary, the Japanese are able to learn much more quickly than the Chinese to write their language intelligibly, even if not elegantly. (Elegance and style require the use of characters in Japanese.) Japanese differs from Chinese not only in its writing, but in almost all other aspects as well. Along with Korean, Japanese is related to the Altaic language family, which includes Turkish but not Chinese. In Japanese there is a highly elaborated system of hierarchical expression for speaking with persons of different social levels, something Chinese does not have. In Japanese, verbs come at the end of a sentence; in Chinese they come in the middle. In Japanese, the characters may be read with words of several syllables. In Chinese, every character is read with a single syllable. To sum up, although the two languages both employ written characters, their differences outweigh their similarities, and Americans should not assume that the two languages have much in common.

Each Chinese character is pronounced as a single syllable. This is the source of the myth that Chinese is monosyllabic. The truth is that most Chinese words are polysyllabic and are written in clusters of characters. Most words in modern Chinese are two syllables (i.e. two characters). Thus, *ming* means "clear, bright" and is written with the character 明, and *bai* means "white, blank" and is written 白 . Put together, *mingbai* 明白 means "understand, clear," and only *mingbai* can be used to mean "understand." *Ming* can never be used alone, and *bai* means something different when it is used alone.

The most troublesome myth to deal with is the one which maintains that, because their language is structured differently from ours, the Chinese necessarily think differently from Westerners. One of the silliest versions of this myth that I have heard is the claim that science cannot be practiced in Chinese because that language is not "scientific." (Since all languages are about equal in their inconsistencies and irregularities, it is difficult to know what the word "scientific" means when applied to a language.)

The idea that Chinese and Westerners think differently because of linguistic differences is, in my opinion, unconvincing. Indeed I find very little hard evidence to prove that language and thought are intertwined in any culture. Certainly, our individual thoughts and the specific language in which we express them are inseparable. But that does not mean that what we say in our own language may not have direct equivalents in another language if what we say happens to be spoken by someone with our same aims.

The only serious attempt that I am familiar with to show that language and thought are causally related has been made in comparatively technical statements such as the speculation that in Eskimo languages doing physics may be difficult because there is no linguistic reference for past, present and future time. The only such technical statement of any plausibility seriously proposed by a noted scholar of Chinese (in this case, by the eminent Sinologist, L.S. Yang) is the speculation that classical Chinese may not express the notion, so basic to logic, of "the principle of the excluded middle." That principle holds that with reference to any other quality, any phenomenon can be said exclusively to belong to the quality or not (or, put more simply, a phenomenon can't be something and not be it at the same time). For example, a classical Chinese statement such as, "The horse is not a vegetable" may have been less absolute in its negation than it sounds; that is, it may have left room for vagueness. Even if this should turn out to be true, it does not mean that speakers of classical Chinese could not understand the notion of exclusivity or that they did not in fact use this notion in their reasoning. Certainly, this does not suggest at all that the Chinese ever confused horses and cabbages.

Other, less plausible assertions about the way that the Chinese language makes the Chinese people think include these: the Chinese do not distinguish between one and many because their words are not marked for singular and plural; the Chinese do not know the difference between definite and indefinite because their language lacks articles; the Chinese do not always understand the differences between past, present and future because their verbs are marked for change and completion rather than directly for time reference; the Chinese do not clearly understand the difference between counterfactual statements and possible ones (e.g. "If I were you, I would . . ." vs. "If I go, I will . . .") because their language does not have any formal ways to distinguish the two. If any of these assertions were true, it is unlikely that the Chinese race would have survived three or four millennia, since they would be always in the wrong place with the wrong objects and quite uncertain about whether they were there or not.

Most such misunderstandings come naturally from an inadequate understanding on the part of non-Chinese who are attempting to analyze Chinese. Some of it also comes from Chinese speakers who inadequately comprehend Western languages.

There is, however, one relationship between thought and language which is not myth. That relationship is exemplified in Chinese by the tendency of ordinary Chinese to understate, or to convey meaning indirectly. Not only do the Chinese not share our predilection for expletives of a superlative intent such as "Terrific!" "Great!" "Fantastic!" and the like, but they frequently describe situations through understatement, double negatives, apparent vagueness, euphemism and allusive language. In negotiation, an agreement to a proposal may be given as wenti buda which literally means "The problems are not great." This tendency is related to formulaic expressions in Chinese such bucuo "no error" = "right you are," bushao "not few" = "a lot," chabuduo "off not much" = "approximately." Similarly, a denial may take the form of "Perhaps it's not convenient" or "Possibly the time isn't right" when refusing to respond to a proposal that is seen as impossible to implement. Criticism is often given indirectly, but effectively. Frequently historical allusion is used to describe a situation that the critic does not like, and the reader or hearer is left to infer who in contemporary life is being castigated. The former head of state, Liu Shaoqi, was labelled as "China's Khruschev" in the months before he was publicly denounced and brought down. The late premier, Zhou Enlai, was identified with Confucius in the Anti-Confucius/Anti-Lin movement of the early seventies. Naturally, political labels and symbols form a major part of the vocabulary of both criticism and approbation, though it seems that the vocabulary for identifying deviants (right winger, right deviationist, capitalist roader, ultra-leftist, those who use the red flag to oppose the red flag, etc.) is much greater than that for identifying model citizens (as is equally true of the language use of the Christian Church).

It is important to realize that these usages are not new in Chinese society; only the specific terms, such as those with Marxist-Leninist content, are new. The tendencies to indirectness and allusion are ancient cultural traits of the Chinese, and politicians and negotiators were using them as much hundreds of years ago as they are now. This use of language is an expression of a cultural preference for harmonious and positive intercourse among people. It is a cultural expression, not a control of thought by language. Language is simply one of the tools through which a society expresses its character, and it is to be expected, not wondered at, that Chinese society expresses the same characteristics through its language as it does in other cultural forms.

Because the focus of American relations with China has moved within the past three or four years from diplomatic sorting out to business connections, there is one area of cultural expression in language that must be mentioned in closing. That concerns the use of a special language for legal purposes. In our society, legal language is so specialized that it alone often makes the difference between one party's satisfaction and the other's in a hotly contested dispute. Our legal profession is a huge body of technocrats trained principally in the wielding of the tool of legal language. It is often noted that China has a tiny number of lawyers (as does Japan) compared to the United States. This is not primarily because Chinese criminal proceedings have failed to allow sufficient protection for defendants (though that has often been true), but because binding relations involving the exchange of money, goods and services are not sealed in immutable language in China. Rather, contracts lay out basic wishes of both sides and fundamental intents; from our point of view, at least, a great deal is left to the common sense and mutual trust of the parties concerned. That procedure is unobjectionable so long as the expectations and assumptions of the two sides are the same. But troubles may arise when they differ. Different expectations, of course, are more likely to occur when the parties are from different cultures and where the principal participants do not know each other's language well.

China's joint-venture law of 1979 is a case in point. That law simply states general principles and does not contain the level of detail that American and other Western business executives would consider normal in their own societies. Because of the vagueness of the language used, many businesses hoping for deals in China have held back from entering joint ventures for fear of losing their investment should something not planned for occur.

Misunderstandings related to language--particularly those that lead to troublesome problems--come from cultural misperceptions and language incompetence, not from the different structures of the two languages that two peoples speak. So long as we in America remember that Chinese is one of the world's human languages and make intelligent provisions for the training of enough Americans in the use of that language, we face little problem from the uniqueness of the way that the Chinese speak and write. But if we continue our historical ignorance of both China's culture and its language, we doom ourselves to a very conflict-ridden relationship.

V. B.

INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE CALLIGRAPHY

Walter H. Hahn

(Reprinted from Focus on Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3)

The collecting of the arts and the development of connoisseurship added to the admiration of masterworks of an abstract nature, in particular calligraphy and the allied art of painting bamboo and orchids.

English translations of the Chinese word shu fa, the laws of writing, into the western word "calligraphy," defined as "fair or elegant writing or penmanship," is rather inadequate. In China shu fa is one of the highest regarded of the arts. Let me augment the meaning to fit closer to the Chinese ideal.

Shu fa is the arrangement of lines in a prescribed form to communicate an idea. There are three necessary components to shu fa; the dots and lines must be arranged with sensitivity to spatial relationships, with a feeling of rhythm, and with a consideration given to the quality of the materials used.

Materials .The Chinese refer to the basic materials used for shu fa as the four treasures: the grinding slab, the ink stick, the brush, and the paper. Other paraphernalia is superficial but can add to the psychological joy of the scholar. Other objects are sometimes accumulated but not essential, such as, weights for holding the paper in place; brush rests in the shape of dragons, insects, or mountains to keep the brush from rolling away; water droppers to get just the right amount of liquid on the land area [see below] of the grinding slab; arm rests, frequently engraved with pictures or calligraphy, to support the arm while doing small characters; and brush washers, sometimes made of elegant jade, just to hold clean water. Many of these objects have found their way into private and museum collections and can be minor art forms in themselves.

The traditional ink stone -- grinding slab -- is a stone that resembles slate and is generally cut into a flattish rectangle. It has two levels of depression: the deeper one is referred to as the ocean and the more shallow one, the land. The ocean holds water or excess ink. The land surface is the grinding area and also where one takes up the ink, while at the same time sharpening the point of the brush.

The slab need not be stone. It could be ceramic, or even metal. Ancient ceramic roof tiles have lent an air of antiquity and tradition on a scholar's desk. Sometimes even a fragment of an unglazed jardiniere has been used, but the porousness of the pottery must be considered.

Many of the blocks have stylized decoration, but this obviously does not improve their quality.

The ink stick is made from pine soot, glue, and other materials listed in secret family formulas. It is formed in molds and some are so artistic that they have become collector's items. It is common to store ink for a generation or more to be sold by one's descendant.

Preparing the ink One determines the top end of the ink stick, then places the bottom in a small puddle of water laid out on the land surface of the grinding block. The stick is moved in a circular or back and forth motion until it becomes black and slightly viscous. When the grinding is finished the moist end of the stick must never be left resting on the stone. The stick will virtually glue itself to the slab and the two objects will have to be chipped apart. A handy arrangement is to rest the stick over the far edge of the slab so that the wet end extends beyond. The ink should not be dipped into the water of the ocean area, for if the moist tip is not ground off, it will eventually crack.

Holding the brush The brush must be held in the right hand. The Chinese student is traditionally prohibited from using the left hand to write. The characters, for the most part, start in the upper left-hand corner. Using the left hand would be awkward when writing with a brush. Of course modern writing tools do not mitigate against left handedness as did the traditional calligraphy brush.

Hold the brush between the thumb and the first two or three finger tips. The little finger may line up on the handle or ride on the inside. This should leave the hand hollow — so an egg could be placed inside the palm and fingers. One of my teachers claimed he was given an egg to hold as he wrote; another teacher tells of being given a water container to balance on the top of the hand in the round, flat shape formed between the thumb and forefinger. Gripping the brush handle firmly be sure it is at right angles to the paper. There are several stories of young students whose fathers or teachers attempted to pluck the brush from the hands of the novice. A successful brush holding technique was achieved if the unaware student's brush could not be easily removed.

As one can see from these tales of eggs and water, firmness of grip must be achieved from a horizontal or vertical movement of the whole arm. Brush lines that are ragged on one side betray a slanting handle. It is desirable to hold the brush at right angles to the paper so that the tip of the brush will be centered in the stroke. When writing tiny characters, it is acceptable to rest the forearm on the left hand or arm rest and for larger forms, say 3/4", one may rest the elbow, but when one can learn to write with one's arm, it gives the freedom that is so much admired! It is in the writing of the larger characters that the arm must be totally free of any impediment; the forearm and elbow must be held at a comfortable level above the table.

In Japan, I worked at a low table, not unlike a coffee table, and knelt rather than sat. This worked quite well. With Chinese teachers, tables and chairs were the basic furniture and getting the correct height relationship for oneself should be a beginner's preoccupation.

Character composition It is in the dots and lines that one begins to discover the excitement of the movement of ink on the paper surface. A dot is made with the calligraphy brush pressing light, then heavy. At the same time the tip is moved and twisted, leaving a mark that shows the drag of the point. The lines should indicate movement -- advance and retreat, twist and turn -- always working as a total form.

The composition of any character can challenge a teacher or student of design in its various possibilities of symmetry and asymmetry. Each dot and line must be placed with sensitivity to spatial relationships, not unlike a Mondrian, Kline, or Motherwell work of art. The Chinese most commonly use a 3 x 3 grid to teach the student to arrrange the lines (or strokes) in relation to this space. The beginning student will be given a booklet with characters printed on a scaled grid. At the earliest stage the characters will be traced in proper stroke order (strokes must not only be made in a specified shape, and direction, but they must also be written in a specified order -- first, second, third, etc.; sometimes to as many as twenty-some odd strokes per character). The beginner thereby learns the "choreography" of writing each character and how to utilize the pressures of the brush to form the desired shapes. It is expected that tracing will help the student gain a feeling for the spacing and a sensitivity to the possible composition of differing characters.

At the next level of development, the student is expected to copy admired masterworks over a grid -- the transparency of the rice paper allows this to be done with ease. As in Chinese painting, copying is not frowned on, but encouraged. It is considered an achievement to develop the capability of working in the style of several different masters. Finally, one might approach this in a rather eclectic way by combining aspects of different masters. The strong student will integrate various styles and eventually invent his or her own original form.

Rhythm is achieved through spacing and the repeat of a chosen motif. There are different styles, and each style places limitations on the calligrapher, challenging his or her abilities to develop nuances of rhythm. The specific styles of calligraphy are not within the scope of this essay, but further investigation can be made by the interested reader.

Buying supplies The term rice paper is a catchall and is used to refer to many different Chinese and Japanese papers -- some made from mulberry leaves, some from leaves of the rice plant, and some even from silk discard. Many art stores carry or will obtain a variety of these papers. If one can purchase a sampling and experiment, that would prove to be most interesting and valuable.

The quality of the less absorbent papers will produce lines that are smoother and the overlapping puddles more obvious. The very absorbent paper requires more skill since rapid movement is needed, and it is best used for running and wild styles. The very thick and bulky papers are better for painting pictures but are worth trying. The best way to manipulate the absorbency problem on any paper is to use thicker ink and a bit less on the brush. The very thin papers, like tissue paper, are favored by the Japanese. A slightly thicker paper may be chosen, but it should be sufficiently transparent to allow tracing characters and seeing the grid beneath.

If one observes both surfaces of the paper, one will note a smooth and a rough side. The smooth side is, in general, used for tight calligraphy. To attain a Zen-like feeling, with dry, wispy strokes (called areas of "flying white"), I would suggest the use of the rough side on an absorbent paper.

Felt or absorbent scrap paper should be placed under the writing sheet. It is handy if grids can be marked using a 9 square box, that is 3 x 3 units. The Japanese prefer a 2 x 2, and one can frequently purchase such a felt already printed up for school children in Japanese art and supply stores.

Chinese brushes look like western round sable watercolor ones. Those with white and light colored bristles tend to be soft and are generally used for running and grass styles. Those with dark brown bristles are better for the standard styles that the beginner will be tackling. These brushes could be made from the hair of various animals, ranging from mouse whiskers to wolf hair.

Care of the brush It cannot be overemphasized that extreme care should be taken to preserve the pointed shape of the brush's bristles. When purchased, the bristles are usually covered with a plastic cap (that used to be brass). Discard it immediately. Attempting to place it back on a used brush will usually bend the hair out of shape. Also, always let the brush dry naturally. The bristles come starched, so the end must be softened. This can be done by dipping it into room temperature water (never warm or hot) and gently pressing down. Many calligraphers prefer to break in only a little over half of the tip and leave the rest in starched form. Eventually after use it will all become soft.

Always take the ink up by holding the brush at a low level, drawing it through the land surface of the grinding block toward oneself, and rotating it in the air. Repeat these steps until the tip is inked and still pointed.

It is also good practice to have a piece of paper nearby that can be used for scrap to remove the excess moisture. It is easiest for a beginner to write with a slightly dry brush on the Chinese paper because of its absorbency. As soon as one finishes, the brush should be rinsed in clean water and stored. I have found that, as an interim measure, it is possible to roll a sheet of newspaper around the brush so the paper is beyond the bristles and then seal it with tape or a rubber band. This will protect the tip until you can store it properly. Ideally one can hang the brush up or place it upright in a jar. One can carry a brush in a mat that looks like split bamboo window shades; some Asian art supply shops stock these for students.

Trying it One should be aware that all that is noted here is funadmentally true of Japanese calligraphy as well as Chinese. Calligraphy is an exacting art and not devoid of contradictions. Each school of writing has its dogma. Frequently a new teacher may inform the student that it is necessary to completely relearn some aspect.

Now get yourself a brush and ink and begin appreciating calligraphy on a new level.

It is desirable to use authentic materials, especially the brush and paper, but budgets or availability may make this impossible. Substitutes can be found around most artists' studios, for instance, a round watercolor brush, India ink, newsprint paper, or even newspaper -- especially the want ad section (free of illustrations and laid out in columns) -- work quite well. I frequently have students start by practicing on the want ad section to develop a sense of the brush and basic forms. However a drawback to this approach is that they often become confident with the cheaper materials and then find it difficult to switch to the genuine Chinese papers.

Most Chinatowns in the United States have bookstores or novelty shops that stock the necessary materials. Sometimes the quality of these materials is inferior to the quality of those found in art supply stores. One must keep in mind that good materials are not cheap for we are competing with the Chinese and Japanese themselves, who place a high value on these esoteric supplies. Many art supply companies now carry brushes, paper, and even grinding blocks and ink sticks. With a bit of searching, one should be able to find most materials needed to try one's hand.

Books in local libraries can supply introductory methods for self-instruction. Local community groups, Y's, adult education centers, and art schools may offer classes.

The following illustrations indicate the Chinese numbers, 1 through 10, enabling the beginner to write numbers from 1 to 99 (numbers above 10 are formed by combining characters -- 11 is 10 + 1, 12 is 10 + 2, etc.; 20 is 2 + 10, 21 is 2 + 10 + 1, 22 is 2 + 10 + 2, etc., to 99, which is 9 + 10 + 9). The numbers 1 through 10 offer a good introduction to the variety of strokes since most of the possible directions and shapes are represented within these several characters.

The arrows on the illustrations indicate the stroke direction. The numbers indicate the stroke order. It is essential to observe the specified direction and order to each stroke when writing Chinese characters. Balance, ink distribution, even the flow of the ink will be distorted if the rules of stroke direction and order are not followed.

As you practice the order and direction, you can begin to achieve the balance and design of the numbers shown here. Trace them until you begin to feel the rhythm of the character. Then practice without tracing. Be patient. To become a master calligrapher is a lifetime endeavor!

Numbers, written from 1 through 10 —starting at upper right and descending. Note that #19 is a combination of a 10 and a 9 and #99 is a 9, a 10, and a 9. All the numbers are built on this principle; e.g., 31 is a 3, a 10, and a 1.

一 1
二 2
三 3
四 4
五 5

六 6
七 7
八 8
九 9
十 10

十九 19

九十九 99

Each number should follow the sequence indicated—1, 2, 3, etc. The brush is placed near the position of the number. Central line indicates the movement of the brush, keeping the tip of the brush in mind.


1
2
3
4
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
3
4
5
2
1
2
1
1
2
3
4

Reprinted from Demystifying the Chinese
Language. Stanford: Bay Area China
Education Project, Leland Stanford
Junior University, 1980.

STUDENT

LIST #1

DECODED CHARACTERS

In recent years archaeologists have been working in China--digging up artifacts used by ancient societies, and investigating them to see what they can learn about how people lived long, long ago. Imagine that you are junior members of an archaeology team. On past trips to China, the senior members of your team discovered some tablets and animal bones with writing on them. They "decoded" this writing, and found out that the characters below mean:

SUN



TREE



PERSON



ROOF



FIELD



CART



EYE



ONE

STUDENT

LIST #2

NEWLY DISCOVERED CHARACTERS

While you were digging in North China, you came across more oracle bones with the following characters on them. However, you have never seen these characters before! You must use your knowledge of the characters on LIST #1 and work as a group to "decipher"--figure out the meaning of--these new characters. Don't forget that the ancient Chinese used COMPOUND IDEOGRAPHS. Some characters will have more than one part and you must pay attention to how the parts fit together. GOOD LUCK!

(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)



54

(6)



(7)



(8)



(9)



(10)



ANSWER KEY

DISCOVERY PROJECT #1

(1) PRISONER



(2) FOLLOW/AGREE



(3) BRANCH



(4) BRIGHT



(5) REST



(6) EYEBROW



(7) FOREST



(8) GARAGE/STOREHOUSE



(9) THREE



(10) FARMER



Arts VI

VI. A.

THE ARTS IN CHINA

(This material was adapted from a draft essay prepared by Michael Sullivan for The Asia Society's Education Department and from his article, "Painting With a New Brush: Art in Post-Mao China." The latter appeared in China Briefing 1980, edited by Robert Oxnam and Richard Bush and published by Westview Press in cooperation with the China Council. To some degree what follows complements the material in the Culture sections of part VIII, China's Dynastic Past. Readers are forewarned that there are important omissions. For instance, although the bronzes are considered one of the stars of history of Chinese art, we don't include them in this essay. They are discussed in considerable detail in the textbooks as well as in the information sheet from the Freer Gallery of Art, included in Part VI.)

Introduction

The following essay presents a broad and selective overview of general artistic development in China. There are two parts. In the first, we suggest the historical development of a variety of cultural activities and briefly indicate their place in contemporary China.

In the second part we summarize how art has related to larger political imperatives since 1949. One central theme becomes apparent. Tradition is so important in China that the arts of today must be examined not only as a dynamic interaction with the West but also with China's own past.

The Historical Development of Chinese Culture

Calligraphy The highest arts in China are those of the brush -- writing and painting. Of the two calligraphy was supreme. Perhaps this is because this difficult and expressive art marvelously combines meaning, content and pure form as well as bearing witness to the understanding, cultivation and character of the calligrapher.

Examples of calligraphy are still hung on wall to be admired. In a restaurant or dining car one might see the handwriting of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) or Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai). If it is considered good -- the word "beautiful" is practically never used of art in China -- it is at least partly because it is the handwriting of an admirable man.

The individual character of the written language carries an enormous weight of meaning, reference and association. A Harvard dictionary project, eventually abandoned, devoted its first volume to a single character. Respect for the written word in China was so great that paper with writing on it had to be burned separately to give it a "clean death." The literature was vast, and such was the prestige of belles lettres that poetry and calligraphy were included in the Civil Service examinations.

Painting The lively, rhythmic, expressive brush line of calligraphy is the basic aesthetic standard by which painting has been judged in China. Paintings took many forms: there were wall-paintings in temples, halls and tombs; large standing screens; handscrolls up to thirty or more feet in length, and hanging scrolls (both kinds would normally be kept rolled up); fans, and album-leaves. Scrolls were first painted on silk, then after its invention 2000 years ago, on paper. Since the pliant brushes and the ink ground from cakes of pine-soot mixed with glue are essentially the same as those used for calligraphy there is an intimate technical union between the two arts.

In the sixth century an obscure portrait painter set down six principles for judging painting that have influenced Chinese art for centuries: rhythmic vitality, the structural strength of the brushwork, color, proportion, composition, and copying the old masters. The last was not just to train one's hand but to preserve and transmit the tradition to later generations. The work of earlier masters could be as much an inspiration to painters as nature itself.

People often remark that "all Chinese paintings look the same" -- the same themes and subjects seem to appear again and again. There is some truth in this, because the composition is often conventional or traditional. It should be remembered, however, in Chinese terms what makes the picture admirable is not its originality but the vitality of its brushwork and the quality of its poetic feeling. For example, we would listen to Rudolf Serkin playing a Beethoven Sonata -- not for the originality of his interpretation of a familiar work, but for the subtlety and depth with which he both interprets the master and expresses himself. What we hear is Beethoven and also equally uniquely Serkin. The Chinese connoisseur enjoys his paintings "in the manner of" an old master in much the same way. Because spontaneity and vitality was the highest aim, the laborious building up of a composition through trial sketches and the careful application of thick layers of oil paint and varnish characteristic of traditional Western painting had little appeal to the Chinese artist.

In ancient times the main purpose of painting in China was ritual and didactic. The subjects of wall-paintings and scrolls were notable emperors and loyal ministers, virtuous concubines, tyrants and usurpers, painted by anonymous artisans as an example and a warning. In the chaotic period after the Han, however, the idea of the artist as a creative individual emerged.

In the T'ang dynasty the greatest master, Wu Tao-tzu (Wu Daozu), was still a figure painter but two new trends were developing. First, landscape painting was replacing figure painting as the supreme form of the pictorial arts. By the 11th century the great landscape painters had created a classic style that was profoundly philosophical. Although not realistic to eyes accustomed to evaluating Western art, their paintings are also intensely realistic in Chinese terms. There is little or no color, no blue sky, no cast shadows, and no perspective as the West understands it, but the rejection of these techniques was at least partly deliberate. Shadows and correct perspective fix the viewer's standpoint; the angle of the sun, the time of day. But the Chinese artist is not interested in the momentary glimpse or transient effects. Instead, he wants to create a vision of the world that is always true, and therefore must be generalized. Rather than a single viewpoint he creates an infinite number of viewpoints that dissolve into each other as one moves through the scroll. It is like looking at the landscape from a train -- or up it, as if one were in a helicopter. The slow unrolling of the handscroll takes us on a journey through the landscape in time. This creates a four-dimensional aesthetic experience that was not attempted in the West until modern times.

The second trend elaborated on the individualism of the artist. The scholars were declaring that the purpose of painting was not to depict the world -- that could be left to professionals and court painters -- but to express oneself. It was thought that the art of the scholar-gentry, whether paintings of landscape or figures, bamboo or flowers, should be personal and spontaneous. If it were amateurish so much the better, for that would show that the painters were educated men, who did not make their living by their skill as painters. Gradually, as the literati came to dominate Chinese cultural life, their ideas came to dominate art.

Inscriptions and poems affixed to the paintings often made them intellectual as well as very human documents. That they were extremely elitist need hardly be said.

By the 19th century the great art tradition described above was smothering in inertia. It took the aggressive intrusion of Western culture to reinvigorate artists like Chi Pai-shih (Qi Baishi) (1863-1957) who responded with vibrant color and powerful brushwork. The 1920s and 1930s saw the founding of Western-style art schools and China's first museums. Artists studied in Paris and brought home the style of the Salons and the influence of Matisse and Picasso. A new cosmopolitan art was born in Shanghai and Hangchou (Hangzhou), only to be rudely interrupted by the war with Japan (1937-1945). At the same time, the unfinished revolution stimulated a powerful socialist-realist woodcut movement, encouraged by the writer Lu Hsun (Lu Xun).

All the strands and traditions mentioned above can be found in the art of the People's Republic, which flourishes in the spirit of Mao's slogan, "Make the past serve the present." The age-old didactic figure painting, in both oils and the Chinese medium, serves the ends of propaganda as it did in the Han dynasty; a classic landscape shows the building of the Red Flag Canal through the mountains of Shansi (Shanxi); woodcuts dramatically contrast the bad old days with the good new ones. What is gone is the old elitist attitude of the scholar painter, and perhaps, although this is not so certain, the philosophical and metaphysical foundation of landscape painting.

Literature The ideographic nature of the written language makes great concentration of form in poetry possible. Although there is nothing quite as compact as the Japanese seventeen-syllable haiku, there were other poetic forms to challenge the Chinese poet. The lines of five or seven words, rigid tone patterns, end-rhymes and internal rhymes, taxed the poets' ingenuity and command of vocabulary. The long descriptive prose-poem (*fu*) was once fashionable, but in recent centuries poems have tended to be short, open-ended and evocative. The idea is to carry the meaning "beyond the words."

There is nothing in Chinese poetry comparable in scale to the sustained compositions of Dante or Milton. In the 20th century poets experimented with the sonnet and other Western forms, and for a while the influence of the French Symbolists was very strong. However, since 1949 there has been a return to traditional poems although, as in many of Mao Tse-tung's own poems, the content is often revolutionary.

China's storytelling tradition is reflected in the early well-known epics -- the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *All Men are Brothers*. These works are a series of stirring episodes strung together rather than a single literary composition. The novel is a late development in China. The most famous is *The Dream of the Red Chamber*. This marvelous story of the prosperity and subsequent fall of a rich family was written by Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in (Chao Xueqin) in the mid-18th century. However, even with the inevitable Confucian or Buddhist moralizing, the novel was never a respectable literary form in traditional China. It has taken the revolutions of the 20th century, the creation of vernacular literature as well as the influence of the Russion realists and such writers as Dickens and Balzac to bring the form to maturity.

Modern China's greatest writer, Lu Hsun (Lu Xun) (1881-1936), was not a novelist, but a satirist, polemicist, and short-story writer. His scathing writings became a rallying-cry for young reformers and revolutionists. Although on the left, he was never a Communist, and he found the efforts of the Party to control him increasingly intolerable.

Since 1949 the most significant event has been the emergence of writers of proletarian background. Their work can be read in translation in the Peking monthly, *Chinese Literature*, which is a good index of the ups and downs of modern Chinese culture. The new fiction often seems rough and the characterization over-simplified. This may be a function of the authors' unfamiliarity with the development of modern literature elsewhere. In the best of this literature, the writers speak strongly from their own experience.

The idea that art is propaganda, or at least that it is a positive harmonizing force in society, is not new in China. Thus the Chinese accept much heavier doses of moralizing than the liberal modern Westerner would find tolerable.

Architecture Even traditional architecture was an expression of social and cosmic harmony, from the orientation and layout of the capital city to the plan of temple, palace or mansion. Experts in geomancy (*feng-shui*) determined the siting of buildings, pagodas and tombs, and so ensured the fostering of good influences and protection from evil ones.

Although tombs, gates, walls and towers were generally built of stone or brick, the essence of Chinese architecture is the wooden post, lintel and frame. A complex system of bracketing supports the heavy tiled roof which has a wide overhang to protect the light infilling of the wall between the posts. We think of the curved roof as characteristically Chinese, but it was unknown before the sixth century in China. Its origin is uncertain, but the "beam-frame" construction of the internal roof supports, unlike the rigid Western triangular truss, can be adjusted to fit any profile, and the curve was probably developed simply because it was beautiful.

The marriage of Chinese and Western architecture has not been a happy one. Too often, from the mid-19th century onwards, architects have capped a foreign building with a curved roof in the hope that it would look Chinese, and imitated intricate timber bracketing in cast concrete friezes. In the 1950s Russian influence was inevitably and disastrously prominent, and the traditional roof was condemned as a wasteful extravagance. The result was characterless modern architecture, neither Western nor Chinese. The Great Hall of People (1959), in spite of poor detail, succeeds by its sheer scale and monumental proportions.

The Mausoleum of Mao Tse-tung (1977) was less successful, being a synthesis of many uninspired schemes. The problem of creating a modern architecture that is distinctively Chinese in spirit has yet to be resolved. There are signs now that Chinese architects may find solutions as their Japanese counterparts have so brilliantly done.

Sculpture Just as architecture in traditional China was regarded as a craft, rather than a major art form, so was sculpture perceived. The sculptor, because he labored with his hands, had a low status. Monumental, even life-size sculpture seems to be no older than the third century B.C. which is astonishingly late in the history of a major civilization. For the most part Chinese sculpture was limited to tomb figures and the works inspired by Buddhism.

20th-century sculptors study Western motifs in art schools at home and abroad. With a limited indigenous tradition to build on, modern works tend to be in either the conservative Paris-Salon style or heavily influenced by Soviet models. Ideology and realism are blended in monumental groups of figures involved in such activities as the periodic payment of rent to the landlords.

Crafts Until 1949 the crafts suffered from the same social stigma as sculpture in spite of China's skill and artistry in this area. Today, however, papercuts and New Year pictures, embroideries and batiks, toys, baskets and lanterns are produced in huge quantities and enjoyed by everyone. The export of handicrafts is an important source of foreign exchange. However, the foreigners want traditional designs which discourages the creation of a new design aesthetic that is both contemporary and Chinese.

Music The popular Western notion of Chinese music, acquired chiefly from the movies and television, is either of catchy or sinister melodies played on a pentatonic scale or of what seems like the caterwauling of Chinese opera. But since at least the fifth century B.C. China has had a chromatic untempered scale of twelve half-tones.

Although music was never a great art form in China it has a long history. In ancient China solemn music was performed with chants and dancing at sacrifices and court rituals. Music was also played on sets of up to sixteen bronze bells and stone chimes hung on frames. Sometimes the melody came from bamboo tubes with the pitch established by the Bureau of Weights and Measures. Music was controlled by the State for, as Confucius declared, it was a means both of harmonizing heaven and earth and bringing order to society.

Even after the introduction of new instruments and music between A.D. 300 and 700, traditional Chinese music continued to be more restricted in form and expression than Western music. There was nothing, for instance, that could be compared to the choral and symphonic works of the great Western composers. Nor has there been a really vigorous tradition of folk music, except among the country people. Some of the most beautiful melodies were to be found among the minority people of the Southwest and the Grasslands.

Intimate chamber music of the scholars was played on the flute and the seven-stringed zither chin (qin). This instrument is roughly comparable to the clavichord in its delicacy and inaudibility. Music from the chin was often inspired by poetry, while poets -- including Mao Tse-tung -- wrote new lyrics to old melodies. . . thus establishing a close link between music and poetry.

Because of the limitations of Chinese music Western music has been welcomed with enthusiasm in China. . . except during the periods since 1949 when all Western culture was suspect.

Chinese Art Since 1949

The guidelines for art after 1949 were those uncompromisingly socialist principles set down by Mao Tse-tung in his "Yenan Talks on Art and Literature" (1942). While acknowledging the value of China's artistic heritage, he stressed the overriding importance of political criteria. Artists and historians fell into line.

To embrace the great art of the past that had been produced for the "slave-owning" and "feudal" ruling class, it was held that works such as the sacrificial bronzes of the Shang dynasty, and Buddhist sculpture, bore witness to the skill of the laboring masses. The suggestive, elitist painting of the scholar-gentry, which for centuries constituted the "mainstream" in Chinese art, presented more of a problem. It was eventually solved by stating that while the social attitudes of the artists were bad, they were a product of their time, and their art was good -- indeed, that it was "realistic" in the sense that it contained the "essence" of the birds and flowers, bamboo and landscapes that they portrayed. What was attacked was not the art but the social system in which it was created. Realism as normally understood was to be confined to pictures exposing the evils of pre-Liberation society. Life in the People's Republic of China had to be idealized by a kind of art that came to be called "revolutionary romanticism."

In the springtime after Liberation, creative men and women were inspired to astonish others and themselves. But with the crackdown on dissidents and independents that followed the wilting of the Hundred Flowers in 1958, autumn set in. The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968 brought violent storms.

During these turbulent years the artists' associations were disbanded and art schools closed. Painters were dismissed, jailed, or intimidated for alleged subversion. Li K'u-ch'an (Li Kuchan), for example, was vilified for painting in monochrome ink eight lotus flowers for the International Club in Peking -- their lack of positive, cheerful color was taken by Chiang Ch'ing (Jiang Qing) as an attack on the eight operas and ballets she had promoted. Chou Yang (Zhou Yang), head of the National Federation of Writers and Artists, hitherto regarded as a loyal supporter of Mao, was paraded through the streets like a common criminal with a placard around his neck.

When order was restored, it gradually became apparent that Chiang Ch'ing and the "Gang of Four" had seized almost total control of the arts and the media. No art could exist that did not have their stamp of approval. Artists, actors, musicians, dancers who did not conform, and they included most of the important ones, were dismissed, imprisoned, or forced to become farm laborers. Deep winter had set in. The arts were saved only by the sudden downfall of Chiang Ch'ing and her group a week after the death of Mao Tse-tung in August 1976.

At that moment, with the most spontaneous outburst of public joy that China had seen since Liberation, the thaw began. Today a new spring has come. Great painters of the past, formerly condemned as bourgeois, are now admired once again, and a new freedom of expression is gathering momentum. Foreign music is enthusiastically welcomed: Debussy, Faure and Stravinsky, until lately dismissed as decadent, are performed to rapt audiences. Chinese artists and musicians are once again going abroad to study, and even the nude has its place in the art schools.

We watch these events with bated breath. Has the spring really come -- and if so, does that mean that another winter is not far behind? A guarded optimism suggests that that may not be so. The oppression in the arts is now associated with the bad years of 1966-76, and, above all, with the excesses of Chiang Ch'ing and the "Gang of Four." It cannot return so long as their memory is still fresh.

However, there are limits beyond which the Chinese will not go. We must not look for echos of the latest artistic trends in America. The Chinese are not interested in the fragmentation of art into a succession of movements and "isms." For them, art is but one part of a larger whole. Western art, like Western science, is a great stimulus, but in the end it is the traditional Chinese view of the purpose of art and the artist in the good society that will triumph. The art of the future, in all essentials, will be Chinese.

VI. B.

CHINESE BRONZES

Freer Gallery of Art
Smithsonian Institution

The excellence of ancient Chinese bronze-casting has never been equaled. While the earliest bronzes may actually predate the Shang dynasty (ca. 1523-ca. 1028 B.C.), bronze vessels came to be used by the ruling elite in state rituals of ancestor worship early in that period. Toward the end of the Shang dynasty, bronze vessels were also used in private worship of ancestors. During the Chou (ca. 1027-221 B.C.), Ch'in (221-207 B.C.), and Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) dynasties, bronzes were also widely used as luxury articles and utensils for daily life.

The Chinese made bronzes according to methods that differed greatly from those used in ancient Mesopotamia and Greece. Instead of cold-working the alloy to create shapes and decor, the Chinese relied instead on a direct-casting process, using clay section-molds assembled around a clay core. The mold sections contained the negative image of the desired vessel's contour and surface ornament, either carved directly into the clay or transferred from a clay model. Therefore, after the molten alloy, composed primarily of tin and copper, was poured into the mold-assembly and allowed to cool, the resulting vessel required no further work beyond minor finishing.

Bronze vessels were cast in a variety of shapes, many of them based on pottery forms inherited from the preceding Neolithic era. Shang vessel types included food cookers, food containers, wine containers, wine warmers, wine servers, wine goblets, and water basins. In later times some shapes disappeared and others were introduced, such as food vessels and liquid containers.

The decoration of bronzes underwent extensive evolution, starting with the narrow bands of geometric decor found on the earliest examples. By the Anyang phase of the late Shang period (thirteenth to eleventh century B.C.) ornamentation had expanded to cover the entire vessel with complex patterns, including elements in rounded relief. Crisply executed motifs like stylized demon-masks, dragons, serpents, cicadas, birds, and a host of other zoomorphic forms appeared at regular intervals around the vessel, often against a background of squared spirals.

During the Western Chou period (ca. 1027-771 B.C.) the repertoire of ornamental motifs gradually changed. Long-tailed birds were prominent on vessels from the initial phase of this period, while repetitive band patterns became important during the later years. In the Eastern Chou (770-221 B.C.) these band patterns developed into exquisitely detailed, abstract curls organized in interlocking units densely covering the surface of vessels. These fine and uniform designs were probably impressed with a master stamp into the piece-molds. For extremely ornate curl-patterns in relief, found on certain vessels from the Warring States period (480-221 B.C.) of the Eastern Chou, the lost-wax method may have been used in preparing the molds. In the lost-wax process, a model of the desired form is created using wax and the clay mold shaped around the model. When the clay mold is fired, the wax melts and runs out, leaving a cavity to be filled by the molten bronze during casting.

Techniques for inlaying gold, silver, copper, and semiprecious stones into bronze were perfected during the Warring States period, permitting surface decoration of contrasting color and frequently accentuating the linear vitality of ornamental motifs. Using inlay and other cold-working processes such as engraving, craftsmen depicted not only geometrical motifs but also stylized landscapes and hunting scenes, a development that continued in the Han dynasty.

Inscriptions in archaic script were cast into a number of the vessels on display. The earliest inscriptions, dating from the Anyang period, consist of simple pictograms, later developing into terse ancestor dedications. By the Western Chou period, the texts were becoming much longer, sometimes recording valuable historical information. Chinese connoisseurs have traditionally prized vessels bearing important or beautifully written inscriptions above uninscribed vessels. They also preferred vessels with a rich, even patina, the dark green or blue surface corrosion caused by chemical reactions during burial in the earth.

Other objects in addition to vessels were made of bronze, including weapons and chariot fittings during the Shang and Chou periods. Recent archaeological discoveries show that bronze mirrors were also made as early as the Shang (ca. twelfth century B.C.) dynasty. Mirrors, however, occur in large numbers only after the fourth century B.C.

Garment hooks were first made in China during the Eastern Chou period, the earliest now known being assigned to the seventh century B.C. Textual sources suggest that hooks may have been introduced to China by nomadic tribes on China's northern border. While most extant garment hooks are made of bronze, iron was sometimes used during the Warring States and Han periods. Jade, silver, and gold also occur in the more sumptuous examples. These personal articles provided the craftsman with additional formats in which to develop ornamental techniques.

Suggested Reading

Fon, Wen, ed. The Great Bronze Age of China. New York, 1980.
Loehr, Max. Chinese Bronze Age Weapons. Ann Arbor, 1956.
-----. Ritual Vessels of Bronze Age China. New York, 1968.
Pope, John Alexander; Gettens, Rutherford John; Cahill, James; and Barnard, Noel. The Freer Chinese Bronzes. Washington, 1967.
Watson, William. Ancient Chinese Bronzes. London, 1962.

Literature VII

VII. A.

BASIC SOCIAL STUDIES AND LANGUAGE ARTS SKILLS
Using Chinese Literature in Translation

A. Elgin Heinz

(Reprinted from Focus on Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2)

When we think in terms of a global education curriculum we do so on the premise that we live in a shared world in which everyone's emotions and actions affect everybody else. Several images come to mind: one is Buckminster Fuller's metaphor of spaceship earth, with the world's people as passengers and crew; another is Norman Cousins' lifeboat earth, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at opposite ends, competing to see which can drill the bigger holes in the bottom. Personally, I have always liked John Donne's expression of the basic premise of global education. Nearly 400 years ago he said, "No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. . . any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee. . ."

For the sake of convenience in the classroom, we can subdivide global education into five themes — world cultures, language and literature, globalizing U.S. history, understanding our ethnic diversity, and contemporary issues. In preparing and organizing materials that support the learning of concepts, skills, and behaviors that facilitate survival in this shared world, the five themes are useful — so long as we don't make them mutually exclusive. Whichever theme we choose to emphasize in a particular class, our lesson plans should include sidelights from the other four as well as references to the student's place or role in the total context.

With which of the world's cultures and literatures should we begin? Should we start with "American" culture? After all, we are much more interested in ourselves than in anyone or anything else. Yes, because of that interest, we should -- but indirectly. Immersed in our own culture or subculture, we take it for granted; we are unaware of its distinctive characteristics -- just as we pay no attention to the air we breathe until students in the chemistry class down the hall produce some hydrogen sulfide. Also, since it is ours, we are not prepared to examine it without emotional involvement; objective observations are too easily perceived as threats.

Therefore, since all learning is by comparison, let's start with another culture, one about which we can be objective, and analyze the inevitable comparisons with our own as they appear, learning the characteristics of both groups of people simultaneously. My candidate for the other culture is the Chinese. The experiences of the Chinese people provide fascinating and pertinent illustrations of what we need to learn.

The Chinese have had 4,000 years of continuous history. There are individuals living today who have uninterrupted genealogical tables dating from the time of Confucius. For 400 years, the civilized world was divided between the Romans and the Chinese — and as an indication of which part was preferable, the Huns attacked Rome only when they couldn't get into China. Chinese contributions to civilization are familiar to all of us -- among them the paper, printing, gunpowder, compass, stern-post rudder, and civil service exam that made possible the European conquest and control of most of the rest of the world.

Chinese literature is the twin of Chinese history. Up to the 19th century, the Chinese had published more about themselves, their ideas, and their experiences than all the rest of the people in the world combined.

At this point, by an enormous exercise of won't power, I refrain from plunging into the ocean of Chinese literature and never reappearing. Instead, let us embark upon that ocean, planning to touch all five themes in the brief voyage.

"Basic social studies and language arts skills using Chinese literature in translation" -- a formidable topic for an expert; an impossible topic for someone like me, who was never even taught how to read. I'm enthusiastic about Chinese literature as a marvelously rewarding way of learning history, all of the social sciences, and all of the humanities, including the arts of cooking and garden design. But skills? However, if you will accept my naivete and bear with me while I substitute enthusiasm for expertise, and if we stretch the definition of "skills" to include what teachers as well as students use, we may come up with some working hypotheses.

How many of you learned at one time to ride a bicycle?. . . How many of you learned to do it by reading a book of instructions?. . . Teaching skill discovery No. 1 that we have all made but sometimes would like to ignore when faced with the amount of "stuff" that is supposed to be crammed into a semester: skills as abstractions don't exist. Skills exist only as they are applied to situations. Learning to read can be learned only by reading. Score one for the Chinese: they produced a lot of reading material to practice on.

So, we lead the horse to the water. How do we make him think he's thirsty? Let's look at one of my many failures and two of my few successes. Soon after I started teaching world history, I had the course neatly organized -- a fine structure of interlocking generalizations that came out even with the textbook at the end of the semester. But one day, as she was leaving, a student dropped an earnestly penciled note on my desk, "Mr. Heinz, I hear you talking, but you don't say nothing to me." Her courage placed her in my pantheon of saints. She taught me better than any methods course that generalizations are meaningless without experiential referents.

A few years later (I'm a slow learner), in an Asian Studies class, I mentioned having ridden a motorcycle in China. A young man, slouching apathetically in the back row, sat bolt upright and listened intently for the rest of the period. As soon as the bell rang, he rushed up, "Mr. Heinz, what kind of motorcycle was it?" That semester, we learned the geography, economies, and cultures of Asia from the saddle of a motorcycle. We repaired flat tires in Tibet, calculated the gasoline needed to travel the Silk Road, and figured out how to make friends with people who had never seen a self-propelled vehicle. Alas, I didn't have the foresight to turn the course into Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Instead, Robert Pirsig did it thirty years later.

Then, there was a "non-reader" who, simply by occasional attendance, had reached the 12th grade. His forte was reciting an apparently inexhaustible fund of bawdy limericks. When I asked where he had learned them, he said he had read them in a borrowed book! Next day, I happened to mention the novel, Jin Ping Mei (Chin P'ing Mei), a wonderfully perceptive, satirical (and satyrical) 16th-century expose of the lives of wealthy Chinese officials. Unfortunately, I couldn't recommend it because of the erotic passages that, in the book's first translation had been rendered in Latin, but in the second, in English. Strangely, this "non-reader" learned more about traditional Chinese society that semester than anyone else in the class.

So, as teaching skill discovery No. 2: sensitivity to existing interests. But, individual interests are so diverse! Score two for Chinese literature; it is so diverse that there is something for everyone. Heroic fighting? Try Outlaws of the Marsh for historical picaresque adventure; for a recent event, the taking of Luding (Luting) bridge across the Dadu (Tatu) River as a crucial incident in the Long March. Philosophy of war and military tactics? Sun Tzu on The Art of War. Humorous fantasy-satire-adventure? Monkey, who, with his miraculous powers of transformation, irreverently outwits all opponents in helping a Chinese monk travel to India to get the Buddhist scriptures. Detective stories? The cases of Judge Dee, recounting the exploits of Tang (T'ang) dynasty magistrate that show, more clearly than scholarly texts, the interface between the Chinese bureaucracy and the people. Less simplistic, Jonathan Spence's The Death of Woman Wang, a reconstruction of life and a murder in a 17th-century village from local records and stories. Romance? Dream of the Red Chamber is one of the great classical romances of world literature, focused on a pair of teen-age lovers caught up in the complexities of one of the great 18th-century extended families. Modern romance? Every issue of Chinese Literature has short stories and poems representative of current writing.

As a roundabout approach to identifying another skill that teachers develop, let's glance at the theme, globalizing U.S. history. Chinese have had more effect on American history than any of our current textbook authors seem willing to recognize. How many of your texts mention, for example, that Jefferson's "right of revolution" came from Mencius, in 3rd century B.C. China, via John Locke? Or the economic reforms of a Chinese statesman in 54 B.C. that were copied in detail by Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture under Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he set up the ever-normal granary and farm loan systems? Or the copying of Ming dynasty farming practices that vastly increased American farmers' cotton crops and made it possible for California orange growers to ship their fruit to eastern markets? In exchange, perhaps, the South American sweet potato became a staple for hungry North Chinese as the white potato did for the Irish.

After the American Revolution, European ports were closed to American merchants. Where did they turn? To China, of course, trading ginseng and furs for porcelain, tea, silk, and wall paper as described and depicted in Voyaging to Cathay. The profits from this trade provided the capital for American industrialization.

Everyone has heard of how the Chinese and Irish built the transcontinental railroad -- but how many know that the Chinese also built California's wineries? Much has been written about the Chinese in America. One of the latest, most comprehensive, and most interesting accounts is Jack Chen's The Chinese in America.

Only by a stretch of the imagination could we classify philosophical precepts and economic innovations as literature. However, when we turn to the often poignant biographies and autobiographies of Chinese immigrants and their children, we are firmly on course again -- and fortunately so, since teacher's-skill discovery No. 3 was that my students had no interest in abstractions like "China" or, for that matter, "United States." They were interested in people, individuals either real or fictional, who had believable experiences and lives that could be compared and contrasted with their own. Maxine Hong Kingston satisfies that interest in people with two marvelously graphic collections of stories, The Woman Warrior and China Men.

Here we have the opportunity to encourage the use of students' social studies skills, as well as our own, in the creation of conceptual generalizations from specific data. Kingston's books, exciting though they are, and deserving of all the critical acclaim they have received, are one person's viewpoint on her own selection of personal experiences. The stories may be absolutely true for these individual people, but they certainly are not true for all Chinese who came to America. Quite different images are found, for example, in Louis Chu's Eat a Bowl of Tea and Laurence Yep's Dragonwings, although the people of these stories lived in the same culture at the same time. We may not be as blind as the wise men of the Indian fable, but we are all very near-sighted, and the elephant we are describing is very large.

Once students become consciously aware of these differences, they can recognize and cope with stereotypes. Stereotypes, or the opportunity for stereotyping, are an inherent aspect of all literature. In fact, one of our measures for evaluating literature is the writer's ability to convey a sense of universality without resorting to stereotypes. Living with stereotypes as part of our social atmosphere, we use them without thinking until a writer from another culture shocks us into awareness. Coming from another culture myself, I still remember my amazement at the way people in America accepted Charlie Chan, Fu Manchu, and their comic strip kin as Chinese norms!

Charting our course through five themes, we have sailed from globalizing U.S. history, through understanding our ethnic diversity, to contemporary issues. Here, modern Chinese literature provides us with remarkably appropriate materials for analysis. "Proletarian" writers, in the service of the Party, have mirrored every shift of dogma with no hint of the mental acrobatics involved, leaving us to wonder if personal values are being suppressed. Even today, with individual initiative being officially encouraged, memories of earlier purges are too vivid for much freedom of expression. Because of this repression, many of the best examples of the struggle for individualism, stories with which our teenagers would have the greatest empathy, were written in the revolutionary 1920s and '30s -- the stories of Lu Xun (Lu Hsun), for instance, or the novel Family, by Ba Jin (Pa Chin), in which the questioning of parental values as well as of broader social norms runs through every page. Student readers will find endless equivalents of their own growing-up problems.

It is also in proletarian literature, both traditional and modern, that the social studies skills of making inferences can be practiced. In a totalitarian society, political criticism is always dangerous, and Chinese writers became adept at concealing their real meanings -- which their readers became equally adept at inferring. Today, Chinese observers privately wonder at American failures to infer the real meanings behind what is said in business and political negotiations. Here is training for future statesmen!

The exercise of skills of inference and of synthesis is encouraged by recognizing short stories, poems, plays, and novels as primary sources -- the actual raw materials of history on which the judgements of textbook writers have not been made and that, therefore, don't get in the way of the students' own creative thinking.

Earlier, I mentioned appealing to existing student interests through a literature that has something for everyone. This is easier to say than to put into practice -- at least I have found it so. However, rather than giving up if our success is less than total, suppose we push the principle to its logical extreme. Here we realize that everyone's basic interest is himself or herself. Without exception, students are interested in anything that will enhance their own ego-satisfaction or self-image. So are we all. One approach to enhanced self-image is to discover that we are more complex than we had visualized ourselves, thus interesting to more people in more ways.

But, because this self-image is so important, most students are reluctant to expose it. I don't propose to enter the maelstrom of values clarification, as such, on this voyage any more than I have mentioned skills divorced of context. However, bored or apathetic students often respond to perceived challenges to their own cherished -- and usually unexamined -- beliefs. Therefore, let us take a second look at the point with which we started: awareness of cultural differences as potentially threatening. Chinese literature presents an extraordinary vista of different values and behaviors -- values and behaviors that challenge ours by the evidence that they work and have worked successfully for a lot of people for a long time. And yet, because the challenges aren't perceived as immediate threats, students can examine them with reason instead of simply reacting with emotion. The examination is facilitated by most Chinese stories being written versions of oral tales, stylistically simple if psychologically complex.

Role-playing can uncover motivational differences and complexities. Take, for example, The West Chamber, a traditional play in which three travelers -- a beautiful girl, her mother, and a young scholar -- are besieged by bandits in a monastery where they have stopped for the night. The young scholar sends the monastery cook through the bandit lines to his friend, a general, who comes with troops and scatters the bandits. Who gets the credit for the rescue, the daring cook or the brave general?

Neither of course. This being China, the young scholar who wrote the letter begging for rescue is the hero. While awaiting the general's arrival, he has seduced the maiden. And, after the siege is lifted, he resumes his interrupted trip to the capital to take the civil service exams without a backward glance for the heartbroken girl. What should she have done? What would you have done? Why? And is it all as simple as I have made it seem?

Examination of situations like this makes students aware of cultural assumptions and value systems. More important, by recognizing from the reading of Chinese literature that they themselves have and live by a value system, students become aware that, instead of being helpless pawns of that system, they can assume control of their own values and actions and modify aspects they don't like.

A particularly significant social studies skill inherent in this recognition is the ability to deal with cultural differences not as polarized opposites, but as different positions on a continuum. All people have the same basic needs and wants, but, depending on the cultural context, assign them different priorities. Differences are of degree, not kind. The motivations of the characters in The West Chamber are clear to all of us, for they are inherent in our own behavior. Using a continuum instead of polarizing may well be the most important social skill of all (not just social studies skill). Without it, "we-they" polarization is inevitable and truly global or one-world thinking is impossible.

In every example of Chinese literature mentioned, and in the vastly larger number not mentioned, there is an open invitation for teachers and students to exercise the skills of examining evidence, comparing, contrasting, distinguishing stereotypes from useful generalizations, analyzing, synthesizing, inferring, and perceiving examples.

In my examples, you will have noticed the omission of a major category of Chinese literature — poetry. This has not been by oversight. Poetry evaporates under the spotlight of analysis, leaving a residue of verse. In translation, this residue may still have some emotional and ideological impact, as in Du Fu's (Tu Fu) "A Song of War Chariots." In this 8th-century poem, Du Fu could have been writing about conditions in Charlamagne's kingdom half a world away. It is a poem of feelings still shared by people everywhere whose loved ones have never been sent to war. But verse translated from Chinese has none of the stylistic elegance or connotational richness of the original. Folk songs fare better in translation. The message of "The Electric Lights Shine in Everybody's Heart" is clear and unmistakable.

Another omission I really regret is that of sample lessons. For creating your own units, there are all kinds of guides. I recommend "Skill Development in Social Studies," "Teaching Skills in the Social Studies," "Developing Decision-Making Skills," and "Thinking Skills."

In summary, we have noted nine points related to learning skills:

1. Compartmentalization is convenient, but it must never obscure the fact that whatever we study has meaning only as part of a larger, organic whole.

2. Skills don't exist as abstractions; therefore, we must elect suitable materials with which to practice learning them. Generalizations are meaningless without experiental referents.

3. No learning occurs without an appeal to existing personal interests; Chinese literature is varied enough to meet the widest range of interests.

4. People are interested in people as individuals, not as impersonal masses or nations.

5. Given interesting, even if contradictory, data, students can and will formulate useful concepts.

6. Using Chinese literature, students can learn to identify stereotypes and differentiate them from meaningful generalizations.

7. Chinese literature is especially appropriate in making inferences and

analogies.

8. Chinese literature enables students to identify values -- and to realize that they can make decisions about them.

9. Chinese literature helps students think in terms of continua instead of polarizations -- essential for a one-world view.

Let me conclude then, with a Chinese version of unity even more comprehensive than John Donne's. It is the first chapter of Lao Zi's (Lao Tzu) Daodejing (Tao te Ching), written about 2,400 years ago:

> Existence is beyond the power of words to define;
> Terms may be used, but are none of them absolute.
> In the beginning of heaven and earth there were no words;
> Words came out of the womb of matter.
> And whether a man dispassionately sees to the core of life
> Or passionately sees the surface,
> The core and the surface are essentially the same,
> Words making them seem different only to express appearance.
> If names be needed, wonder names them both.
> From wonder into wonder, existence opens.

Books Mentioned, in Order of Reference

1. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Robert M. Pirsig (Bantam, 1974)
2. Chin P'ing Mei. Hsu Wei (?), tr. Miall & Kuhn (Putnam, 1940)
3. Outlaws of the Marsh. Shih Naian & Lo Kuan-chung, tr. Shapiro (Indiana, 1981)
4. The Long March. Dick Wilson (Avon, 1971)
5. The Art of War. Sun Tzu, tr. Griffith (Oxford, 1963, 1971)
6. Monkey. Wu Ch'eng-en, tr. Waley (Grove, 1943)
7. Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee. tr. van Gulik (Dover, 1976. See also Scribner series)
8. Death of Woman Wang. Jonathan D. Spence (Penguin, 1978)
9. Dream of the Red Chamber. Tsao Hseuh-chin, tr. Wang Chi-chen (Doubleday Anchor, 1958)
10. Chinese Literature (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, monthly)
11. China's Gifts to the West. Derk Bodde (Am. Council on Education, 1942)
    Chinese Ideas in the West. Derk Bodde (Am. Council on Education, 1942)
12. Voyaging to Cathay. Alfred Tamarin & Shirley Glubok (Viking, 1976)
13. The Chinese in America. Jack Chen (Harper & Row, 1980)
14. The Woman Warrior. Maxine Hong Kingston (Knopf, 1977)
15. China Men. Maxine Hong Kingston (Knopf, 1980)
16. Eat a Bowl of Tea. Louis Chu (U. Wahsington, 1961)
17. Dragonwings. Laurence Yep (Harper & Row, 1975)
18. Family. Pa Chin, tr. Shapiro (Doubleday Anchor, 1972)
19. Romance of the Western Chamber. tr. S.I. Hsuing (Columbia, 1968), Henry H. Hart (Stanford, 1936), T.C. Lai & Ed Gamarekian (Heinemann, 1973)
20. Anthology of Chinese Literature. ed. Cyril Birch (Grove Evergreen, 1965)
21. 20th Century Chinese Poetry. tr. and ed., Kai-yu Hsu (Doubleday, 1963; Cornell, 1970)
22. Skill Development in Social Studies. ed. Helen Carpenter (National

Council for the Social Studies, 1963)
23. Teaching Skills in the Social Studies. ed. Johanna Lemlech (California Council for the Social Studies, 1976)
24. Developing Decision-Making Skills. ed. Dana Kurfman (National Council for the Social Studies, 1977)
25. Thinking Skills. Richard W. Samson (Innovative Sciences, 1975)
26. The Way of Life According to Lao Tzu. tr. Witter Bynner (Capricorn, 1962)

VII. B.

THE DRAGON'S VILLAGE
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOVEL OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA

Yuan-tsung Chen

Note: This review by A. Tom Grunfeld, Empire State College, New York State University, first appeared in Focus on Asian Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, Spring 1983, published by The Asia Society. The book is published by Penguin Books, New York City, 1981. It costs $4.95 in paperback.

Background

In the eternally frustrating effort to convey some rudimentary characteristics of Chinese society there is a never-ending quest for adequate teaching materials. We daydream wistfully of a time when students will read The Analects, The Romance of The Three Kingdoms, or the writings of Mao Zedong. But, rather than wait for that to happen, over the years I have used a number of materials at both the secondary and tertiary levels with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately I have yet to find the perfect textbook or curricular materials but this book is one with which I have had considerable success at the undergraduate level and that, I believe, can be equally successful at upper secondary levels.

Yuan-tsung Chen was raised in a wealthy Shanghai family, educated in a Western missionary school, and grew up in as cosmopolitan a fashion as any Chinese could in the years before 1949. In 1949 Chen, at the age of 17, found herself facing a difficult choice. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had just achieved victory in the civil war and wealthy families such as hers were fleeing the mainland of China for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and points beyond. Many young people -- rich as well as poor -- found themselves intoxicated with the opportunity to rebuild a once-great but now weak and war-torn China. She chose to stay and within a year had volunteered to be a land-reform cadre in western Gansu province. The Dragon's Village is essentially an account of that experience.

Chen originally wrote up her experiences in Chinese during the 1950s. She continued to write -- unpublished, as far as I can determine -- until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Fearing she might be found out and attacked for her writings, which did not adhere to the narrow ideological guidelines of the period, she destroyed everything. In 1972 Chen, her son, and husband (Jack Chen, son of China's former Foreign Minister Eugene Chen) came to the United States. It was here, after several years of work on her English, that she rewrote and published The Dragon's Village.

Objectives

In the short time usually reserved for studying China, the vastness of its civilization and history force teachers to be highly selective as to what they will teach. The Dragon's Village can aid in that selection process, for it succeeds in two crucial ways. First, the novel structure allows for character development. There are no one-dimensional revolutionary heroes here. Each individual is three-dimensional; down-to-earth; easily identifiable; full of self-doubt, misgivings, and weaknesses in addition to heroism. In many ways American students will find these people recognizable and will readily relate to them. Consequently, I have found students are anxious to finish the book in order to find out what happens to the characters. This not only heightens interest but makes the story less foreign.

Chen's second success is equally important, for the story clarifies what I would consider to be the most important characteristics of modern and contemporary China:

- the nature of Chinese life and society in various social strata prior to 1949;
- the conditions that fostered a communist movement;
- the objectives of the Chinese communists;
- the reasons for their victory; and
- the changes brought about by the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

This book does not provide an instant course on China. Rather, what Chen has accomplished in a thoughtful, clear, exciting, and, at times, quite moving way, is to touch on all of these themes. Her enthusiasm creates a climate of receptivity to supplemental readings and class discussions.

Discussion Topics

The Dragon's Village is extremely rich in detail. The following are only a few of the many possible approaches to the themes.

Character Development The characters are of particular interest. An old schoolmate, Ma Li, has for many years been an underground radical activist. After six months in Gansu, Ma Li loses some of her more utopian ideas, developing a more realistic notion of the revolution's ability to change society. Wang Sha is a veteran communist organizer. He has been among the peasantry for so long, during the civil and anti-Japanese wars, that he appears to be turning bitter and cynical over the lack of immediate social change. The young peasant girl, Xiu-ying, excited by the changes in the status of women and what those changes portend for her is, at the same time, fearful of challenging the old order. The old peasant, Sun, keeps his wife in perpetual terror, refusing to acknowledge any attempt to change age-old customs. There are dozens more characters who mix fear with bravery, good with evil, and are interesting enough as individuals to spur discussion, while demonstrating to students the kaleidoscope of Chinese who make up a quarter of the world's population.

Social Strata, pre-1945 One of the strengths of the book lies in its depiction of pre-1949 class divisions in China. Chapter 1 begins with a vivid description of a dinner party of wealthy Shanghaiese. The sheltered nature of their lives is immediately obvious from their simultaneous aloofness and limited concern about the civil war raging around them. There are politicians and secret police, a Kuomintang general, and a view of China as can only have been seen from such lofty heights. There is a short but ample description of how urban industrial workers live (pp. 32-34).

More than half the book is devoted to descriptions of Longxiang (the dragon's village of the title). Chen offers ample details on varying social strata, even at the village level. There are landless peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, small landlords, and big landlords -- their relationships to each other, as well as to everyone else up and down the social ladder, become understandable as Chen reveals the intricate fabric of rural life.

Conditions that Fostered the Communist Movement Details about the conditions of the urban industrial workers and the peasantry of Longxiang depict the life of the vast majority of the populace at the time. However, I have found that the most telling part of the story for my students was the culture shock suffered by the narrator, Ling-ling, upon her arrival in Gansu. (In this autobiographical novel, Ling-ling bears a close resemblance to the author, Chen. She is the daughter in a wealthy family, who becomes a land-reform cadre.) Here is a westernized woman, accustomed to living in a multi-storied brick house with servants, electricity, telephones, indoor plumbing, running hot water, and more food than she could possible eat (in other words someone to whom American students can relate, even if they do not live exactly like her) being transported into a world more than a century behind in technological development. The houses are all single-storied, with earthen walls and floors; light is by dim oil lamps; latrines are wherever one happens to be; water is so scarce that peasants only bathe three times in a lifetime (at birth, marriage, and death); and where, for half the year, there is only sufficient food for two meals a day while for the remainder of the year there is far less. Even though Ling-ling is Chinese and she has only traveled to another part of China, American students -- able to envision her Shanghai life -- can well comprehend the culture shock brought on by conditions found in Longxiang (see especially chapters 5 and 6).

One of the true measures of the book is its highlighting of the state of women in China. The story is replete with incidents that reveal the superstitions under which women were forced to live. For example, there is the case of a young woman who, although her betrothed husband died before the marriage ceremony, is compelled to go on with the ritual "marrying" of a board of wood as the groom's stand-in. She is then designated as a "widow." Social custom forbids her "remarriage" and condemns her to a life entirely given over to caring for her aged "in-laws." There are women forced into prostitution, women sold by their families in times of grave need, and girl babies who are the tragic victims of female infanticide (pp. 25-26, 79, 107, 174).

Objectives of the Communist Movement Land was clearly the key to the CCP's winning the allegiance of China's peasantry (80 percent of the population), and the importance of land can easily be discerned from this story. Land reform -- in its multiple stages -- is documented. Even though land reform will benefit the peasants, they are wary. Chen documents their doubts and fears -- what if the CCP is soon defeated and the peasants suffer retribution for having collaborated, how are they to know the CCP is not lying to them, can the CCP change a situation that has persevered for thousands of years? The peasants' response is classic pragmatism. For example, when a Poor Peasants' Association is organized, the only volunteers turn out to be young boys and men over sixty. The reason?

> "Well, when we asked them to put their names down they suspected we wanted to press-gang them or something like that, and yet they didn't want to be left behind if we really

> intended to hand out land. So they sent their old fathers and uncles to register in the Poor Peasants' Association. They reasoned that if it was a trick there would be no use taking in old men over sixty. If we really meant business they could always argue that the old man represented the entire family. Some families haven't got old men left, so they put down their small sons' names." (pp. 83-84)

This offers quite a different picture from the one students usually get of "uneducated" peasants.

Communist Victory The weakest aspect of the story for teaching purposes is the treatment of the reasons for the communist victory. It is true that the complexities of World War II, American and Soviet foreign policy, and political struggles among the leadership of China are all outside the scope of this story. However, there is an internal element to this success that is largely undisputed -- in 1949 the majority of the Chinese populace, who knew of the civil war, supported the communists over the Nationalists (the Kuomintang). Chen touches on this in her description of the ruling elites in Shanghai and in her accounts of the cadres who believed that the communist future promised a better life. But this theme will need further elucidation by the teacher, particularly for the years leading up to 1949. (See suggestions for further reference, below.)

Changes Brought on by the PRC Finally, the changes brought about by communism are explored. Since the story ends in 1951, there is little post-1949 detail; yet the hints for the future are clearly there. The author, after all, remained in China until 1972. We learn of the tragedy of the rich peasants who are mistaken for landlords and suffer the consequences. We also see that oppressive landlords are no longer a viable force in China. There are hints that members of the peasantry are learning -- however slowly -- that they have the power to shape their own lives to some degree; and that superstition and tradition are not immutable. And, most clearly, there are the hints that the women of China will no longer be victims of the brutal subjugation of the past -- the realization is evident that women have the capacity to think and act and do as their male counterparts.

Conclusion

This book is no paean to revolution, no tract for communist propaganda, but rather an attempt to understand the Chinese revolution on a popular level. At times the characters and the situations are too simplistically drawn, at times too melodramatic; and one wishes for more information. Students, and teachers for that matter, will not become China experts by reading this book. Yet, despite its shortcomings, and despite the existence of a shelf full of books on this period with considerably more scholarly information, only The Dragon's Village manages to capture so much detail in so short a space with such sensitivity and appeal. It offers a superb beginning for any budding Sinophile.

For Further Reference

Teachers might be interested in reading some of the following books for additional background on this period in Chinese history. Jack Belden, China

Shakes the World (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1973). Belden was an American journalist who traveled extensively in China during 1947-1949 and produced one of the best anecdotal accounts of that period. Jack Chen, New Earth (Peking: New World Press, 1957). The husband of Yuan-tsung Chen presents his own account of a village in Zhejiang province; his is a more statistically informative but drier account than his wife's. William Hinton, Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (N.Y.: Vintage, 1966). The classic account of the transformation to communist rule; poignant, detailed, and the most informative of this list. Isabel and David Crook, Ten Mile Inn. Mass Movement in a Chinese Village (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1979). As in Hinton's book, this account comes from foreigners who personally observed changes; less detailed than Hinton's but includes excellent photographs.

VII. C.

USING JUDGE DEE IN THE CLASSROOM

Note: This review by Sanford Stein first appeared in Focus on Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No., 2, Winter 1983. Celebrated Cases of Judge Dee, Translated by Robert van Gulik. New York: Dover, 1976, 237 pp., paper, $3.50.

During the years that I have taught Chinese history to high school students I have used selections from a number of different sources to teach about China, its literature, and its culture. Parts of The Water Margin, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Dream of the Red Chamber, and various poems have found their way into my classroom. However, for the purpose of introducing students to Chinese literature I have had the best success using the Judge Dee stories by Robert van Gulik. The stories center around the mythical exploits of an actual Chinese civil servant, Judge Dee or Dee Jen-djieh. Judge Dee served the Chinese court during the Tang (T'ang) dynasty. After his death in 700 A.D., he became legendary as story tellers began to spin yarns about his courage, rectitude, and cunning. Judge Dee represented all that was best in the Chinese magistrate. He was relentless in his pursuit of justice for all people whether they were rich or poor, noblemen or commoner, male or female, scholar or peasant. While Judge Dee was an expert with a sword, and as a wrestler, it was usually through the use of his intellect that he brought criminals to justice. Robert van Gulik was a Dutch diplomat and scholar who spent many years in East Asia. During that time he read and subsequently translated some of the Judge Dee detective stories. These stories served as the basis for a series of Judge Dee mysteries that van Gulik published between 1951 and 1968.

A work that I have used to introduce Chinese fiction is the short story, "The Coffins for the Emperor," in the book Judge Dee at Work. I start out by giving the students a list of two dozen terms from the story. The students are to find definitions to the following terms: brazier, marshal, courtesan, beaker, ramshackle, Uigurs, Tartars, dubiously, Khan, sedan chair, hovel, scourge, hordes, night watch, lecher, flogging, perfect, sarcophagus, mail jacket, resplendent, sappers, spurned, halberds, and tawdry. The list of terms is reviewed in class the next day for several reasons. Studying the meanings of the terms helps to build the students' vocabulary and makes it easier to read the story. Also, I ask the students what they think the plot will be, thus stimulating interest before they begin the reading.

After the students have read the story, class discussion starts with simple questions, e.g.: Who is the hero? What are the two mysteries he must solve? Who is Captain Pan? Once I have asked enough questions to satisfy myself that the students understand the basic plot development, I then turn to van Gulik's style. The main point that I try to bring out is that by changing the way in which characters speak to each other, van Gulik is able to show the different types of social arrangements in Chinese society. At first introduction people who are subordinate are humble to the point of obsequiousness, while people in superior positions show a haughtiness bordering on rudeness. Once characters come to know one another, van Gulik changes the dialogue to show that they are more friendly and equal. This can be observed in the scenes where Judge Dee is introduced to the military commander. Dee is curt to the woman, while he literally kowtows to the Marshal.

Finally, I use the story to look at the concepts of justice and morality. Quotations like, "A thousand men must be sacrificed if military necessity dictates it, sir, but not even one man must be lost if it's not strictly necessary," and the use of punishment without any attempt at rehabilitation present a unique perspective and an opportunity to discuss the nature of the criminal justice system in traditional China. The importance in this story of a woman who was sold into prostitution to pay a debt owed by her father, and Judge Dee's seemingly callous acceptance of her condition, can stimulate discussion on morality and cultural relativity.

In order to evaluate student understanding of the story, I use a test that contains three parts. The first group of questions are multiple choice, requiring student recall of factual information about the story. The second part is a group of matching questions based on the list of terms given out at the beginning of the lesson. In the final section, I ask the stuudents to write the answer to an essay question in which they compare and contrast the Chinese view of justice to the one in America today. In this way I hope to check the students' ability to apply what they have learned to the modern world.

Dynasties VIII

VIII.

CHINA'S MAJOR DYNASTIES: INTRODUCTION

A Developmental Approach to Traditional Chinese History

This part of the guide presents descriptions of five periods of premodern Chinese history. The periods, which we refer to as "dynastic segments," are as follows:

A. Hsia (Xia), Shang, and Western Chou (Zhou) Dynasties (2205? BC - 771 BC)
B. Eastern Chou, Ch'in (Qin), and Han Dynasties (771 BC - 220 AD)
C. Sui and Tang Dynasties (581 - 907)
D. Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279)
E. Yuan Dynasty (1260 - 1368)
F. Ming and Early Ch'ing (Qing) Dynasties (1368 - 1750)

We have organized our material this way, with some dynasties grouped together and others split apart, because it fits with our reading of the current interpretation of Chinese history. Our approach focuses on the overall development of the civilization over a three to four thousand year period. The major stages of the evolution of Chinese society sometimes overlapped precisely with dynasties; at other times they did not. The traditional approach, which is similar to traditional Chinese historiography and is borrowed by most textbooks, accepted the dynasties as the historical stages, and even theorized that each dynasty went through the same cycle of rise and fall. This view is partly correct, but it often misses trends that occur across dynasties. We also believe that teaching about such a vast sweep of history will be simplified once it is rationally reduced to a few distinct periods.

Why have we divided up Chinese history in this particular way? To our mind, Chinese civilization in each of these periods presented a different, significant response to an enduring problem -- how to organize and rule the Chinese cultural area so that it was relatively stable, prosperous, and safe. As we have outlined in the section on geography, that area is large, climatically, topographically and ethnically diverse, heavily populated, open to penetration from the Central Asian steppe, and predominantly agricultural. After the first of the five periods (Hsia, Shang, and Western Chou), the fundamental assumption was that there should be one political center, which ruled over the entire Chinese cultural area and influenced neighboring states. The other four represent elaborations and improvements of the idea of a centralized system. The five stages are best summarized as follows:

A. A Multi-State System (Hsia [?], Shang, Western Chou dynasties) During this period, the Chinese landscape was divided up into various states, each of which occupied a given territory, was ruled by a king and nobility, and protected by an army. The balance of power between states shifted from time to time: some disappeared and others emerged. In addition, there were changes as to which state was recognized as first among equals (i.e which had what came to be called the Mandate of Heaven). The Shang held that position from about 1766 B.C. to about 1122 B.C., when it was overtaken by the Chou. (The existence of the Hsia dynasty has yet to be definitely verified through archaeological research. Hence the question mark that follows its name. But more and more scholars assume that verification is only a matter of time, and say that the Hsia held the leading position from around 2200 B.C. to 1766 B.C.) Even the leading state did not have the power to dominate the country, and had to accept the existence of others (thus China in this is said to have had a "feudal" system).

B. The Early Imperial System (Eastern Chou, Ch'in, and Han dynasties) The multi-state system broke down in the Eastern Chou (770 B.C. to 221 B.C.), because changes in warfare, political organization, and the economy allowed some states to greatly expand their power in relation to others. In 221 B.C. the state of Ch'in achieved a dominant position, unified the country, and eliminated the old Chou aristocracy. It attempted to institute a new approach to ruling China -- a centralized bureaucracy which was recruited by examinations and which administered a strict yet standard set of laws. For various reasons the Ch'in lasted only twenty-five years, before it was replaced by the Han dynasty. In many respects it tried to implement the Ch'in system, but was only partly successful at best. Indeed, in the later Han period, there emerged a new landed aristocracy that subverted the attempt at centralized rule.

C. The Transition to Centralized Imperial Rule I (Sui and Tang dynasties) After almost four centuries of disunion -- in effect a multi-state system again -- the Sui dynasty reunified China. It sought to set up a Ch'in-Han type of political structure, and reinstate policies designed to limit the power of generals and the landed aristocracy. The Sui only lasted thirty-seven years, but the Tang successfully carried on its approach for about a century. It fell when faced insurmountable problems posed by its own and foreign armies.

D. The Transition to Centralized Imperial Rule II (Sung dynasty) After a fifty-three year period of disunion, the Sung dynasty reunified the country. Because the Sui-Tang aristocracy had been wiped out during the previous two centuries of intermittent warfare, the Sung dynasty succeeded where others failed in sustaining the centralized system first outlined by the Ch'in. Its emperors were also able to control the imperial army. They were not able, however, to effectively defend China against Central Asian forces, including the Mongols. We include a brief overview of the Yuan primarily to alert readers to new scholarship and to clarify certain points.

E. Note: The Yuan dynasty, for the purposes of this guide, is considered less essential to the study of Chinese civilization.

F. The Mature Imperial System (Ming and Early Ch'ing dynasties) The four centuries after the founding of the Ming dynasty (1368) represented the final act of the drama of traditional Chinese civilization. With the help of a responsive local gentry, an autocratic and bureaucratic system of government managed a large, pre-industrial society. After 1750, however, it was less and less able to cope with the twin problems of overpopulation (which stability had made possible) and a new, unprecedented challenge from the West.

Clearly, this mode of periodization focuses on issues of politics, in particular the relationship between government and society. In one sense, this focus is inevitable, since a genius in governance was the chief contribution of traditional China to human history. There are other trends that should not be ignored: the gradual spread of ethnic Chinese peoples into areas inhabited by other ethnic groups and the conflicts that resulted, the history of contending philosophies and ideas, and the marvels of Chinese artistic and scientific creativity. In the sections that follow, we try to provide an overall picture of the dynastic segments concerned, to include coverage of the economy, society, culture, religion and philosophy, and science and technology. There is a built-in continuity in the treatment of each of these topics, so that the reader interested only in religion and philosophy, for example, can read the relevant section of each dynasty chapter for a coherent, thumb-nail sketch of the subject. Even so, a lot of selectivity is necessary.

How does this approach affect the teaching of Chinese history in schools? First of all, it is not necessary to go dynasty by dynasty and force students to learn disparate facts that have only a remote relationship to the underlying evolution of Chinese civilization. The teacher can begin with the central focus and orient materials accordingly. Second, it is not even necessary to teach about every dynastic segment offered here. Although each represents what we feel to be an important part of the story, none is absolutely essential. Depending on the time available and the interest of the class, it is possible to telescope some periods in favor of others. There is a good case to be made, for example, for starting with the section on the mature imperial system, since that is most relevant for China's recent and contemporary history. Third, a teacher need not be comprehensive in the treatment the dynastic segment(s). China's history can be taught through its art, or its philosophies, or its politics. All are useful windows on the whole. Users of this guide should look carefully at Section II, "Strategies and Priorities" for further suggestions on how to be selective.

Are Dynasties Out?

Even though we have offered a developmental approach to understanding and teaching premodern Chinese history, we believe that dynasties still have a place. This should be obvious, since they are the building blocks of our periodization. However, they sometimes hide as much as they reveal.

Why have people used dynasties to make sense out of Chinese history? There are several reasons:

-- Each dynasty was ruled by a single family, and the succession from emperor to emperor stayed within the ruling family. Succession could still get very complicate d-- even bloody -- but it was a family affair. Once the ruling family lost its capacity to bring peace and prosperity to the Chinese empire, it came under attack and soon other families began competing for the right to call one of their own the "son of heaven."

-- The major dynasties were also the periods when China was relatively unified (although each dynasty did not necessarily rule over the same territory). The Emperor (and, in one case, the Empress) had the authority and power to command at least the nominal obedience of his subjects and other states. This situation contrasts with the periods of disunion, when the country split up into a number of rival kingdoms, each of which had a leader who claimed to be the true emperor but usually did not have the power to defeat his rivals and thereby make the claim stick.

-- The alternation between periods of fragmentation and unity under a strong dynasty can also illuminate changes in the Chinese economy. The various histories and textbooks credit different dynasties as being the ones in which commerce flourished. The chief candidates are usually the Han, the Tang, and the Sung, meaning that there is a thousand year difference between the earliest and the latest. In a sense, all claims are probably correct, for each period was relatively peaceful, the principal condition for the expansion of commerce. In periods of fragmentation the economy of the various small kingdoms was more self-contained. Each was more likely to fight than trade with its neighbors. (What we do not yet know is the level of commercial activity in each major dynasty; the answer probably is that each period of peace saw higher and higher levels of trade.)

-- The old Chinese approach to analyzing China's history is perhaps the most important reason for a dynasty-by-dynasty approach. Early on, traditional Chinese historians of a Confucian bent theorized that there was an objective and inflexible cycle that each dynasty experienced. For students of Chinese history, such an intepretive framework was quite a boon for according to it, each major period would be basically the same as any other, and each would develop along the same lines.

According to the dynastic cycle theory, a dynasty was like a living thing. It had its sequence of birth, growth, maturity, old age, and death. Each stage of the cycle had its indicators: prosperity and creativity in the early periods, peasant rebellions and natural disasters in the decline phase. (Earthquakes, floods, and famines were seen as relevant omens since the emperor was thought to mediate between heaven and earth). The source of a dynasty's legitimacy -- the difference between dynastic life and death -- was the Mandate of Heaven. The most important force driving the cycle was the quality of imperial rule, the example of virtue or corruption that the Emperor conveyed to his subordinates.

Today's historians accord some but not total validity to the dynastic cycle theory in interpreting the reality of Chinese history. It is certainly true that the emperor's character had an impact on the rise and fall of dynasties. The founder of an imperial house had to be an able man, or he would not have been able to unify the country in the first place. A ruling family's later emperors tended be far less able, perhaps because they had grown up in the palace, pampered and the object of attention and manipulation by empresses and eunuchs. But it is less clear how much an effective emperor actually evoked the integrity of his subordinates. And there were many reasons for each dynasty's troubles aside from imperial character. Some scholars, including John King Fairbank, have tried to save the dynastic cyle theory by looking at administrative and economic causes. Fairbank's framework is provided following this introduction for those who are interested.

In a sense, Fairbank's approach and the one offered here are both developmental. The difference is the scope involved. The dynastic cycle focuses on the evolution that takes place under one imperial house. Our "developmental approach" adopts a wider angle of vision, taking in the whole of traditional civilization. Neither is necessarily wrong because each is examining different phenomena. On the other hand, students of Chinese history in recent years have found the latter more interesting. It is our sense that high school students will also.

APPENDIX: The Dynastic Cycle, An Administrative Approach

All the great dynasties have an initial period of prosperity. The group that has seized the throne is relatively small and closely knit. The wars that have brought it to power have eliminated most of its rivals and therefore the wealth of the nation pours largely into its coffers. The country prospers in its newly established peace, the population seems to increase rapidly, and the treasuries and granaries of the central government overflow.

But an excess of yang leads to the rise of yin. The affluent central government builds great palaces, roads, canals and walls. The imperial clan, the nobility, and the high bureaucracy grow in numbers and become accustomed to an ever more luxurious mode of life. The very military successes of the empire have established far-flung defense lines that are costly to maintain. More and more lands and their peasant-cultivators are used for the personal support of the ruling classes and fewer and fewer tax-paying contributors remain to the central administration. Because of constantly increasing expenditures and often a slight decline in income, each dynasty begins to experience serious financial difficulties within a century of its founding.

Economic and administrative reforms are then carried out and may halt the financial decline for a while. The downward trend, however, eventually reasserts itself. Economic and administrative difficulties accumulate. Official self-seeking and corruption become worse, leading to a decline in administrative efficiency and an intensification of factional quarrels at court. The potential rivals of the imperial family become politically and economically more independent of the central government and challenge it with greater impunity. To meet government deficits, the burden on the tax-paying peasant is increased to the breaking point. Because of the government's financial difficulties, canals and dikes are allowed to fall into disrepair, making floods and droughts more probable. Crop failures that once could have been offset by stores from the government granaries now result in famines, and these lead to banditry and eventually to peasant uprisings. Inadequately maintained frontier defenses begin to crumble. Provincial officials and their armies begin to defect, and the central government starts to go to pieces. Then follow the wars that liquidate the old regime and clear the slate for a new dynastic beginning. (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960: 117-118)

VIII. A.

MULTI-STATE SYSTEM

The Hsia (Xia), Shang and Western Chou (Zhou) Dynasties
(c. 2205 B.C. - 771 B.C.)

Introduction

At some point around four thousand years ago, state societies emerged in the Chinese heartland. The village settlements of the Neolithic period gradually evolved into networks of settlements that were ruled over by individual clans or lineages. The rulers, who are usually referred to as kings, had at their disposal military forces and an administrative apparatus.

During this period, no one state had the power to dominate all of China (That stage did not come until 221 B.C.). But there usually was one state that was considered to be first among equals. The first of these is thought to be the Hsia, which controlled parts of Central China and held the leading position from about 2200 B.C. to 1750 B.C. (Archaeologists have yet to find conclusive proof of the Hsia Dynasty's existence, though most assume that confirmation is only a matter of time.)

The Shang, which had its base in East China, replaced the Hsia as the leading state around 1750 B.C. The Hsia state continued to exist for some time during the period of Shang supremacy. In 1100 B.C., the Chou state, which was based in West China, became the dominant force, though the Shang state continued to have minor status. Chou's true hegemony ended around 751 B.C. because its power declined relative to other states. The 1100-751 B.C. period is referred to as the Western Chou Dynasty and the 751-221 B.C. period as the Eastern Chou.

Historians of ancient China have gradually come to the conclusion that the continuities and similarities of the Hsia, Shang, and Western Chou periods are more significant than changes in the dominant state. The three are actually a single, coherent stage of Chinese history, intermediate between the decentralized nature of Neolithic agriculture and the centralization that began in the Ch'in (Qin) dynasty.

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

Stonehenge was built	c. 2000-1400 B.C.
King Tutankhamun of Egypt	1361-1352 B.C.
Trojan War	1200 B.C.
Exodus of Jews from Egypt	1230 B.C.
Carthage was founded	c. 814 B.C.
The first Catholic settlement in Great Britain	

Textbook Treatment

Many of the textbooks surveyed refer to the sophisticated bronze culture and the development of the lunar calendar which occurred during these dynasties.

There is some discussion of kings, pagan religions, ancestor worship and mention of a basically agricultural society. The family system and filial piety are well covered.

Key Concepts

1. Politics and Government The king of the dominant state, or hegemon, exercised direct rule over his own kingdom and indirect rule over the rulers of other states, at least some of whom were members of the royal family. The latter paid homage to the hegemon, who was said to possess what came to be called the "mandate of heaven." The hegemon also tried to retain sufficient military power to bring recalcitrant rulers to heel. This sharing of power and authority is somewhat analagous to European feudalism, though there are some differences.
2. Economic and Social Development The foundation of Chinese society -- family-based sedentary farming -- was securely laid. As Charles Hucker suggests, "The irreducible Chinese essence may be nothing more than the patterns of intensive agriculture that supported Chinese life throughout history." (Hucker 1973: 25)
3. Religion and Philosophy Natural forces were believed to influence human events and therefore were worth propitiating. Ancestor worship was practiced, first by the elite and later by common people.
4. Science and Technology Bronze technology was the main achievement of this period.
5. Art and Culture A sophisticated writing system, from which Chinese characters evolved, existed by the Shang. The Western Chou saw an outpouring of poetry and music.

Politics and Government

Verification that the Shang dynasty actually occurred came with the discovery of oracle bones in the capital city of Anyang in what is now Hopei (Hebei) province. Over the centuries peasants had turned up odd, fossilized bones as they plowed their fields. Believing the bones had medicinal powers, the peasants ground them into powder. It was not until the end of the 19th century that scholars took note of the strange writing on the bones and realized this was a contemporaneous written record of events.

The government, a city-based monarchy, was headed by a king who ruled by divine right. The succession was patrilineal. The king was aided by officials and nobles recruited for the most part from the royal family. There are isolated instances of commoners achieving high rank. The obligations between the king and nobles, who were in charge of outlying agricultural areas, were loose and tenuous.

Royal legitimacy stemmed in part from the belief that the king alone could communicate with his ancestors, who provided practical advice and guidance. The king was thus considered the high priest of the society, and ritual became an essential political activity. (See Religion and Philosophy)

In the 12th century B.C. royal legitimacy also began to emanate from the "mandate of heaven." It was then that the Kingdom of Chou successfully challenged the culturally superior Shang, and justified its military victory by claiming that the weak and self-indulgent Shang king had so abused his position that he had lost the "mandate of heaven" to rule. According to the Chou view, the Shang god, "Shang-ti," was thought of as a heaven that decreed who should be the ultimate ruler on earth. This god supposedly offered signs (floods, famines) to indicate when that person was no longer fit to hold power. The implication of this direct relationship between king and heaven was that the king was the son of heaven.

In this early period the mandate of heaven was sustained by religious belief but centuries later it was reinforced by practical application. In a primitive agricultural society there was indeed a real basis for the linkage between ineffective government and the wrath of the heavens. Government failure to maintain irrigation systems and man-made dikes meant that the famers suffered unduly from natural occurrences such as floods or drought -- which were heaven sent.

The principle of the mandate from heaven soon became enshrined as a central element of political power in traditional China and the key to interpreting the rise and fall of dynasties. It symbolized the accountability that the sovereign owed to his people.

A corollary of the mandate-of-heaven principle was that the state should play a broad role in social life. The view of classical Western liberalism that government should only interfere in society when absolutely necessary did not find favor in China. As Charles Hucker comments: "Thus what modern Westerners think of as welfare-state ideas were commonly preached, accepted and put into practice in Chou China. The ruler was administrator, military leader, judge, manager of the economy, priest, educator and moral exemplar. His responsibility was total. Accordingly, his authority had to be unlimited. . ." (In practice however, the ruler's sway was never total.) (Hucker 1973: 56)

The people's welfare, good government and one authority -- the king -- became interlocked into a familial, paternalistic relationship that was to be central to the political structure in Imperial China. The mandate of heaven persisted as the key to the Emperor's claim to political legitimacy throughout China's imperial history.

Early Chou kings took their mandate seriously and tried to follow the above model of the perfect king. The loose political organization of the Shang was consolidated into a structure which, because of its resemblance to the framework of medieval Europe, has been called feudalism. As refined by the Duke of Chou, one of the early strong men of the dynasty, this system was based on a formal arrangement whereby the king was to entrust territory conquered from the Shang to his kinsmen to rule, develop and protect. In return the kinsmen or lords had to acknowledge the king as ruler and pay him some sort of tribute. The individual lords often further divided their territory in an extension of this dependency relationship.

These fiefdoms soon became hereditary rather than being renewed at the pleasure of the king. Within each political unit or fiefdom, starting at the court and reaching down to the regional level, various ministers and officers actually ran the government. They, too, were soon to hold their positions by heredity. In these respects the actual operation of government and economy was decentralized during the first centuries of the Chou. On the other hand, the king was generally acknowledged to be the source of political strength to whom the regional nobles owed their power and he was looked to for leadership. In addition, within some states (including the House of Chou itself) the government was highly centralized.

How can this system be considered feudal? Chinese Marxist historians focus on what they consider to be a system of primarily economic domination, whereby peasants labored to support the lords and to provide the tribute paid to the king. They assert that the essence of this system persisted from the Chou dyansty down to the revolution of 1949.

Western historians take European feudalism as their point of comparison and focus more on political relationships. But they disagree on the final conclusion.

John Meskill, for example, acknowledges a number of similarities, such as dependence on personal loyalties, decentralized administration of territories by appointment and fragmented political and economic authority in the hands of a minority of warriors over a majority of peasants. For him the differences are more telling. The Chou rulers had the religious power which in Europe was lodged in a formal priesthood. The system developed from kinship rather than from a voluntary agreement which, in the European case, could be broken. Blood ties were reinforced by worship of a common ancestor which, in his view, made the differences between the two systems too great for them to be considered essentially the same type.

John Fairbank agrees with Meskill. As he puts it: "It would probably be a mistake to regard any part of the Chou period as having had a fully developed feudal system. . . In some ways it might be better to consider the early Chou system as simply an extension of a tribal type of organization, in which effective control depended more on bonds of blood relationship than on feudal legal principles." (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960: 52)

Charles Hucker is comfortable using the term feudalism to describe this period. However, he does note the imporance of kinship ties.

Economic and Social Development

To date there has been no evidence that the Chinese migrated into China proper from another area. Charles Hucker says: "China's national consciousness, therefore, does not include any epic Volkerwanderung in the remote past. Rather there is a strong sense of territorial permanence, deriving from the fact that the Chinese till fields their ethnic forbears have tilled since the very beginning of remembered time. The people and land belong to each other." (Hucker 1973: 13-14) The Chinese have no confusion about the location of their "roots."

The family-based sedentary agriculture helped determine the future shape of

Chinese civilization. It was a mode of life that was easily transported into the fertile river valleys further south, though not into the more arid north. Over the centuries, therefore, Chinese civilization spread south, but faced continual military threats from nomadic peoples suited to life in Central Asia.

The majority of the population were farmers who engaged in agriculture and food-gathering. They lived in outlying districts and cultivated fields theoretically owned by the king but in reality controlled by nobles. Their labor supported the nobles who lived in the walled cities.

The peasants used simple tools made of wood and stone; plows and formal irrigation systems were uncommon. The major crops were rice, wheat, and millet. Farm families kept domestic animals as well as water buffalo. Peasants lived in small one-room semi-subterranean houses with access by earthen stairs. Aside from farming, they participated in the royal hunts and were subject to recruitment as foot-soldiers in the army. Marriages in peasant families were probably monogamous.

Family life was most likely organized along patriarchal lines. Marriage was not to be taken lightly in the Chou dynasty -- at least if the Duke of Chou had his way. He wrote out a six-part marriage ceremony for a sub-group of administrators which, he hoped, would be a model for society. The ceremony involved the go-between, modest betrothal presents for the bride's family and the removal of the bride to the groom's house. These became the basis of marriage customs in China.

Although reluctant to forbid polygamy which was practiced by the nobility, the Duke considered monogamy the ideal. To emphasize this, the groom's family had to give a wild goose to the bride's family during each of the six stages of the ceremony. It is well known that the goose mated for life and the Duke hoped that the young man would -- after six offerings -- be similarly committed to monogamy. Whether or not Chinese society was ever matriarchal, as European Marxist historiography hypothesizes for all early civilizations, remains a major question.

The elite was headed by the king and composed of his nobles and officials, who paid homage to him but did not necessarily obey him. The lives of members of this elite revolved around hunting, war, ceremony and an interest in writing. They lived in large palaces, built above ground of pounded earth and roofed with thatch. The large number of bronzes discovered later (see below) suggests a high degree of civilization and luxury for that time. A special chariot-riding warrior class was a prestigious sub-group of the nobility. Members of the nobility may have had several wives.

Also living in the royal capitals were artisans, who were highly skilled but of considerably lower social-economic status. They worked in shops that produced articles for the court, such as bronzes. There are hints also of a merchant class, and evidence that cowrie shells were used as a form of money.

At the bottom rung of society were the slaves. They were captured war prisoners and did the most menial tasks for the nobility. It is the existence of this group that prompts contemporary Marxist Chinese historians to refer to the Shang as the Slave Society. Excavations reveal the remains of human sacrifices (see Religion and Philosophy) which are believed to have come from this group.

Religion and Philosophy (See Politics and Government)

As might be expected in a prescientific agricultural society, religion was closely associated with natural forces, and infused all aspects of everyday life. During the Shang dynasty, earth and some sort of God or Lord Above, called Shang-ti (Shangdi), received special homage. Unlike the Western concept of God, this being possessed no physical characteristics or human qualities. Since it was the king's obligation to perform rituals to this force, religion was practiced to obtain secular ends. Whether there was a special group of priests at this time is a matter of debate.

The relationship between the king and this natural force continued to be emphasized during China's imperial history. For instance, both the Emperors' robes and roofs of the Imperial Palaces were yellow in recognition of the rich yellow loess soil of the North China Plain.

Ancestor worship was confined to the ruling class. John Meskill provides a rationale for this practice. "It has seemed to many people, trying to explain what happened after death, that when those close to them had lost their breath, color and movement, their life force or spirit must have gone elsewhere, and it was concluded that this spirit needed care after it had joined the gods, just as it had when it inhabited the now lifeless body. Moreover, it was believed that the spirit could aid the living, especially those who had been formerly close to it." (Meskill: 10)

There was, therefore, thought to be a close linkage between the well-being of the ancestors and the quality of their living descendents' lives. Sons and grandsons were required to perform the rites. Thus, from the beginning of recorded history in China, it was necessary for the ruling classes to have sons with surnames to distinguish between families. Why the royal court made human sacrifices has yet to be fully answered. Some scholars suggest that the practice many have had a political rather than a religious motive. Since most of the human sacrifices appear to have been slaves from captured tribes, they may have been killed as a show of strength when a dynasty was weakened by change in leadership. It is known that animals rather humans were sacrifices to the natural forces.

Science and Technology

The royal tombs have been a rich source of artifacts which give some sense of the technology. Intricately ground jade ornaments, sophisticated bronzes, remains of silk, pottery shards and two-wheeled chariots attest to the high level of technological and artistic maturity. The design for the chariots is believed to have reached China through Central Asia from the Near East. However, it is surmised that the origins of the bronze technology were Chinese. Using clay molds rather than the lost-wax method known to the Near East, skilled craftsmen made a wide variety of vessels. The Chinese also developed a lunar calendar during this period.

Foreign Relations

Warfare was the chief instrument of foreign relations as the various kings tried both to protect their holdings and expand their territory. The two-wheeled chariots driven by the noble warrior class were the heart of the armies.

Wolfram Eberhard cautions us to discard any European concept of a frontier. Quite logically, if the Emperor were the son of heaven -- and there could be only one son -- all countries of the world were subject to the Chinese Emperor. The extent of this subjection decreased in direct proportion to the distance from the royal capital.

Trade was confined to some sort of tribute from the captured tribes.

Art and Culture

Aside from the bronzes, writing was the most significant cultural development of this period. It is clear that modern Chinese language evolved from the advanced pictograms of the Shang. The existence of at least 3000 characters and the remains of books written on bamboo strips reveal a high degree of literacy. Clearly, the written word has been held in high regard since the beginning of China's recorded history.

Percussion instruments used in the court ceremonies were also among the archaeological finds.

ENRICHMENT

I. Standard Chronology of Chinese History as found in the Chinese Museum of Chinese History in Peking in 1978:

Primitive society	ca. 1,000,000-4000 years ago
Slave society	ca. 21st c. B.C.-476 B.C.
Feudal society	ca. 475 B.C.-1840 A.C.
Semi-colonial and Semi-feudal society	1840-1919 A.D.

II. The following poem comes from The Book of Odes. It is believed to describe the life of peasants in North China -- probably in modern Shensi (Shaanxi) province -- in the 11th or 10th century B.C.

Anonymous / In the Seventh Month

In the seventh month the Antares moves westward. I shall receive new clothes soon, in the ninth month.

In the eleventh month the wind is cold. In the twelfth month the wind is bitter. Without new clothes, how can I pass through the winter?

In the third month I repair the plow. In the fourth month I plow the field. My wife and children bring me food; together we eat in the southern field. The lord's steward passes by, smiling his approval.

In the seventh month, the Antares moves westward. I shall receive new clothes soon, in the ninth month.

The sun shines warmly in the spring; everywhere one hears the oriole sing. Carrying a deep basket, my daughter goes to the mulberry grove. The leaves are moist and tender to be plucked for the silkworms at home.

Days in the spring move lazily; a multitude of silkworms crawl on the straw. "All this saddens me greatly. Oh heavens! When can I join the lad I love?"

In the seventh month the Antares moves westward. In the eighth month I cut straw and weeds. I bundle leaves and branches. To reach distant branches, I climb the tree with an ax.

In the seventh month the tailor birds sing. In the eighth month I weave silk. I dye it black, yellow, flashing red. I shall make clothes for the lord.

In the fourth month the grass grows beautiful and long. In the fifth month the cicada starts to sing. In the eighth month I collect harvest. In the tenth month trees shed their leaves.

In the first month I hunt foxes for their skin. With the skin I shall make winter clothing for the lord. In the second month I learn martial arts, being drilled with other peasants. I have acquired a litter of piglets; I shall present the fattened ones to the lord.

In the fifth month the centipede stirs. In the sixth month the cricket acquires its wings. It stays in the field in the seventh month, but comes to my house in the eighth. In the ninth month I find it inside my room. It goes into hiding underneath my bed in the tenth.

As winter comes closer, mice are smoked out from their hidings; walls are plastered to cover holes and crevices. I caulk doors and windows, especially those facing the north. "Oh, my wife and children, by the New Year you will have a new house."

I eat plums and scallions in the sixth month, and melons and peas in the seventh. In the eighth month I peel dates; in the tenth month I receive rice. Using rice I make spring wine; I shall present it to the lord on the anniversary of his birth.

I eat melons in the seventh month and empty gourds to make vessels in the eighth. In the ninth month I make hemp fiber and collect edible seeds and plants. For firewood I bring home dead trees. Oh, heavens! A peasant has to live!

In the tenth month I rebuild the vegetable garden and make it a threshing floor. In the tenth month I store the crops: millet, hemp, wheat and melon seeds.

Having finished working at home, I must report to the lord. I cut straw by day; in the evening I twist it into ropes. I must hurry to repair the lord's barn; before long it will be spring when I cultivate his field.

In the second month I hew out ice; in the third month I store it in a shady, cold place. In the fourth month the lord tastes the ice in his temple, where he offers scallions as tribute and lambs as sacrifice.

Frost begins to gather in the ninth month, when the air becomes cold. In the tenth month the threshing floor is swept clear and clean, as the day of celebration has finally arrived. Two jars of spirits are opened; lambs are slaughtered for this important occasion. To the lord's mansion we all go.

Raising our cups high, we shout aloud, "Long live the lord!" (LI: 12-14)

VIII. B.

THE EARLY IMPERIAL SYSTEM
THE EASTERN CHOU (ZHOU), CH'IN (QIN) AND HAN DYNASTIES

Eastern Chou (Zhou), 771-256 B.C., capital at Loyang. There are two sub-periods in Eastern Chou, each named after historical chronicles of the area. They are the Spring and Autumn Annals period, 722-481 B.C. and the Warring States period, 403-221 B.C.

Ch'in (Qin), 221-209 B.C., capital at Hsien-yang (Xianyang) and Ch'ang-an (Sian or Xian)

Han, 202 B.C.-220 A.D., capital at Ch'ang-an and Loyang

Introduction

This one-thousand year period saw momentous change in China. The multi-state system, which was described in the previous chapter, broke down as some states saw the possibility of being more than one of many kingdoms. A series of economic, social, political, and technological changes allowed several states to expand beyond old limits and to think of unifying all of China.

The feat of unification was first accomplished by the state of Ch'in, which became the name of the first imperial dynasty. Because of some serious weaknesses, the Ch'in only lasted twelve years. But before it disappeared, it established a framework for rule of a unified China. The Ch'in approach was to create a central bureaucracy staffed on the basis of merit rather than birth. This civil service implemented imperial decrees throughout the empire. This approach flew in the face of tradition, according to which earlier kingdoms had been left pretty much alone to handle their own affairs. Ch'in's goal was made easier by the fact that the ruling class of the Chou period had been greatly debilitated by centuries of conflict. It did not stand in the way of unified administration.

A second unification quickly followed on the heels of the first, this time under the auspices of the Han dynasty. The Han emperors adopted much of the Ch'in framework while moderating its worst abuses. But they also created problems for themselves by granting wealth, status and power to their relatives and supporters. This led to the emergence of a number of large families which were very successful in placing their members in high government positions and limiting imperial interference in their domains. This new aristocracy, which was to become a classic end-of-dynasty problem, eventually brought the Han down (see p. 4-5 in "China's Major Dynasties: Introduction" for a full description of the end of the dynastic cycle). China broke up into a host of independent kingdoms, each ruled by one of the great families, and was not unified again until the end of the sixth century (see VIII-C on the Sui and T'ang dynasties).

This section reviews this transitional period, from the decline of one system (multi-state) to the first experiment with a new system (unified empire). There are two parts.

The first analyzes the economic, social, technological, political, and philosophical dimensions of the Eastern Chou collapse. The second describes the innovations of the Ch'in and the Han emperors and the obstacles they faced.

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

Carthage was founded around 814 B.C.
Rome was founded around 753 B.C.
Solomon began his temple in Jerusalem in 961 B.C.
Punic War in Mediterranean 250-150 B.C.
Hannibal crosses the Alps 218 B.C.
Asoka's Indian Empire crumbles 202 B.C.
Carthaginians facing defeat by Rome 202 B.C.
Romans invaded Britain 55-54 B.C.
Hadrian's Wall begun c. 120 A.D.

Textbook Treatment

The texts generally do an adequate job of mentioning specifics. For instance: the family system and filial piety are well-covered; there is a general discussion of the major philosophical developments; the Ch'in's successful unification of China is stressed and there is a lengthy discussion of the Great Wall. The opening of the Silk Route through Central Asia is similarly highlighted.

The overall treatment of the Han is less successful. Only three texts stress the centralization of government and there are misleading discussions which erroneously imply the civil service examination system was fully matured. The great families, which replaced the hereditary nobility of the multi-state society as competing sources of power, are not discussed.

Generally, errors are those of emphasis. The texts speak in absolutes which make it difficult to perceive Chinese civilization as evolving over hundreds of years.

Part I: The Eastern Chou

Key Concepts

1. Economic and Social Development Because of changes in farming methods, the number of small, land-owning families grew. Commerce grew, and town and countryside became more interdependent. The family was clearly identified as the basic social unit.

2. Science and Technology With the invention of the cross-bow and iron weapons, large, infantry-based armies successfully challenged the chariot forces of the earlier period.

3. Politics and Government Some states, Ch'in in particular, developed new institutions to better mobilize the human and financial resources of their domains. This enhanced their military capability.

4. Religion and Philosophy As the multi-state system's balance of power became increasingly unstable, and as the norms of Chou feudalism began to lose meaning, China's thinkers tried to bring order out of chaos. Confucius and his disciple Mencius (Kong Fuzi and Mengzi) focused on improving social relationships. The Legalists advocated that strict rules be uniformly and predicatably enforced. Taoists (Daoists), like Lao-tzu (Laozi) and Chuang-tzu (Zhuangzi), suggested more of a live-and-let-live approach -- the believed that chaos would continue as long as people tried actively to order society.

Economic and Social Development

The Eastern Chou was a period of extensive social and economic change. Agriculture became more productive and land came to be seen as a commodity that families could own rather than take in trust from a lord. The family taxation systems evolved accordingly. Small towns sprang up as centers of urban-rural exchange.

Agriculture Farming was stimulated by increased use of fertilizer, the introduction of better tools and simple harnesses for animals and, to some degree, by the continuing management of water -- if only on a local scale. With the passage of four or five centuries, occupations became more specialized. Peasants began to concentrate on one crop. In a few cases land became available for sale as the descendants of the lords who had received the original fiefs from the king began, with the passage of time, to think of the land as theirs to do with as they pleased. Individual farmers began acquiring land, thus setting them apart from less fortunate neighbors.

Towns A variety of small manufacturing concerns sprang up in the towns as the peasant exchanged his agricultural surplus for cloth, iron, tools, pottery and other household goods produced in the town. The introduction of coined money in the 5th century B.C. expedited this commercial development. Thus, around the 6th or 5th century B.C. the central walled city began to change from a purely military and administrative unit to a true commercial and trading center, and urban merchants grew in strength. A basic economic structure built around rural-urban interdependence in a clearly delineated area began to emerge in the second half of the Chou dynasty. This structure has been central to Chinese agricultural development ever since.

The Family System Up until about the 5th century B.C. only the noble families had a corporate status, with surnames and recognized economic, political and social functions. They had property to distribute, governing responsibilities, and needed male heirs to worship their ancestors. Peasants lived in family groupings, but the units were not regarded with the same formality. However, in the 5th century B.C., all Chinese were given a surname, a move which gave individuals at all levels of society a family and clan affiliation. Increasingly, lower class family units began to acquire land and assume economic responsibility. Influenced by Confucius' five relationships, three of which were concerned with kinship ties, the family also became a strong social and political unit. Thus by the end of the Chou dynasty Confucian values that had originally been directed to the upper classes were beginning to permeate the whole society.

F.W. Mote has suggested that observing Chinese society solely in terms of class diminishes the importance of these clans and families. One of the dynamics of Chinese civilization was the imperative felt by the families to perpetuate themselves and to assume a wide variety of responsibilities which in Western societies became the province of the state.

Taxation The transition from a "feudal" economic and political organization to an embryonic system of taxation was intensified when the dependents -- peasants or lesser nobles -- began to pay their superiors a certain percentage of their goods rather than undefined "tribute." As John Meskill interprets this: "To pay a proportion of the wealth at one's disposal implied that one was an owner, a radical change for the farmer, who had formerly appeared to be himself a possession, incapable of possessing anything." (Meskill: 19)

Science and Technology

Advances in military technology and tactics during the Warring States period played a role in the decline of the feudal system. Swords and deadly crossbows, and mounted cavalry and infantry units of thousands were employed in the costly and destructive wars. A mobile observation tower, called a nest cart, was used to spot military maneuvers. A man sat in a box which was hoisted to the top of a tower on a platform. The whole device was pulled by men or by horses.

There is archaeological evidence of iron mining activity at Mt. Tonglu (Donglu Shan) on the Yangtze River. Swords, farm tools, glass, the wheelbarrow, and improved harnesses and bellows were all introduced during the late Chou.

The Classic of Internal Medicine established the theoretical foundation of Chinese medicine.

Astronomy was of particular interest to the emperors who had shifts of astronomers making round-the-clock observations. It is possible that the Spring and Autumn Annals contains one of the earliest references to Halley's comet.

Politics and Government

The changes discussed above -- economic growth, a less rigid class structure, the perception of land as property, the increased importance of the family, and advances in military technology -- laid the foundation for a shift in the balance of power between the Chou court and regional lords. These lords did not openly question that the House of Chou had the mandate of heaven to rule. Indeed they seem to have clung to the ideal of a unified country long after the reality had vanished. But they governed what were in fact independent kingdoms, and they grew in economic and military power as fast as Chou declined.

By the end of the 4th century B.C. the rulers of the most powerful states -- Ch'in (Qin), Ch'i (Qi), and Ch'u (Chu) -- began jockeying for power amongst themselves. A form of warlordism, that was to be a recurring phenomenon in Chinese history, became the dominant form of political struggle. When the kingdom of Chou disappeared in 256 B.C. the event was hardly noticed. Thirty-five years later the state of Ch'in accomplished the unprecedented: military control over the whole country.

Religion and Philosophy

The political disintegration in the Eastern Chou encouraged a rich diversity of intellectual activity. The following schools of thought emerged and affected government, social structure and ethics in the ensuing imperial period.

Confucianism was the most significant school of thought that developed. Its founder was Confucius (551-479 B.C.), a teacher and a concerned citizen who had hoped to be a government official. Confucius sought a form of government that would bring prosperity to the people. He regarded the Western Chou period as an age which, if recreated, would end the disunity and instability of the times in which he lived. He believed that government should be ruled by an aristocracy, as it was during the Western Chou, but he believed that this elite would have to prove itself worthy of governing. He maintained that education in ethics was essential to good government, an idea that became the heart of future Chinese political thought. He was more a political commentator than he was a philosopher. He was not a writer. *The Analects of Confucius* are a collection of his sayings assembled after his death. *The Five Classics*, which are associated with Confucius were, with the exception of *The Spring and Autumn Annals*, written before his time.

Confucius set high store on the Western Chou practice of ritual and propriety (li). But this was not form for form's sake. *Li* was both a means of relating with Heaven, and also a way of stimulating good and moral behavior that would clarify relationships and encourage an orderly, harmonious society. Confucius was against written law because it was inflexible and based on force. He felt it would encourage people to be guided by words rather than by what was internally felt to be virtuous and decent. *Li* promotes self-enforcement as a means of social control.

Confucius restated the paternalistic idea developed in the Western Chou that government was to be for the people. However, by stressing that government has responsibilities as well as rights, he hoped to forestall the tyranny of an absolutist monarch. At no time, however, did he entertain the notion that government should be by the people. The election process has never been part of the Chinese tradition. There is thus a dichotomy present in Confucianism.

> Socially it is democratic inasmuch as it grants to all men the possibility of moral and intellectual improvement, yet politically it is paternalistic inasmuch as it reserves governmental activity to a moral and educational elite, while denying it to the people at large. In other words, Confucianism sanctifies a structured and highly hierarchical society, yet at the same time grants to individuals the possibility of moving upward or downward within this social structure. (Bodde 1957: 65)

The authority for Confucianism does not rest on a single text. There is no Confucian equivalent of a Bible or a Koran as the authority for beliefs. Confucius relied upon the historical experience of the Western Chou which he then idealized and reinterpreted to design a model form of government. This lack of clear authority made it possible for Confucianism to be considerably distorted in its application over the next 2000 years. It is a doctrine for all people, capable of supporting conservatism, progressivism, or both. Whether Confucianism and all its modifications was an obstacle to China's modern development is an intriguing and hotly debated question.

Confucius has been brought into many a Chinese political debate during the 2500 years since his death. During critical periods of Chinese history his beliefs have been converted, perverted, damned, praised and selectively edited to legitimatize or discredit government policy. To cite only one example: in 1973 Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), justifying some of his post-Cultural Revolution policies, attacked Confucius for his "feudal" ideas. However, in 1980, during a period when Mao himself was being criticized, Confucius' reputation was rehabilitated at a scholarly forum. Confucius was no longer to be blamed for the feudal ethics that had crippled China, stated modern Chinese philosophers. Previous rulers and scholars "had distorted his teachings for their own purposes." Although expressing reservations about some of his teachings, the scholars agreed "Confucius as a historical figure, should be honored as such."

Mencius (372-289 B.C.) was one of Confucius' most famous disciples. While Confucius was concerned with the just governor, Mencius wrote about the governed. Using a myth about the ancient historical figure T'ang the Successful as an example, he stressed heaven's power to withhold the mandate to rule from the Emperor, if the people showed displeasure. Thus, the "right to rebel" became a political instrument. Mencius also believed that man was basically good. He felt that the study of ethics and conformity to the hierarchy and structure that Confucius advocated brought out the best in men.

Hsun Tzu (Xunzi), a 3rd century B.C. disciple, further developed the idea that there were superior beings who had to prove their excellence if they wanted to govern the common people. He said mental labor contributed more to society than physical labor. Therefore, in a world with a limited amount of goods, those who who worked with their minds instead of their hands should receive the most. This also meant that the educated elite received special privileges such as immunity from certain laws.

Legalism took a very different tack. The legalists had little faith in man's basic desire to be good and virtuous and believed that man acted out of self-interest: "If he (the ruler) counts on people doing good of themselves, there will not be enough such people to be numbered by the tens in the whole country." (DeBary et al: 127)

Therefore, said the Legalists, clearly defined laws and punishments are necessary to deter crime. These laws must be applied equally to all classes and all ranks regardless of one's position. A strong, modern state demands a "single standard of morality for its people." Law was not to protect people but to help the ruler make the state powerful so he could do as he wished.

Taoism (Daoism) was also developed in the Eastern Chou dynasty. Its origins were in the natural forces or spirits worshiped by the people of the preceding Shang and Western Chou dynasties.

It is said that if one claims to truly understand the Tao (Dao), which means the Way, then "that Way isn't the Way." Tao's power is in its elusiveness.

There is a force implicit in this power called wu-wei, which, to add to the confusion, means nonaction. A good example is the popular Chinese exercise, T'ai Chi Chuan (Taijiquan), which is an offshoot of Taoism. Legend says T'ai Chi Chuan started in the 14th century when a meditating monk observed a snake eluding an attacking bird. Rather than take the offensive against the bird, the snake slowly and sinuously pulled back in a series of graceful maneuvers. T'ai Chi Chuan is the essence of wu-wei. It is action without forcing or altering nature's way.

Taoism is often expressed by the ancient symbols of yin and yang which together form a dynamic balanced whole -- while still retaining elements of each in the other. Too much of one will cause a weight which upsets the balance. However, this overload will eventually cause a shift back. This is the way the Taoists perceive the universe operating. If one follows the Tao, or the Way, misfortunes are by definition temporary and will right themselves in time.

One can see why Taoism had great appeal to the Chinese peasant who was at the mercy of natural forces. If he believed in the Tao, he could console himself with the idea that the failure of his crop wasn't necessarily his fault. It was Fate and because the Tao seeks balance, the other extreme of good fortune would come his way.

Although, strictly speaking, Taoism was inconsistent with Confucianism, it was also complementary. This helps explain its appeal. William DeBary puts it well:

> To the solemn, rather pompous gravity and burden of social responsibility of Confucianism, Taoism opposes a carefree flight from respectability and the conventional duties of a society. . . . Confucianism has represented the mind of the Chinese scholar-gentleman in his office or study, being a good family man, a conscientious bureaucrat, and a sober responsible citizen; Taoism has represented the same gentleman in his private chambers or mountain retreat, seeking surcease from the cares of official life, perhaps a little drunk, but more likely intoxicated by the beauties of nature or of the world of the spirit (DeBary et al: 48)

This duality is apparent in the Chinese perception of religion. It is often said that a Chinese is a Confucian at work; a Taoist at play and a Buddhist when he is about to die. No wonder that centuries later (see IX-G) the Chinese were to be confused by the Western Christians who insisted one must be either a Catholic, a Methodist, a Baptist, or some other denomination.

Over the centuries Taoism was to affect many aspects of Chinese civilization. The idea of worship of natural spirits later encouraged the organization of Taoism as a religion with collective worship, priests and ritual. Much of Chinese science and medicine had its roots in Taoism. The Taoist search for immortality encouraged the study of diet and botany, and led to experiments conducted with rare metals. Astronomy evolved out of the Taoist observations of the solar system. Present-day acupuncture had its origins in the Taoist view of the nervous system as a natural force. Taoism also had a political effect when it became associated with secret societies in later centuries. These societies relied on a Taoist-inspired mysticism as a cohesive force. In addition, the Taoist belief in as little government as possible reinforced the strength of the secret societies which became a natural locus of peasant discontent in bad times.

Foreign Relations

The spread of agriculture during the Chou began to affect foreign relations. Although the migration southward toward the Yangtze Valley and East China proceeded peacefully due to a geography and climate that facilitated the assimilation of the indigenous native populations with the family-based agricultural society of the Chinese, migration towards the north went less smoothly. Conflict developed between the northern nomads -- the "barbarians" as they came to be called by the Chinese -- and the Chinese.

The Chinese perceived the northerners as having a technologically inferior and thus barbaric civilization. In fact, geographic constraints demanded a different civilization. At first the northerners followed a mixed agriculture-herding economy. However animal husbandry was more suited to the high arid steppes and with the development of horseback riding in the 8th century B.C. it became dominant. Horses were used in raids against marauding tribes who poached animals and used waterholes and grazing lands. It was a precarious and unorganized life which contrasted with that of the Chinese farmer. Conflict intensified when the northerners realized they could get necessary farm products by raiding Chinese settlements. By the late Chou, "nomadism" was such a threat that the individual warring states began to erect protective walls.

Art and Culture

Bronzes continue to dominate artistic activity in the Chou. Literature describing the 5th century B.C. mentions string and reed musical instruments. In 1978 a set of bronze bells was excavated from a Chou tomb.

Part II: Ch'in and Han

Key Concepts

1. Politics and Government The Ch'in tried to impose its governmental structure on the newly unified empire. The features of this structure were a bureaucracy whose officials were chosen by examination; a system of standardized rules which the officials were to enforce without regard to the social status of those who violated the rules; and elimination of Confucian modes of thought. The Ch'in emperors ruled harshly. Their Han successors tried to end the worst Ch'in abuses while maintaining the fundamental character of the Ch'in system. The Han introduced the idea of training officials in the Confucian classics. As time went on, the Han faced problems that Ch'in did not. Most importantly, a group of large and powerful families rose up and restrained its power and palace groups that rivaled the authority of the emperor emerged.

2. Economic and Social Development During the Ch'in and early Han, there continued to be a large group of free-hold peasants. As a new aristocracy grew, their independence waned and they were forced into dependency on the great families. Because there was relative peace, commerce flourished during the Han dynasty. The imperial government tried to regulate and tax trade.

3. Religion and Philosophy Legalism was the dominant school of thought during the short-lived Ch'in dynasty. It remained influential during the Han, but after synthesizing many features of Chinese folk religion, Confucianism was resurrected as the official state ideology of the Han. Many Han emperors were essentially Taoists, and forms of Taoism inspired the peasant rebellions that threatened the dynasty.

4. Foreign Relations As Chinese began to spread their mode of life to the north and south of the Yellow River valley they came into greater contact with other peoples. In response, the court developed the tribute system of foreign relations, which lasted until the nineteenth century.

5. Science and Technology By the time of the Han dynasty, China had become a world leader in the realm of scientific and technological developments. Many of its inventions did not reach the rest of the world until centuries later, however.

Politics and Government

China's name acknowledges the Ch'in as the first dynasty to effectively unify what had been a loose multi-state system. The first Ch'in emperor, Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (Qin Shihuangdi), abolished the old feudal states and moved the nobles and their families to the capital -- far from the power bases.

The government itself was divided into 36 administrative districts. (These were divided in turn into counties -- the basic unit of Chinese administration until this day.) Both a civil and military governor were appointed to head each of the 36 districts. They, in turn, were supervised by a controller directly responsible to the emperor. There was, of course, a continual struggle between the three but the system defined a clear line of authority to the center and prevented officials from becoming feudal lords. One can see in this system the essence of later Chinese administration. This at least temporarily successful defeudalization or centralization of government in a non-feudal, non-hereditary bureaucratic administration is what led Hucker to refer to this dynasty as a "watershed in Chinese history." (Hucker 1975: 43) The Ch'in laid down the foundations of the Chinese state for the next 2000 years.

Centralization in government led to the standardization of weights, measures, coinage and language. The centralization and standardization that was the hallmark of the Ch'in was not carried out without force. Indeed, the Ch'in is often remembered primarily for the strict system of rewards and punishments that it imposed on the people. Even families were divided into mutual surveillance units to insure social control. Not surprisingly, Confucian historians have responded negatively to the Legalist underpinnings of the dynasty over the centuries and stressed the ruthless, inhumane aspects of the first Ch'in emperor.

Not until the People's Republic was a serious reassessment undertaken. Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang-ti was regarded as something of a cultural hero and Mao Tse-tung was compared favorably with him for his role in unifying China after fifty years of disunity.

The comparison with Mao is apt, for the Ch'in sought to implement what amounted to revolutionary changes in the fields of government, economy, society, and thought. In the end, the dynasty did not have enough time to institutionalize its sweeping changes, primarily because it failed to work out a formula for imperial succession. The death of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti prompted palace plots and a brief round of military conflict between regions.

The first sixty years of the Han dynasty was a period of recuperation and dynastic consolidation. The first Emperor, Han Kao-tsu, did much to reduce the harshness of the legalistic system of the Ch'in. Under the influence of Confucianism, laws became relativistic and conditional rather than rigidly egalitarian.

However, the establishment of the Han did not signal an abrupt break with Ch'in policies or an abandonment of Ch'in institutions. The Han built a new state system which resembled a pyramid with the emperor at the top and groups of agencies in the central, regional, and local strata under him. Each level of the pyramid had three faces -- one each for general administration, military command and censorial surveillance. . . thus retaining the concept which began in the Ch'in of tripartite power under an overall authority.

The Han's major new contribution to Chinese political theory was the creation, in 124 B.C., of a national university to train Confucian officials. The university was a further development of the Ch'in idea that government should be administered by a bureaucracy under the control of a central authority. Through it, the Han attempted to systematize the recruitment of a civil service through written examinations. The underlying theory was that access to the elite should be by merit rather than by birth. However, in practice, selection for state service or promotion in rank continued to be made mainly upon the recommendations of sponsoring provincial or metropolitan officials. A meritocracy based on a written examination was not to become reality until the T'ang dynasty.

The first Han emperor broke with Ch'in policy in his relations with his administrators. Instead of removing the competing sources of power lodged in the feudal lords, he granted princedoms and marquisates to his strongest supporters as a reward for their loyalty to him.

By the 1st century A.D. these huge land grants had provided the great families with numerous avenues for strengthening their economic and political positions. Families found it increasingly easy to evade taxes and incorporate new lands into their estates by falsifying land registers, foreclosing mortgages, and the like. Tenant farmers fell into virtual serfdom and impoverished peasants, fleeing the tax collector, turned to powerful landlords for economic security and protection and ended up hereditary dependents. By the late 2nd century great local families were simply too rich and powerful to be curbed by the central government. They lived off exorbitant rents extracted from the peasantry and, in addition, controlled trade and protected their wealth by monopolizing higher court posts. Political influence was also securely rooted in the control of regional military forces. Despite the efforts of the central government to set up a civil service system, members of the great families continued to dominate the bureaucracy. They owed their posts to inheritance, patronage, or to open manipulation of the fledgling examination system.

During the Han central government was also threatened by palace intrigue. Palace politics always focused on the struggle for power between the regular bureaucracy called the Outer Court and the functionaries of the Emperor called the Inner Court.

The Chinese emperors did not make marriage alliances with daughters of foreign royal houses as did the European kings. Rather, the Empress was selected from among the young women who had been chosen to serve as the Emperor's concubines (concubines were considered necessary to assure male heirs). Thus any young woman in China might become an Empress.

All the men who served in the Inner Court were castrated to guarantee that that the children born to concubines had been fathered by the Emperor. These eunuchs were privy to court secrets and were often used by the Emperor for confidential missions. Thus they had potential to acquire great power. A separate "palace government" controlled by the eunuchs filled the vacuum created by a weak emperor.

Such a situation developed around 20 A.D. Coupled with the economic distress that was developing as the landed aristocracy continued to impose heavy burdens on the peasants, it caused a major dynastic crisis. However, a mid-stream correction under able and conscientious rulers restored the vitality of the dynasty for another century.

In the end, however, these disruptive domestic forces which were exacerbated by peasant rebellions forced the court to rely on the military power of the great families. This spelled the end of the Han dynasty and paved the way for another period of disunity.

Han China did not become a Confucian bureaucracy overnight. The hereditary aristocracy was too powerful to be quickly dislodged from its position and privilege. However, Han initiatives did go a long way towards providing the basic framework of Chinese government and society. Building on the consolidation of centralized authority initiated in the Ch'in and introducing the ideal of a meritocracy, the Han set the stage for the further refinement of the political process which was to take place four or five centuries later.

Economic and Social Development

Government control of major segments of the economy was institutionalized during the Han, although over the centuries the implementation was to be inconsistent and sporadic.

The government owned and controlled the shipyards and armories and assumed the responsibility of regulating and marketing essential goods such as grain, salt and iron. It created a "sophisticated complex of market controls that had no systematic counterparts outside China until state socialism and welfare-state practices developed in the very modern West." (Hucker 1975: 88)

The Han innovation, the ever-normal granary, which was to be periodically revived during the course of Imperial China's history, is an important example of this practice. When supplies were abundant and prices were low, the government purchased and stored large quantities of grain in centrally located warehouses. Thus surpluses were available to counter famine and prices could be kept relatively stable.

Students of American history can identify the parallels with the New Deal legislation designed to alleviate the suffering of American farmers. Indeed, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace made reference to ancient China and the ever-normal granary when commenting on this legislation.

Commerce flourished despite the government's anti-commercial stance and the fact that both Confucianists and Legalists considered private commerce something to be monitored with care and ruthlessly supressed if it began to prosper. Although this philosophy failed to curb the growth of commerce, it did provide the basis for discrimination against merchants. Typically, they were subject to sumptuary laws, disqualified from official service, subject to heavy direct and indirect taxes and permitted to set up shops only in certain areas of town.

Social Organization As the pattern of landholding farmers spread in the Ch'in and early Han, measures were enacted to prevent a new rural elite from emerging from this group of small farmers. It was forbidden for two adult males to live under the same roof, and land was to be distributed among all sons upon the death of the father. The latter measure by and large had the desired effect of encouraging the fragmentation of the land tenure system that became an enduring characteristic of the Chinese countryside. But the prohibition was not completely successful in the case of the privileged great families. If they were prosperous, the great families often found ways to stay together in order to continue to reap the benefits of familial cooperation.

In some respects the great families, which were the backbone of a new elite based on wealth and political influence rather than a hereditary nobility, were like a business concern:

> The components of such a unit typically included (1) a wealthy, politically influential landowner; (2) his immediate family and household, including concubines, servants, and slaves; (3) his agricultural estate, probably including some scattered plots worked by tenants but ordinarily consisting mainly of a large, consolidated tract worked by serf-like indentured peasants and often partly by slaves; (4) a host of "guests" (k'o), ranging from astrologers and scholarly proteges to political spies and assassins; and (5) an army of private fighting men (pu-ch'u), who often manned castle-like fortifications that defended the estate from intruders. "Guests" and private fighting men were attached to the household by pledges of allegiance; they could be given away as gifts but not sold, and they were free to renounce their allegiance to one patron and offer themselves to another. Peasants on an estate seem to have been bound to the land, usually by contracts that theoretically allowed them to regain their freedom. Slaves were openly bought and sold (Hucker 1975: 77)

Although conscientious officials pushed for reforms which would relieve the burdens on the peasantry and the government occasionally remitted taxes, the problem of unequal land distribution and rural poverty was never resolved. Clearly, the Han failed to achieve the social ideal formulated by pre-Han thought -- a prosperous free peasantry governed by an intellectual elite.

Even those peasants who avoided slavery for the most part existed at the margin of subsistence while working share-crop holdings, paying rents and taxes, and responding to decrees to work on military or public works projects. The fate of the peasants and the prevailing attitude towards them is well-illustrated by the following quote:

> The gambler came upon a farmer clearing away weeds. He had a straw hat on his head and a hoe in his hand. His face was black, his hands and feet were covered with calluses, his skin was as rough as mulberry bark, and his feet resembled bears' paws. He crouched in the fields, his sweat mixing with the mud. The gambler said to him, "You cultivate the fields in oppressive summer heat. Your back is encrusted with salt, your legs look like burnt stumps, your skin is like leather that can not be pierced with an awl. You hobble along on misshapen feet and painful legs. Shall I call you a plant or a tree? Yet you can move your body and limbs. Shall I call you a bird or a beast? Yet you possess a human face. What a fate to be born with such base qualities!" (Wright 1971: 19)

Religion and Philosophy

There was no place for Confucian thought during the Ch'in dynasty. All philosophical thinking not of the Legalist school was viewed as a threat. In 213 B.C. all works except Ch'in chronologies, medical and agricultural texts and treatises of divination were eliminated. The only teachers allowed were those employed by the state. Large numbers of scholars were executed when they defied these orders.

Therefore, when Confucianism was resurrected as the orthodox state ideology during the Han it took a form that bore little resemblance to the Confucianism of Chou times. Even though massive efforts were made to reconstruct works lost during the Ch'in, Han Confucianism was syncretic rather than specifically Confucian. It was an "amalgamation of Confucian morality with elements from Cosmology, and superstitious beliefs within a framework which correlated human, natural and supernatural spheres and emphasized portents and numerology." (Hook 1982: 318)

Han scholars were not so much won over by Confucian philosophy as interested in identifying themselves with the respected Confucian tradition. The new Imperial University, established in 124 B.C., was directed by Confucian scholars. (See Politics and Government)

Although in the later Han the ethical and moral concepts of Chou Confucianism began to reassert themselves and members of the imperial government claimed to be ardent believers in Confucianism, the disciplines and controls of Legalism were always present.

Buddhism entered China along the caravan routes in Central Asia. In the years of the Han, it did not, however, influence major social or intellectual movements. (See VIII-C for a more extensive discussion.)

Foreign Relations

The Ch'in dynasty pursued an aggressive foreign policy. In addition to conquering China Proper, the Ch'in penetrated into the northern part of present-day Vietnam and established Ch'in rule along the southern coast of China in the neighborhood of Canton (Guangzhou). These areas were not, however, fully assimilated or firmly controlled. To the north existing protective walls were consolidated and expanded into the Great Wall which ran from Kansu (Gansu) province to the Pacific coast.

The Han also pursued an active, aggressive foreign policy. In 104 and 102 B.C. two Chinese armies crossed the Tarim Basin and the Pamir range to subdue Ferghana in what is now Russian Turkestan. In 42 B.C. armies got as far as Sogdiana, the former Greek kingdom. "Thus Chinese armies, marching across all but impenetrable deserts and mountains, extended Han military might farther from their capital (over 2000 miles) than the Roman legions ever reached from Rome, despite the much easier communications of the Mediterranean area." (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960: 101). Closer to home, the Han saw the filling out of China's borders to the south.

By the Han dynasty, historians can begin to identify certain hallmarks of Chinese foreign policy. The important principle of "using barbarians against the barbarians" was devised in response to the threat from the Hsiung-nu (Xiongnu) tribe in the north. Having failed to appease these tribes people by such strategems as offering a Chinese princess in marriage to their emperor, a Han emperor complemented military activity by dispatching diplomatic missions to make alliances with Central Asian peoples hostile to the Hsiung-nu.

A pattern of diplomatic relations known to students of Chinese history as the tributary system was also instituted during the Han to maintain control in areas not suited to Chinese settlement. Under this system "lesser countries" acknowledged Chinese superiority by sending useful and elaborate gifts to China. In return they received "gifts in reply" and the prestige associated with a relationship with the "superior" China. This tributary system became a major feature of China's relations with all foreign people. It also became the major means of foreign trade in the early Imperial Age, since dealings with "barbarians" were discouraged. Any trade that existed was restricted to frontier markets supervised and sponsored by the government.

By the end of the Han the tenuous Chinese hold on Central Asia had slipped away. However, the foundations of a tightly controlled trading system based on tribute remained to become one aspect of Chinese foreign policy.

Science and Technology

Despite the intellectual persecution in the Ch'in, unification and standardization resulted in a great outburst of technological activity. Large-scale construction projects were undertaken and waterways were improved. The Ch'in official, Li Ping (Li Bing), devised a magnificently engineered irrigation system in the region of Chengtu, Szechuan (Chengdu, Sichuan), which is still in use, irrigating 980,000 acres. The Great Wall was another superb engineering feat of the period. It should be kept in mind, however, that such vast projects were, in part, made possible by the harsh Ch'in system of law. Hundreds and thousands of subjects were convicted of crimes and sentenced to hard labor thus providing the administration with a huge work force.

During the Han, Chinese astronomical and mathematical learning reached a high level that may reflect stimulation from India and West Asia. On balance, however, the Han marked the beginning of a 1000 year period in which a large number of mechanical inventions was borrowed by Europe from China.

The two most significant were paper and porcelain. The invention of paper was reported to the emperor in 105 A.D. and paper was in common use by the 3rd or 4th century A.D. It replaced the wooden or bamboo slips that had been used for writing. By way of contrast, the Arabs did not use paper until the 8th century and paper was not used in Europe until the 9th century. The original manufacturing techniques are similar to those of today.

Glazes on clay pots were well developed during the Han but Han craftsmen are best known for the invention of rough porcelain which, over the centuries, was to be refined into fine Chinese porcelain. Eventually it became known as China in recognition of its origin.

Other important inventions of the Han include the stem-post rudder which stimulated the growth of shipping, the development of the shoulder collar which increased the efficiency of draft animals, the development of a seismograph which could accurately detect earthquakes and the mastery of deep bore hole drilling.

The Han was also important because it was during this period that methods of classification of plants and animals were established and book lists compiled by experts in astronomy, medicine, military science, magic and divination were developed.

Art and Culture

Recent archaeological finds have added greatly to the world's knowledge of art during China's early imperial age. It is now possible to trace the development of sculpture from the study of tomb figures. The discovery in Sian of a terra cotta army of more than 7000 figures that guards the first Ch'in emperor's tomb has provided archaeologists with a rich source of material.

The excavation of Han tombs has also provided modern-day historians and archaeologists with important new information. These tombs contain technically superior and delicately wrought ceramic models of figures, animals, bulldogs, boats and vehicles that tell much about life in China. The tombs of nobility are also important simply because of the sheer beauty of the objects found.

During the Han members of the nobility were sometimes buried in suits made of small jade pieces sewn together with gold thread. It was believed, erroneously, that jade had preservative qualities.

In general, by the Han, the ornate designs of the Shang and Chou bronzes gave way to plain, incised, inlaid, or gilt surfaces. The shapes of Han bronzes included hu vases, lien caskets and incense-burners with lids in the form of mountain peaks designed to represent the Taoist paradise. Han art also introduced Mediterranean design motifs and the Western approach to artistic representation through realistic silhouettes rather than the abstract animal forms that were common in the Chou. The Han is well known for the quality of its textiles and silk, as well as its lacquer ware.

The Han was also an important period in the development of Chinese literature, history, and philosophy. Ssu-ma Ch'ien (Sima Qian), China's foremost historian, lived during the Han as did Ssu-ma Hsiung-ju (Sima Xiongru), one of China's most important poets and Tung Chung-shu (Dong Zhongshu), one of China's major philosophers. Much of what they were doing was innovative. For example, Ssu-ma Ch'ien's great work, Historical Records, established a new form for historical writing that was adopted in successive dynasties. Instead of relying on hearsay and other unreliable sources, the Records drew on older documents and archives of state, some of which were incorporated into the texts, and included comments on major events.

In the field of poetry a major new form, the fu, was developed. It consisted of rhymed prose that combined richness of language and exuberance of feeling.

ENRICHMENT

I. By the time of the Han we begin to get a sense that women's position in traditional China was neither stagnant nor static. Although the hierarchial familial relationships defined by Confucius were well in place, some women -- mostly those of the upper class -- enjoyed status and education.

One of the most well-known was Pan Ch'ao (Ban Chao), the well-educated niece of an imperial concubine. She is regarded as one of China's greatest women of letters. Unfortunately, all that has survived of her work is a study of astronomy, a few historical chronologies and a short essay on "The Seven Feminine Virtues." Clearly, she saw her role as helping other women accommodate to a male-dominated society. It is interesting to note that she believed women should be educated so they can learn "how to become a woman. . ." Compare this idea with the beliefs of two other Chinese women centuries later. (See IX-L, ENRICHMENT III and X-D, ENRICHMENT II)

The Seven Feminine Virtues

Pan Ch'ao

I do not worry about the boys of our family who will manage somehow when they grow up. I am deeply concerned, however, about the girls who, on the threshold of marriage, may not have been educated sufficiently to know what a woman should or should not do. They may, after their marriage, speak or act improperly and thus bring shame and dishonor to the family that gave them birth and was therefore responsible for their education. . .

The first feminine virtue consists of meekness and humility. In ancient times a female infant, on the third day after her birth, was placed underneath her parents' bed and given a spindle to play with. Meanwhile her father would fast and do penance and report to the familial ancestors on the arrival of a female child. The placement of a female infant underneath the bed indicates her inferior position, and the provision of a spindle as her first toy is to familiarize her, at the earliest possible moment, with the importance of diligence and hard work. . . . As a woman, she should always be modest and respectful; should keep herself constantly in the background, whatever she does; should never speak of her own goodness or flinch from the performance of her assigned duties, however unpleasant; and finally, should be able to endure all the humiliations and insults, from wherever they come. . .

More concretely, she should be the first to get up in the morning and the last to go to bed in the evening and should work every minute in her waking hours. She undertakes every task inside the house regardless of its difficulties, proceeds with it in an orderly and efficient manner, and completes it in time. This is what I mean by diligence. She waits upon her husband with seriousness and integrity and conducts herself in a most refined and unsullied manner. She of course never indulges in any form of frolic, including laughter.

The second feminine virtue has to do with a woman's relationship with her husband. . . . The gentlemen of our time, realizing that the ability to govern one's wife and the necessity of inspiring respect are prerequisites to the cultivation of manhood, have been most careful in the education of their male offspring, including education of a bookish kind. They fail to recognize that the purpose of cultivating masculinity for their sons cannot be achieved if in the meantime the daughters of other families have not been taught the importance of feminine virtues. In short, one cannot succeed in teaching a boy how to become a man without in the meantime teaching a girl how to become a woman.

According to the Book of Rites, a child should be taught to read at the age of seven and should be able, under normal circumstances, to pursue his own independent studies by the time he reaches fourteen. It does not say that this education is precluded as far as female children are concerned.

The third feminine virtue has to do with reverence and obedience. . . . In a quarrel that ensues, excess in words tends to be followed by excess in emotions. This is the time when a woman often becomes contemptuous of her husband, even though she is supposed to honor and obey him at all times. The problem can be avoided if she knows how to stop airing her own opinions when it is time to stop. . .

The fourth feminine virtue is related to a woman's conduct as a woman. There are four standards whereby a woman is judged: her ethics, her words, her appearance, and finally, her domestic work. . . . Thus by personal ethics is meant that she is quiet and docile, orderly and clean, self-contained and unemotional. . . . When she speaks, she chooses her words carefully, none of which should even remotely resemble vulgarity. She does not speak unless the occasion calls for her speech and will immediately stop when she has apparently become a bore to others. This is what people mean when they say that she should mind her words. As far as her appearance is concerned, society dictates that she should wash and keep herself clean, bathe regularly, and wear fresh but not necessarily new clothes. Finally, in the matter of domestic work, she is supposed to devote herself to spinning and weaving, abstain from any form of frolic, including laughter, and prepare food and wine in a most satisfactory manner when her husband entertains.

The fifth feminine virtue has to do with devotion. The ancient classics command a man to remarry after he has lost his wife; there is no mention whatsoever that a woman can do likewise after she has lost her husband. . . . The Code for Women says that winning a man's affection marks the beginning of a lifelong relationship, while losing it precedes an immediate and permanent departure. Therefore, a woman has to dedicate herself to winning her husband's affection if she wishes to be successful as a wife. . .

The sixth feminine virtue comes about when a woman bends her own will in order to accommodate herself to the wishes of others. . . . Since such devotion is of obvious importance to her welfare, how can she in the meantime afford not to win the affection of her parents-in-law?. . . . She should obey every order of her mother-in-law and carry it out faithfully, whatever her private feelings.

The seventh and last feminine virtue has to do with the maintenance of cordial relations with the brothers and sisters of one's husband. A woman should keep in mind that the success she has achieved as a wife is primarily because her husband's parents are fond of her as a daughter-in-law and that the success she has achieved as a daughter-in-law is primarily because her husband's brothers and sisters have found in her a good friend. (Li 1975: 95-101)

II. A Brief Overview of Life in Han China

Since most of the pre 16th-century wood and clay structures of Imperial China have been destroyed by fire, war and the elements, we have to rely on scholars who have painstakingly examined archaeological artifacts to recreate what life in China was like. Much of the actual construction of the imposing palaces, city walls, gateways and watch towers of Han China was the work of small armies of laborers recruited from the general populace all over China. They contributed a month's service every year in lieu of taxes. There is evidence that this workforce included women.

> The palaces must have presented a sharp contrast with most of the buildings of the city, whose construction was of a very humble standard. Even the palace buildings were not always built of brick or stone, and some of the walls were made of clay and wattle, covered in plaster and brightly painted scarlet and white. The gateways were perhaps the most imposing parts of the buildings, with their towers placed symmetrically to enclose the entrances and to house the upper chambers of the guardsmen. While thatch may well have been the usual form of roofing material, tiles were laid on the halls and chambers of the emperors. These were moulded in earthenware as half-cylinders; and when they were laid side by side in lines the rain water would drain away in the valleys that lay between adjacent tiles. At the lower end of the roof the half-cylinder was sealed with a rounded tile-end which could be used to carry artistic or propagandist designs. . . A passer-by whose glance fell on the tiles could read that "Heaven has brought about the foreigners' submission" or "All aliens submit." (Loewe: 132)

Although many urban Chinese lived in slums and hovels, the Han was a time when the wealthy led lives of growing extravagance. Some officials felt such life-styles compromised well-established values.

> Opulent families lived in multi-storeyed houses, built with intersecting cross-beams and rafters that were richly carved and decorated on all visible surfaces. The stairways and partitions were plastered or painted. Instead of the simple skins or grass-made mats on which their ancestors had been content to rest, these families covered their floors with embroidered cushions, woolen rugs or rush-mats trimmed to a nicety; and even middle-class families could afford to take their ease on coverings of wild boar hide or the smooth felts that came from the north. In the inner rooms of the house the beds were carefully furnished with wooden fittings cut from the choicest timber; fine embroideries were hung up as drapes, and screens were set to overlap each other and ensure privacy.
>
> There was a shocking profusion of fine silk among the rich. Even ordinary folk donned the sort of garments that were fit for queens, and everyday wear was bright enough for weddings. While the wealthier classes wore choice furs of squirrel or fox and wild duck plumes, others were content with woollens and ferret skins. The same was true of footwear, with affluent members of society sporting shoes of inlaid leather or silk-lined slippers. But the worst excesses of dress were associated with weddings, when you could see the rich classes with their red badger furs and their tinkling jades; and even the well-to-do could afford long skirts, with jewels, clasps and earrings. (Loewe: 138-39)

Chinese mural paintings reveal that the Han people often sat or reclined on low wooden platforms. People removed their shoes before they got on. The chair was first used in China sometime between the end of the Han and the beginning of the T'ang dynasties. Although the Japanese borrowed much of T'ang culture (see VIII-C), they continued to live without the regular height chairs and tables which the Chinese adopted.

The k'ang is a distinctive piece of Chinese furniture which is believed to date from a very early period. This platform, common in North China, is an immovable part of the house. A little lower than chair height, it runs across the end of the main room and is used both as a sitting and sleeping platform. Still in use, it is heated from the flues of the stove in the winter.

Architecture in the countryside, where most of the people lived, reflected geographic and political realities. A ceramic model of a house excavated from South China has vertical and diamond shaped openings cut in the clay walls so cooling breezes can enter.

> The two architectural models in this exhibition, the watchtower from Honan and this house from Ch'ang-sha, illustrate the contrasting life styles of northern and southern China during the Han period. In the north, often exposed to the hazards of lightning attacks by the barbarians on horseback, people had to be on the alert, and the balconies were manned by lookouts and armed guards, with crossbows and arrows. In the south the forces of nature were the main hazard. The slope of the roof was steeper to expedite the removal of water, and especially in the Canton area, the house was often placed on elevated pole foundations to guard against floods. Different kinds of trellis work allowed the necessary ventilation. (Fontein & Wu: 75)

III. Political and military instability towards the end of the Han dynasty forced many to leave the capital. The poet Wan Ts'an was among them. The following is a poignant description of his emotions as he leaves China proper and the home of his ancestors.

In the next-to-last line he refers to "Lower Springs" -- a lyric poem which praises good rulers of the past.

"Seven Poems of Lament," One Selection, by Wan Ts'an (177-217)

The Western Capital is in turmoil,
Wolves and tigers create chaos.
Once again I leave the Central Realm,
Cast myself to the Ching barbarians.
Family and relatives face me in grief,
Friends pursue and cling to me.
As I leave the gate, all is desolation:
White bones cover the plain.
On the road there are starving women,
Hugging their children, they leave them in the grass,
Turning back, they hear howling and crying.

They wipe their tears and go on;
"I don't know yet where I will die,
How can I care for us both?"
Driving on my carriage, I leave them behind,
Unable to stand such pitiful cries.
In the south I climb the Pa-ling ridge,
Turning my head, I gaze at Ch'ang-an.
Understanding now the poet of the "Lower Springs,"
I sigh in heartfelt agony!

tr. Ronald C. Miao (Liu & Lo: 41-42)

IV. Schools of Contending Thought: A Teaching Suggestion

Each of the following selections represents a major theme from one of the three schools of thought -- Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism -- that struggled for preeminence during the early imperial period. See if your students can match the selection with the correct school of thought.

1. In earlier times the empire disintegrated and fell into disorder, and no one was capable of unifying it. Thereupon the various feudal lords rose to power. In their discourses they all praised the past in order to disparage the present and embellished empty words to confuse the truth. Everyone cherished his own favorite school of learning and criticized what had been instituted by the authorities. But at present Your Majesty possesses a unified empire, has regulated the distinctions of black and white, and has firmly established for yourself a position of sole supremacy. And yet these independent schools, joining with each other, criticize the codes of laws and instructions. Hearing of the promulgation of a decree, they criticize it, each from the standpoint of his own school. At home they disapprove of it in their hearts; going out they criticize it in the thoroughfare. They seek a reputation by discrediting their sovereign; they appear superior by expressing contrary views, and they lead the lowly multitude in the spreading of slander. If such license is not prohibited, the sovereign power will decline above and partisan factions will form below. It would be well to prohibit this.

Your servant suggests that all books in the imperial archives. . . be burned. Anyone referring to the past to criticize the present should, together with all members of his family, be put to death. Officials who fail to report cases that have come under their attention are equally guilty.

2. Tsai Wo questioned the three years' mourning and thought one year was long enough: "If the gentlemen for three years abstain from the practice of ritual, ritual will decay; if for three years they make no music, music will go to ruin. In one year the old crops are exhausted and the new crops have come up, the friction-sticks have made the several seasonal fires -- one year should be enough." He was answered: "Would you then feel at ease in eating polished rice and wearing fineries?" "Quite at ease," was the reply. His respondent

replied," "If you would really feel at ease, then do so. When a gentleman is in mourning, he does not relish good food if he eats it, does not enjoy music if he hears it, and does not feel at ease in a comfortable dwelling. Hence he abstains from these things. But now since you would feel at ease, then you can have them." When Tsai Wo had gone out, the other person said: "What lack of humanity in Yu [Tsai Wo]! Only when a child is three years old does it leave its parents' arms. The three years' mourning is the universal observance in the world. And Yu -- did he not enjoy the loving care of his parents for three years?"

3. Riches and honor are what every man desires, but if they can be obtained only by transgressing the right way, they must not be held. Poverty and lowliness are what every man detests, but if they can be avoided only by transgressing the right way, they must not be evaded. If a gentleman departs from humanity, how can he bear the name? Not even for the lapse of a single meal does a gentleman ignore humanity. In moments of haste he cleaves to it: in seasons of peril he cleaves to it.

4. Let there be a small country with a few inhabitants. Though there be labor-saving contrivances, the people would not use them. Let the people mind death and not migrate far. Though there be boats and carriages, there would be no occasion to ride in them. Though there be armor and weapons, there would be no occasion to display them.

Let people revert to the practice of rope-knotting [instead of writing], and be contented with their food, pleased with their clothing, satisfied with their houses, and happy with their customs. Though there be a neighboring country in sight, and the people hear each other's cocks crowing and dogs barking, they would grow old and die without having anything to do with each other.

5. Those who are born wise are the highest type of people; those who become wise through learning come next; those who learn by overcoming dullness come after that. Those who are dull but still won't learn are the lowest type of people.

6. He who waits on others misses his opportunities, while a man aiming at great achievements takes advantage of a critical juncture and relentlessly follows it through.

7. Yield and overcome
Bend and be straight
Empty and be full
Wear out and be new
Have little and gain
Have much and be confused.

Therefore wise men embrace the one
And set an example to all
Not putting on a display,
They shine forth.
Not justifying themselves,

They are distinguished.
Not boasting,
They receive recognition
Not bragging
They never falter.
They do not quarrel.
So no one quarrels with them.

Therefore, the ancients say "Yield
  and overcome."
Is that an empty saying?
Be really whole
And all things will come to you.

8. The worthy ruler should be one able to fulfill his kingly duties and employ the technique of censure.[1] Visited with censure, the ministers dare not but exert their ability to the utmost in devotion to their ruler. When the relative positions between minister and ruler are thus defined unmistakably, and the relative duties between superior and inferior are made clear, then none in the empire, whether worthy or unworthy, will dare to do otherwise than exert his strength and fulfill his duties in devotion to the ruler. Thus the ruler will by himself control the empire, and will not be controlled by anyone. Then he can enjoy himself to the utmost. How can a talented and intelligent ruler afford not to pay attention to this point?

[1] The translator indicates "The Chinese term may be more literally translated as 'inspection and punishment'."

9. A young man's duty is to be filial to his parents at home and respectful to his elders abroad, to be circumspect and truthful, and, while overflowing with love for all men, to associate himself with humanity (jen). If, when all that is done, he has any energy to spare, then let him study the polite arts.

10. By nature men are pretty much alike; it is learning and practice that set them apart.

The correct responses are as follows:

1. Legalists - Li Ssu
2. Confucius
3. Confucius
4. Taoism
5. Confucius
6. Legalists - Li Ssu
7. Taoism
8. Legalists - Li Ssu
9. Confucius
10. Confucius

VIII. C.

THE SUI AND THE T'ANG:
THE TRANSITION TO CENTRALIZED IMPERIAL RULE I

Sui 589-617
T'ang 618-907
The capital was at Chang-an or present-day Sian (Xi'an)

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

First Viking Raid on Britain 793
Charlemagne Crowned Holy Roman Emperor 800
Danish Invasion of Britain 865

Textbook Treatment

Taken together, the textbooks surveyed hit many of the high points of this period: the expansion of the Chinese empire, the cosmopolitanism, the growth of commerce, the emergence of a central civil service selected by examinations, the challenge of Buddhism, the flourishing of the arts (especially poetry), and the invention of printing. But none examines all of these topics. This results in rather spotty coverage, and some subjects are neglected altogether. Most do overstate the success of the civil service and the exam system, and few identify the reason why that institution was created in the first place. There is no mention of the eighth century military threats the T'ang faced from Central Asian tribes and its own generals. This almost brought the dynasty to its knees. And there is no discussion of major social and economic changes late in the dynasty which affected China for the rest of the Imperial period.

Key Concepts

Politics and Government

1. The Sui and T'ang dynasties represent the second, long period of national unity in Chinese civilization. Sustaining this unity probably made the difference between the unitary Chinese imperial system and an assemblage of politically separate but culturally related states as in Europe.

2. The principle obstacle with which the new dynasties had to contend was the large aristocratic families which dominated political and economic life. They had been the beneficiaries of the changes in the late Han dynasty and had become islands of relative security during the preceding four centuries of disunion. Their position was enhanced by military power.

3. The T'ang was able to effectively weaken the wealth and influence of these families by a number of institutional innovations which strengthened the centralizing trend begun in the previous period. Probably the most important was the movement toward a civil service selected more on merit than on birth. This later became the hallmark of traditional Chinese civilization.

4. The issue of central control of regional military power strategically located in border areas was unresolved.

Economic and Social Development

5. Fewer government restrictions on commercial activity encouraged the growth of sophisticated urban centers.

Religion and Philosophy

6. Buddhism flourished in China during the T'ang and had a profound effect on Chinese culture. Its popularity was so great that the Emperor was forced to impose restrictions which effectively limited its power for all time.

Art and Culture

7. A cultural explosion occurred in the T'ang dynasty.

Politics and Government

The main Sui-T'ang contribution in the political sphere was to increase for a while the strength and effectiveness of the central government. Institutions which it was hoped would increase imperial power over the aristocracy and prevent military challenges to the throne were created. In many cases the Sui and T'ang built on experiments begun during the Ch'in and the Han. We can see the influence of both Confucian and Legalist principles.

The major innovation was instituting a professional civil service, whereby officials were selected on the basis of merit (tested by examinations). This was to replace the use of recommendations which worked to the great advantage of the aristocratic families. Once assigned, the officials were expected to be loyal to imperial priorities and less beholden to the prominent families in their jurisdiction.

Implementing the Han idea of recruiting an autonomous bureaucracy using civil-service examinations was a signal event in the development of Chinese civilization for which the Sui and T'ang have received due credit. More recently, those who study the T'ang have suggested that the praise may have been exaggerated. At that time at least, all officials tended to come from the upper classes, no matter how they were recruited. There was not a fundamental conflict of interest between those chosen by exams and those chosen by reason of aristocratic birth. Moreover, once officials got to their posts, their power extended to a limited number of areas (law and order, tax collection, census compilation, land allocation, and mobilization of labor and army conscripts). Like lower-level officials in later dynasties, they could not issue direct orders and expect them to be obeyed. Rather, they had to compromise with local influentials.

(One excellent and entertaining way of appreciating this conflict between uniform, central authority and complex local situations is to read the Judge Dee mysteries, compiled by Robert Van Gulick. Judge Dee was a T'ang Dynasty magistrate, or local official. The stories illumine the obstacles that he had to overcome in investigating and adjudicating criminal cases according to the imperial statutes. They also reveal much about the social complexities of the time and the way people thought. Most of all, they make for enjoyable reading. (See Stein, VII)

Another innovation was the equal-field system, by which farming land was redistributed on a periodic basis. This was designed to prevent concentrations of land ownership and the political, economic, and social power that went with it; to reduce rural poverty and the resulting disorder; and to build a foundation for stable tax revenues for the government.

The implementation of the equal-field system seems to have worked best during the first half of the dynasty in North China, where the policy originated in the first place. In the south, however, there was a built-in problem. Land was scarcest in the areas of densest population. There were other complications: special allotments were made to persons of official status, the emperor made special grants of land to his favorites, and the government did not always stop influential individuals from encroaching on peasant rights. (See Economic and Social Development)

A system (called fu-ping) of citizen-soldiers was developed. It was to provide the government with troops and ensure that they were under central government control rather than that of independent generals allied with the great families who might challenge the throne.

This device began to decay a century after the dynasty's founding, as challenges came from non-Chinese in Central Asia and the southwest. The Emperor Hsuan-tsung (Xuan zong) tried to meet the threat by setting up military provinces in border regions. The commanding generals accumulated power for themselves, and one, An Lu-shan (An Lushan), rose in rebellion and proclaimed himself emperor in 755. The T'ang emperors eventually restored order out of the resulting chaos, but found it difficult to reverse the flow of military power to regional figures. It was not until later dynasties that the imperial court found a way of maintaining control over its military forces and still keep them strong enough to defend the empire against external and internal military threats.

The new dynasty continued the codification of law to serve as the uniform standard of behavior. The T'ang emperors also tried to improve the central political structure. At times, they beefed up the "outer court" of leading advisers and ministers vis-a-vis the "inner court" of eunuchs and palace denizens. They also increased the power and autonomy of the censorate to monitor bureaucratic and imperial performance.

One of the great T'ang emperors "likened himself to a ship and the people to the waters that support it or let it sink. The power of a happy and peaceful population is to be treasured, he taught. . ." (Smith and Weng: 116) When his most severe critic died, he mourned: "With bronze as a mirror, one can correct his improper appearance; with history as a mirror, one can understand the rise and fall of a nation; with good men as a mirror one can distinguish right from wrong. I have lost one mirror with the passing of Wei Cheng." (Smith and Weng: 116)

However, the basic feature of imperial family rule did not change. Capable and energetic emperors accomplished a great deal; weak and ineffective ones created a power vacuum that was filled by empresses-dowagers and eunuchs. Factional infighting was commonplace and palace coups did occur.

Thus it is apparent that the T'ang had mixed success in using centralizing institutions to prevent the problems that had plagued the Han. However, by the end of the dynasty the effective power of the great families had been substantially diminished and the concept of elite access by merit was in place.

A mass rebellion, led by a salt merchant named Huang Ch'ao (Huang Chao), erupted in 875, from which the dynasty never recovered. The imperial government was a facade behind which rival military forces contested, fragmenting the country in the process. Officially, the T'ang ended in 907, to be followed by the Five Dynasties period. All of these were located in North China, and each was ruled by a military strongman (not by the aristocratic clans as before). In the south there was a patchwork of kingdoms that generally enjoyed greater peace and stability.

Economic and Social Development

The T'ang dynasty was the second period in Chinese history in which a landed aristocracy met its demise. (The first period was the Ch'in and Early Han, during which the new imperial government eliminated the hereditary nobles of the late Chou.)

The T'ang elite was composed of large lineages or clans that sometimes seemed to be states within the state. (See VIII-B, Pt. 2, Government and Politics and Social and Economic Development) Indeed, during the preceding period of disunity the more powerful great families had declared themselves to be kingdoms.

From the more prominent of these families came most of the government officials; others dominated the regional or local scene. By the time of the Sui-T'ang unification, this upper class prevented new families from joining it and forbade intermarriage between classes. Geneological research, designed to reinforce claims of high status, flourished.

Although this aristocracy continued to dominate the T'ang social structure, it was definitely in retreat. The imperial effort to create a professional civil service and to redistribute land, described above, set a partial brake on the powers of the great estate-owning families. More significant were the An Lu-shan rebellion, the disorder that followed it, and the rebellions at the end of the dynasty. In the process, aristocrats began moving to the imperial capital, and gave up the original basis of their power (land). As in the Ch'in and early Han, land came to be bought and sold in a free market and was worked by tenants. This paved the way for a new class of landowners composed of individuals who had risen through the bureaucracy or the military and then used their position to acquire land. This transition set the stage for the Sung dynasty emergence of a social structure that characterized Chinese society down to the 20th century. There continued to be a social elite, but it was not able to establish itself as an aristocracy.

The population hovered around 50 million during the T'ang. Although the Yellow River continued as the most populous area, migration continued to the central Yangtze valley and delta.

For the farmers who composed the majority of the population, life presented a series of unpleasant choices. Agriculture was not productive enough, and the times not stable enough to permanently sustain a class of peasants owning their own land. When there was not enough to eat, the best a peasant could do was to become the tenant of a more wealthy landlord, and pay rent and other services in return for a minimum of economic security. In times of political upheaval, such as the period of disunion, farmers were more likely to become serfs or slaves.

It was partly to improve the lot of the peasantry that the Sui and T'ang dynasties instituted the equal-field system. As noted above, the system worked well for a time in certain parts of the country, but did not last. The imperial government ended its attempt to solve rural problems by redistributing land. Later dynasties would try to manage the problems brought by the inevitable concentration of land in relatively few hands. Not until the Communist Party came to power was there a fundamental change in the system.

During the period of disunion, when different parts of China withrew into themselves, commerce and the class of wealthy merchants had declined. With the return of relative peace and unity in the T'ang, both rebounded. Exchange was less through barter and more through currency; early forms of paper money were already in use by late T'ang. Private institutions for credit and banking began to appear. Merchants came to resemble a self-conscious bourgeoisie.

Cities grew to support the increased trade. Hucker provides this description of the T'ang capital, Ch'ang-an (present-day Sian):

> Ch'ang-an in T'ang times was unquestionably the most populous, most cosmopolitan, and most brilliant city in the world. Rebuilt several times since Former Han, it now enclosed within great walls some 30 square miles, including an outer city, an administrative quarter that was a small city in itself, and a palace compound that was almost a city-in-a-city. The outer city contained 106 separately walled wards, two large market areas, and hundreds of temples, mostly Buddhist. The resident population within the walls was about a million, and the city always thronged with visitors from afar -- horsemen from Mongolia, camel drivers from Central Asia, holy men from India, Arab traders from the Persian gulf, Malay adventurers, and Korean and Japanese monks, diplomats, and students. Musical troupes, jugglers, acrobats, dwarfs, and blacks from distant realms amused the crowds at the city's fairs; sing-song girls enlivened its eating and drinking houses; and exotic wares from much of Eurasia, as well as specialty goods from every region of China, were sold in its markets.
>
> The cosmopolites of Ch'ang-an were fascinated by foreign things, and adopted one outlandish fad after another -- in music, dancing, costume, food and drink, hairdressing, makeup, pets, and slaves. The same cosmopolitan spirit infected other T'ang cities and left its mark on subsequent urban life in China (Hucker 1975: 174-76)

The T'ang government did not try to restrict commerce to the extent that the Han did. Most of the restrictions on what merchants could and could not do were effectively dropped by mid-dynasty. Business was no longer confined to specific towns or cities, with the result that new urban centers flourished. The number of government monopolies was less that the Han: salt was the main commodity, and tax-supported relief granaries were revived to prevent private speculation. Efforts to monopolize the liquor and tea businesses failed. Foreign trade was regulated through tribute missions and border trading posts, but not really restricted.

Records note the existence of families of five generations living together during the T'ang. The extended family was a practical solution to the tradition of equal inheritance which could dismantle a prosperous "family farm". There was great economic advantage to the surviving sons in continuing to share the same house and pooling their land, labor and tools. However, the potential for personal conflict between the brothers, cousins, wives and generations and the appeal of owning one's own farm precluded the large extended family from ever becoming the norm in China.

Some upper class T'ang women continued to enjoy education and contribute to literature. The Buddhist nunneries did much to stimulate education among women. There are also clay figures from the T'ang which show women playing polo.

Religion and Philosophy

By the time of the Sui-T'ang, Taoism had been converted into a popular religion with communities of believers, a written scripture, and priests. It was well on its way to becoming an organized church.

Christianity was first introduced into China in 635 by way of a Nestorian monk from Syria, named Alopen. He preached this variant of the Christian religion around the city of Ch'ang-an. Although Christianity did not survive the end of the dynasty, a nine-foot wide and three-foot high stone tablet describing the arrival of Christianity in China was discovered in 1625. This Nestorian stone is on view in present-day Sian. That and a few metal crosses are all that remain of this first exposure to Christianity.

Buddhism was the only foreign religion that established a major presence in China, and it had an important influence on art and literature. The Sui and T'ang dynasties and the preceding period of disunion were the heyday of Buddhism in China.

Transplanting the alien faith was not automatic, however. Buddhism had to adapt itself to the Chinese situation, to compete with religious Taoism, which it resembled, and to deal with government restrictions. Chinese religion and philosophy also adapted itself, with the result that Chinese religion down to the present day has been ecletic, mixing the most appealing aspects of various traditions.

Buddhism took root and spread in China after the collapse of the Han dynasty. Like religious Taoism, which flourished at the same time, it provided a world view suited to disordered times that Confucianism could not. Unlike Taoism and like Confucianism, Buddhism had an ethical component. Unlike them both, it could continually invigorate itself from India, its place of origin.

There was opposition to Buddhism from Taoist and Confucian leaders, and from the political sector. Religious Taoism resented the competition that it posed for believers. Confucians asserted that Buddhism sought donations from people who were already poor, undermined the family system and filial piety by recruiting monks, and hurt the state because its monks and nuns were exempt from taxation, labor service, and military service. Running through many of these attacks was the basic fact that it was a foreign faith. The Confucian Han Yu had this to say about the display of a bone that supposedly came from the body of the Buddha.

> Now the original Buddha was a man of the barbarians. Having no comprehension of Chinese speech and wearing strange garb, he neither spoke nor dressed in accord with the prescriptions of our former kings. He knew nothing of the right relations between rulers and subjects or the natural affections between fathers and sons [as advocated by Confucius]. If he were to appear in person here today [as an ambassador], bearing his country's commission and coming to court in our capital, your majesty might be willing to receive him; but there would be no more than an audience in the Hall for Manifesting Governance, a banquet in the Pavilion for Entertaining Guests, and a bestowal of clothing. Then he would be sent under guard beyond the frontier, so that he might not delude our people. How is it conceivable that now, when he is so long dead, his rotted bone -- this inauspicious, odious relic -- should be admitted directly into the imperial quarters? (Hucker 1975: 219-220)

In the one major instance of religious persecution in China the government began to suppress Buddhism. Thousands of monasteries and temples were destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of monks and nuns were defrocked.

Although this attack seriously affected the religion's establishment to the point that it never regained its former power, Buddhism has survived to the present-day as a religion.

The appeal of Buddhism -- and religious Taoism -- during the Sui and T'ang does not mean that Confucianism played no role at all. Indeed, the two dynasties restored Confucianism as the official cult for purposes of court ritual. It was used as the curriculum for the civil service examination system. And its ethical norms were the basis for moral exhortation of the populace. Confucianism thus helped foster a level of ideological unity. Its problem was its formalism, its lack of any intellectual excitement. That was to come in the Sung dynasty, with a synthesis of the original thought of Confucius with the metaphysics of Buddhism.

Foreign Relations

The foreign relations of the Sui and T'ang dynasties were primarily military in nature — how to defend the empire. They can be divided into two general periods. The first, lasting until the early eighth century, was one of expansion. The Sui emperors and their early T'ang successors re-established direct control over territory acquired by the Han: Yellow, Yangtze, and Pearl River valleys, Szechwan (Sichuan), the Kansu (Gansu) corridor, and the northern part of what is now Vietnam. They displayed enough military might to bring states from Korea in the east to Western Turkestan in the West, and to Tibet in the southwest into a tributary status. These areas were not ruled by the imperial government, but recognized its nominal authority.

The balance of power on the empire's periphery shifted during the 8th century. Arab and Western Turk forces reduced the T'ang presence in central Asia, and an independent aboriginal kingdom in the southwest asserted its independence. The T'ang dynasty set up a ring of military provinces or commandaries to defend against these accumulating attacks. This in turn shifted the internal balance of power between the generals and civilian officials, culminating in the An Lushan rebellion in 755. The T'ang court had to get help from the Uighurs, a nomadic people living in what is now Mongolia, to defeat the rebels. With Uighur help, a weakened China was able to survive for another century vis-a-vis its other neighbors before falling apart in the late 9th century.

Art and Culture

Culturally, the T'ang dynasty is of great importance. During the preceding years of disunity small but significant cultural changes had taken place. The Chinese language was gradually being absorbed by neighboring tribes and by the beginning of this period cultural contact with Japan, which had begun as early as the 1st century A.D., began to increase. Buddhism was imported from China, and the Japanese adopted the Chinese calendar, a legal system based on the T'ang codes and many of the central institutions of the Chinese political system. In the 8th century Japan copied the design of the T'ang capital, Chang-an, in building its famous cities of Kyoto and Nara.

Buddhism was particularly influential in Chinese art. Monumental sculptures of Buddha gilded in gold leaf and sculpted in stone -- some of the ones still standing today are 40 feet tall -- are a rich part of China's artistic legacy.

The opulent and rich life of the T'ang nobility has been preserved in handsome glazed ceramics, and bronze, silver and gold objects reflect design features from India and the Middle East. A ten-foot square bronze mirror -- decorated with a bronze tree with gold flowers and silver leaves -- was strategically placed so the Emperor could view himself as he rode by.

The technique of making fine porcelain was refined to such an extent that the best pottery looked like jade.

Landscape painting as well as genre scenes of court life flourished.

Chinese poetry reached brilliant heights during the T'ang and the succeeding Sung dynasty. Proficiency in writing poetry was a major criterion in the examination required of scholar-officials. Writing poetry also spread to a broad class of people including women and Taoist and Buddhist monks.

Chinese poets often got their inspiration from their surroundings. They dealt with the life of the people and contemporary social conditions. For example, the theme of parting is very popular. This reflects the difficulty of travel; the poignancy associated with leaving the home of one's ancestors; and the many forced separations which occurred when the Emperors recruited armies of laborers for various projects.

One of the great T'ang poets, Tu Fu (Du Fu), wrote explicitly about conscription (see translation at the end of this section) and another, Li Po (Li Bo), made reference to the examination system. These are considered two of China's greatest poets.

Theater was a popular form of entertainment at the court and one of the emperors established an actors school in the pear garden of the palace. Since then stage people were referred to as "sons of the pear garden."

Science and Technology

The most important technical advance during the T'ang was the perfection of woodblock printing. This was spurred by the demand for Buddhist sutras or sermons.

Two other inventions were to affect China's development. Agriculture was further advanced when wooden buckets were attached to large water wheels. As the wheel turned the buckets were filled from a stream and then carried to a point where they emptied into an irrigation ditch.

Also, the discovery that a mixture of saltpetre, sulphur and charcoal would cause an explosion forecast the advent of gunpowder or "fire medicine." However, during the T'ang the compound was used only for firecrackers.

ENRICHMENT

I. Korea had been colonized by the Chinese during the Han but control had returned to Korea around 313. In 597 the founder of the Sui dynasty sent a letter to the King of Korea in the hope of persuading him to become a vassal of China proper. In the letter the Sui emperor clearly extends the familial relationship to China's association with other countries. We see the emperor assuming the role of the aggrieved father chastising an ungrateful son.

In 1979 when present leaders were explaining their rationale for China's invasion of North Vietnam, they said, among other reasons, they had to punish the North Vietnamese "as father would a son" for their treatment of Chinese nationals living in North Vietnam.

Korea refused to succumb to the Sui emperor's appeals, leaving it up to the T'ang to successfully incorporate Korea into China's sphere of influence.

"A Letter of Warning to the King of Korea," by Yang Chien (Sui Wen-ti)

Having received the mandate of Heaven to love and cherish all the people in the empire, I entrusted you with the responsibility of governing one corner of the earth next to the sea, in the hope that you would continue to promote the great civilization of China and that all the people in your kingdom, whatever their station in life is, would live a peaceful and enjoyable life. As my vassal, each year you have sent tribute missions to China and pledged your fealty to the sovereign of all men. However, doubt still exists about your sincerity since you, as my vassal, have not followed policies parallel to my own.

First, since you know that the Tungus and the Khitan Tatars have pledged their allegiance to the Celestial Empire and have indeed become our vassal states, why do you use force either to chase them from their home, as in the case of the Tungus, or to forbid them to move about, as in the case of the Khitan Tatars? How can you be so brutal and merciless to them after they, like other peoples who know where righteousness is, have sworn their loyalty to us?

Second, why do you use bribes to seduce archery makers from China and ship them to Korea, when you yourself must know that you will be provided with artisans of all kinds if you openly request them, since we have a large number of them ready for service anywhere? Is it not true that you prefer this illicit method of smuggling in order to cover up your true intention, namely, making or repairing weapons for an unlawful war against China?

Third, I have repeatedly sent envoys to your kingdom for the purpose of not only assuring you of my kind regard but also inquiring about the conditions in your country, so that I shall be able to provide you with necessary instructions to govern successfully. In each case you subject my envoy to house arrest, thus preventing him from seeing or hearing anything. You must have some evil design of your own; otherwise you would not have been so afraid of his inspection.

Fourth, time and again you have sent cavalrymen across the border to kill and injure people in China. Your agents are also active in the border regions, engaging in not only false propaganda but also conspiratorial activities to the detriment of China. Their action speaks loudly of the evil of your heart.

Fifth, since I regard all men within the Four Seas in the same way as I regard my own children, I have chosen to grant you territories and titles, and my generosity in this regard is well known to all the people in the world. Yet you continue to entertain doubt about my intentions and have gone as far as sending spies to China to seek information. Can this conduct of yours be regarded as proper and right if you mean to remain a loyal subject of mine?

> I have often thought that all your misdeeds may have been my fault, owing to the fact that I may not have taught you as well as I should have. If that is the case, you shall have my forgiveness, on the condition that from now on you correct all the mistakes you have made, carefully observe the duties required for a vassal, and abide by the law of the Celestial Empire. Moreover, you shall do your utmost to govern your kingdom successfully, and under no circumstances are you allowed to attack or invade the territory of your neighbors. If you can do all this, not only will you continue to enjoy fame and wealth with no worry whatsoever, but also I myself will be greatly pleased. Your kingdom may be small in territory and population, but you, as its king, are as much cherished by me as other subjects of mine. If I dismiss you, I would have to find someone else to occupy your present post which cannot remain vacant long. It is my hope that you will purify your heart and rectify your conduct so that once again you will become my loyal subject and abide by my law. In that case there will be no need for me to find another man to replace you. The law of our ancient kings stresses the importance of love and faith and the necessity of using reward and punishment as means to promote good deeds and discourage misconduct. I have likewise made this law known to all the people in the empire. What would my other vassals think of me if you are innocent and yet I choose to dispatch armed forces to punish you? You must be open-minded enough to take this advice of mine and dismiss any doubt of yours. Under no circumstances should you harbor the thought of traitorous activities. (Li 1975: 150-152)

II. In the early 20th century a number of T'ang documents were discovered in a temple which had been sealed in a cave in Tun-huang (Dun huang) at the western edge of Kansu province. This oasis was a popular stopping place on the silk road. The paper documents were preserved in the arid climate and are a good source of social history. This ballad describes the life cycle of an obviously well-off woman whose enjoyment of life's pleasures changes to sadness as she ages. Observers note that this theme "of the transcience of life" is common to Buddhism. It is possible that the reference to the "red curtain" means the young girl is not allowed out of the womens' quarters without good reason

"A Woman's Hundred Years"

At ten, like a flowering branch in the rain,
She is slender, delicate, and full of grace.
Her parents are themselves as young as the rising moon
And do not allow her past the red curtain without a
 reason.

At twenty, receiving the hairpin, she is a spring bud.
Her parents arrange her betrothal; the matter's well done.

A fragrant carriage comes at evening to carry her to her lord
Like Hsiao-shih and his wife, at dawn they depart with the clouds.

At thirty, perfect as a pearl, full of the beauty of youth,
At her window, by the gauze curtain, she makes up in front of the mirror.
With her singing companions, in the waterlily season,
She rows a boat and plucks the blue flowers.

At forty, she is mistress of a prosperous house and makes plans.
Three sons and five daughters give her some trouble.
With her ch'in* not far away, she toils always at her loom,
Her only fear that the sun will set too soon.

At fifty, afraid of her husband's dislike,
She strains to please him with every charm,
Trying to remember the many tricks she had learned since the age of sixteen.
No longer is she afraid of mothers and sisters-in-law.

At sixty, face wrinkled and hair like silk thread,
She walks unsteadily and speaks little.
Distressed that her sons can find no brides,
Grieved that her daughters have departed for their husbands' homes.

At seventy, frail and thin, but not knowing what to do about it,
She is no longer able to learn the Buddhist Law even if she tries.
In the morning a light breeze
Makes her joints crack like clanging gongs.

At eighty, eyes blinded and ears half-deaf,
When she goes out she cannot tell north from east.
Dreaming always of departed loves,
Who persuade her to chase the dying breeze.

At ninety, the glow fades like spent lightning.
Human affairs are no longer her concern.
Lying on a pillow, solitary on her high bed,
She resembles the dying leaves that fall in autumn.

At a hundred, like a cliff crumbling in the wind,
For her body it is the moment to become dust.
Children and grandchildren will perform sacrifices to her spirit,
And clear moonlight will forever illumine her patch of earth.

* a stringed instrument (Ebrey: 56-57)

III. Perhaps the greatest Chinese poet, Tu Fu (Du Fu) writes poignantly in this ballad of the pain of an old woman who fears her husband will be called for military duty. Not only did the common man face annual labor service but he had an obligation to serve two months each year in the local militia or fu-ping.

Tu Fu travelled widely in China after failing the Imperial examinations. Although he eventually received a government appointment, he is remembered for his poetry which covers a wide variety of themes and was written in all the known verse forms. Visitors to Cheng-tu (Chengdu) in Szechwan (Sichuan) are often taken to the site of his cottage where he did most of his writing.

"Recruiting Officer of Shih-hao"

At dusk I sought lodging at Shih-hao village,
When a recruiting officer came to seize men at night.
An old man scaled the wall and fled,
His old wife came out to answer the door.

How furious was the officer's shout!
How pitiable was the woman's cry!
I listened as she stepped forward to speak:
"All my three sons have left for garrison duty at Yeh;
From one of them a letter just arrived,
Saying my two sons had newly died in battle.
Survivors can manage to live on,
But the dead are gone forever.
Now there's no other man in the house.
Only a grandchild at his mother's breast.
The child's mother has not gone away;
She has only a tattered skirt for wear.
An old woman, I am feeble and weak,
But will gladly leave with you tonight
To answer the urgent call at Ho-yang --
I can still cook morning gruel for your men."

The night drew on, but talking stopped;
It seemed I heard only half-concealed sobs.
As I got back on the road at daybreak,
Only the old man was there to see me off.

(Liu & Lo: 130-131)

IV. This poem by one of China's most celebrated poets, Li Po (Li Bo), will strike a familiar chord with all students facing deadlines. Born in 701, Li Po was considered somewhat of a bohemian and bon vivant. His poems reflect his cultivated self-image as "carefree and unrestrained." Critics remind us that he reflected the general culture of the T'ang elite known for its cosmopolitan lifestyle. This poem, like much of his verse, is written in the old ballad form. He died in 762.

"Thoughts While Studying at Hanlin Academy

Sent to My Colleagues at the Chi-hsien Academy"

At dawn I hasten toward the Purple Hall,
At dusk I await edicts from the Golden Gate.
I read book after book, scattering rare manuscripts all around.
I study antiquity to search for the ultimate essence.
Whenever I feel I understand a work,
I close my book and suddenly smile.
Black flies too easily defile the pure,
A lofty tune like "White Snow" finds few echoes.
By nature carefree and unrestrained,
I've often been rebuked for eccentricity.
When the cloudy sky becomes clear and bright,
I long for visits to woods and hills.
Sometimes when the cool breezes rise,
I'll lean on the railings and whistle aloud.
Yen Kuang angled in his T'ung-lu Creek,
And Hsieh K'e climbed his Ling-hai Peak.
When I finish my task in this world,
I shall follow them and try my fishhook.

(Liu & Lo: 104)

V. This account of the celebration of Buddha's birthday gives some sense of the strength of popular Buddhism.

> On the eighth day of the fourth moon. . . a bone of the Buddha was brought to Ch'ang-an. From the K'ai-yuan gate to the An-fu temple and personally made obeisance to it. The great houses of the Yen-shou ward and the adjacent West Market combined to give in its honor a great vegetarian feast and religious gathering open to all. They rivaled one another in assembling the clergy and in erecting Buddha-images on a grand scale. The blowing of conches, the clashing of cymbals, the flickering of lanterns were unceasing, and the Yen-shou ward became a place of festive assembly. (Wright and Twitchett: 21)

VIII. D.

THE SUNG DYNASTY:
TRANSITION TO CENTRALIZED IMPERIAL RULE II
(960 - 1279)

During the Northern Sung, 960-1127, the capital was in Kai-feng.
During the Southern Sung, 1127-1279, the capital was in Hangchow (Hangzhou).

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

Norman Conquest of England 1066
Leif Ericsson sails to North America 1000
Tower of London begun 1078
King John seals the Magna Carta 1215

Textbook Treatment

Cultured, inventive, increasingly commercialized and urbanized, ruled by the world's first professional civil service, yet threatened by "barbarians" from the north -- these are the themes that emerge from textbook portraits of the Sung dynasty. Indeed, a few stop at the Sung juncture to describe the central features of traditional Chinese life. In general, those texts that only devote the equivalent of one page to the Sung are too random and cursory in their presentation to be of much help. Those that provide several pages do cover most of the important aspects of that era; what is missing is depth, context and color. A few books treat the T'ang and Sung together, which is a perfectly acceptable device if the content is correct.

Key Concepts

Politics and Government

1. The period of disunity following the fall of the T'ang and the beginning of the Sung lasted only fifty years. Compared with the 350 year period of disunity between the Han and the Sui-T'ang, this suggests the maturation and efficacy of the centralized imperial system of government.

2. The Sung's major innovation in the centralization of authority was controlling the centrifugal tendencies of the Imperial Army.

3. The organization of the professional civil service was perfected.

Economic and Social Development

4. The Sung was a time of major agricultural development which began a spiraling population increase.

5. A new upper class defined by general wealth and the mastery of the Confucian classics -- rather than by land ownership and military prowess -- dominated the social structure.

6. A rigidity and excessive conservativism in society's perception of women set the tone for the forthcoming centuries.

7. Urban centers grew at an unprecedented rate during this dynasty.

Foreign Relations

8. The North China plain continued to present an open road to Central Asian peoples with new ways of warfare and an appetite for conquest. Failure to effectively contend with this threat set the stage for the dynasty's collapse at the hands of the Mongols.

Art and Culture

9. The Sung was a brilliant period of creativity -- particularly in painting.

Politics and Government

The Sung's major innovation in the centralization of authority was devising a means of controlling the imperial army.

The new emperor, Sung T'ai-tsu (Song Taizu) took several steps to ensure there would be no internal challenges to his rule (such as the An Lu-shan rebellion during the T'ang). He retired his close military supporters with generous pensions. Gradually he replaced regional military leaders with civil officials from the capital. And he incorporated some of the regional units into the palace guard, where he could supervise them directly. "In this way he created a military establishment in which the main fighting force was a large, mobile professional army garrisoned around the capital, while local forces consisted largely of substandard recruits" (Hucker 1975: 269-270).

Continuing to heed the political lessons learned from the Sui-T'ang, the Sung perfected the professional civil service, five or six centuries before it surfaced in Europe. This approach to ruling a large and diverse society had been around for more than a thousand years, and had been partially implemented in the Ch'in, Han, and T'ang dynasties. The obstacle had always been the large, aristocratic families, who sought to deflect centralizing tendencies that went against their interests. For example, the great families preferred selection of officials through recommendation rather than examination. The decline of the old aristocracy in the late T'ang paved the way for a new approach which persisted with only marginal modification down to the beginning of the twentieth century.

There were several key elements to the civil service system. One was the examination system. As it evolved during the Sung Dynasty, the examination became much more competitive and egalitarian. This is not to say that officials were no longer selected by other, more ascriptive ways; but the examination system became by far the most important and socially prestigious way to acquire official status. Nor is it to say that those from the wealthy did not have a distinct advantage; but increased social mobility meant that many more families could attain elite status for a while.

The examinations took place in three stages, every three years. The first stage was a preliminary examination in each of about 300 prefectures. Those who passed then faced another round at the national capital (the metropolitan examination). The final test was an examination at the palace. Those who passed at that level were then eligible for appointment to an official position. Their status was referred to as chin-shih (jin shi). The examinations generally tested knowledge of the classics and history, and skill in literary composition. Ideological conformity rather than technical skill was the priority, but this accorded with the Chinese belief (still current today) that the best way to insure competent governance was instilling the right values in the minds of the governors.

A number of steps were taken to prevent examination candidates' using their "connections" to get special treatment. The candidate's name did not appear on the examination paper. Each paper was graded independently by several examiners. And exam papers were copied over so that the examiner could not recognize a protege by his calligraphy. These devices did not completely stop cheating, but it did keep it under control. Families desperately wanted to place one of their members in the officialdom.

Another element concerned the law of avoidance. It did little good for the government to try to prevent private interests from subverting the examination if the new officials were placed in authority over their relatives and close friends. The pressures of mutual obligation would make it difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the law fairly and impartially. The Sung court instituted prohibitions against relatives who were officials working in close relationship with each other, and against officials working in their native area.

The promotion policy was a third element in the examination system. Impartiality also had to be the goal in determining an official's movement up the bureaucratic hierarchy, as it is in all administrative bureaucracies. The Sung borrowed the approaches of the T'ang dynasty: seniority, merit ratings by superiors and censorial inspectors, and, sometimes, recommendations by senior officials. How much these measures prevented favoritism is unclear.

Another factor was the rule of law. Like their Han and T'ang predecessors, Sung emperors relied on a large corpus of laws to guide officials in the exercise of their duties. As before, laws did not cover every aspect of life; rather they focused on those issues most critical to imperial rule (taxation, public order, etc.). In those areas, however, they served as a framework within which magistrate and subject were expected to work.

And, finally, the censors were integrally involved. Another way of enhancing the quality of civil service rule was the independent censorate, begun in Han times. Censors per se, who monitored the performance of officials, lost some of their power during the Sung, but remonstrators, who commented on policy proposals, gained in influence and prestige.

By and large the Sung emperors were distinguished by the professionalism with which they defined their relationship with the bureaucracy. Although their authority and status was constantly emphasized by rigid protocol, Sung emperors were alert to the importance of heeding the views of their subordinate officials.

This was not to say that subordinate officials all offered the same advice. Sung politics was marked by continual policy debates and power struggles which were usually referred to as factionalism. Conservative and reformist elements were often at odds over how best to deal with domestic problems. Even though such debate might offend Chinese feelings about the value of harmony, a clash of subordinate's views is the principal way an isolated emperor learns about the state of his realm.

There were two significant changes in palace politics during the Sung. Eunuchs, a powerful force during the Han and the T'ang, were of minimal political importance. The emperors' accessibility to their official ministers is one reason given. Also, in contrast to the Han and T'ang periods, Sung emperors were very successful in minimizing the interference of imperial relatives in affairs of state.

Economic and Social Development

Technological advances were as important as political factors. . . such as the new dominance of the examination system. . . in reshaping Chinese society and economy.

The wet rice agriculture was ideally suited to the rainy climate of South China where population had begun to grow during the late T'ang. During the Sung famines were rare and mainly caused by malfunctions in the distribution system rather than by agricultural failure. Population continued to increase dramatically during the Sung and rose to about 100 million people.

Observers note the great variety of foodstuffs available. New patterns of commercial production of staples and the agricultural and marketing specialization provided a bewildering assortment of vegetables and fruits to say nothing of quail, geese, donkey, venison and rabbit. Fish were particularly abundant and there are accounts of couriers rushing live fish to market in bamboo baskets full of water. Apples, pears, peaches, pomegranates, grapes, plums and oranges were among the available fruits. Tea drinking became a common practice in all households.

The consumption of this rich assortment of food was confined to the financially secure. Although the diet of the poor was limited, it provided essential protein and carbohydrates. It was said "the things that people cannot do without every day are firewood, rice, oil, salt, soybean sauce, vinegar and tea. Those who are just slightly better off cannot do without. . . 'food to help get the rice down'. . . and soup (presumably full of vegetables). Though they be the poorest people, this must always be so." (Chang 1977: 151)

By the time of the southern Sung, the capital had moved from its historic center in the region of the Yellow River to Hangchow in the Yangtze delta. . . thus emphasizing the economic decline of the north.

The general prosperity stimulated by the agrarian revolution supported a rural society of freeholders and permanent tenants. However, the large landholding families did not become a phenomenon of the past. A new elite emerged but it did not monopolize the rural scene and it did not assume the military roles of its Han and T'ang predecessors.

Still, many rural dwellers could only survive by becoming permanent tenants on these manors, bound serflike to the land and to service. For them and for peasants who were still free but might have to give up their freedom when times were bad, little had changed. There were a few government attempts to give freeholders a better chance, but they were the exception rather than the rule.

By all the imperfect measures available, the Sung dynasty was a period of intense commercial activity. Financial and commercial transactions were facilitated by an advanced money economy utilizing paper currency; national bank notes; certificates of deposit and "flying cash" or a money draft system.

The continued laissez faire policy adopted by the government also encouraged the prosperity. Although the state continued to be directly involved in monopolies in certain sectors (salt, large-scale construction), private enterprise was more common. Generally the state confined its intervention in the commercial economy to collecting taxes. Unlike other dynasties, the Sung promoted (and taxed) foreign trade; Chinese ships, guided by compasses, took silks and porcelains as far as India, returning with spices.

With commerce came urbanization, on a scale unprecedented in the world at that time. Although statistics are imperfect, China in the eleventh century had ten metropolitan areas whose prefectures had a million or more people. At this time, the largest cities in Europe had about 50,000 residents. Hucker describes the general urban scene: ✓

> Urban China became increasingly a nation of small shopkeepers, and cities and towns teemed with street peddlers, wage-earning craftsmen, and day laborers of every sort. . . By early Sung times merchant and craft shops sprawled throughout every city and town, lining the streets, intermixed with residences, and especially clustered around the gates of walled cities. Merchants dealing in a given commodity began to cluster together, and eventually a city of the later empire characteristically had one whole street of shops selling the same product or service (Hucker 1975: 349).

Fortunately, we have available richly detailed pictures of two Sung era cities. The first is a famous hand-scroll of the Northern Sung capital of Kai-feng on the occasion of the Ching-Ming (gravesweeping) festival. It is available for classroom use in several forms. For Hangchow, the capital of the Southern Sung, we have Jacques Gernet's marvelous Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250-1276.

Thus the new social elite referred to earlier was a product of both agrarian and commercial development. Far more fluid and thus more resilient than its T'ang and Chou predecessors, it retained its position of privilege until the early 20th century.

When Westerners arrived in China in the 19th century and began describing that alien place for their countrymen, they often used the word "gentry" when referring to the Chinese elite. That term was as misleading as it was familiar, and historians have wrestled with it ever since. "Literati," another label used, also failed to capture the full essence.

Terminology aside, the features of this elite are fairly clear. It was composed of families, often extended families, and not individuals. Members of these elite families were able through various means to avoid manual labor. Generally, elite families tried to accumulate both wealth and political power, and translate the one into the other. Wealth came not only from landownership but also from commerce and a host of other occupations.

As individuals, members of this elite did not have to belong to the official bureaucracy but they had to have access to it. Political power and status came primarily from having one or more family members pass the civil service examination, which meant that education was a high priority. Political power also came from managing local affairs. (This was to become quite important in the Ming dynasty.)

Members of this elite seem to have moved comfortably from country to town and back again, but they were more urban in their tastes and orientation. Mobility, both up and down, was quite high. Talented common folk could and did accumulate wealth and official status for themselves or their children, but shifts in political winds and inheritance rules could mean a decline in the national, and even local prominence of an influential family (this is the theme of Pearl Buck's The Good Earth).

Although there were other strata in the society, the prestige of the social elite assured that China was not to be a culturally pluralistic society with, as in the west, competition between clergy, military, merchants, and landlords.

It is unclear why the prevailing conservative attitudes concerning women solidified during the Sung. Although women poets continued to enjoy recognition, there are fewer references to educated upper class women. Perhaps the linkage between education and civil service mitigated against the perception of education as an end it itself. The remarriage of widows became socially unacceptable and women generally led a more restricted life. However, divorce by mutual consent was allowed.

Footbinding had begun at the very end of the preceding T'ang dynasty and spread througout parts of China during the Sung. Its origins are believed to be found in a court dancer. This description evokes toe dancing in western ballet.

> . . . Li Yu had a favored palace concubine named Lovely Maiden who was a slender waisted beauty and a gifted dancer. He had a a six foot high lotus constructed for her out of gold; it was decorated lavishly with pearls. . . . Lovely Maiden was ordered to bind her feet with white silk cloth to make the tips look like the points of a moon sickle. She then danced in the center of the lotus, whirling about like a rising cloud. (Levy: 39)

Chinese men found the "lily-walk" of women with bound feet particularly appealing, and foot-binding soon became common practice in the upper classes. It permeated all levels of society as families sought to arrange advantageous marriages for their daughters.

However, foot-binding was never uniformly practiced throughout China. In areas where labor intensive crops such as rice or sericulture demanded seasonal input from women workers, women's feet often went unbound. It was much more of an upper-class phenomenon.

Science and Technology

The improvement of wet rice agriculture which had a much higher yield of food per acre of land was a major scientific breakthrough in China.

In what was probably the world's first extension service, the Sung government disseminated knowledge about rice agriculture. Pamphlets suggested new types of farm tools -- the iron-blade plow introduced then is still use in China today -- and methods of water control such as the terracing of hill sides. New drought-resistant seeds with shorter growing periods and higher yields, especially some from Champa or southern Vietnam, were promoted. In addition to markets for agricultural goods, growing cities and towns created a ready supply of human waste suitable for fertilizer. Nightsoil, transported in what are euphemistically called "honey buckets," is still the most common form of fertilizer in China today.

A significant development in the Northern Sung was the growth of an iron and steel industry. Chinese metallurgy was quite advanced, and iron and coal deposits were available in quantity near the capital of Kai-feng. Independent entrepreneurs operated large complexes, sometimes employing hundreds of workers. Marco Polo described the development in metallurgy: "One huge complex at Ch'i-ts'un in Hopei employed more than 700 coal miners, 1000 ore miners, and 1000 furnace workers, and annually consumed some 35,000 tons of ore and 42,000 tons of coal to produce over 14,000 tons of pig iron. National iron production soared to a total of 125,000 tons a year. . . . In addition to military armor, sword blades, arrowheads, bows and crossbows [which were produced for the government], manufacturers turned out such nonmilitary products as nails, plowshares, harrows, hoes, and spades [which played a role in the agricultural revolution]". (Hucker 1975: 352).

Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) once identified three inventions that "changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world." They were all perfected in China during the Sung. One was movable type which expanded the already flourishing printing industry. Another was using gunpowder in weapons and the third was the magnetic compass. The latter two were to come back to haunt the Chinese six or seven centuries later.

Foreign Relations

No matter how successful the Sung was in managing its internal affairs, its failure to guarantee its security from internal threats resulted in its ultimate collapse.

From its founding, the Sung dynasty had faced a succession of serious threats on its northern border. First were the Ch'i-tan (Qitan) (also known as the Liao dynasty), an early Mongol people. Second were the Jurched (also known as the Chin dynasty), tribes of proto-Manchu peoples. Third were Mongols themselves, led first by Genghis Khan and then his grandson Kubilai.

How did the Sung deal with these challenges? First of all, it created a large military force to defend the northern borders. The Sung's armed forces were larger than the T'ang's or the Han's. This was made possible by the dynasty's prosperity. As noted earlier, the Sung emperors were the first to put the military on a professional basis and maintain civilian control over it. With sophisticated weaponry -- including incendiary and explosive devices made from gunpowder -- the army was an effective fighting force when properly maintained.

Second, the Sung bought off its enemies. During periods of military stalemate, the imperial government made payments of silk and silver to the Ch'i-tan and Jurched regimes. Though it probably galled Chinese to pay tribute to "barbarians," who, according to Confucian tradition, should be paying homage and tribute to the emperor, it was an efficient way of keeping the peace. The payments never came to more than two percent of the Sung's state revenues.

Third, the Sung tried an alliance strategy, perfected during the Han, of "joining with the farther to attack the nearer," or "using barbarians agains barbarians." In the early 12th century, the Chinese court sought Jurched help in solving its Ch'i-tan problem, only to find its ally to be just as great a threat. Then in the mid-13th century, the Southern Sung allied with the Mongols to attack the Jurched. The final result was the total elimination of the Sung at the hands of Kubilai Khan.

Various explanations have been advanced for the Sung's military problems, none mutually exclusive. Generally, the militaristic emphasis in Chinese society had suffered a permanent decline, to be replaced by a focus on civilian affairs. Civil officials had a low opinion of military matters, and were willing to pay for peace if such a policy worked. In addition, China had specific problems in resisting the invasions from the north. Chinese armies had no effective defense against cavalry forces, particularly in the flat lands of North China, hence their defeat at the hands of the Jurched. That loss deprived the Sung of its centers of production of iron and steel, and hence of weaponry. The Mongols found ways of overcoming the Chinese advantage in the river- and canal-laced south, primarily by developing naval forces to attack the Chinese rear.

And, even though the Sung was noted for its prosperity, maintaining armies far removed from the economic center became an increasing financial drain. Serious deficits led to economic imbalances.

Religion and Philosophy

By the time of the Sung, the realm of popular religion had seen the eclectic melding of Buddhism, religious Taoism, and religious Confucianism into one system called san-chiao (san jiao), or three teachings.

Although san-chiao was officially condemned as heresy, its practices dominated popular religion into the 20th century. Chinese families did not consider it contradictory or inappropriate to observe state-sponsored Confucian rituals and practice ancestor worship at home while also revering Taoist and Buddhist divinities and engaging in Taoist and Buddhist religious exercises at local temples and shrines. Such shrines can be seen today in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

More important in the history of Chinese civilization was the birth of what is known as Neo-Confucianism. Remarkable as it may seem, Confucianism did not have a dominant place in Chinese society and thought until the Sung. True, it had been the state cult since the Han and the basis for the examination curriculum during the Han and the T'ang. It infused social relationships and tempered law codes based on Legalist principles. And it had been adapted for the purposes of popular religion. But it lacked a vitality and energy.

That uncertainty ended during the Sung. Both the new preeminence of the examination system and the metaphysical questions long posed by Taoism and Buddhism spurred a burst of intellectual creativity that shaped Chinese life for the next millenium. The question of the nature of man and his place in the universe dominated philosophical activity. Hucker concludes:

> It is not inappropriate to consider Neo-Confucianism a reassertion of ancient Confucian political and moral values buttessed by cosmological and metaphysical conceptions adapted from Buddhism and Taoism, but Neo-Confucianism is much more. It is a fermenting of new truths out of old rhetoric -- "Confucian" truths that philosophically undercut otherworldly Buddhism and unworldly Taoism and gave vibrant life to the positivist, optimistic doctrines that human fulfillment is found in life as mankind knows it, and that everyone has the potentiality of realizing such fulfillment. . . .
>
> Neo-Confucians succeeded in persuading Chinese intellectuals that the world perceptible to the senses is real, not illusory as Buddhists maintain; and that mankind attains fulfillment by earnest participation in society, not by standing aloof from it as Taoists are inclined to do. They disdained Buddhism's promises of spiritual salvation and Taoism's promises of physical immortality (Hucker 1975: 363-364)

From the beginning, competing schools of Neo-Confucianism emphasized different means for improving society. The first, more prominent during the Northern Sung, focused on reform of institutions. The second, more influential in the Southern Sung and afterwards, focused on cultivation of individual morality. The most famous Neo-Confucianist from the Sung period was Chu Hsi, whose commentaries on the Confucian classics later became the prevailing orthodoxy in China. (See VIII-F, Religion and Philosophy)

Art and Culture

Culturally, the Sung dynasty was one of the most vital and brilliant in the history of Chinese civilization. This flowering reflected the high level of civilization; sophistication in the urban standard of living; and covert supported artistic activity.

Beginning with the Sung dynasty there was a proliferation of prose commentary, histories, and compendia of all sorts. The most famous prose writer was Ou-Yang Hsiu (Ouyang Xiu), an 11th century official. The most innovative historian was Ssu-ma Kuang (Sima Guang).

Compared to the T'ang, Sung poets tended to emphasize quantity over quality.

They addressed a wider range of subject matter, and, in line with Neo-Confucianism, were generally more optimistic. The most famous Sung poet was Su Tung-p'o (Su Dongpo), also known as Su Shih (Su Shi).

The cities of Sung China featured a variety of performing arts. Towards the end of the dynasty these coalesced into what is today known as Chinese opera.

By the Sung dynasty the Chinese had mastered the technique of high-fired, hard-glazed porcelain. Sung pieces were usually monochrome, with white and light green (celadon) being the most well-known colors.

Painting The Sung dynasty is highly esteemed for its painting. Subject matter was varied: calligraphy, bamboo, human figures, flora and fauna, and landscapes. There were a number of different schools and styles -- too many to summarize in any cogent yet simple way. More important are some underlying elements.

First is the attitude toward the relationship between man and nature, with the former finding its proper place in the latter in true Taoist fashion.

Second is the preference for catching the essence of a subject rather than the totality of its detail. Thus blank space is a common -- and dynamic -- element of many Chinese paintings.

Third is the frequent absence of a single vantage point on the part of the person viewing the painting. For some paintings, or parts of paintings, the viewer may seemingly be suspended in space.

Fourth is the idea that Chinese painters are only imitating or copying the works of old masters. That is definitely not true for the better painters. They sought in past masterpieces inspiration for a work that had its own identity, not unlike a jazz musician taking an existing melody and improvising on it.

Finally, there is the relationship between the technique of Chinese painting and the painting itself. As Hucker relates:

> Any outsider hoping to appreciate Chinese paintings fully must first of all take into account the conditions imposed on Chinese painters by the materials they worked with. Except for murals, Chinese traditionally painted on silk and paper with watercolors or sooty inks -- inks that each painter prepared for himself by rubbing hard sticks of dry ink on moistened, flat, fine-textured stones. One of the many important consequences is that, unlike a worker in oils on canvas, the Chinese painter could not proceed by trial and error, scraping off what did not please him. The moment he put his brush to silk or paper he made an irretrievable commitment. Unless he had in mind from the beginning a complete vision of what he wanted to paint, he floundered. The Chinese therefore have not commonly painted from life; their art has been a studio art and a highly intellectualized one -- rendering on silk or paper a mental image that has no necessary relation to any particular reality. Another consequence is that, though composition has by no means been disesteemed, the Chinese themselves base their

> aesthetic judgments largely on the quality of the brushstroke or the vitality of the line. Lines are classified in categories of infinite refinement -- hesitant or bold, weak or strong, raw or delicate, relaxed or pulsating with vibrant power. The spirit and personality of the painter are thought to be exposed in the character of his brushwork, and the viewer of a painting is expected to commune and interact with the mind of the painter fully as much as to appreciate his subject matter and design. (Hucker 1975: 414-415)

ENRICHMENT

I. The meticulous detail and obvious concern about maintaining soil fertility illustrated in this translation of a portion of a Sung farming manual explain why an agrarian revolution took place during the Sung. A mou is .1647 of an acre.

Plowing

> Early and late plowing both have their advantages. For the early rice crop, as soon as the reaping is completed, immediately plow the fields and expose the stalks to glaring sunlight. Then add manure and bury the stalks to nourish the soil. Next, plant beans, wheat, and vegetables to ripen and fertilize the soil so as to minimize the next year's labor. In addition, when the harvest is good, these extra crops can add to the yearly income. For late crops, however, do not plow until spring. Because the rice stalks are soft but tough, it is necessary to wait until they have fully decayed to plow satisfactorily.
>
> In the mountains, plateaus, and wet areas, it is usually cold. The fields here should be deeply plowed and soaked with water released from the reservoirs. Throughout the winter, the water will be absorbed, and the snow and frost will freeze the soil so that it will become brittle and crumbly. At the beginning of spring, spread the fields with decayed weeds and leaves and then burn them, so that the soil will become warm enough for the seeds to sprout. In this way, cold as the freezing springs may be, they cannot harm the crop. If you fail to treat the soil this way, then the arteries of the fields, being soaked constantly by freezing springs, will be cold, and the crop will be poor.
>
> When it is time to sow the seeds, sprinkle lime in the wet soil to root out harmful insect larvae.
>
> tr. Clara Yu (Ebrey: 110)

II. The great Sung poet Su Shih (1037-1101) spent a great part of his life as a provincial administrator in a wide variety of regions. He wrote with wit and sensitivity of the people with whom he came in contact and of subjects which simply caught his fancy.

Sunflower

Too fragile to endure the heat of a long summer day,
Yet pretty enough to cheer the cool morning --
Head stooped, a golden cup raised high,
Reflecting the splendor of the sun's first light.
A heart of sandlalwood color forms its own halo;
Its leaves of kingfisher sheen grow dense and prickly.
Of all who sketched from still life since ancient times,
Who could have excelled the art of Chao Ch'ang?
Fresh morning makeup, or drunken stupor at noon:
Its true likeness holds the yin and the yang.
Just look within this flower and its stem,
There you'll find the fragrance of wind and dew.
tr. Irving Y. Lo (Liu & Lo: 344)

Bathing the Infant

Most people expect their sons to be clever,
My whole life was ruined by cleverness.
I only wish my son to be dull and stupid
And without suffering or hardship to reach the highest rank.
tr. Chiang Yee (Liu & Lo: 348)

On a Toad

Its savage eyes, at whom do they glare?
Its whitish belly swells in vain.
Just take care not to worry the centipede,
A hungry snake will never let you go free.
tr. Irving Y. Lo (Liu & Lo: 345)

III. Hangchow in the Late 13th Century

When the Imperial Court moved to Hangchow in the beginning of the 12th century, the population was around 200,000. However, it is estimated that by 1275 about one million people lived in the city and its immediate environs. A visitor, Oderic de Pordenone, described it:

> This city is greater than any in the world, and is quite 100 miles round; nor is there any span of ground that is not well inhabited, and often there will be a house with ten or twelve families. This city has also great suburbs containing more people than the city itself contains. It has twelve principal gates; and at each of these gates at about eight miles are cities larger than Venice or Padua might be, so that one will go about one of those suburbs for six or eight days and yet will seem to have travelled but a little way. (Gernet: 31)

Hangchow was believed to be a city of multi-storied wooden houses. In the poorer sections there were shops on the ground floor with a family living in each of the stories in the narrow building. These houses usually belonged to the state to whom rent was paid. Destructive fires were commonplace and serious. There was always the fear of epidemics in the hot and sticky summer months and great effort was made to keep the streets clean and remove the garbage and collect the night soil.

Commercial life thrived and even the scholar-officials augmented their modest salaries by investing in private business through intermediaries. The court was seemingly unaware of this and other illegal practices dependent upon widespread influence peddling.

The new bourgeoisie, for its part, aspired to official status but was frustrated both by a prohibition against their sons taking the civil service examinations and by their sons extreme distaste for work of any description. Marco Polo described how the second generation preferred to adopt the customs of the elite.

> The leading and wealthy owners of these shops do no work with their own hands and affect, on the contrary, a grave and disastrous behaviour. The same is true of their ladies who are very handsome, as we have just said; they are brought up to acquire habits of great timidity and delicacy, and their dress displays such magnificence of silks and jewels that it would be impossible to estimate the cost. And, although it is prescribed by the laws of their former kings that each man must exercise the profession of this father, yet it is permitted to them, when they have made their fortune, to dispense with the necessity of doing manual work, on the understanding that they keep up the ancestral establishment and employ workmen to carry on the hereditary trade. (Gernet: 89-90)

There was a rich variety of restaurants to serve the people.

> The big restaurants had doors in the form of archways decorated with flowers. From them was suspended half a pig or a side of mutton. The decoration was brightly coloured here too. There were small rooms on each side of the large central banqueting hall. "As soon as the customers have chosen where they will sit," says a contemporary account, "they are asked what they want to have. The people of Hangchow are very difficult to please. Hundreds of orders are given on all sides: this person wants something hot, another something cold, a third something tepid, a fourth something chilled; one wants cooked food, another raw, another chooses roast, another grill. The orders, given in a loud voice, are all different, sometimes three different ones at the same table. Having received the orders, the waiter goes into the kitchen and sings out the whole list of orders, starting with the first one. The man who replies from the kitchen is called the Head Dishwarmer, or the Table-setter. When the waiter has come to the end of his list, he takes his tray to the stove and then goes off to serve each customer with the dish ordered. He never mixes them up, and if

> by any unlikely chance he should make a mistake, the proprietor will launch into a volley of oaths addressed to the offending waiter, will straight-away make him stop serving, and may even dismiss him altogether." There were restaurants where all the dishes, including fish and soups, were served iced. Others specialized in certain kinds of food or in regional cooking of some kind. Others again, of the cheaper variety, only served noodles stuffed with vegetables or pork or beanshoots with boiled leeks. It is scarcely astonishing that the people of Hangchow were often taxed with being greedy. "Anyone who should see the supply of fish in the market," says Marco Polo, "would suppose it impossible that such a quantity should ever be sold; and yet in a few hours the whole shall be cleared away; so great is the number of inhabitants who are accustomed to delicate living. Indeed they eat fish and flesh at the same meal." (Gerner: 50-51)

There was also plenty of entertainment for this leisure class. . . from poetry societies to prostitutes. Boating parties were particularly popular.

> On the Lake of which we have spoken there are numbers of boats and barges of all sizes for parties of pleasure. These will hold ten, fifteen, twenty or more persons, and are from fifteen to twenty paces in length, with flat bottoms and ample breadth of beam, so that they always keep their trim. Anyone who desires to go a-pleasuring with the women or with a party of his own sex, hires one of these barges, which are always to be found completely furnished with tables and chairs and all other apparatus for a feast. The roof forms a level deck, on which the crew stand, and pole the boat along whithersoever may be desired, for the Lake is not more than two paces in depth. The inside of this roof and the rest of the interior is covered with ornamental painting in gay colours, with windows all around that can be shut or opened, so that the party at table can enjoy all the beauty and variety of the prospects on both sides as they pass along. And truly a trip on this Lake is a much more charming recreation than can be enjoyed on land. For on the one side lies the city in its entire length, so that spectators in the barges, from the distance at which they stand, take in the whole prospect in its full beauty and grandeur, with its numberless palaces, temples, monasteries, and gardens, full of lofty trees, sloping to the shore. And the Lake is never without a number of such boats, laden with pleasure parties; for it is a great delight of citizens here, after they have disposed of the day's business, to pass the afternoon in enjoyment with the ladies of their families, or perhaps with others less reputable, either in these barges or in driving about the city in carriages. (Gernet: 53-54)

IV. In the essay (see Politics and Government) we mention ongoing policy debates among scholar-officials. Wang An-shih (1021-1086) was perhaps the most important spokesman for reform in Imperial China. Unlike many of his fellow Confucians, Wang believed good government depended as much on reform of institutions as of persons.

In one case he spoke of the need to facilitate loans for crops. Here he justifies the "green sprouts" program.

> In former times the poor people paid interest on loans obtained by powerful persons. Now the poor get loans from the government at a lower rate of interest, and the people are therby saved from poverty. Thus our policy on agricultural loans has worked in practice. (DeBary et al: 423)

In another he advocated a system called Pao-chia (Bao jia) which grouped households together for mutual protection and for self-policing. Here he comments on the possibility of abuse if the wrong person assumed control.

> However, for hundreds of thousands of years the people of the empire have been free to live together or to disperse and go in all directions as they chose, not subject to any restriction. Now we want to change it forthwith, organizing the people into units of fives and tens, and attaching one village to another. Unlawful activities would thus be kept under observation while benevolence would be manifested to all; the soldiers would be housed in their own homes and ready for any use. If, however, we fail to secure the right kind of person to administer this measure, the people will be alarmed by summonses and frightened by mobilization, and thus the people's confidence will be lost. (DeBary et al: 424-425)

Wang's reforms were short-lived. His style was abrasive; the reforms were controversial and threatened existing institutions and his reinterpretation of the classics antagonized other Confucianists to such an extent as to jeopardize all his reforms.

V. A Simulation of the Chinese Civil Service Examination

(This simulation is based on a five-day version created by Dr. Eugene Lubot at Wheaton College. It came from the Children's Museum in Boston.)

Time: 2 class periods or 1 1/2 hours.

Grade Level: Tested with 10-12 grade students; adaptable to 6th grade and up.

Objectives: To gain a deeper understanding of the Chinese civil service examination system.

To gain a deeper understanding of Confucianism.

To gain insight into how Confucianism affected behavior.

To evaluate the examination system as a method for recruiting talent into the bureaucracy.

To draw comparisons with students' experiences taking standardized tests (SAT's and Achievement Tests, best comparison).

Background: Before doing the simulation, the students should have a good understanding of the civil service examination and of Confucianism. (See VIII-B, D, and F)

There is an excellent story about a boy taking the exam in People in Change: East Asia, published by Addison-Wesley, which will be going out of print. The story takes place during the Qing dynasty and the description of family life is readable for the 6th grade and up.

Procedure:

1. The Emperor (teacher) selects three Imperial Examiners and they meet to discuss the rules outside the classroom. (5-10 minutes)

- -- Examiners will give the instructions.
- -- Examiners will walk around, and patrol for behavior. No cheating, no slouching, no talking, no fooling around.
- -- If a candidate, in the opinion of an Examiner, behaves poorly, the Examiner will put a demerit on the paper (1-10). This is entirely discretionary. If a candidate protests the demerit, more shall be given. There will be no discussion.

2. While the Emperor and Imperial Examiners are meeting, the candidates (class) will rearrange the desks and chairs so that the classroom looks like examination cubicles. (They might turn all the chairs and tables so they face the walls, but allow them to figure this out for themselves. (5-10 minutes)

3. The Emperor and Examiners should approve the set up in the classroom and explain the directions for the examination. (5 minutes)

a. You will write a six-line poem in which the 2nd, 4th and 6th lines rhyme. The poem should express a basic tenet of Confucianism. For example, it could deal with filial piety, the relationship between a ruler and the people, the relationship between men and women, or harmony in society.

b. The exams will be graded by the Examiners on the following basis:

Style, 1-10 points (10 high)
Calligraphy and neatness, 1-10 points
Content, 1-10 points
Spelling, 1-10 points
Decorum, 1-10 points

Since calligraphy and neatness count, candidates are encouraged to wite a rough draft and then copy it over in their best writing.

c. The poems will be graded anonymously. (The Emperor will keep a record of the number assigned to each student.) Each candidate will write his/her number -- not name -- on the paper and his/her class, hall, house, or any subgrouping (representing provinces). In order to assure geographic diversity, the finalists will not come from the same hall (province).

(This may provoke protests, but this is the way it was and it's not a bad parallel to the factor of regional distribution in college admissions.)

d. You will have 20 minutes to write the poem.

4. At the end of the time, the Examiners will tell all candidates to put down their pens. Any failure to do so immediately constitutes cheating and the candidate's paper should receive demerits.

5. The Examiners will read and judge the poems. Judge for form, content and behavior. Regional distribution must be taken into account. The finalists must all come from different regions. (20 minutes)

6. The Examiners announce three finalists. They must be from different regions. The successful candidates will read their poems aloud.

7. If there is distress among the unsuccessful candidates, you might ask them to explain what will happen to them as a result of failing the exam. How will their families react? What alternatives do they have for professions or for earning a living? Who in the family will be most disappointed? Will they try again? Were the Examiners unfair, in their opinion? Were true talents overlooked? (10 minutes)

8. End simulation. Begin debriefing. Here are some suggestions for the discussion: (20 minutes)

- Why did you arrange the room the way you did?
- Was the method of grading the test fair?
- Was it fair to take halls (regional distribution) into account?
- What was the atmosphere like during the exam?
- If you received a demerit for poor behavior during the exam, how did you feel about it?
- Were the Examiners fair during the exam?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of the civil service system for recruiting talented men into the bureaucracy?
- In what ways did your behavior change during the simulation? Why? Confucianism or demerits?
- How do you feel when you take the standardized tests?
- Does your future ride on SAT's and Achievement tests as much as it did for candidates taking the civil service exam?

VIII. E.

YUAN DYNASTY
(1260 - 1368)

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

100 Years War	1338-1453
Black Death in Europe	1347-1351

Textbook Treatment

The textbooks cover the career of Genghis Khan in some detail. They describe the development of trade and communications in the Yuan as well as commenting extensively on the active and expanding foreign policy. Material progress is emphasized and there is lively discussion of the growth of literature and drama.

Although the dynasty is clearly identified as alien, there are varying opinions about the extent of sinification of the Yuan and about the long-term effect it had on the development of China.

Overview

Although the Yuan is not vital to the study of Chinese civilization, there are two reasons why we include this brief overview. One is that the Western world is more aware of the Yuan, which was the first major non-Chinese dynasty, than of any other ruling house in China. For this interest we have to thank Marco Polo whose enthusiasm for China was exceeded only by his narrow view. His information has enriched us all. However, he may have started the Western trend of looking at China from the point of view of Western experience rather than from the perspective of the anonymous Chinese people. Much of what Marco Polo described was, in fact, true. But his account based on a position of privilege in the Court gives us a picture of China as an exotic treasure house full of curiosities and wondrous accomplishments. This perception was not to be seriously challenged until the 19th century when an equally limited view was to swing opinion in the opposite direction.

Not incidentally, Marco Polo's writings altered the course of history when Christopher Columbus set out to find the waterway to the fabled East and stumbled on America instead.

The texts make frequent reference to Marco Polo and for those teachers who wish to pursue that aspect of the Yuan we recommend Discovering Marco Polo: A Resource Guide for Teachers, published by The China Project (BAYCEP), Stanford Program on International and Cross Cultural Education, Stanford University.

The second reason we discuss the Yuan is to clarify some misconceptions in the texts and/or reveal new scholarship. The latter suggests the study of the Yuan is far from complete.

Until recently, conventional wisdom treated the Yuan as an aberration in the development of Chinese civilization. However, Edward Dreyer introduces a different thesis. "Not only did the Ming retain institutions and practices that were often Yuan innovation, the next Chinese ruling elite itself manifested values and attitudes similar to those of the former Mongol warrior aristocrats, and often did so in contradiction to Confucian prescriptions." (Dreyer: 2)

Dreyer seems to be questioning the assumption that China has always sinicized her conquerors. Instead he suggests that, during the transition from Yuan to Ming rule, the early Ming depended upon an infusion of Yuan ideas, all of which contradicted Confucian orthodoxy. As evidence, he cites how early Ming emperors used military force, the major governing tool of the Yuan, to establish military and political unity. This effectively forestalled the disunity which in the past had sometimes led to interregnums of several hundred years when many dynasties had collapsed.

Dreyer also discusses the strength of the privileged hereditary military elite, inherited from the Yuan, who were used for governing purposes in the early Ming.

In short, he credits the effective use of the military in the early Ming with establishing the secure frontiers behind which six centuries of subsequent rulers were to withdraw in unwitting complacency and isolation.

This thesis of the lingering Yuan influence during the transition to the early Ming suggests the value of considering the Yuan as contributing more than commercial development to the Han Chinese civilization. It also suggests that the Ming emperors had a choice. They could have opted for a military government but chose, in the long run, to restore the government by the Confucian-trained bureaucracy.

The conquest of China by Genghis Khan represented a major confrontation between the nomadic culture of the steppes and a civilization based on intensive agriculture. Contrast the rural Chinese house made of clay bricks and firmly rooted to the soil or the delicate wooden houses with graceful tiled roofs of the city with a Franciscan monk's description of the Mongolian yurt -- a 13th century version of the mobile home.

> Nowhere have they fixed dwelling-places, nor do they know where the next will be. . . They set up the dwelling in which they sleep on a circular frame of interlaced sticks converging into a little round hoop on the top, from which projects above a collar as a chimney. . . And they make those houses so large that they are sometimes thirty feet in width. I myself once measured the width between the wheel-tracks of a cart, twenty feet; and when the house was on the cart it projected beyond the wheels on either side five feet at least. . . (Cameron 1970: 35)

Other customs reinforced this cultural incompatibility and suggest that the Mongols went to some length to maintain their own identity. They preferred furs and leather clothes to silk and cotton. They drank both cow's and mare's milk and ate quantities of meat. They relied on written codes of law rather than moral training as a means of social control.

At the same time Confucian orthodoxy was being quietly maintained in private academies.

The Yuan rulers failed to work out a compromise between these two cultures. When the dynasty fell the Mongol nation stayed intact. It didn't disappear as previous dynasties had. Instead, the Mongols went north and retained their form and culture, becoming less aggressive as they became more interested in Buddhism. Their presence was to be a painful reminder to China that the world was not all China. From now on, the Chinese were forced to acknowledge that China was "but one world -- distinct from other worlds."

The texts include a lively discussion of the growth of literature and drama during the Yuan. This raises a question. Was the orthodoxy of Confucianism so pervasive -- and inhibiting -- that it required the anti-intellectualism of an alien dynasty to stimulate creativity outside the conventional structure?

An "upstart world" added great variety to city life which flourished under the active commercial policies of the Yuan. "Beggars, commission agents, loafers, peddlers, trainers and exhibitors of fighting animals like cocks and crickets, professional storytellers, mountebanks, dancers, acrobats, jugglers, singers, actors" were all part of the street scene. Considered little more than the dregs of society, this underworld stimulated the popularization of art and drama.

Some of the texts are unclear about Yuan cooperation with existing Chinese institutions. Although the Mongols retained the facade of the Chinese administrative structure which had been in place since the T'ang dynasty, for all practical purposes theirs was a military rule.

The examination system was initially abolished to allow the conquerors time to position their people in top posts. When it was reinstated in 1315, a strict quota system guaranteed Mongols and other non-Chinese subjects of the Mongol Empire a large share of the important degrees. Thus an hereditary military elite assumed power. Serious Chinese scholars and philosophers withdrew from public life and from competition in the exam system which they felt was being compromised. The Chinese scholar-officials who served in lesser positions were under-utilized and often ignored.

From this we can observe a shift from the basic premise on which the bureaucracy had been based. The Mongols perceived administration officials in the narrow sense of people who did a job. They, unlike the Chinese, had little idea of the bureaucracy as an institution which would serve as the perpetuator and repository of the civilization. Therefore, it seems that the extent to which the Mongols adapted Chinese institutions may have been based on self-interest and expediency rather than on a belief in the superiority of the Chinese system.

Another example of co-opting Chinese institutions can be found in the Mongols retention of government control of much of the commerce and industry. This continued to inhibit the merchant class from developing as an independent, separate and competing political force.

With one exception, the texts attribute the collapse of the Yuan to ineffective and unpopular rulers who succeeded Khubilai Khan; to natural disasters; and to general discontent with foreign rulers. We add two other important factors. One was the whole Mongol Empire itself was collapsing. The other involved serious factional disputes -- reminiscent of those which occurred in the Sung -- in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. This controversy, which erupted at the level just below the court, involved Confucian antagonists debating how to accommodate to Mongol rule. However, the leaders of the controversy were Mongols and their Asian administrators. The irony is that although Confucian terms were used in the discussion, the Mongols weren't committed to the orthodoxy. They were also unable to control or contain the argument which became extremely divisive and further diminished Yuan authority.

VIII. F.

THE MATURE IMPERIAL SYSTEM: MING AND EARLY CH'ING (QING)
1368-1750

Contemporary Events Elsewhere in the World

Columbus reaches America	1492
The Reformation of Luther	1517
Cortez conquers Mexico	1619
Queen Elizabeth I	1588-1603
The *Mayflower* entered Plymouth Harbor	1620

Textbook Treatment

In general the textbooks tend to focus on China's relationships with the rest of the world in both the Ming and Ch'ing periods. China's internal developments, which explain its extraordinary accomplishments as well as its enormous weaknesses in the 19th century, are only sketchily covered.

Key Concepts

Politics and Government

Chinese civilization came to full maturity during the late imperial age. The efficacy of a system of government that had been evolving since the Shang dynasty and which had been refined in the Sung was tested and not found wanting. The government was able to effectively rule and defend a united territory the size of the United States. Its economic, social and political sectors were well integrated, strong, and flexible.

As a result, China enjoyed domestic peace for nearly 400 years. It also steadily strengthened its preeminence over neighboring peoples, grew in population, became remarkably homogeneous in language and culture, and became an elegantly sophisticated society. By the Ch'ing its principles of governance and social organization were so extolled by Voltaire and other Western intellectuals that Confucius became virtually the patron saint of Europe's Age of Enlightenment. In short, China had reached its heyday.

Ironically, however, the very reasons for its success were to become the reasons for its collapse in the 19th century. Its enormous mass, its remarkable self-sufficiency in trade and defense, its ideology of imperial Confucianism all lead to so great a success that its leaders were unprepared for disaster. (Fairbank: 5-6).

China had reached a plateau that made appropriate responses to unaccustomed challenges difficult. The government was as unable to deal with the dramatic drop in the standard of living caused by the population explosion that had come with peace and prosperity as it was unprepared to cope with Western nations who no longer were willing to accept the restrictions that China had imposed for three centuries. In one sense China had reached a state of perfection that lead not to an outward expansion, but to an implosion.

In the realm of government, much that had been established in the Sung reasserted itself during the late imperial age. There was considerable continuity between the Sung and the Ming and the transition from Ming to Ch'ing was a smooth one. Despite the fact that they were conquerors, the Manchus did a great deal to preserve the status quo. They honored and perpetuated Ming ideology, adhered to Ming governmental patterns and preserved Ming social organizations.

The emperors of the Ming and Ch'ing, like their Sung predecessors, were complete autocrats who could not be challenged in theory, law and usually in practice. Although their personal styles differed, they tended to dominate the top level of society, the military command, the administration of civil affairs and even the national economy through monopolies like that on salt and the licensing and the regulation of all large-scale economic activity. (Fairbank: 27) They were also considered religious and intellectual leaders. They were, however, saved from being religious figureheads or puppets like the Japanese emperors because of the Confucian regard for their moral self-cultivation and their daily involvement in government.

The organizational structure underneath the emperor was divided into three components as it was in the Sung: administrative, military, and judicial/censorial. This structural division was also reflected in regional government. Counties remained the base of the governmental pyramid and supervisory prefectures or provinces continued. Below these levels the burdens of administration fell, as they had previously, on the people. The mundane affairs of the Chinese empire went on below the level of government attention. The typical magistrate's local jurisdiction had swollen from 80,000 in the Sung to 250,000 by the mid-Ch'ing, dramatically increasing the thinness of the bureaucracy but apparently not its ability to function. The system of government operated well enough to astonish Western visitors to China. Its ability to do so was due to several factors, the most important of which was the essential but unofficial role the gentry played in local government.

It was incumbent upon a magistrate arriving at a new post to establish a working relationship with the local elite for he had to rely on them to perform many functions of leadership. They frequently superintended public works, supported schools and academies, sponsored and printed local gazetteers and participated in local sacrifices and Confucian rituals. They could be counted on to organize relief efforts in times of disaster and in times of disorder to even finance, recruit and lead militia forces. In return the magistrate helped protect the economic position of the gentry. (Fairbank: 13) In this way, local social hierarchies, national elites and the imperial bureaucracy meshed together to provide a unifying framework for Chinese society. (Cohen: 10)

Self-control on the part of the gentry and magistrate alike was an important feature of the system since the local government did not have a separate budget and was expected to rely on customary fees while the magistrate lived off his take of local revenues. Out of this he had to maintain his administration and quota payments. This, of course, created a government by interest groups in which the gentry enjoyed an unfair advantage and were often able to secure regressive taxation. Thus gentry participation in local government was hardly a form of representative government; it was a form of elitism. As a result, the "equity and efficacy of Ch'ing administration depended heavily on the morale of the local populace and the self discipline and restraint of gentry leadership in each region". (Fairbank: 21)

In addition to the gentry, local magistrates made use of two neighborhood organization systems to extend imperial control. In the first, the li-chia (li jia) system, families were grouped into tens and hundreds for local self-governance; tax collections were the responsibility of an overlapping network of unpaid tax captains, who were responsible for an area owing a standard large sum. The system was also used to keep the peasantry informed about laws and indoctrinate it with Confucian values. The second system, the pao chia (bao jia), was inherited from the Sung. It was a mutual responsibility system designed to involve all households in the affairs of neighbors and promote mutual spying to maintain order. It was organized in a way that prevented gentry control and single village domination so that local influence would remain fragmented.

The Civil Service Bureaucracy Those who ran the government both at the central and regional level in both official and unofficial capacities were products of the civil service examination system that had been refined during the Sung. The old hereditary aristocracy was firmly displaced from predominance in government. During the Ming and Ch'ing degree candidates passed through three main stages (local, provincial and national examinations) on their way toward the final Sung-style palace examination (see VIII.-D.). By the end of the Ming and during the Ch'ing, the intellectual rigor of the examinations deteriorated. Creative thinking, never an important element in one's success in the exams, became a positive liability. Successful candidates had to be able to write a "good" eight-legged essay, something that required little knowledge and even less creativity but demanded excellent calligraphy and a facility with rhyme, diction and political expression. The exams became predictable and answer books were mass-produced. (Hucker 1975: 321)

The examination system was also less democratic by the Ch'ing. The poor never participated in the system in any numbers but during the Ch'ing the system was less open than ever. Only thirty percent of those who passed the exams could claim that no one holding the highest degree had been in his family for three generations; in the Ming and Sung this figure had been fifty percent. The possibility of success, no matter how remote, nevertheless probably continued to serve to alleviate social discontent and give the Ch'ing bureaucratic system enormous staying power. (Wakeman 1975: 23)

The Legal System Legal philosophy and practice differed greatly from that of the West. The courts were part of the executive branch of government and there was no such thing as due process of law or advice of counsel in a trial. Actual law enforcement was a personal and localized matter more dependent upon the particulars of a given situation than upon a strict interpretation of the codes. People were not treated equally before the law, nor were they supposed to be. The typical case would be tried on the basis of its moral implications, rather than any considerations of legality. Lawsuits and litigation were in general avoided at all costs and disputes were often settled through non-official avenues. Going to trial was an example of unvirtuous behavior and one's social status was sure to fall if one became involved in a legal proceeding. In general, law was perceived as a device to protect and conserve the central government rather than to protect the individual. It was always flexibly administrated.

Economic and Social Development

By the late imperial age traditional agriculture had been perfected into a high art. The accumulated wisdom of small farmers over the centuries and state investment in irrigation, dikes and water control had paid off. The proper use of organic fertilizer, crop rotation and the development of fast ripening rice, which had their beginnings in the Sung, also contributed to the slow but steady growth in agricultural output. It was only natural thac the economic center of China remained in the productive Yangtze delta.

Dry land crops such as corn, sweet potatoes and peanuts and increased terracing encouraged the colonization of formerly marginal farm land and helped the struggling northern economy. One of the trade-offs was the gradual deforestation of the once heavily wooded areas as land was converted to agriculture. Centuries later north China, in particular, was to pay the price for this ecological imbalance.

At first some of the steady but continuous population growth stimulated by this agricultural revolution could be absorbed. Manchu frontiers were extended to include present-day Tibet and Sinkiang (Xinjiang) in the west and Outer Mongolia and Manchuria in the north. However, by the 18th century, the Chinese population had grown and China was essentially filled up. It is estimated that in the early 1500s China's population was one million. By 1750 it was three million and by 1850 it exceeded four million. This development is considered a central cause of the decline and eventual collapse of the imperial system.

During the Ming the economy of rural China was consolidated into an enduring structure similar to the organization of present-day rural communes. A growing number of market towns dominated the countryside. A specialized economy and an expanding population demanded more places to sell or barter surplus produce, to buy domestic necessities, to seek professional advice from fortune tellers or doctors or simply to exchange gossip with neighbors. Arranged in a pattern identified by G.W. Skinner as a standard marketing area, each small village of a few hundred people was half a day's walk away from a larger market town which accommodated all the people within a self-sufficient area. These towns, which were generally smaller than their European counterparts, were trading rather than commercial centers.

In spite of major and obvious economic and social differences between the city and countryside there were important similarities and none of the stark urban-rural contrasts characteristic of pre-industrial societies. A pattern of social organization was common to urban and rural regions. The city was merely the center of its rural hinterland. Although the wealthy landowners continued to migrate to the cities, they retained their emotional ties with their birthplace. They returned to tend their ancestors' graves and were generous in funding public buildings or memorial arches in their home towns.

China's industrial output followed the pattern set in the Sung and was nurtured by increasingly sophisticated inter-regional transportation systems as well as by the silver-based currency system. The Grand Canal was re-opened in 1415. This facilitated the transport of porcelains from Kiangsi (Jiangxi), silk from Soochow (Suzhou), iron goods from Anhwei (Anhui), and Shanghai-produced cotton. Handicraft production and cottage industries were important to the rural economy.

The imperial government's ongoing preoccupation with identifying sources of revenue was responsible for the state monopolies of goods universally demanded. For instance, by the Ming the government was involved in the actual production, distribution, transportation and sale of tea. Needless to say, every transaction required a license or tax payment.

Social Structure Similarities between Chinese families and communities were far more fundamental than differences despite the large size of China and its population (Cohen: 4). The family was the critical unit in Chinese society and economy. Families who were engaged in farming were organized along the same lines as families engaged in any combination of cultural, commercial, or handicraft activities, regardless of status. All families obtained their livelihoods through the coordinated efforts of its members who were supported by a common family fund. Family holdings were owned jointly by male members and worked by the whole family.

A new family was not created by marriage (brides moved into their husbands' families) but by the division of family holdings. In the majority of cases this involved a division among married brothers, each of whom would receive an equal share. The family, therefore, went through cycles where family formation through division was followed by expansion and finally division again.

The ideal Chinese family of several generations under one roof was large by Western standards but it was rarely achieved except among the wealthy. There was a close connection between greater adherence to large family ideals and achievement of higher social and economic standing. It must be remembered, however, that success in the exams could not be passed on to one's sons. As a result, families faced continued upward and downward mobility. In villages families averaged five members. Some families would include both parents, one son, his wife and their children, others would be limited to parents and unmarried children.

The highest position in society continued to be enjoyed by the gentry or social elite. This group, like the old aristocracy that it replaced, dominated government service and managed the economy. A rigid class structure such as that which developed in Japan did not take hold in China. There was great variety not only from class to class but within each class. For instance, the shady real-estate broker living by his wits and the influential landlord, whether a respected member of the community or a scoundrel, could belong to the gentry class.

Merchants were in an ambiguous position. Although formally they were considered less worthy than the peasant, whose intimate association with the land gave him status, they were recognized as necessary members of the community. Members of the elite acknowledged the merchants' function in the economic sector as a banker, trader, investor and manufacturer and were often grateful to have a family member pursue a career in a commercial (and lucrative) field.

By the Ch'ing the merchants had formed non-government organized guilds. One form of these, the hui kuan (hui guan), or provincial lodges, was especially prominent in the 18th century because of growing interregional commerce. Merchants traveling to Peking would typically find their provincial lodge in the capital. These lodges served as social clubs as well as cooperative business associations that provided letters of introduction and limited credit. Several hui kuan were originally built to house literati visiting the capital to take exams. The hui kuan thus provided businessmen with a chance to become acquainted with the future gentry and symbolized their reliance on this class for economic protection. Merchants as a class did not adopt a distinct class manner or style. No matter how wealthy, they aspired to the lifestyle of the gentry.

Beneath the level of formal bureaucracy and local notables was the peasantry. By the mid-Ch'ing this sector of society was a confusing hodge podge of small free-hold farmers, almost undistinguishable from tenant farmers, and farmers who worked some fields that they owned, and worked others that they didn't and rented out still others.

Owning serfs was technically illegal in the late imperial age for all but officials. However, the line between tenant farmer and serf was a fine one. The tenant-farmer was not bound by a formal contract as the serf was but he was often in debt and dependent upon the local elite for protection in the event of a legal dispute, for work assignments, or for help in time of a natural catastrophe. The small landowner sometimes turned his land over to a large landlord to avoid paying taxes. An intense relationship dominated by dependency and paternalism grew out of this network of personal and financial obligations. This was every bit as binding and immobilizing as any formal contract.

Throughout the late imperial period peasants in both North and South China alternated between order and disorder, agriculture and rebellion, but as long as subsistance was possible there was a strong inclination toward order. By the 1770s the Chinese had, however, multiplied more rapidly than the land allowed. A series of revolts, large and small, began to erupt and the ancient accommodation between peasants and gentry was destroyed. A permanently dispossessed class of impoverished people for whom there was neither land nor jobs began to appear for the first time in Chinese history. Activity among secret societies became more frequent. The centuries-old White Lotus Society precipitated a rebellion in 1793 that seriously disrupted North China for eleven years. By the 1820s and 1830s rebellions had become endemic. And by 1850, the Taiping Rebellion erupted and in the course of the next 15 years nearly brought China to its knees. More than 15 provinces were affected, hundreds of towns and cities were damaged or destroyed, and approximately 30 million people were killed. (Hucker 1975: 302)

Religion and Philosophy

An ever-present paradox in the study of Chinese civilization is that periodic outbursts of creative intellectual thought co-existed with Confucian orthodoxy. This is well illustrated by the late imperial age.

The first Ming emperor decreed that the philosophy developed by Chu Hsi in the Southern Sung should be the basis of the curriculum of the state-supported schools. This conservative neo-Confucian doctrine stressed re-examination and re-interpretation of the classics. It maintained that a person's nature differs from one's mind and only by cultivating the latter by serious study of the past can man perform conscientiously.

However, during the Ming, another philosopher, Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) developed an alternative. He said, "since it does not require much thought, nor does it demand learning to distinguish right from wrong, innate knowledge is in fact the nature of Heaven reflected in the mind of man. . . the mind can instantly tell whether such a wish is morally right or wrong." (Li 1975: 292)

Wang also maintained that it was not necessary to cultivate one's self through a study of the past. He believed that there was a unity of knowledge and action. Discipline and self-examination were required so man would do what he intuitively knew he should do. Individuals can judge for themselves what is right and what is wrong. Eventually Wang's ideas were distorted by followers who perceived such concepts as personal self-examination as license to extreme individualism. This effectively discouraged any long-lasting consideration of them.

The most impressive scholarly movement of the Ch'ing circumvented the two schools of thought described above and sought to rediscover what the classical writings meant in their own time. There was renewed interest in the pre-Sung methodology, particularly for annotators. The movement was, as a result, called the School of Han Learning. It produced important philological refinements, textual criticism, and historical criticism. Masterpieces of new inductive, objective scholarly work appeared during the Ch'ing.

Religion in the late imperial age continued much as it had in the Sung with Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism incorporated into one eclectic belief. Although Buddhist monks and Taoist priests were theoretically registered by the state, the government control was loose.

Science and Technology

China maintained its economic and technical superiority in the world until the 18th century. It was not until then that the West approached the level of development that existed in China in the 14th century. The following chart illustrates this enormous lag.

Invention	Delay in reaching the West
Wheelbarrow	900-1000 years
Crossbow	1300
Kite	about 1200
Deep drilling	1100
Cast iron	1000-1200
Suspension bridge (two types)	800-1200
Canal lock-gates	700-1700
Gunpowder	400
Magnetic compass (lodgestone spoon)	1100
Magnetic compass (with needle)	400
Printing (with blocks)	600
Printing (moveable type)	400
Paper	1000
Porcelain	1100-1300
Clockwork (the escapement mechanism)	400

(Cameron 1975:9)

Even the spinning wheel, one of the developments that triggered the industrial revolution in the West in the 18th century, was invented in China. The following poem was written in the 14th century to describe a Chinese water-powered mechanical spinning device.

> There is one driving-belt for wheels both great and small:
> When one wheel turns, the others all turn with it.
> The rovings are transmitted evenly from bobbin-rollers.
> The threads wind by themselves onto the reeling-frame.
> (Elvin 1973: 198)

The question that looms in the 20th century is why China did not continue its remarkable pace of scientific development. Despite its brilliant history of independent invention China found itself, by the mid-19th century, so technologically deficient that it was unable to defend itself against Western military power.

Mark Elvin has developed a controversial theory called "the high-level equilibrium trap." Citing the spectacular increase in population, the resulting increased pressure on the limited amount of land available for food production, the fact that the Chinese had already taken advantage of such standard technology as irrigation and flood control, and that highly scientific inputs such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides and quality seed development were scientifically out of reach, he argues it took all available energy to maintain the existing balance between food and population. Demand for new goods was limited and developing new technology was secondary to maintaining food supplies. Thus, according to Elvin, the society had reached a saturation point with little incentive for qualitative change.

Others have focused on the role of Confucianism in China's inability to maintain its momentum in science. One scholar has written:

> Most probably the main inhibiting cause was the intellectual climate of the Confucianist orthodoxy, not at all favorable for any form of trial or experiment, for innovations of any kind, or for the free play of the mind. The bureaucracy was perfectly satisfied with traditional techniques. (Balazs: 22)

In discussing this theory another scholar points out that by the 16th and 17th centuries the upper stratum of society was gaining its wealth by association with officialdom. This group. which had the capital, was becoming increasingly removed from the production process. As the rural landlords moved to urban areas, activities involving the salt trade and banking, for example, captured their interest. Capital was invested in land and in education, which was the access route to the prestigious scholar-official class. But it was not invested in technological modernization. (Lippit: 305-306)

It is impossible to determine which of these theories or which combination of theories answers the question posed. There is no doubt, however, that as the Ming progressed and then as China came under Manchu control, the West began to first catch up with and then overtake China in the realm of scientific development. By the early Ch'ing, China, for the first time, was more influenced by Western developments than the West was by Chinese development. The Jesuits, particularly Matteo Ricci, played a significant role in this switch. From them, Chinese learned Western methods of cannon-casting, calendar-making, cartography, mathematics, astronomy, algebra, geometry, geography and architecture. Knowledge of these new developments did not, however, trigger new advances as they did in the West. China was interested in but not stimulated by Western advances.

Foreign Relations

China's foreign policy changed during the course of the late imperial age in response to the changing nature of the threats against it. In the early Ming, the Chinese directed their energies toward controlling their old enemies -- the Central Asian nomads who had threatened China since Ch'in times. They also carried out some naval expeditions but failed to pursue China's obvious capacity to become a maritime power. This period of aggressive policies on land and experimentation on the seas did not survive throughout the Ming, however. By the middle of the dynasty the Chinese began focusing on providing an effective government for a united empire. It was not until the late Ming and early Ch'ing that new threats from the outside forced China again to look outward. A new era in China's relations with the world began when the Russians began marching across Siberia to the Manchurian border and the Westerners began arriving by sea.

At first the Russians posed a much more serious threat to the empire. They started a sustained drive to capture Siberia in the 16th century and during the 17th century penetrated into the region of the Amur River and began to send exploratory and diplomatic missions to China. Finally, in 1685, the emperor K'ang-hsi organized two expeditions against them. Although both were successful, China decided to negotiate with the Russians rather than to press its advantage. The result was the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) -- China's first agreement with a Western power. By this treaty which, significantly, was reached on the basis of equality, Russia gained control of a large chunk of undecided territory and, in addition, was given a number of commercial privileges. China, for its part, saw the Russian threat diminished.

As a result of this treaty and one signed in 1727, Russia began to occupy a special position in China. It was the only country with which China traded diplomatic missions and to which China granted religious, commercial and educational privileges in Peking. These privileges continued long after Russian neutrality was no longer essential. Russia was, as a consequence, able to learn more about the inner workings of the country than any other Western power. Its monopolistic position was not broken until Peking was opened up to the diplomatic representatives of Britain, France, and the United States in 1861. (Hsu 1975: 166)

In general, despite its success in dealing with the Russians and other border peoples, and its seemingly strong military position, China was ill-prepared for Western contact. Several factors contributed to its lack of preparation and set the stage for China's inability to defend itself from Western aggression in the 19th century. First, its size made it remarkably self-sufficient and foreign trade remained an unimportant part of its economy. Western traders that arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries were tolerated but not welcomed. The prosperous and self-sufficient Chinese were indifferent to the products these "barbarians" brought and restricted their activities to a few pockets along the coast. (See IX.-A.)

Second, China's ideology of imperial Confucianism made it almost impervious to the acceptance of foreign concepts. Missionaries, and particularly the Jesuits, were quite well-received in the late Ming and early Ch'ing but their impact was limited. The Chinese admired the Western science and mathematics that they introduced but were not stimulated towards the process of modernization by it.

Finally, the tradition of absorption or neutralization of invading barbarians in the vastness of China's society and culture made China unresponsive to foreign aggression. Thus, during the late imperial age, China became a supra-nationalistic system which could not easily appreciate the sentiment of nationalists from other countries and was incapable of quick reaction. China's ruling class was mainly concerned with preserving its agrarian social order; foreign relations were a marginal concern. (Fairbank 1978: 5-6)

Art and Culture

During the late imperial age literature and arts did not reach the heights that they did in the T'ang and Sung, but it was not until the 19th century that they began, like Neo-Confucianism, to sink to the level of imitative conservatism. By then the prolonged stability of Manchu rule had led to conformism. (Hucker 1975: 425)

Architecture Much of the architecture that we regard as quintessentially Chinese dates from the early part of the late imperial age -- the Ming dynasty. For example, the Forbidden City, the imperial palace complex, was constructed by the third Ming emperor, Yung-lo (Yong Luo). It follows the basic architectural design of a central city surrounded by four walls, each with a gate. The horizontal lines of the palaces and the generous use of space help to integrate the sky with the buildings. The effect is dignified but not overpowering. Inside the Forbidden City the elaborate golden roofs, the marble bridges and roadways, the fountains, the palaces and their courtyards, the halls and the gardens are a testament to the craftsmanship and artistry of hundreds of thousands of workers.

The Temple of Heaven is another famous series of buildings constructed in the 15th century. This awe-inspiring enclosure includes the altar where the Emperor performed an elaborate series of rites at the winter solstice. Its gloriously painted and heavily decorated halls utilize sophisticated architectural techniques that attest to both the high artistic and technical level of the periods. The observer is particularly struck by the perfect symmetry.

The towering marble gateway and the large statues of animals and humans that line the road to the Ming tombs outside of Peking are another reminder of the artistic legacy of this age.

Literature Literature in a variety of forms flourished throughout the late imperial age. During the early part of the period officially sponsored publications proliferated. Among the many ones of significance was an 11,095 volume encyclopedia which listed all the publications on history, government and philosophy produced in the preceding dynasties. As the period continued such publications became less frequent but literary men continued to write local histories and traditional forms of literary prose and poetry.

Although traditional literary works dominated the literary scene, they by no means monopolized it. The growth of the merchant class and the urban merchant's thirst for diversion and entertainment stimulated the growth of popular literature. This literature, which used vernacular language, combined story-telling with social satire. Although it was in fact well-received by people, it was not officially admired and authors generally remained anonymous or assumed pseudonyms to conceal their identity. Four Ming novels are still read by educated Chinese. These novels focused on the abuses of the Confucian system of government rather than directly criticizing the Imperial system. One of them, "Water Margin," draws on the experiences of a group of outlaws that organized the downtrodded. It later became a great favorite of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong).

Two Chinese fiction classics were written in the Ch'ing -- *The Scholars*, which good-humoredly ridicules the scholar class, and the *Dream of the Red Chamber*, which depicts the degenerate life of an upper-class household.

Calligraphy Calligraphy continued to flourish during the period. This was particularly true during the early Ch'ing when an individual style was pursued with renewed dynamism. The work of the 18th and 19th century painters has not been carefully evaluated by specialists. However, the current view that their works represent a decline from earlier dynasties is unlikely to change when they do. "In the affluent mid-Ch'ing society, painters abounded and demonstrated great versatility; but they generally painted 'by the book'." (Hucker 1975: 425)

Ceramics Although Sung pottery styles remained popular during the late imperial age they were eclipsed by the development of more colorful and highly decorated wares. The new styles are associated with Ching-te-chen (Jing dezhen), the famous pottery center that was the site of both Ming and Ch'ing imperial kilns.

All Ching-te-chen wares are known for their delicate white bodies. The earliest of the Chin-te-chen products are the famous Ming Blue and White wares. Many ceramic designs and glazes became increasingly ornate during the Ch'ing and reached the height of their popularity in the 18th century. Heavy porcelains were produced specifically for the European market -- some on special order. Monochromes remained popular as did Blue and White ware but new styles of polychrome ware were in even greater demand.

ENRICHMENT

I. Generally the Ming emperors did not work as well with the officials as the Sung emperors had. Even in the best possible case, a natural tension developed between the officials with overall responsibility for the people's welfare and the Inner Court of palace women, eunuchs and a few highly placed advisors who, because of their confinement and dependence upon the Emperor, were more interested in court intrigue than in government.

Whether or not the Ming emperors were "ordinary" men, a brief look at their daily routine illustrates both their removal from the real world and the tedium and boredom of their existence.

The emperor lived in the Forbidden City which was closed to all but palace women and eunuchs. In the Ming these concubines were purposely selected from commoner families to assure that these families wouldn't try to gain power through their daughters' position in the court. At the time of Wan-li (1573-1620) there were an estimated 20,000 eunuchs and 3000 palace women. The Forbidden City was part of the larger Imperial City which was a self-sufficient community of parks, villas, warehouses, stables, supply depots and small industries. Only the Inner Court of officials and nobility had access to it.

A young potential emperor's chief companions were eunuchs and tutors. Under Ming law obvious role models such as older male cousins or uncles had, upon maturity, been removed from the Imperial City and resettled on estates where they were supported by the government and kept isolated. In this way they could not become a competing source of power. However, maintaining this Imperial clan, which at one point had around 100,000 members, was to be a devastating financial burden.

The tutor had enormous influence over the young emperor and was subject to intense pressure from officials promoting a particular cause.

Ceremonial functions were essential to governing a large territory. The emperor couldn't possibly attend to all the details but by performing certain routine rituals, he set a tone which suggested his discipline and concern. He attended a daily audience with the court which had to be finished by dawn. In the 16th century one emperor reduced the number of items considered from 185 to eight. Other emperors tried to reduce the frequency of the audiences. The emperor was supposed to read and comment on the ever-increasing number of reports and memorials which reached the Court. He had to attend daily study sessions. He met with his officials individually. They depended upon this contact as reassurance of his commitment to government. Every function required a different costume which meant hours spent in changing clothes.

This test of endurance and will was proof that the Emperor was doing his job and shared a belief in the highest moral order. It is small wonder that some emperors found public life trying at best and retreated to the study of calligraphy or Taoism or, as some did, began to indulge in drink, experiment with drugs or other varieties of sensual pleasures.

This is a description of just one of the many rituals.

> The symbolic value of the office of the monarchy was amply illustrated by the ritualistic farming performed by the emperor every spring in front of the Altar of Earth. About two hundred farmers were called in from the two counties surrounding Peking to form an assembly. Actors dressed up as deities of wind, clouds, thunder, and rain. Two officials led an ox; two older farmers held a plow. Other peasants carried farm implements and barrels for human fertilizer. The emperor, however, touched neither the tools nor the draft animal. His left hand holding a whip and his right hand a ceremonial plow carved with

> a dragon and painted in gold, he was flanked by two elders. The procession marched across the field three times. Then the ruler retired to the tent to watch his courtiers, led by the minister of revenue, repeat the process. Seeding was performed by the prefect of Shun-t'ien and his staff. No sooner was the soil covered than actors in peasant clothing presented five principal grains to the emperor, simulating a good harvest. The sovereign was then congratulated by all present. (Huang 1981: 6)

II. The Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, was allowed to build a mission house in China but local authorities protested when a picture of the Virgin Mary was placed on the altar. They couldn't comprehend worshipping a female god. In a show of the flexibility and tact which enabled him to live and work in China for a number of years, Ricci quickly replaced the controversial picture with one of Jesus.

Ricci has also described what happened when he made a map of the world for Chinese.

> The Fathers had hung up in their hall a map of the whole world. . . When the Chinese understood what it was, never having seen or imagined such a thing before, all the more serious-minded of them wanted to see it printed with Chinese characters, so as to understand its contents better. So the Father (Ricci refers to himself in the third person), who knew something of mathematics, having been a disciple of Clavius when in Rome, set about the task, helped by one of the literati, a friend of his: and before long they had made a map of the world bigger than the one in the house. . . It was the best and most useful work that could be done at that time to dispose the Chinese to give credit to the things of the Faith. For up to then the Chinese had printed many maps of the world with titles such as 'Description of the Whole World' in which China was all, occupying the field with its fifteen provinces; and round the edge they depicted a little sea where a few islets were dotted about, on which they wrote the names of all the kingdoms of which they had ever heard; and these (kingdoms) all put together would not have equalled the size of one of the provinces of China. . . When they saw the world so large (on Ricci's map) and China in a corner of it. . . the more ignorant began to make fun of such a description, but the more intelligent, seeing such an orderly arrangement of parallel lines of latitude and longitude. . . could not resist believing the whole thing true. . . It was printed again and again and all China was flooded with copies. (Cameron 1970: 158-159)

III. In this essay, we identify the late imperial period with the final maturation of the imperial system of governance. However, in a region as large as China there were pockets of despair where the system failed. In these areas we can anticipate the larger tragedy which overcame China in the 19th century.

Jonathan Spence, the historian, relies on a 1673 local history, the memoirs and handbook of a magistrate and a contemporary short-story writer to recreate events in the late 17th century in T'an-chang, a village of little consequence in

Shantung province. The following is an excerpt from The Death of Woman Wang.

> The Manchu conquest of China, with its promise of a restoration of order and prosperity and an end to the old corruption and inefficiency of the Ming, brought no sharp change of fortune to T'an-ch'eng: the decade between the late 1640s and the late 1650s continued the previous pattern. The I River flooded in 1649, ruining the autumn crops along a great belt of land stretching for fifteen miles below Ma-t'ou market. In the autumn of 1651 the I and the Shu rivers both flooded, pouring so much water across the fields that the newly appointed magistrate had to come by boat to T'an-ch'eng city to take up his office, sailing across the sodden land. The next year both rivers flooded after heavy summer rains that destroyed the millet and kaoliang crops and brought a winter famine; while in 1659 the same rivers flooded in late spring after sixteen days of uninterrupted rain, just as the winter wheat and barley were ready for harvest. The farmers watched helplessly as the sheaves already cut went bobbing off across the waves while the heavy ears of still-standing grain fell water-logged below the surface.
>
> With these natural disasters came yet more bandits -- in 1648 bandits from the mountains to the northwest sacked Ma-t'ou market; in 1650 a band driven out of their home base in the western Shantung county of Ko-tse sacked the market of Kuei-ch'ang and laid waste the surrounding area; and in 1651 another large bandit force, driven out of their base to the northwest by government troops, broke through the defenses of T'an-ch'eng city itself and sacked it. The Local History has poignant stories about each of the raids: woman Yao, aged seventeen in 1648, cursing the bandits as they dragged her out of her house, still cursing as they cut off her arm and killed her; woman Sun, gathering her dead husband's bones and those of her mother-in-law from the ashes of the home the bandits burned in 1650 and proceeding with funeral rites as the bandits looked on; Tu Chih-tung, who had survived the wars and sacks of fifteen years, refusing to be carried off for ransom in the 1651 raid, cursing the bandits and being killed in his home. Surviving relatives often could not recognize their own family members among the piles of the dead, but would identify them by some item of dress or else reluctantly bury them in group graves. . .
>
> Huang Liu-hung was a scholarly and observant man, from a minor official family in Honan, who had passed the chu-jen examination. T'an-ch'eng was his first posting. It was his responsibility to try to hold the shattered community together, and in the personal memoir and handbook that he compiled twenty years later during his comfortable retirement in Soochow, he wrote movingly of his attempts to come to terms with the misery that once surrounded him. It is clear that while he was in office Huang worked skillfully for the community, trying to induce his superiors -- and through them the government in

Peking -- to grant tax concessions and corvee labor rebates, and to be generous in reassessing reclaimed land, so that the effects of decades of catastrophes and the culminating earthquake could be mitigated. To attain such concessions one had to keep constantly pressing, for the government moved slowly, and as far as Peking was concerned, there were hundreds of T'an-ch'engs, each with its own definitions of its own crises, and each one needing to be evaluated on its own terms. Weeks went by before the effects of the 1668 earthquake in central Shantung were examined by officials from the Board of Revenue, and it took eighteen months before tax rebates for the area were approved. The board's final decision was that such an earthquake should be considered in the same light as a serious drought or flood, thus bringing the local population a tax rebate for one year of 30 per cent; this rebate was extended to those who already had part of the year's taxes in advance installments. The board also recommended that in view of high casualties T'an-ch'eng county's assessed labor-service total should be lowered by 400 persons. However, no generosity was seen in this gesture by the local officials in T'an-ch'eng, who estimated that almost 1500 of the earthquake's dead had been on the tax registers as able-bodied males liable for services; the government's decision therefore meant that the local community would still have to come up with 1100 previously unregistered males and draft them onto the corvee labor rolls. (Spence: 8-14)

VIII.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHINA'S MAJOR DYNASTIES

Balazs, Etienne. *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

Bodde, Derk. *China's Cultural Tradition*. Hinsdale, Ill: Dryden Press, 1957.

Bodde, Derk. *Essays on Chinese Civilization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Cameron, Nigel. *Barbarians and Mandarins*. New York and Tokyo: John Weatherhill, Inc., 1970.

Cameron, Nigel. *From Bondage to Liberation: East Asia 1860-1952*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Chang, K.C., ed. *Food in Chinese Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Chang, K.C. "Sandai Archaeology and the Formation of States in Ancient China: Processual Aspects of the Origins of Chinese Civilization." In *The Origins of Chinese Civilization*, edited by David N. Keightley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Ch'eng, T'e-k'un. *Archaeology in China, Volume II: Shang China*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1960.

________. *Archaeology in China, Volume III: Chou China*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1963.

Cohen, Myron L. "Chinese Society: Past and Present." Unpublished essay written for The Asia Society, 1980.

Dardess, John W. *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yuan China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

DeBary, William Theodore, Wing Tsit Chan and Burton Watson. *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume I*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Dreyer, Edward L. *Early Ming China, A Political History 1355-1435*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.

Eberhard, Wolfram. *A History of China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

Ebrey, Patricia, ed. *Chinese Civilization and Society: A Source Book*. New York: The Free Press, 1981.

Elvin, Mark. *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Fairbank, John K. "Introduction: The Old Order." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part I*, edited by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Fontein, Jan and Wu Tung. *Unearthing China's Past*. Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1973.

Gernet, Jacques. *Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion 1250-1276*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Ho, Ping-ti. *The Cradle of the East*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Hook, Brian, ed. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. *The Rise of Imperial China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970 and 2nd edition, 1975.

Huang, Ray. *1587: A Year of No Significance -- The Ming Dynasty in Decline*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Hucker, Charles O. *Some Approaches to China's Past*. Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 1973.

Hucker, Charles O. *China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Kates, George N. *Chinese Household Furniture*. New York: Dover Publications, 1962.

Kuo, Ting-yee, "Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part I*, edited by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Loewe, Michael. *Everyday Life in Early Imperial China*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1968.

Levy, Howard. *Chinese Footbinding*. New York: Walton Rawls, 1966.

Li, Dun J. *The Civilization of China: Translations and Introductions*. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1975.

Lippet, Victor D. "The Development of Underdevelopment in China." In *Modern China*, Vol. 4, no. 3, July, 1978.

Liu, Wu-chi and Irving Lo, eds. *Sunflower Splendor: Three Thousand Years of Chinese Poetry*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

Maspero, Henri. *China in Antiquity*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978.

Meskill, John. An Introduction to Chinese Civilization. New York: D.C. Heath, 1973.

Morton, W. Scott. China: Its History and Culture. New York: Lippincott and Crowell, 1980.

Mote, Frederick W. Intellectual Foundations of China. New York: Knopf, 1971.

Reischauer, Edwin O. and John K. Fairbank. East Asia: The Great Tradition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960.

Spence, Jonathan D. The Death of Woman Wang. New York: Penguin, 1979.

Smith, Bradley and Wan-go Weng. China: A History in Art. New York: Harper and Row, n.d.

Twitchett, Denis, ed. The Cambridge History of China, Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. "The Canton Trade and the Opium War." In The Cambridge History of China, Voume 10, Part I, edited by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Wakeman, Frederic Jr. The Fall of Imperial China. New York: The Free Press, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1975.

Wright, Arthur F. Buddhism in Chinese History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Wright, Arthur and Denis Twitchett, eds. Perspectives on the T'ang. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Wu, K.C. The Chinese Heritage. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982.

IX.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA, 1750-1911: INTRODUCTION

In this section of the guide we review the major events and trends of the period 1750 to 1911. During this period the Chinese imperial system was hard pressed -- and eventually failed -- to solve the multiple problems facing the country. In the end, after several attempts to engineer change within the system, the Manchu rulers fell to revolutionaries who believed that the political system itself was the major problem.

This section does not cover everything that might be covered. Rather, we have focused on those subjects which we feel are most important, many of which are also covered in textbooks. It is not necessary for teachers to know or teach about all the episodes reviewed here (however much we might prefer it). As indicated in the section, "How to Use This Guide," it can be just as useful to use a few of the essays in this section as case studies of the underlying trends in China during this century and a half. These trends were:

-- Serious internal problems, many of which flowed from a growing population By the early Ch'ing dynasty China had more people than could be accommodated by the available space, by traditional economic production methods, and by the imperial system of government. Competition among the common people for land and other types of employment; competition among the upper classes for wealth, postitions, and status was fierce. (This subject is addressed directly in IX -B)

-- A military, political, economic, and cultural challenge from newly industrialized Western countries The challenge began with the Westerners' desire to trade but broadened to include demands that China adapt its foreign relations to suit Western international law and allow missionaries to proselytize. Gradually China adapted and a short-lived modus vivendi of sorts was reached in the 1860s. Before too long, however, foreign penetration took a new form as some countries sought to encroach on Chinese territory. China did not have the military might to defend against these attacks, and this weakness led many Chinese to give up on the imperial system. (This theme is explored in IX -A , C , E and H)

-- A series of attempts to solve China's problems through reform from above The imperial government did not merely sit back and wait for the deluge to overwhelm it. Confucianism included an activist, reformist tradition which came to the fore after Opium War, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Boxer Rebellion. In each successive phase Chinese officials tried to borrow more and more Western ideas to meet both external and internal challenges. But reformers faced a dual opposition, from conservatives who believed change was coming too fast and from radicals who thought it was coming too slowly. (This theme is examined in IX -F , I and L)

-- A series of revolutionary upheavals from below China had a long history of peasant rebellions, fueled by poverty and heterodox belief systems. Imperial stability was always relative. With the added problem of overpopulation, the Ch'ing dynasty had already faced several serious rebellions in the late

18th century. Increased foreign presence in the 19th century was a contributing factor to two major upheavals. The dawn of the 20th century saw a new phenomenon: a revolutionary movement fueled not by anti-establishment religion and misery, as in the peasant rebellions of the past, but by nationalism, and whose followers were not the dispossessed peasants but sons and daughters of the elite. This movement toppled the imperial system in 1911. (This theme is dealt with in IX -B , D , J and L.)

IX. A.

THE INITIAL SINO-WESTERN TRADING RELATIONSHIP
1760-1839

Key Concepts

Trade was the thin end of the Western wedge into China. Initially this trade was to the advantage of both Westerners and Chinese. The problems arose with the Chinese restrictions which limited the foreigners' access to Chinese ports, with the application of Chinese justice to foreigners and with economic imbalances.

Textbook Treatment

The textbooks tend to focus on the British desire for a more favorable presence in China, and on the Macartney Mission in particular. Some mention the imbalance of trade in China's favor, but there is relatively little discussion of the monopolistic character of the trade and the economic problems of sustaining it. There is almost no mention of the American role in the trade.

Current Interpretation

The Canton System of strictly regulated trade began, by imperial decree, in 1760. Before that, Chinese officials and merchants had been allowed to take advantage of British merchants in Canton (Guangzhou). The court only intervened when Britons violated conventions and tried to appeal directly to the capital. One of the Englishman who submitted a list of merchant grievances spent three years under house arrest for his audacity.

Under the new system, trade took place between two monopolies. The British already had their monopoly, the East India Company (EIC), which London licensed to trade with China. (the EIC in turn granted some licenses for private trade.) On the Chinese side were thirteen merchants, or hong (Cantonese for firm), known collectively as the Cohong, who received licenses to do business with foreigners. This was just a new version of a long-standing Chinese mode of foreign trade, the frontier trading station (the other being periodic tribute at the court).

The EIC merchants' actions in China were strictly controlled:

> Included in these control measures were the confinement of foreign trade to a single port of Canton and restriction of the Western traders to the 'foreign factories,' a rectangular area that measured only 1100 by 700 feet. With the exception of a visit under escort to a public park three times each month, they were required to remain within these compounds for the duration of the four- or five-month trading season. They had to then depart for home or for [Portuguese] Macao to await the arrival of the ships in the fall. Other rules included

> prohibitions on bringing any foreign women to Canton, on foreigners hiring Chinese language teachers, and on direct communication with the Chinese authorities. (Edwards 1977: 364)

Despite these restrictions, the Canton System was not intolerable. "On the whole, life in the factories, with their spacious drawing rooms, was rather pleasant, and the relations between the foreign traders and the hong merchants were harmonious and friendly. William C. Hunter, an American who went to Canton in 1825 and stayed for many years, spoke of the hong merchants as a body of men "honorable and reliable in all their dealings, faithful to their contracts, and large-minded." (Hsu 1975: 202) Above all, despite the risk, there was money to be made by British and Chinese merchant alike. Although the court wanted the foreigners at a distance, it wanted the trade to continue, because the government levy on the trade was allocated to the imperial household.

Why did the British Try to Change the Canton System? There were two principal reasons. First was the limitation of trade to one port only. Second was the system of criminal justice meted out by the Chinese government, particularly in cases where a foreigner had committed a crime against a Chinese. (The defendants in these cases were usually sailors; the merchants themselves were much less rowdy.) Foreigners objected both to the severity of punishment (often death by strangulation) and the Chinese practice of holding a unit responsible for the actions of its members. The 1784 case of the British ship Lady Hughes brought matters to a head.

> On November 24 of that year, this . . . ship fired a salute and accidentally wounded three minor mandarins, two of whom subsequently died. The Canton authorities demanded the surrender of the gunner, and when told that he had absconded, seized George Smith, the supercargo of the ship, besieged the factory, and stopped trade. It was not until the gunner was found, on the Lady Hughes, and surrendered to the Chinese authorities that the supercargo was released and trade resumed. They then strangled the gunner. The . . . incident, plus the Chinese explanation that the sentence was light because it only demanded one life for two, shocked the foreign community into a seizure of terror. (Hsu 1975: 204-205)

The Macartney Mission of 1793 It was, however, nine years before the British were able to get a mission to Peking. This was led by Lord Macartney, whom George III had charged with 1) acquiring a British area near the tea and silk producing-areas; 2) negotiating a commercial treaty; 3) rectifying the problems in Canton; 4) promoting British goods in China; 5) gaining diplomatic representation in Peking; and 6) opening up Japan and Vietnam (nominally Chinese protectorates) to British trade. Macartney's pretext for going to Peking was to congratulate the emperor on his eighty-third birthday, and he took gifts -- a planetarium, globes, chronometers, a telescope, mathematical instruments, measuring instruments, chemical and electrical instruments, glass, carpets, textiles, copperware, and Wedgwood pottery -- worth over fifteen thousand pounds.

The Macartney mission almost collapsed over protocol. In accordance with the ritual of tribute missions, the emperor ordered that Macartney should perform the kowtow, a nine-time prostration, at the beginning of his audience. Macartney refused, because he was under orders not to compromise the honor of his king or country. He would kowtow only if a Chinese official of his rank would prostrate himself before a picture of George III. In the end, there was a compromise: the emperor allowed Macartney to fall on one knee, as he would do before the English monarch. Court historians altered the record somewhat to accord with ritual theory, saying that Macartney "unconsciously fell on his two knees" when he came into the imperial presence. (Hsu 1975: 210)

(Note: The kowtow involved kneeling to the floor three times -- and at each kneeling knocking one's head to the floor three times. It was performed by Chinese from all walks of life. The children kowtowed to their parents on special occasions; the parents knelt before their ancestors' graves; the scholar-officials kowtowed before the emperor; and the emperor himself kowtowed to heaven. The kowtow acknowledged the relationship.)

Opposing views of the conduct of international relations were at the root of this protocol disagreement. They also caused Macartney to return home without achieving his objectives. The clash of cultures is best seen in the Chinese emperor's letter to George III, which follows this section.

Why did the Canton System Break Down? The Canton system survived for another forty years despite numerous incidents and another failed British attempt to reach the emperor. The causes of its breakdown were primarily economic, concerning the goods traded and trade financing.

The EIC had a basic problem: it bought increasing amounts of tea and silk for sale in England, but had few items to sell to China. It was able to make up some of the difference by allowing non-EIC traders to ship goods from India to China. The balance had to be paid in silver bullion. The EIC burden was aggravated by the difficult situation of the Chinese merchants, who lacked working capital and whom the Chinese officials were already pressuring for contributions. In the absence of banks, the EIC was put in the position of providing the hong merchants with capital at the beginning of the year and waiting until later in the year to be repaid with tea or silk.

By 1820, two things had happened. First of all, the trade by non-EIC traders, including Americans, exceeded that by the EIC. As a result, the mood in England for the end of the EIC monopoly grew. When the monopoly ended in 1834, the trade became even more free-wheeling. Second, opium became the largest foreign import into China. It was brought in by the non-EIC merchants (the EIC did not deal in the drug because of an official Chinese ban, though it did have a monopoly over its cultivation in India). The annual import was 4500 chests from 1800 to 1820, over 10,000 chests from 1820 to 1830, and it reached 40,000 chests in the late 1830s. The Chinese government had to take action, which led ultimately to a radical change in the Sino-Western relationship.

ENRICHMENT

I. One Edict from the Emperor, September 1793, on the Occasion of Lord Macartney's Mission to China.

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial. Your Envoy has crossed the seas and paid his respects at my Court on the anniversary of my birthday. To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce.

I have perused your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy. In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your tribute, I have shown them high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. . .

As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. It is true that Europeans, in the service of the dynasty, have been permitted to live at Peking, but they are compelled to adopt Chinese dress, they are strictly confined to their own precincts and are never permitted to return home. You are presumably familiar with our dynastic regulations. Your proposed Envoy to my Court could not be placed in a position similar to that of European officials in Peking who are forbidden to leave China, nor could he, on the other hand, be allowed liberty of movement and the privilege of corresponding with his own country; so that you would gain nothing by his residence in our midst.

Moreover, Our Celestial dynasty possesses vast territories, and tribute missions from the dependencies are provided for by the Department for Tributary States, which ministers to their wants and exercises strict control over their movements. It would be quite impossible to leave them to their own devices. Supposing that your Envoy should come to our court, his language and national dress differ from that of our people, and there would be no place in which he might reside. . . Besides, supposing I sent an Ambassador to reside in your country, how could you possibly make for him the requisite arrangements? Europe consists of many other nations besides your own: if each and all demanded to be represented at our Court, how could we possibly consent? The thing is utterly impracticable. . .

If you assert that your reverence for Our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. . . As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. This then is my answer to your request to appoint a representative at my Court, a request contrary to our dynastic usage, which would only result in inconvenience to yourself. . . (Gentzler: 23-24)

IX. B.

INTERNAL SEEDS OF DYNASTIC DECLINE

Key Concepts

By the early 19th century, China was facing fundamental problems. The large agrarian society, which the imperial government had mastered during the Sung and Ming dynasties, was becoming too populous for the available land and the bureaucracy's capacity. The arrival of the Western powers and the usual end-of-dynasty problems contributed to this basic crisis.

Textbook Treatment

Most textbooks recognize the importance of the internal causes of the traditional system's decline, though most do so cursorily. Most mention the growth of population but do not always elaborate fully on why it was such a problem. Most identify a few of the features associated with dynastic decline such as official corruption and peasant misery. Most, however, accept all this as an immutable given, and fail to discuss how the government sought to cope except to refer to the persistence of "traditional ways."

Current Interpretation

China's Population Explosion Demographics are at the heart of the 19th-century crisis. In a period of peace and prosperity that lasted from the late 17th century to the late 18th century, the population doubled (from about 150 million to over 300 million). In the seventy-one years from 1779 to 1850, it grew fifty-six percent to about 430 million.

This increase in people was made possible by the introduction of new crops (sweet potatoes, corn, and peanuts) that could be grown on marginal lands. Also, initially such an increase had been perceived as an advantage. More people made rice agriculture more productive, since they contributed more night-soil and improved irrigation works.

By the late 18th century, however, this advantage had disappeared. China, which today is only twelve percent arable, had "filled up." Through large internal migrations even the marginal land was taken and increasing numbers of people could not be accommodated. The competition for land and water often led to social conflict. With traditional modes of labor-intensive farming, Chinese had reached the peak of efficiency. One more body would not mean more output and would be another mouth to feed. The excess of people to land created an explosive situation which did not begin to get corrected until the 1960s when science and technology was applied to agriculture. It remains a major concern of the present government.

A large population caused other problems. People needed fuel, primarily for cooking, and cut down forests to get it. Inevitably, this led to erosion of the topsoil and catastrophic floods. The traditional means of flood control could not cope with this new challenge. The problem of erosion seems to equal or surpass corruption in water conservancy agencies as the cause of serious flooding.

Remarkably, the administrative bureaucracy did not expand in size in spite of this population explosion. The number of state civil servants remained constant; the average county magistrate now had responsibility for 250,000 persons (as opposed to 80,000 in the Northern Sung) and was forced to become increasingly dependent on local elites to perform services for the people. As this happened, it became increasingly difficult for the dynasty to maintain control over the administrative system.

The freeze on the number of official posts had other consequences for China's elite. The competition on the civil service examination and for official posts was increasingly intense. Whereas the average Chinese had a 1 : 500,000 chance to pass the top-level examination in the Sung dynasty, that chance had shrunk to one in four million by 1800. There were a number of men who had passed the lower-level exams but would never have the chance to take higher level ones and thereby become officials.

Political Consequences of Social Change These pressures -- of population on land and of elite aspirations on the administrative bureaucracy -- translated into difficult political problems for the Ch'ing dynasty. Corruption is thought to have intensified. There was a series of rebellions in the late 18th and early 19th centuries which the government was hard-pressed to suppress. And there was growing resistance to the levels of taxation required to keep the patronage system afloat. But the three -- corruption, rebellions and tax resistance -- had other varying causes.

The growing demand for elite status and government position relative to the supply corrupted the integrity of the civil service system. The court itself was partly responsible; it began allowing purchase of elite status (but not government status), thus devaluing its prestige. Officials came under mounting pressure (and financial encouragement) from friends and relatives to create unofficial staff and advisory positions for unemployed expectant officials. A magistrate was expected to take this entourage with him when he was transferred. Wherever he went his staff supported itself from extra-legal fees and exactions. Large government agencies, such as the grain transport agency, tended to accumulate large numbers of employees, who were paid from surcharges for whatever service the bureaucracies provided. This sort of patronage system was not unknown in previous eras. But its scale in the 19th century and the importance of personal connections and money in making it work were unprecedented.

The rebellions tended to occur in the border areas that had been recently settled (as opposed to long settled areas with high rates of tenancy). In these regions, which were often barely suitable for habitation, people of different social, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds were thrown together for the first time. Han Chinese competed with ethnic minorities; recent arrivals speaking one dialect contested with long-time residents. Armed camps dotted the landscape. The Miao minority in Hunan rebelled against incoming Han for ten years after 1795. Secret societies in Taiwan and along the South China coast engaged in smuggling, piracy, and sometimes rebellion. The White Lotus sect in northwest China rose in revolution in 1793 in response to government attempts to suppress it. With the growing support of mountain and bandit gangs, the rebellion lasted until 1805. Other sect-based rebellions erupted during the first half of the 19th century. Supressing them was expensive, a serious drain on the imperial treasury. Having mercenaries became expedient but demonstrated the weakness of the regular armies.

The problem of tax resistance was more common in the richer and more settled areas. The burden on peasants grew as officials demanded more funds for private needs. Actually, a long term inflation in grain prices meant that the actual burden did not grow as fast. One of the major reasons for the inflation was the increasing supply of silver coming into China as a result of foreign trade.

That situation changed in the early 29th century, as silver began flowing out to balance the trade deficit caused by the importation of opium. Suddenly, taxes, which had to be paid in silver, became very onerous very quickly, as the cost of silver rose in terms of other currencies and goods:

> Popular reaction to the deflation and the rise in real tax rates broke forth in widespread tax-resistance movements during the 1840's and 1850's, particularly in the central and lower Yangtze valley. Leadership often came from the lower elite. . . Forms of resistance varied widely, from litigation, to mass petitions, to mob violence. Riots led occasionally to open revolt and the seizing of administrative cities. One such incident that has been well documented reveals the suprisingly moderate, loyalist character of many of these movements; no attempt was made to justify uprisings in terms of anti-Ch'ing political goals. (Jones & Kuhn: 131)

The Government's Reaction The official response to these crises was mixed. There was a new breed of officials who believed in active reform of abuses. They did attempt to make changes at the provincial level and met with some success. When it came to basic changes in the system, they accomplished less. Rather than trying to reduce tax quotas in the areas most affected by the rise in real taxes, they falsely reported that natural disasters had occurred, usually prompting a tax remission from the court.

The basic problem in the early 19th century was the attitude in the capital. Although there were officials there who recognized the need for reform, those closest to the Emperor preferred to ignore the problems, in part because the system of patronage corruption could not tolerate a rocking of the boat. But the upright Confucians of a traditional bent refused to budge. One of these, the emperor's closest advisor from 1820 to 1835 is said, in what may be an apocryphal story, to have advised:

> There was no need to agonize over the flood of official correspondence that reached him daily; that officials considered it their duty to memorialize about problems, even where none existed. Memorialists could not be admonished or punished, however, for that would be tantamount to ignoring forthright criticism, an unseemly posture for a Confucian monarch. Therefore, one had to assure them that their complaints were heard, on the one hand; yet somehow reduce the volume of complaints, on the other. Ts'ao's solution was simple. The emperor was merely to scan memorials for errors in

> calligraphy or composition and punish the offender accordingly. In that way he could simultaneously demonstrate his own careful attention to detail, chastise the trouble-maker, and ignore the issue in question. (Jones & Kuhn: 145)

Clearly, it would take more to make a dent in the Forbidden City. The Opium War and especially the Taiping Rebellion would make an impression.

ENRICHMENT

I. This translation of a magistrate's report describing working conditions in the mines in Hunan is but one instance of the misery which began to pervade 19th century China. In this particular instance, the central government acquiesced to the provincial government's request to control such abuses.

The Magistrate's report stated:

> The southeast portion of Lei-yang country is rich in coal, which has attracted many entrepreneurs. Hundreds of coal pits of various sizes have been exploited for a long time, so that by now the coal veins lie under water which must be removed before mining can be started. To manage water pumps, the mine owners hired foremen, known as 'Water Men.'
>
> To fill this post they usually picked the worst elements of the local population, men who are extremely violent and wicked. These men, allied with local gangsters, have formed a Blue Dragon Society and accumulated huge amounts of money. To trap poor people, they established gambling dens and sold opium; then they lent them money at usurious rates. Moreover, they colluded with wine shops and restaurants to raise their prices. Badly in debt, the poor people had no choice but to sell themselves to the mine. They would also sometimes capture travelers passing through and force them to work in the mine.
>
> The foreman built near the pit dark, damp, earthen cubicles which had only a single opening. Surrounded by stockades, both the entrance and exit of these cubicles were controlled by the foremen. These were known as 'Sealed Drums.' People lured, bought, tricked, or kidnapped were all incarcerated in such 'Drums,' and were called 'Water Toads.' Their clothes and shoes were stripped off, and they were forced to work manning the water pumps in alternating shifts day and night without respite. No consideration was given to their hunger and cold. Those who looked tired had their backs whipped and those who attempted to escape had their feet slashed. Moreover, because it is freezing in the pits and the work is extremely heavy, the weaker miners usually died within a fortnight, and the stronger ones suffered from rotten legs and swollen bellies within a couple of months. Without rest and medication, they perished helplessly. What was the most pitiful was that those 'Water Toads' who survived were still kept in the 'Drums' during the

spring suspension in order to be used as water pumpers again the next season. They were called 'Pension Rice.'

tr. Jane Chen (Ebrey: 233)

IX. C.

THE OPIUM WAR
1839-1842

Key Concepts

The Opium War resulted from ongoing tensions over Sino-British trade arrangements and the British sale of opium to China. Its significance lies in the terms of the treaty of Nanking (Nanjing) (see IX -E) and the initial Chinese predisposition to accept the terms of the treaty.

Textbook Treatment

In examining the Opium War, only some of the textbooks surveyed explain that opium became a factor in Sino-Western trade because it was the first commodity the foreigners found to balance their purchases of Chinese tea and textiles. Not all note that a principal reason for the Chinese government's opposition to the opium trade was that it lead to a negative balance of trade which caused an outflow of silver from China and, it was thought, "tight money." The texts disagree whether the war was over opium per se or trade restrictions in general. Some suggest, innaccurately, that the war directly followed the confiscation and destruction of a large amount of opium by the Chinese official Lin Tse-hsu. Few say anything about the war itself. Most list at least some of the concessions Britain received as a result of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) and subsequent negotiations (these are listed in IX -E). Some books suggest that the Opium War was the fatal blow from which the Ch'ing Dynasty never recovered.

Current Interpretation

The war was fought over opium and whether and how the Chinese government could control what came into the country. Previously, although Sino-British trade tensions had existed for years each side, because of its interests in keeping trade going, had managed to keep tensions at a manageable level. The magnitude of the opium trade and the negative economic and social consequences for China were, however, so extreme that China was forced to take a stand. Britain, for its part, was unwilling to stop the opium traffic which was providing the West with a favorable balance of trade for the first time in the history of its trading relationship with China.

Why Opium was a Problem Opium created severe economic problems for China. In the first decade of the 19th century, China gained about $26 million in its world balance of payments. From 1828 to 1836, $38 million flowed out of China. If the imperial government had allowed an indefinite drain of silver, the economy would have been bankrupted.

The court also regarded opium as a serious social problem. Lin Tse-hsu (Lin Zexu), the court-appointed official charged with regulating the trade, estimated that one percent of the population (about four million persons) were users. The actual figure may have beeen double or triple that. More significant was who was taking the drug. Opium addiction was usually found among wealthy members of the gentry, central government officials, some government workers, and soldiers.

Imperial Measures The court tried unsuccessfully to stop the trade by punishing Chinese merchants who willingly cooperated with the British and bought opium from them. In addition, Lin proposed to threaten addicts with death and to stop foreigners from importing the drug. In 1839 he stopped all trade in Canton (Guangzhou) and held 350 foreign merchants hostage, demanding that they hand over their opium. In the end, the Crown's representative promised the merchants that the British government would cover their losses, so the merchants complied. Lin then asked that the traders sign a pledge not to sell opium in China. Lin increased the pressure by refusing British access to Canton or Portuguese Macao. He believed that hunger and the profit motive would force them to yield.

Sliding into War In the end, two British trading ships decided to submit to Chinese demands. To enforce the embargo, a British naval vessel fired on one of the British ships as it sailed to Canton, and nearby Chinese naval vessels entered the fray. The British won this brief engagement, and after some debate (see ENRICHMENT) London decided to go to war.

The British forces were far superior, especially in artillery and tactics. Chinese soldiers were capable of fighting fiercely, but that could not make up for the corruption and poor leadership that riddled the Chinese army (for an example, see ENRICHMENT). The British occupied several points along the southeast coast, and then marched inland to Nanking.

Creeping Toward Peace Efforts to reach a settlement were complicated by the physical and psychic distance between the battlefield and between London and Peking. Once, in 1841, a truce was reached at the front only to be rejected by the two governments. London wanted more concessions from China; the Chinese Emperor refused to believe that China was losing and his subordinates were afraid to tell him the bad news from the battlefield and the negotiating table.

Significance The importance of the Opium War should not be underestimated. It was the first of several Chinese "humiliations" at the hands of the foreigners, and is still regarded as such by Chinese today. The Treaty of Nanking opened China up to the Wast as never before. In the wake of the war, disorder spread in south China, creating the breeding ground of the Taiping Rebellion. What is striking is the minimal reaction of China's leaders. They knew China was weak, but assumed that they would be able to keep the Western barbarians relatively isolated. It took another war and a major revolt to shock the system into more radical action.

The American Role Americans had been trading with China since 1784, and joined in the opium trade. When Lin Tse-hsu locked out the British traders in 1839, Americans stepped in to make huge profits on the tea trade. After the war Washington sent Caleb Cushing to China to secure the same rights for the United States as Britain had secured in the Treaty of Nanking, under the principle of most favored nation treatment. This he did at the signing of the Treaty of Wang-hsia (Wang Xia) in 1844. This was the first U.S. treaty with China.

ENRICHMENT

I. Lin Tse-hsu, Letter to Queen Victoria

> But after a long period of Sino-British commercial intercourse, there appear among the crowd of barbarians both good persons and bad, unevenly. Consequently there are those who smuggle opium to seduce the Chinese people and so cause the spread of the poison to all provinces. Such persons who only care to profit themselves, and disregard their harm to others, are not tolerated by the laws of Heaven and are unanimously hated by human beings. His Majesty the Emperor, upon hearing of this, is in a towering rage. He has especially sent me, his commissioner, to come to Kwangtung, and together with the governor-general and governor jointly to investigate and settle this matter. . .
>
> We find that your country is sixty or seventy thousand li from China. Yet there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That is to say, the great profit made by barbarians is all taken from the rightful share of China. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people? Even though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do us harm, yet in coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for injuring others. Let us ask, where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is strictly forbidden by your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country, then even less should you let it be passed on to the harm of other countries -- how much less to China! Of all that China exports to foreign countries, there is not a single thing which is not beneficial to people; they are of benefit when eaten, or benefit when used, or of benefit when resold: all are beneficial. Is there a single article from China which has done any harm to foreign countries? Take tea and rhubarb for example; the foreign countries cannot get along for a single day without them. If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are to suffer, then what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves alive? Moreover the woolens, calets, and longells (i.e., textiles) of foreign countries cannot be woven unless they obtain Chinese silk, satin, chinaware, and so on, all the things that must be had by foreign countries are innumerable. On the other hand, articles coming from the outside to China can only be used as toys. We can take them or get along without them. Since they are not needed by China, what difficulty would there be if we closed the frontier and stopped trade? Nevertheless our Celestial Court lets tea, silk, and other goods be shipped without limit and circulated everywhere without begrudging it in the slightest. This is for no other reason but to share the benefit with the people of the whole world. (Teng and Fairbank: 24-26)

II. British Views on the Opium War

For (by Thomas Macauly)

The Englishmen who had been blockaded at Canton belonged to a country unaccustomed to defeat, to submission or to shame; to a country which had exacted such reparation for the wrongs to her children as had made the ears of all who heard it tingle; to a country which had made the Bey of Algeria humble himself in the dust before her insulted consul; to a country which had avenged the victims of the Black Hole on the field of Plassey; to a country which had not degenerated since the great Protector vowed that he would make the name of Englishman as much respected as ever had been the name of Roman citizen. They knew that, surrounded as they were by enemies, and separated by great oceans and continents from all help, not a hair of their heads would be harmed with impunity.

Against (by William Gladstone)

"A war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know and I have not read of. The right honourable gentleman opposite spoke of the British flag waving in glory at Canton. That flag is hoisted to protect an infamous contraband traffic; and if it were never hoisted except as it is now hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror." (Wakeman 1978: 195)

III. China Prepares to Do Battle With the English

The emperor had decided that the fall of Ningpo (near Shanghai) was perhaps not such a stroke of misfortune after all. The barbarians were now committed to land warfare, which was China's forte, and a massively organized imperial military campaign in Chekiang could probably wipe them all out. He selected as commander-in-chief his cousin, I-ching, who was an excellent calligrapher and essayist, but whose military experience was largely confined to the directorship of the Imperial Gardens and Hunting Parks, and to the command of the Peking gendarmerie. I-ching's specialty was planning and preparations, which he attacked enthusiastically. As soon as he reached Soochow, he began to organize the twelve thousand regular troops and thirty-three thousand militia under his command into an encampment. Since he depended on local notables for provincial intelligence, he posted a wooden box outside his headquarters to encourage the gentry to drop their calling cards and offer their services. A large staff of fervid but inexperienced young scholars, whose studies of the classics were interrupted by this moment of crisis, was thus assembled, each officer jealously claiming the right to a personal bodyguard and other perquisites of rank. The chain of

> command, therefore, was entirely unclear, particularly since regular units, assembled from several provinces, refused to take orders from each other's commanders. But this fragmentation was ignored behind the bright pennants, embroidered robes and glistening weapons of the army. Spirits rose among the scholars as they made the camp round of tea parties, banquets, and poetry contests. There was no question of victory. In fact, a month before the troops actually went into combat, a painter of repute depicted the triumphant battle scene in that beautiful glowing academic style of Northern Sung. I-ching himself even held a scribal contest which kept him busy for days trying to decide which announcement of the coming victory was best written. The one he finally chose included descriptions of fictitious engagements and citations for each unit commander. True, the emperor's cousin did feel some concern about the best day for a battle, but that problem was solved most propitiously for him one day in Hang-chou, when he consulted the oracles in a local temple and drew a divining slip which spoke of tiger omens. Obviously, therefore, the time to strike was between 3 and 5 a.m. on 10 March 1842: a tiger-hour on a tiger-day in a tiger-month during a tiger-year — and also, incidentally, the height of the spring rainy season. Thus, by the eve of battle, most of the troops who had slogged painfully into position over mud-filled ruts were out of reach of mired supply convoys and had not eaten for days. Exhausted, soaking and starving, they readied themselves for the offensive. (Wakeman 1978: 204)

IV. Biographical Portrait, Lin Tse-hsu (1785-1850)

Lin Tse-hsu was from the province of Fukien, the descendant of a once prominent family. He was very successful in the Confucian examination system, and rose quickly in the bureaucracy. He became a provincial governor at the relatively young age of forty-seven, and became the governor-general of Hunan and Hupei provinces in 1837. He criticized the form of Confucianism prevalent at that time for not being sufficiently adaptive to current problems. Also, he believed in the ability of the Cultivated Man, and of himself to perceive Heaven's Way and act on it with self-confidence and zeal.

In 1838, Liu convinced the Emperor that his approach to opium control would work, and he was sent to Canton as Imperial Commissioner. He tried to pressure the British into quitting the opium trade. When war began, he wrongly believed that China would win. The Emperor was furious with Lin when the war spread north, relieved him of his duties, and banished him to the remote Northwest. He was recalled to office in 1845 and died five years later.

V. Present-day visitors to the Yangtze River town of Chenchiang (Zhenjiang) in Kiangsu (Jiangsu) province are reminded that the Opium War is very much a part of modern China.

In describing a battle which the Chinese lost to the British on an island adjacent to the town, local guides make a direct linkage between current speculation over Hong Kong's future and the Opium War. Referring to the cession of Hong Kong to the British as a humiliating result of the Opium War, the guides assert it is a matter of national honor that the Chinese recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. (See XI-D)

IX. D.

THE TAIPING REBELLION

Key Concepts

In the view of many, the Taiping Rebellion marks the beginning of modern Chinese history. For fourteen years (1851-1864) this internal rebellion, which was led by a Chinese who believed himself to be Jesus' younger brother, raged within China and challenged imperial rule. It penetrated 16 provinces, destroyed 600 cities, and killed perhaps as many as 20 million Chinese. (Hsu 1975: 277) But it is distinguished from other internal rebellions in Chinese history not merely because of the vastness of its scope or the enormity of its destruction. The beliefs it propagated and the organizations it established set it apart. The Taipings attacked not only the dynasty in power but the very social order on which it rested.

Textbook Treatment

The texts, with one exception, cover the Taiping Rebellion in a cursory way that only hints at the reasons for and the significance of this event. One gets very little sense of what one historian has called "one of the most extraordinary stories of all history." (Michael 1966: 4) In addition to their errors of omission, the texts contain errors of commission. Most notably, the decision in most texts to discuss the rebellion in the context of the growing foreign impact in China has led to distortions of the role of foreigners in the rebellion. For example, one text makes the serious error of crediting "the Chinese government, aided by an army organized and led by foreigner officers" with suppressing the rebellion when in fact the main burden of suppression was assumed by armies both organized and led by the members of the Chinese gentry.

Current Interpretation

Seeds of rebellion The Taiping Rebellion broke out in south China in Kwangsi (Guangxi) province. Some of the conditions which led to its outbreak and later contributed to its success were similar to those that led to the rebellions of earlier dynasties -- social and economic inequities, natural calamities, political corruption and military degradation. Other conditions were particular to the Ch'ing. Most important among these was the enormous population explosion of the 18th and 19th centuries (See IX -B), the accompanying massive internal migration, and the economic dislocation caused by the importation of opium and other foreign goods. Still others were particular to the region. The south was located farthest from the center of government in Peking and had been exposed longest to foreign influence and contact. As such it was particularly vulnerable to uprising. In the mid-19th century it was also experiencing severe economic distress -- the shift in foreign trade to Shanghai after the Opium War threw countless transportation workers out of work. Intensified social conflict between native settlers and "guest settlers" (Hakka), who had migrated from Central China in the 13th century but never assimilated themselves, further complicated conditions.

Hung Hsiu-ch'uan (Hong Xiuquan) and the Outbreak of Rebellion The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo) was founded by Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, the third son of a Hakka family living in Kwangtung not far from Canton. As a youth, Hung showed considerable academic promise but he was not able to pass the first level exams despite repeated attempts. After his third failure, in 1837, Hung fell ill and had hallucinations which he later, under the influence of a Christian tract, came to believe were of his ascending to Heaven and being commissioned by Jehovah to destroy demons. He also decided that he was God's second son or Jesus Christ's younger brother and started proselytizing among the Hakkas.

The Hakkas as a social "outgroup" oppressed by society were responsive to Hung's interpretation of Christianity which was characterized by a stark duality between the saved and the damned that mirrored the Hakka's own alienated position in Chinese society. Hung's cousin, Feng Yun-shan, was able to successfully and quickly organize converts into a militarized self-defense league of religious congregations called the God Worshipping Society. As it grew in strength, the Society began to develop national political ambitions with anti-Manchu aims. This attracted a broad spectrum of people. The "demons" in Hung's hallucinations became clearly identified as Manchus and in January 1851, the God Worshippers formally declared a revolution.

The Taipings fought with the vigor of religious zealots and when they marched through the Yangtze Valley, the imperial army, provincial forces, and the local militia all collapsed before them. Their success was spectacular; in two and one-half years they had reached Nanking. They captured the city in March 1853 and renamed it "Heavenly Capital." A northern expedition was then sent toward Peking but the Taiping forces were turned back. The rebellion had, however, at this point, become a political regime whose control stretched over the central and lower Yangtze, the richest section of the country.

The Political Structure and Institutions of the Taiping During the long campaign from Kwangsi to the Yangtze Valley the Taipings developed a more complex political structure than they had originally devised. Power was divided among "kings" (wang), one for each of the four directions. Hung remained the Heavenly King but his authority was reduced. The real leader of the rebellion became the Eastern King, Yang Hsiu-Ch'ing (Yang Xiuqing), who entered trances to transmit commands from heaven.

There was a puritanical spirit in the early period of the Taipings and Heavenly Rescripts prohibited opium-smoking, the use of tobacco and wine, prostitution, foot-binding, sale of slaves, gambling and polygamy. The Taipings also abolished private ownership of land and property and introduced a primitive form of communism. The utopian "land system" defined a social-political order based on state ownership of property (in trust for God), a hierarchy of residential producer groups based on groups of 25 families, and a merging of political and military command at all levels. It was not, however, successful because of the Taiping's precarious military situation and their dependence on local elites to collect taxes. A new civil service system was, however, instituted and candidates (both men and women) were tested on their knowledge of Christian texts, not Confucianism. (Hook: 237) Other reforms and social welfare measures were also instituted with varying degrees of success. However, the oligarchic and hierarchic tendencies which were built into the Taiping system from its early days made it impossible for the Taiping to carry out a lasting social revolution in China. A completely elitist mentality underlay the entire regime.

The Defeat of the Taipings In mid-1856 the entire Yangtze Valley was under Taiping control and the future looked bright for the regime. It was just at this point, however, that a fratricidal conflict erupted among its leaders. Not only did this conflict result in the death of two of the Taipings' most talented leaders, but it depleted the spirit and vigor of the entire movement. Simultaneously, important changes were taking place in the Ch'ing command. Most importantly, the Han elite was forming irregular armies to defend the imperial order. These forces were organized on personal loyalty, and were thoroughly indoctrinated in Confucian principles. Headed by capable leaders such as Tseng Kuo-fan (Zeng Guofan) and Li Hung-chung (Li Hongzhong), they eventually assumed the major burden of suppressing the rebellion. Li Hung-chung who fought in the Yangtze delta region was, however, aided by the "Ever-Victorious Army," a foreign-led auxilliary force. Nanking was re-captured in 1864.

In retrospect the failure of the movement was due to several factors. First, strategic blunders played a role. The Taipings concentrated on forward movement at the expense of their rear. Ideological conflict was also a factor. The appeal of its anti-Manchu stance was overshadowed by elite hostility to its anti-Confucian views, peasant hostility to its policy of destroying temples and idols and foreign hostility to its unorthodoxy. The leadership's struggles for power also were an important factor in the Taiping's ulimate failure. And, finally, the enormous inconsistencies between the hardships the leadership demanded of its followers and the luxuries and privileges it allowed itself weakened the regime.

The Legacy The Taiping Rebellion had profound consequences for China. Politically, the successes of the irregular armies and their leaders against the Taipings led to the locus of power shifting from Manchus to Chinese and from the central government to the regional. Militarily, these same armies provided models for the private armies created by warlords in later periods. Finally the Taiping experience served as an inspiration to later revolutionaries. Sun Yat-sen's third principle, Livelihood or Socialism, was in part inspired by the Taiping land system and communal ownership of property. Today, PRC historians regard the Taiping Rebellion as China's first peasant revolution.

ENRICHMENT

I. What follows is a translation of an official text of the Taipings which was published in 1851. It contains the basic religious and moral principles that the Taiping leaders sought to inculcate in their followers. One can see in it the influence of Confucian thinking.

Praising God

The Lord God-on-High, the divine Being,
Is respectfully worshipped in all countries.
Men and women throughout the world,

Pay homage to Him morning and evening.

All that we see, above and below,
Basks in the Lord's favor.
In the beginning it took only six days
For the creation of all things to be completed.

Is there anyone, circumcised or uncircumcised,
Not created by God?
Give thanks [to Him] for the heavenly favor
That you may obtain everlasting glory.

Praising Jesus Christ

Jesus was a Crown Prince
Whom God sent to earth in ancient times.
He sacrificed His life for the sins of men,
Being the first to offer meritorious service.

It was hard to bear the Cross;
Grieving clouds darkened the sun.
The noble Prince from Heaven,
Died for you -- men and women.

Having returned to Heaven after His resurrection,
In His Glory, He holds all power.
Upon him we are to rely --
Be saved and enter Paradise!

Praising Parents

[Just as] the storing up of grain provides against starvation,
[So] the raising up of children provides against old age.
He who is filial to his parents will have filial sons.
Thus, mysteriously, is recompense made. . .

The Imperial Court

The imperial court is an awesome place.
With fear and trembling heed the imperial authority as if it
  reached into your very presence.
The power of life and death belongs to the Son of Heaven.
Among the officials none should oppose Him.

The Way of a Subject

The more virtuous the Master, the more honest will be His subjects.
Wise kings produce good officials.
I [Yin] and [Duke] Chou have set the example [for ministers].
Upholding justice, they maintained discipline at court.

The Way of the Family

Kinsfolk within the household --
Be cheerful and happy!
Be harmonious and united as one body,
Blessings will shower down on you from Heaven.

There follow similar maxims for eleven other family relationships from mother, son, etc., to older and younger sister-in-law, as well as injunctions with regard to sexual chastity and fidelity, and disciplining of the senses. For the most part these are of a traditional Chinese character, and largely Confucian, like the verses above. The primer concludes with the following:

Paradise

Whether to be noble or mean is for you to choose.
To be a real man you must make an effort to improve yourself.
Follow the teaching of the Ten Commandments;
You will enjoy the blessings of Paradise.

(DeBary et al: 28-30)

II. The following selection is taken from The Land System of the Heavenly Kingdom, an official Taiping publication promulgated in 1853. While what is described was never implemented, the proposition itself is of interest because it reflects one of the main appeals that the Taiping movement held for the peasantry. It is also of interest because it foreshadows the land distribution system instituted by the Chinese Communists in the 1940s.

> The division of land must be according to the number of individuals, whether male or female; calculating upon the number of individuals in a household, if they be numerous, then the amount of land will be larger, and if few smaller; and it shall be a mixture of nine classes. If there are six persons in a family, then for three there shall be good land and for three poorer land, and of good and poor each shall have half. All the fields in the empire are to be cultivated by all the people alike. If the land is deficient in one place, then the people must be removed to another, and if the land is deficient in another, then the people must be removed to this place. All the fields throughout the empire, whether of abundant or deficient harvest, shall be taken as a whole; if this place is deficient, then the harvest of that abundant place must be removed in order to relieve the deficient place; thus, all the people in the empire may together enjoy the abundant happiness of the Heavenly Father, Supreme Lord and Great God. There being fields, let all cultivate them; there being food, let all eat; there being clothes, let all be dressed; there being money, let all use it, so that nowhere does inequality exist, and no man is not well fed and clothed. (Gentzler: 55)

IX. E.

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS AFTER THE OPIUM WAR

Key Concept

After its defeat in the Opium War, China no longer had the dominant say in how it related to foreign countries. By force of arms, Britain had asserted a role in defining the new relationship. Other Western countries gained the same privileges as the British through the most favored nation principle. Two sets of treaties, one negotiated in 1842 and another in 1858-1860, defined the new system, which worked fairly well into the 1870s. This was because of China's ignorance of the implications of the concessions made to the foreigners as well as China's policy of appeasement. The latter was based on expedience and traditional attitudes to diplomacy. The foreigners also had a vested interest in keeping the relationship operative.

Textbook Treatment

Most textbooks mention some or all of the conditions imposed on China after the Opium War and after the Arrow (or Second Opium) War of the late 1850s. China's temporary success in living within these limits is not discussed. Instead, the texts tend to jump right to the division of China into spheres of influence. Some books refer to the agreements that set up the new system of Sino-foreign relations as "unequal treaties," without noting that this is a Chinese term of later origin.

Current Interpretation

The gulf between Chinese and Western ideas regarding how international relations should be conducted was probably too wide to bridge without the use of force. (See Sections II, Cultural Pattern #3 for Chinese view.) Indeed, it is perhaps remarkable that the Opium War took so long to happen. Even after the treaty system was put in place, China was not at a total disadvantage: the diplomatic and trade adjustments by themselves did not represent a serious threat to the Manchu dynasty or the imperial system. Indeed, some foreign countries soon realized that they had a vested interest in China's political stability. The gravest blows came late in the 19th century, and at the hand of "rising powers" like Russia and Japan. It was their actions that stimulated Chinese nationalism and anti-Manchuism.

What Did China Give Up After the Opium War? By the Treaty of Nanking (1842) and follow-up negotiations, China made the following concessions to Britain: an indemnity of $21 million; opening Canton, Amoy (Xiamen), Foochow (Fuxhou), Ningpo, and Shanghai for trade; contact on the basis of equality between officials of corresponding rank; British consuls at each open port; abolition of the Cohong monopoly; a uniformly moderate tariff to be imposed on both exports and imports; cession of the island of Hong Kong to Britain; and British consular jurisdiction over Britons accused of crimes (extraterritoriality).

China quickly signed similar treaties with France and the United States.

The court assumed that French and American traders would disguise themselves as Britons if necessary, and wanted to get the credit for granting the privileges. Also, Chinese officials assumed that they could play off various nationalities against each other, an age-old tactic of barbarian management. The treaty with the United States allowed churches and hospitals in the treaty ports.

The most significant concessions by China, however, were those regarding customs tariffs and extraterritoriality. Why did China make them? In part, China was ignorant of international law and its concept of national sovereignty, and so did not realize it was giving up what no Western nation would. In addition, China justified its actions as expedient. The court saw no problem with the tariff rate of five per cent suggested by the British. The previous rate had ranged between two and four percent, though locally imposed irregular surcharges made the actual levy much more. What the Chinese government did not realize was that this rate was fixed until it was renegotiated, which the foreign powers were unlikely to do. (Restoration of China's tariff autonomy was first discussed after the Boxer Rebellion, and was finally accomplished in 1930.) Regarding extraterritoriality, the court was convinced that the task of governing the strange barbarians was best left to the foreigners themselves. China came to regret this concession, especially since it was frequently abused. (Extraterritoriality was formally renounced in 1943.)

Chinese Diplomatic Strategy In the wake of the Treaty of Nanking, the Chinese approach toward the foreigners was one of appeasement. Advocates of this policy believed it was futile to convert Westerners to the Chinese system of foreign relations. More effective, they felt, was an effort to disarm foreigners' suspicion, to win their confidence and trust, and to subject them to a sort of psychological obligation. The Manchu Ch'i-ying (Qi-ying) was the leading exponent of this approach, which was successful for a while. But it was frequently criticized by other Chinese who felt that China should stick to a hard line, and many Westerners did not respond to Ch'i-ying's ingratiating approach.

The Arrow War, 1856-1858 This is sometimes called the Second Opium War, even though opium was not an issue. The major cause for this conflict was China's failure to open the port of Canton, as required by the Treaty of Nanking. The Chinese based their refusal on fear of a xenophobic reaction by the local people. This fear was well-founded: an anti-foreign riot took place in 1846 and there were a number of incidents thereafter. The British responded by raiding the city in 1847. Thereafter the Chinese tended to take a hard-line on opening the city, while the British vacillated, sometimes protesting and other times avoiding the issue. The foreigners then tried to renegotiate the treaties according to their provisions, but to no avail.

The Arrow War began over the Chinese seizure near Hong Kong of a ship called the Arrow in October 1856. Fighting in and around Canton followed. Joined by the French, the British seized the city in December 1857 and created a puppet government.

Representatives of the two allies sailed up the coast, and by late spring 1858 took the city of Tientsin (Tianjin) in north China and the forts outside it. With the approach to the capital open, the court in June 1858 sent negotiators, including Ch'i-ying, to deal with the foreigners. The British humiliated Ch'i-ying by producing a copy of his views on "barbarian management." By threatening to attack Peking, the British secured their primary diplomatic representation in Peking, which the court opposed on the grounds that it meant the end of the tribute system. Among the other provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin were the opening of ten new treaty ports, permission for foreign travel throughout China, an indemnity, and freedom of movement for Protestant and Catholic missionaries. (Russia, France and the United States signed similar treaties.)

But this was not to be the end. Hostilities erupted in 1859 and 1860 over where the ratifications of the treaty were to be exchanged, Tientsin or Peking. British forces ultimately destroyed the forts outside of Tientsin and one of the emperor's summer palaces. (The leader of the British force had considered destroying the Imperial Palace in Peking.) The British dictated new terms: confirmation of the right to diplomatic representation in Peking, the opening of Tientsin as a treaty port. Britain also got the Kowloon peninsula opposite Hong Kong island and France secured for Catholic missionaries the right to own property in the interior. For its help in reining in the British, Russia received large tracts of territory north of Manchuria, now called the Maritime Province.

The Cooperative Policy Despite the humilitation suffered by China, the next decade in Sino-foreign relations was amicable. The leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement (see IX.-F.) concluded that Western governments would abide by the treaties and try to hold their citizens to them. The foreigners having seen China go to the brink of the Taiping disaster, did not want to risk the fall of the dynasty, because it would disrupt trade. Consequently, both sides sought to work together within the context of the treaties. This "cooperative policy," which Britain and the United States advocated had four elements: "(1) cooperation among Western powers; (2) cooperation with Chinese officials; (3) recognition of China's legitimate interests; and (4) enforcement of the treaty rights." (Hsu 1970: 324)

Under the Self-Strengtheners' leadership, China set up new institutions to facilitate the cooperative policy. Among them were the following:

-- a foreign office, called the Tsungli Yamen (Zongli Yamen) (Office for General Management), which not only implemented foreign relations but also played an important role in policy formulation. It also engaged in a number of modernization projects and had an elite foreign language school.

-- superintendencies of trade, one for northern ports and one for southern ports, to implement the treaty system.

-- the maritime customs service, to ensure proper enforcement of the regulations concerning customs tariffs. Although this was a Chinese government agency, its leaders were foreigners who were unusually conscientious in their service to their Chinese masters. The spirit of this institution is best captured in the statement of Robert Hart, the most famous customs inspector-general.

-- greater sensitivity to international law, as a way of controlling the foreign powers through their own principles.

China thus went to some lengths to devise ways to accommodate to Western demands. . . even though it involved a radical change in its traditional system of foreign relations. As time went on however, it faced challenges that were less procedural and more territorial in nature (see IX -H).

ENRICHMENT

I. The following is an excerpt from a memorial Ch'i-ying wrote to the Emperor in 1844 after he had negotiated early American, British, and French treaties. It defends his policy of appeasing foreigners.

Ch'i-ying's Views on Handling Foreigners

> Throughout this period of three years the barbarian situation has undergone deceptive changes in many respects and has not produced a unified development. The methods by which to conciliate the barbarians and get them under control similarly could not but shift about and change their form. Certainly we have to curb them by skillful methods. There are times when it is possible to have them follow our directions but not let them understand the reasons. Sometimes we expose everything so that they will not be suspicious, whereupon we can dissipate their rebellious restlessness. Sometimes we have given them receptions and entertainment, after which they have had a feeling of appreciation. And at still other times we have shown trust in them in a broad-minded way and deemed it unnecessary to go deeply into minute discussions with them, whereupon we have been able to get their help in the business at hand.
>
> This is because the barbarians are born and grow up outside the frontiers of China, so that there are many things in the institutional system of the Celestial Dynasty with which they are not fully acquainted. Moreover, they are constantly making arbitrary interpretations of things, and it is difficult to enlighten them by means of reason. . . .
>
> Moreover, the barbarians commonly lay great stress on their women. Whenever they have a distinguished guest, the wife is certain to come out to meet him. . . . Your slave (minister) was confounded and ill at ease, while they on the other hand were deeply honored and delighted. Thus in actual fact the customs of the various Western countries cannot be regulated according to the ceremonies of the Middle Kingdom. If we should abruptly rebuke them, it would be no way of shattering their stupidity and might give rise to their suspicion and dislike. . . .
>
> With this type of people from outside the bounds of civilization, who are blind and unawakened in styles of address and forms of ceremony, if we adhered to the proper forms in official documents and let them be weighed according to the status of superior and inferior, even though our tongues were

> dry and our throats parched (from urging them to follow our way), still they could not avoid closing their ears and acting as if deaf. Not only would there be no way to bring them to their senses, but also it would immediately cause friction. Truly it would be of no advantage in the essential business of subduing and conciliating them. To fight with them over empty names and get no substantial result would not be so good as to pass over these small matters and achieve our larger scheme.
>
> (Teng and Fairbank: 37-40)

II. Robert Hart, a member of the British diplomatic service, was in the unusual position of working for the Ch'ing government as inspector-general of the Chinese customs service. His tact and sensitivity are well illustrated in a circular he wrote as a code of behavior for foreign employees.

Robert Hart's Guidelines to Foreign Employees of the Maritime Customs Service

> . . . it is to be distinctly and constantly kept in mind that the Inspectorate of Customs is a Chinese and not a Foreign Service, and that, as such, it is the duty of each of its members to conduct himself towards the Chinese, people as well as officials, in such a way as to avoid all cause of offence and ill-feeling. . . It is to be expected from those who take the pay, and who are the servants of the Chinese Government, that they, at least, will so act as to neither offend susceptibilities, nor excite jealousies, suspicion, and dislike. In dealings, therfore, with native officials, and in intercourse with the people, it will be well for the Foreign employees of the Customs to remember, that they are the brother officers of the one, and that they, to some extent, accepted certain obligations and responsibilities by becoming, in a sense, the countrymen of the others: the man who cherishes such an idea, will be led to treat the one class with courtesy, and the other with friendliness. (Hsu 1970: 331)

III. The following description of life among the foreign residents in Hong Kong in the early 1850s suggests the advantages in being part of the international resident community.

> I doubt if there be another class of men, who live in more luxurious state than the foreign residents in China. Their households are conducted on a princely scale, and whatever can be had in the way of furniture, upholstery or domestic appliances of any sort, to promote ease and comfort, is sure to be found in their dwellings. Their tables are supplied with the choicest which the country can afford, and a retinue of well-drilled servants, whose only business is to study their habits, anticipate their wants. All the management of the household is in the hands of the native servants. The

"comprador" furnishes the necessary supplies -- for which he generally obtains a fat commission -- the butler regulates the internal economy; and every inmate has one or more personal servants who have charge of his own private wants. The expense of keeping up such an establishment is of course very large; but so are the profits of a flourishing commercial house, and this easeful and luxurious mode of life, while it tends to preserve health in a climate hostile to the Northern race, furnishes a solace, sensuous though it be, for the want of those more enlightened recreations which a civilized land affords. (Taylor: 471)

IX. F.

SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT

Key Concept

The Chinese responded to increasing Western demands with a "self-strengthening" movement. Highly controversial, its goal was to acquire the technological and diplomatic skills which would permit the imperial government to counter foreign aggression. The reforms were meant to strengthen the old order -- not to create a modern substitute.

Textbook Treatment

The Self-Strengthening Movement is not mentioned in the majority of the textbooks. This leaves an unfortunate impression that China made no significant attempt to reform itself in the decades following the Opium War. Of the four books that cover the topic, only one gives the reader an adequate picture of the reforms that were undertaken, the controversy that surrounded them, or the extent to which they were successful.

Current Interpretation

The hostilities that erupted in 1859 and 1860 over the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin after the Arrow War ended in another round of humiliations for China and even greater concessions for the British and French (see IX.-E.). China's latest defeat did, however, have a silver lining. Faced with this latest example of China's impotence vis-a-vis the West, the court was forced to change its attitude toward reform. Beginning in 1861, memorials, edicts and writings of literati-officials who proposed reforms under the banner of "self-strengthening" (tzu ch'iang or zi qiang), began to find a receptive audience.

Periods of Self-Strengthening The Self-Strengthening Movement can be divided into three periods. (Hsu 1975: 350-355) The first and perhaps the most innovative dates roughly from 1860 to 1872. It stressed the adoption of Western weapons, machines, scientific knowledge, the training of diplomatic and technical personnel, the establishment of translation bureaus and new schools and the sending of students abroad for study. The study of diplomacy was also promoted. The motivation for all this activity was the desire "to learn the superior technique of the barbarian in order to control the barbarian." (Hsu 1975: 350) An important feature of this process was that its undertakings were "government undertakings" and thus retained traditional and inefficient managerial and administrative procedures.

In Peking the chief advocates of reform were Prince Kung (Gong) and an official named Wen-hsiang (Wenxiang). These two Manchu leaders, who had experience dealing with Westerners, became convinced by the 1860s of the need for careful diplomacy, the training of troops, and the development of modern weapons. They felt, "If we can strengthen ourselves, we [and the Europeans] can live with each other in peace and we can quietly subdue their ambitious schemes against us. Otherwise we will have nothing to rely upon and it will be difficult to ensure their not bullying us. . . Now that we know what they depend on for victory, we should try to master it." (Kuo: 495)

In the early 1860s their ideas enjoyed the support of some influential metropolitan officials.

At the provincial level, the leading spirit of self-strengtheners was Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang). Although a provincial authority, he actually performed a number of central government functions and was the "coordinator" of the self-strengthening programs around the country for thirty years. Among his major achievements were the establishment of Nanking (Nanjing) Arsenal in 1867, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company in 1872, a naval and military academy in Tientsin (Tianjin) in 1880 and 1885 and the Peiyang (Beiyang) fleet in 1888. (Hsu 1975: 348) As significant as Li's accomplishments were, his conviction that China surpassed the West in everything except weaponry, railways, and machinery and his dismissal of the need for any wide-ranging political or social reform greatly limited the scope of the movement.

The second period (1872-1885) reflected a growing recognition that wealth leads to power. Defense industries continued to be the major concern but attention was also diverted towards profit-making enterprises such as shipping, railways, mining, and the telegraph. These enterprises were called "government supervised merchant undertakings" and were modeled on the traditional salt administration. Unfortunately they were also afflicted with the traditional bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, and nepotism. Foremost among them were the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, the K'ai-p'ing (Kaiping) Coal Mines, the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill, and the Imperial Telegraph Administration.

In the third period (1885-1895) the idea of increasing the wealth of China through the encouragement of light industries (such as textile and cotton-weaving industries) gained favor. Some "private enterprises" appeared at this time but they were extremely weak and fell far short of mobilizing capital as similar enterprises did in Japan during the Meiji era.

Opposition Although the modernization efforts described above were not aimed at changing China's social, economic, or political institutions, the opposition to them was strong. The Chinese educated class as a whole was anti-foreign and conservative. Their views are reflected in the following quote by Wo-jen (Wo-ren), a leading Neo-Confucian scholar of the times:

> . . . according to the viewpoint of your slave, astronomy and mathematics are of very little use. If these subjects are going to be taught by Westerners as regular studies, the damage will be great. . . Your slave has learned that the way to establish a nation is to lay emphasis on propriety and righteousness, not on power and plotting. The fundamental effort lies in the minds of people, not in techniques. Now if we seek trifling arts and respect barbarians as teachers regardless of the possibility that the cunning barbarians may not teach us their essential techniques -- even if the teachers sincerely teach and the students faithfully study them, all that can be accomplished is the training of mathematicians. From ancient down to modern times, your slave has never heard of anyone who could use mathematics to raise the nation from a

> state of decline or to strengthen it in time of weakness. The empire is so great that one should not worry lest there be any lack of abilities therein. If astronomy and mathematics have to be taught, an extensive search should find someone who has mastered the technique. Why is it limited to barbarians, and why is it necessary to learn from the barbarians? (Teng and Fairbank: 76)

The Empress Dowager, T'zu-hsi (Ci Xi), and high officials at court also frequently opposed reforms. Often their opposition was based on ideological rather than factual grounds. Li Hung-chang, who had to bear the brunt of the conservatives' attacks, once said:

> The present situation is one in which, externally, it is necessary for us to be harmonious with the barbarians, and internally, it is necessary for us to reform our institutions. If we remain conservative, without making any change, the nation will be daily reduced and weakened. . . Now all the foreign countries are having one reform after another, and progressing every day like the ascending of steam. Only China continues to preserve her traditional institutions so cautiously that even though she be ruined and extinguished, the conservatives will not regret it. Oh heaven and man! How can we understand the cause of it? (Teng and Fairbank: 87)

Results of the Self-Strengthening Movement Although the accomplishments of the Self-Strengtheners were impressive, especially given the opposition they faced, their efforts at modernization barely scratched the surface of China's problems. More than two decades after the beginning of the movement, China was unable to defend her tributary state, Annam, in a confrontation with France (1884-95) and it suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan a decade later.

The failure of the movement to achieve its goals can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the lack of coordination and central planning caused insuperable problems. The government provided little direction and regional promoters of reform rivaled rather than cooperated with each other. Secondly, the narrow scope of the effort limited popular participation in the movement, a critical ingredient in Japan's successful modernization. Chinese officials continued to disdain merchants and discourage private enterprise and competition. Other factors include a shortage of both bureaucratic and private capital, increased foreign imperialism which divided the attention of the government, overwhelming technical backwardness and reliance on unqualified Western "specialists," and the aversion to dealing with "barbarians."

Legacy of the Self-Strengthening Movement Despite the failure of the Self-Strengtheners to achieve their main objective of creating a strong China that could stand up against modernized, industrialized countries, a number of important economic and social developments can be traced to the Movement. It marked the beginning of industrialization and sowed the seeds of capitalism. The establishment of arsenals, dockyards, factories, and schools contributed to the development of China's metropolises and a working class of industrial workers or laborers. The new industries and enterprises also created a new professional class of foreign-educated engineers, managers, and entrepreneurs who became leaders in the army, navy, schools and diplomatic service.

The presence of this professional class which was clearly critical if China was to acquire the tools to survive foreign encroachment alerts us to an even graver crisis China faced. This new class raised serious questions about the value of a Confucian education. Wo-jen had perhaps recognized the dilemma: how to maintain confidence in the Confucian tradition upon which the government depended when such tradition was so clearly inadequate to save China?

ENRICHMENT

I. Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang) (1823-1901) was born into a wealthy family and at the early age of 24 won the highest degree in the civil service exams. After being appointed to the Hanlin Academy, he studied under Tseng Kuo-fan (Zeng Guofan), who later became one of China's greatest statesmen. Tseng became Li's patron and together they played a major role in suppressing the Taiping and Nien rebellions.

Li held numerous high posts during his career. The principle one was, however, governor-general of Chihli. His position of leadership was in yang-wu or "foreign affairs." He enjoyed the confidence of Empress T'zu-hsi (Ci Xi), and functioned as China's "prime minister" until 1895. He frequently overshadowed the foreign office or Tsungli Yamen by negotiating foreign treaties and settling disputes.

In the years after the Opium and Arrow Wars, Li called on China to make changes to meet the unprecedented challenges from the West. He understood that machinery was the dynamic of Western civilization and advocated developing and making use of it. He did not, however, have a coherent overall plan that could be carried out step-by-step. His calls for Self-Strengthening were based on the needs of the time. In his view the wealth and power of the West was based on material achievement; he did not recognize the value of Western political and social institutions. In fact, Li seems to have thought that China's political and educational system and its customs and culture were superior to those of the West. He only acknowledged China's inferiority in cannon, railways and machinery. He felt that if China could claim to use and make these things, its problems would be over. Just how wrong he was was demonstrated by China's resounding defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1895.

In the document below Li describes the way China's social structure impeded Westernization and forecast military development with China and Japan. It was written in 1863.

> Everything in China's civil and military systems is far superior to the West. Only in firearms is it absolutely impossible to catch up with them. What is the reason? It is because in China the way of manufacturing machines is for the scholars to understand the principles, while the artisans put them into practice and do the work. In developing their learning the two do not consult each other, hence their achievements cannot keep abreast. The best of the artisans is limited to becoming a head craftsman. Foreigners, however, are

> different. He who can make a machine that can be used by the nation can become a prominent official and his family for generations can live on the trade and keep their position hereditary. . . .
>
> Formerly England, France and other nations regarded Japan as a foreign treasury, recklessly making demands upon her. The Japanese emperor and ministers exerted themselves to become strong, selecting brilliant sons from the imperial house and high ministers to learn various techniques in the factories of Western nations. They also bought the machines for making machines so as to practice manufacturing in their own country. Now they can navigate steamships, and make and use cannon. Last year the English people threatened them ostentatiously and brought up soldiers. And yet the superior techniques of the effective weapons which the British people have been relying upon for attacking and fighting had already been shared and mastered by the Japanese. Consequently, they remained steady and undisturbed; and the English in fact could do nothing against them. The Japanese of today are the "dwarf pirates" [wo-k'ou] of the Ming dynasty. They are farther away from Western countries but close to China. If we have some weapons with which to stand on our own feet, they will attach themselves to us, and watch the shortcomings or strength of the Westerners. If we have nothing with which to make ourselves strong, then the Japanese will imitate the Westerners and will share the Westerners' sources of profits. Japan, a tiny country overseas, can still change her course at the proper time and know what she could take as her model. Since we Chinese thoroughly understand the principle that when one reaches a point of exhaustion, one must reform and then one can go on smoothly, we should also greatly change our plans. (Teng and Fairbank: 70-73)

II. The traditional Confucian emphasis on enlisting human talent in the administration led to the idea of training men abroad. A major project, promoted by Yung Wing, the first Chinese graduate of an American university, started in 1872 when 120 promising Chinese students were brought to the United States. Then, as now, there was considerable concern about the effects of exposure to foreign countries upon impressionable students and their values.

> Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Educational Mission thus inaugurated (after ten years of agitation by Yung Wing) was the fact that it actually functioned, more or less as planned, for a decade (1872-1881), only to be summarily discontinued at the end of that time with nothing in its place.
>
> Some of the reasons for the recall of the Mission are stated in detail by Yung Wing, My Life in China and America, chapter 18. He puts the chief blame on Wu Tzu-teng, a chin-shih of 1852, a compiler of the Hanlin Academy, and a good mathemetician, who worked for some time in the Chinese legation at Paris, before he was transferred to the United States as superintendent of

> students attached to the Chinese Embassy. Wu was fond of display and prestige, and acted even more autocratically than the old-fashioned Chinese educational commissioners who had preceded him. No sooner was he installed in his new position than he summoned all the Chinese students to Washington to receive his instructions. When the students came for the interview they did not perform the kowtow. One of the subordinates of the new superintendent, a Mr. Chin, became very angry saying, "All these students have forgotten their original civilization and disregard their teachers and elders. Even though they might have some success in the academic field [which was still uncertain], still they could not be of any use to China." Mr. Chin, who turned out to be a favorite of a certain influential noble of the imperial family, prepared a memorial asking to have the students suddenly recalled to China, in 1881. Other staff members of the Chinese Educational Mission disapproved of this action but no one dared to say anything (according to Yung Wing) except Yung Wing, who argued strongly but to no avail. Huang Tsun-hsien, then consul-general at San Francisco, upon hearing of this incident was so affected that he wrote a long sad poem to describe it. (Teng and Fairbank: 93)

Despite attempts by Li Hung-chang to devise a compromise solution, the experiment was abolished in 1881.

III. Many of the issues China confronts today first emerged in the Self-Strengthening Movement. These still unresolved problems emphasize the significance and extent of the disruption which was to continue for the next one hundred years.

In retrospect, the observer can identify the Self-Strengthening Movement as the first stage in what was to become a century-long modernization process. Compare Li Hung-chang's comments in 1872 with those of Teng Hsiao-p'ing (Deng Xiaoping) in 1976.

> The method of self-strengthening lies in learning what they can do, and in taking over what they rely upon. . . . If we can really and thoroughly understand their methods -- and the more we learn, the more improve -- and promote them further and further, can we not expect that after a century or so we can reject the barbarians and stand on our own two feet?"
>
> -- Li Hung-chang, 1872
>
> (Teng and Fairbank: 109)

> We should study with modesty all the remarkable and advanced things from abroad, import advanced foreign techniques according to a plan. . . . We must still of course count on our own struggle, be independent and autonomous, fight the philosophy of servility to foreigners. . . .
>
> -- Teng Hsiao-p'ing, 1976
>
> (Chesneaux: 222)

IX. G.

THE 19TH CENTURY MISSIONARY MOVEMENT

Key Concepts

Although the missionaries had little effect on the religion of the Chinese people, their impact on the social and political system was substantial. They were an additional element of instability in 19th-century China.

The negative response of much of the official class to the missionaries was often transferred to all foreign thought. This may have delayed the selective introduction of Western ideas that might have eased China's transition into a modern nation.

Textbook Treatment

There is very little discussion of missionary activity in the texts. A few cite Matteo Ricci as illustrative of the 17th-century missionary but no attempt is made to contrast his experience with that of his 19th-century successors. The few passing references to the 19th-century missionaries include them in generalized discussions of foreigners.

Current Interpretation

From Matteo Ricci's time on, Roman Catholics of various orders attempted to convert the Chinese elite. In 1715 the Vatican prohibited a compromise that would have allowed a unique fusion of Catholicism and Confucianism. The Imperial Court responded by expelling all Christian missionaries. Thus, an anti-Christian tradition was already in place when the 19th-century missionaries arrived on the heels of the foreign powers who had wrung political and commercial concessions from the Chinese.

The Political Impact of the Mission Movement The political presence of the missionaries was felt on all levels. Whereas the 17th-century Jesuits had been alone in China, dependent entirely upon the goodwill of the Chinese, their 19th-century successors enjoyed the complete protection of their home countries. This, and their immunity from Chinese law, gave them a large measure of operating freedom. It was also a source of Chinese resentment. Their country of origin was under obligation to protect the missionaries, and this became one more way the foreign country further imposed its presence on the Chinese. One articulate, responsible church leader wrote that Chinese attempts to control missionary activity have:

> . . . created an impression on the mind of a public not very well informed on the subject of the missions, that for our government to back up the missionaries by affording protection or exacting redress is equivalent to forcing our religion on an unwilling people. But is it forcing our religion on the Chinese to protect our missionaries any more than it is forcing our commerce on them to protect our merchants.
> (Martin: 445-446)

By the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin), signed in 1860, missionaries were permitted to travel to the interior, where in contrast to their 17th-century predecessors, they worked closely with the everyday Chinese. The missionary, with his education and higher standard of living, was perceived by some of the Chinese to be a part of the local elite with the responsibility to protect his flock. As a result, when a Chinese convert committed a crime against a Chinese, he often fled to the mission seeking refuge under the rules of extraterritoriality. These "rice Christians," who joined the Church out of expediency, became a divisive element locally. The Chinese local elite and the magistrate saw their influence diminished when the missionary became involved in local affairs.

On the national level, the failure of the Ch'ing officials to curb missionary excess was interpreted by concerned Chinese as yet another sign of Ch'ing inefficacy. However, the dynasty's ability to respond to local pressure and challenge the missionary was limited. Taking a stand often meant risking a showdown with the West and portraying the Chinese as violating international law.

The Social Impact of the Mission Movement The mission movement also had an enormous impact on Chinese society. Missionaries raisedd questions about many of the institutions basic to Chinese civilization.

Their reaction to Confucianism was somewhat ambiguous. Recognizing it as indispensible to Chinese civilization, some missionaries believed that it was futile to challenge it. Others, probably the majority, felt that the vast doctrinal and practical differences between Confucianism and Christianity* demanded that they work actively against Confucian practices. Ancestor worship, filial piety and Chinese burial -- all critical elements of Confucianism -- were perceived as particularly wasteful, energy-consuming and psychically crippling. Most missionaries did not doubt the desirability, indeed, necessity of changing these practices. In their words, "The great question. . . is, how are we to correct their views of, their relations and obligations to the dead?" (Conference Report 1877: 386)

Missionaries were also actively introducing new institutions into Chinese society. Committed to helping the Chinese improve their lives, they founded various mission schools as well as medical and nursing schools. The origins of a number of now-famous institutions -- Yenching University, Nanking University and

* Christianity is based on original sin. Confucius believed in man's basic goodness. Christianity depends upon an original Creator. Confucianism depends upon the collective wisdom of past experience. The Christian belief in immortality contrasts with the practical Confucian emphasis on life in this world. Such Confucian customs as bowing to ancestor tablets are confused with idolatry by Christians. Institutional religions such as Christianity depend upon collective worship. Confucianism is pervasive, dependent upon universal belief and reinforcement from all sectors of the civilization. Confucianism was casual about its "purity," permitting eclectic belief combining elements of different doctrines. Christianity was meticulous in differentiating between Presbyterians, Methodists, Episcopalians, and Catholics, for instance.

Yale in China -- were linked to the missionary movement. Peking Union Medical College was the gift of the Rockefeller family. Although organized with the best of intentions these institutions created inevitable conflicts. Administered by foreigners or by Chinese trained outside the traditional system, they were proof that studying the classics wasn't the only route to influence and prestige. The official class began to be confronted with competing centers of authority.

The missionaries' interest in Chinese women deserves special mention. They were appalled by child marriage, footbinding and concubinage and spoke out openly against these customs. The missionaries also actively promoted women's education in founding the first girls' schools in China. Significant too, was the visible role model presented by missionary wives. Daniel Bays, a scholar who has studied the mission movement, has hypothesized about the visible role of Western missionary wives who were teachers and doctors:

> I simply cannot conceive of this phenomenon -- foreign women playing roles of near-equity with men and sometimes of formal institutional leadership -- not having a certain amount of influence on the way in which Chinese women who came into frequent contact with them looked at the role of women in Chinese society and possible changes in that role. (Bays: 6)

The missionary presence in 19th-century China raises the question of what the historian Arthur Schlesinger refers to as "cultural imperialism," or the "purposeful aggression of one culture against the ideas and values of another." This question provokes a corollary: If so, was this, in China's case, all bad? Historians continue to debate whether it was necessary to dismantle traditional China before change could occur (see IX-L).

The controversy surrounding the missionaries had little to do with the number of converts. By 1905, there were only 178,000 Chinese Protestants. However, many years later, after the Revolution of 1911, an important Chinese official replied, when asked when the Revolution began, "on the day Robert Morrison, the missionary, landed in China." (Robinson: 181)

ENRICHMENT

I. Young J. Allen, born in the southern United States in 1836, is representative of the best of the enlightened missionaries who combined secular and religious activity in China. Educated in church-sponsored schools, he became a Methodist while attending Emory College. Upon arrival in Shanghai he earned his living teaching at a local school. This experience convinced him that education was critical to change in China. However, since he was also familiar with Chinese language and Chinese civilization, he was well aware of the incompatability between the two cultures.

Allen did not deny the value of Confucianism as a means of ordering man's relationship to his fellow man. But Confucianism, he believed, did not go far enough. Allen maintained that the universal love and concern for each individual's soul which was implicit in Christianity was essential in developing a morality which could respond to China's needs. The "old theories" were no longer viable.

Allen's targets were scholar-officials, young Chinese and women. His strategy involved preaching, teaching and publishing. His journals, published in the Chinese language, were far-reaching. Aimed at Christian and non-Christian Chinese, they dealt with humanitarian concerns, social reform and Western technology. Much of his material was written by Chinese who shared his beliefs. His overall editorial concern was to convince his readers that Christianity would help China in her current crisis.

He had a strong interest in the reform of the examination system which he believed ill-prepared the officials for their administrative duties and did nothing to promote free popular education. Acutely aware of the subordinate position of women, he wrote: "The degrading systems of the East are based mainly on the condition of women; and experience has demonstrated that if we could make any permanent impression on society, she must receive more attention." (Bennett: 13)

Allen also started the Anglo-Chinese College. Although he insisted that the students study Chinese history and classics, he soon discovered that they were more interested in learning English.

Allen's biographer, Adrian Bennett, is firm in his belief that Allen clearly understood that the programs he advocated were incompatible with traditional Chinese culture. However, Bennett points out that it was the Chinese, not Allen, who took action on his suggestions. The form this action took is something over which Allen had little control. Therefore, the question here is whether the Chinese would have become committed to educational reforms and changes in the status of women without the stimulus of ideas from concerned and well-meaning missionaries such as Allen.

II. Many 19th-century Americans were first introduced to China through the missionaries. While acclaiming China's ancient civilization and the endurance of the Chinese people, missionaries expressed their frustration with the Chinese resistance to Christian salvation. The compassion and understanding underlying the comments of some missionaries were often unconsciously rejected by American audiences who retained images of uncivilized heathens. Such books as one written by Rev. Arthur H. Smith describing Chinese civilization encouraged these negative views.

The following chapter titles hint at his approach: "Face", "Economy", "Industry", "Politeness", "The Disregard for Accuracy", "The Talent for Misunderstanding", "The Talent for Indirection", "Flexible Inflexibility", "Intellectual Turbidity", "The Absence of Nerves", "Contempt for Foreigners", "The Absence of Public Spirit", and "Conservatism". (Thompson et al: 55)

Thus began a period (1844-1900) which has been referred to as the Era of Contempt. For China it coincided with attempts to exclude Chinese immigrants from the United States. This anti-Chinese agitation which had its origins on the West Coast of the United States was reinforced by the missionary perception of the Chinese (see IX-K, ENRICHMENT).

The Chinese response was equally skewed. This 19th century version of a "Yankee, Go Home" poster which appeared on a street in Foochow is typical. The "cakes and tidbits" refer to communion wafers. The "old women" were Chinese Christian women, called Bible women, who helped the missionary organize Bible study and discussion groups. Such extra-familial activities for women were simply unknown in traditional Chinese culture.

> Recently foreigners (lit. barbarians) have been secretly concocting schemes for the purpose of grievously injuring the people. They have erected churches into which they inveigle women for licentious purposes.
>
> Whoever sees these outlandish foreigners, with their hideous faces and eyes, is constrained to hate them. How happens it then that people are willing to enter their society and associate with them? Truly we are concerned. These stupid foreigners unable to appreciate the value of money, employ many devices. They bribe persons to feign themselves Taoist priests, and engage old women, all of whom they send into the country villages to circulate false stories concerning a pestilence which they say is about to come on the people. They then offer to the people a poisonous medicine called "mysterious fairy powder," and employ women in all the villages to mix it with rice flour in the shape of cakes and tidbits, which when cooked are first offered to the idols and then eaten by those who offered them, in the belief that this will protect them from the pestilence. Alas! they do not think that within 20 days after eating these cakes, the feet of the males and the bellies of the females begin to swell; so that the disease is very difficult to cure. In all this the sole object of foreigners is to entice people into their society; and when they succeed in getting them into their society, they cause every female to submit to their licentious desires at libitum. Alas! alas! Innocent females after taking this poison yield themselves to pollution and thus become objects of hatred to all.
>
> Whenever any of these persons, whether male or female, enter any village to give out their poisonous medicine, they should be treated like vagabonds. Don't, by any means, spare them. Thus you will protect the lives of the people from the poisonous machinations of these stupid foreigners. This thing has already (in connection with the provincial idols) injured a great many females. We therefore prepare and post this placard that all good people may fear and be cautious, and thus avoid being ensnared by idle words. It is our earnest desire that good people will copy this placard and circulate it everywhere, thus performing a most merciful deed.
>
> Tung Che 10th year, 5th moon 20th day. (July 7th, 1871)
> Recipe for counteracting the above named poison.
> Take poedera fetida, pigeon dung, crabaster flowers, mix and sweeten with honey. This if taken will effect a cure.
>
> (Doolittle: 82)

IX. H.

FOREIGN ENCROACHMENT IN CHINA AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

Key Concepts

The period of peace that followed the settlement of the Opium Wars did not extend beyond the 1870s. Propelled by new forces of nationalism, evangelism, capitalism, and Darwinism, the European powers resumed their aggressive behavior toward China. They were joined by newcomers to the game of imperialism -- Japan and Germany. China's failure to successfully modernize was obvious to all and the foreign powers were determined to seize the advantage. During the 1870s and 1880s Japan advanced in Formosa (Taiwan), the Russians occupied Ili in Sinkiang and the French seized Vietnam. This nibbling at frontier areas and neighbor states was followed, in the 1890s, by Japan's swift and humiliating defeat of China in Korea. This led to a scramble for additional concessions on the part of the aggressor nations, both old and new. China faced the new century shaken to its core and in imminent danger of partition. Self-strengthening clearly had not worked.

Textbook Treatment

Developments in China's foreign relations during the years between the Opium War and the Sino-Japanese War are ignored by all texts. Textbook treatment of the Sino-Japanese War itself is brief but most texts discuss the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war. Significantly, little attention is paid to the psychological consequences for China of a resounding defeat at the hands of a former tributary state, or to the internal political movements that grew up in response to that defeat.

In light of the perfunctory treatment of the Sino-Japanese War and the foreign aggression that preceded it, the time and space the texts devote to the United States' Open-Door Policy seems unjustified. This policy was, in fact, little more than a declaration of principle that the United States had neither the will nor power to enforce. It was generally ignored by the other powers in China.

Current Interpretation

The Sino-Japanese War was fought in Korea over the issue of which country -- China or Japan -- would dominate Korea's economic and political affairs as East Asia entered the 20th century.

China and Korea's relationship was traditionally a close one. Korea described its relations with China as "serving the great" and modeled its institutions and way of life on Chinese patterns. For its part, China traditionally considered Korea its most important tributary state and a valuable buffer well worth defending. The defense of Korea by the second half of the 19th century had, however, become an impossible task for an increasingly powerless China. As a result, Peking urged Korea to open up to Western trade to counter Japan's increased aggressiveness in East Asia. Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang), one of the real powers of the Ch'ing dynasty, was put in charge of Korean affairs and Yuan Shih-k'ai (Yuan Shikai), who was to become the first president of the Republic of China, was installed as Chinese resident in Korea. Both Li and Yuan were, however, unable to avert the war that Japan, emerging from a period of rapid economic and military growth, was determined to wage.

The Outbreak of War Two events gave Japan the excuse to send troops to Korea. The first was the 1894 assassination in Shanghai of Kim Ok-Kyun, a pro-Japanese Korean politician. The second was the Tonghak Insurrection, a rebellion against the Korean Court led by the followers of a heterodox religious sect. Once in Korea Japan refused to evacuate its troops despite the fact that Yuan's troops had restored order. Li's efforts to avoid a military confrontation were useless. War was declared on August 1, 1894. Japan emerged quickly as the victor. China, after 30 years of self-strengthening, was easily defeated on land and at sea.

The Peace Settlement The sting of defeat was followed by humiliation at the peace table. The Treaty of Shimonoseki required that China recognize the independence of Korea; cede Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung (Liaodong) Peninsula, pay an indemnity of 200 million taels (1 tael= $1.63) to Japan; open four ports; and allow Japanese nationals to engage in industry and manufacturing in China. Although Japan was soon forced to retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula by Russia, France and Germany, China remained greatly weakened and extremely vulnerable to other encroachments. The war exposed China's self-strengthening efforts as a failure and shocked China's intellectuals into recognizing that China would need thoroughgoing reform or perhaps even revolution to survive. The reformists and revolutionaries who emerged during this period started the two political movements that were to dominate China in the decades to come.

The Reasons Behind China's Defeat In retrospect China's defeat was inevitable. Japan fought as a nation while there was no demarcation of authority, no unity of command, and no nationwide mobilization in China. In a sense the war was one between Li Hung-chang's regional army and navy and the Japanese empire. Corruption at the court and regional levels also contributed to China's defeat as did Li's attempt to use outdated diplomatic tactics.

ENRICHMENT

I. The following memorial was written by Chang Chih-tung (Zhang Zhidong), one of China's leading statesmen and intellectuals, and submitted to the throne in August, 1895, four months after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In it Chang advocates using Russia as an ally to check Japan. A treaty between China and Russia was eventually signed but China had to pay a price for the military agreement it wanted in strategic and territorial concessions. By doing so, China's potential power base for future industrial development (i.e. Manchuria) was drawn into power politics.

This memorial is also interesting since it describes at some length the special position Russia occupied among the foreign powers. (See VIII-F: Foreign Relations for the origin of Russia's special position vis-a-vis the other powers.)

To save the critical situation today, nothing is better than the conclusion of a secret treaty of alliance with a strong power for assistance. From ancient times, whenever nations have opposed each other, as if with horns, they usually have used the policy of allying with a distant country to attack an enemy nearby. With regard to the Sino-Japanese situation today, this policy is even more suitable. . . .

Now if we wish to make a treaty, and to have a bond for mutual assistance, naturally Russia is most convenient for us, because England uses commerce to absorb the profits of China, France uses religion to entice the Chinese people, Germany has no common territorial boundary with us, and the United States does not like to interfere in others' military affairs. It is difficult for all of these nations to discuss an alliance with us. It is known that Russia, as China's neighbor, has kept treaty agreements with us for more than two hundred years, and that she has never embarked on hostilities; she is different from other countries who have frequently resorted to warfare with us. Moreover, her behavior is grand and generous, and cannot be compared with that of the Europeans. . . .

It is just the right time for us to take this opportunity and work vigorously for an alliance, deepening our friendship and making a secret treaty with her. In everything concerning Russian commercial affairs and boundary matters, we should make some compromises. . . But we should have it settled in the contract that in case China is attacked, Russia will have to help us with armed forces, of which the most important is the navy. We must also make a decision during our conference with Russia concerning the method of compensating her, because Russia is very suspicious that England dominates the situation in the East. If China and Russia form an alliance, English influence will be considerably curbed, and Russia would be willing to accommodate us.

After all, it is not easy for China to train a navy. If we have the Russians to aid us, in the future, regardless of what country may start hostilities with us, after a few weeks several tens of Russian warships could be sent to patrol the Eastern seas. Thus we can prepare only the strategy of war on land, and our enemy cannot plan to invade the interior deeply. This is the crucial point in our international relations and the most important policy for saving the critical situation.

With regard to the foreign countries, China has always treated them on the same level. Thus, during the last time [presumably, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894] there was no one to help us. Such matters must be prepared in advance during days of peace, and at present our plan for alliance should absolutely not be delayed.

(Teng and Fairbank: 128-129)

This map shows the foreign spheres of influence in 1911.


China 1911
MANCHURIA
Harbin
OUTER MONGOLIA
Later under Russian influence
SINKIANG
Some British but later Russian influence predominant
Peking
Dairen
Port Arthur
CHINA
Grand Canal
Lanchow
Yellow R
TIBET
Some British influence
Lhasa
Nanking
Shanghai
Ningpo
Yangtze R
Wenchow
Foochow
Amoy
Formosa (Jap)
Canton
Swatow
Hongkong (Br)
Macao (Port)
Shanghai Treaty ports
French influence
British influence
German influence
Russian influence
Japanese influence
Railways

(Gittings: 137)

IX. I.

HUNDRED DAYS OF REFORM
1898

Key Concepts

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95 (see IX-H) launched a new reform movement which had much broader support than the Self-Strengthening Movement. The prospect of the imminent dismemberment of China by the foreign powers convinced all but China's ultra-conservatives that reform was essential for survival. It was in this atmosphere of desperation that K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei) and other leading reformers of the day prevailed upon the emperor to issue decrees calling for widespread reform of China's institutions and customs. The period when these reform decrees were being issued is called the Hundred Days of Reform.

As the name of the period implies, this flurry of reform activity was short-lived. Agreement that there should be reform did not mean that there was agreement on the type and extent of reform necessary. The conflict over these issues was so intense that the reforms initiated by Kuang-hsu (Guang Xu) hardly became official policy before they were jettisoned by the court.

Textbook Treatment

The majority of the texts ignore this significant event in Chinese history. However, two texts that cover this topic do a fairly good job. Both adequately describe the events leading up to the Hundred Days of Reform and the reasons for its failure.

Current Interpretation

China's defeat at the hands of Japan, a former tributary state, played the major role in leading to a general awakening to the need for reform broader than that advocated by the Self-Strengtheners. The missionaries also contributed to this awakening. Since the 1870s, many had undertaken to "secularize" their work and had established schools, sponsored lectures, opened libraries and museums and published newspapers and magazines in an effort to introduce Western civilization. The best of these missionaries were sought out by prominent statesmen and reformers for advice.

Although there was a consensus on the need for reform, the form it should take was hotly debated. Conservative reformers went farther than the Self-Strengtheners but still clung to the idea that China's basic institutions and moral teaching need not be fundamentally altered. This viewpoint was crystallized into the famous slogan "Chinese learning for the foundation, Western learning for application." (Hsu 1975: 438-9)

The radical reformers, on the other hand, advocated sweeping changes in basic institutions. One of these reformers was K'ang Yu-wei who, although a Confucian scholar, believed strongly in equality between all peoples and dreamed of a state where there would be no suffering and selfishness would give way to human love. He, and others, were convinced that the old system had become totally outdated and they believed the government must modernize its structure to deal with foreign relations and a broad range of far-reaching reforms.

By 1898 K'ang had completely won over the Emperor Kuang-hsu to his position. Beginning in June some forty to fifty reform decrees were issued in the areas of education, government administration, industry and international cultural exchange. Among the most significant were decrees that replaced the eight-legged essay in the civil service examinations with essays on current affairs; the establishment of modern schools with Western curricula; the abolition of sinecure and unnecessary offices; the promotion of railway construction and agricultural, industrial and commercial developments; improvement of legal codes and the preparation of a budget.

For the first time, reformist policies became official government policies. Unfortunately neither Kuang-hsu nor K'ang Yu-wei or any of their supporters were experienced politicians. They made the fatal mistake of ignoring those in opposition to them and the decrees succeeded in angering a broad spectrum of society. Those already in a position of power and those who had invested years of study to prepare themselves for such positions were threatened. Opposition to the decrees was widespread and most officials, confident of the Empress Dowager's ultimate authority and sympathy, chose to ignore them. The clash between progressive and conservative forces was finally resolved by the Empress Dowager. Intuitively she had come to the correct conclusion that the reforms were aimed at destroying her and the political and social systems on which her power and authority rested. In September she staged a coup d'etat and seized control of the government. She imprisoned the young emperor and executed a number of prominent reformers. Unfortunately for China, this harsh reaction left the Empress Dowager with no room to compromise even if she had been so inclined. In the post-One Hundred Days of Reform period, she was forced to assume an increasingly rigid and conservative position which indirectly led to the last debacle of the century, the Boxer Rebellion.

ENRICHMENT

I. The Empress Dowager By the latter half of the 19th century the Imperial Court was clearly failing in its mandate to serve the people. Indeed, the people were becoming victims of inept government. For this, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi (Ci Xi) must assume major responsibility. During these perilous times she was concerned as much with maintaining her position of power as with seeking solutions to China's crises. She set a tone of corruption and moral decay which permeated all levels of bureaucracy.

Tz'u-hsi had entered the court as a concubine. When the Emperor died without a son by his first wife, Tz'u-hsi's son, who was five, was named heir apparent. Tz'u-hsi and the Emperor's wife -- who became known as the Western and Eastern Empresses, respectively -- shared control over his upbringing and over the Empire. But the Eastern Empress was no match for Tz'u-hsi, who had a keen mind and acute political sense.

When the young emperor died in 1874 leaving no heir, it was said that

Tz'u-hsi had encouraged his life of debauchery which is credited for his early death. Another child was then named emperor. He is known by the name of Kuang-hsu (Guang Xu). As he reached his majority, the Eastern Empress, who still retained nominal co-rule, died. Tz'u-hsi's control over the young Emperor, whom she had brought up with the help of selected eunuchs, seems to have been tight.

An account of the confrontation she had with him when she decided to stop the reform movement follows:

> 'I have been feeding you and taking care of you for more than twenty years, and yet you listen to the words of these churls to plot against me.' The emperor trembled without uttering a single word, but after a long time he stuttered, 'I have no such intention.' The empress dowager spat at him. 'Stupid son! If I do not exist today, how can you exist tomorrow?' And then the empress's decree was issued to the effect that the emperor was so ill that he could not manage affairs of the state and thus it was necessary for her, the empress, to attend court affairs and to instruct the administration.
>
> (Li Chien-nung: 160)

Rumors abound as to the events surrounding the deaths of Tz'u-hsi and Kuang-hsu. Both died one day apart in 1908. The emperor's biographer is quoted:

> The emperor enjoyed such excellent health that for thirty-four years he was never ill and never absent from court functions for even a single day. . . After his return from Sian he lived in compulsory retirement without interferring in state affairs. The eunuchs who surrounded him were replaced by the confidants of the empress dowager. He sat idly in a small room, spending his life in melancholy solitude. In the autumn of 1908 the news of his illness was suddenly spread, and famous physicians were summoned to treat him. When the physicians came to feel his pulse, he put his two hands on the desk without uttering a single word. . . If any physician tried to ask him a question, he would grow very angry. . . Those physicians who examined him agreed unanimously that his health was normal. On November 3 he led all the high courtiers in the birthday celebration of the empress dowager. The officials in attendence, who were responsible for keeping a record of the emperor's daily life [Yun Yu-ting was one of these], had been assembled first at the threshold of the empress's palace. The emperor walked to that spot. . . The keepers noticed that the emperor tried to open the gate and that he exercised his legs to prepare himself for long kneeling during the celebration.
>
> After a while, a decree from the empress dowager was suddenly proclaimed to the effect that the emperor was sick in bed and that he should be excused from leading the courtiers in performing the ceremony.
>
> Upon hearing this the emperor cried bitterly. At that time the empress dowager had been suffering from diarrhea for several days, and someone had slanderously accused the emperor before

> the empress dowager of being elated when he heard of her illness. The empress dowager said in anger: 'I cannot die before him.'. . .
>
> On November 11 Prince Ch'ing [I-k'uang, the emperor's father] was ordered by the empress dowager to leave the palace to investigate something, and he did not return until November 14. It was thought by some that he had been purposely sent out of the way. On the twelfth, imperial guards were increased at all gates of the palace, and people who entered and left the palace were very carefully examined. . . It was rumored that the emperor had died. On the thirteenth all was quiet, but in the afternoon a decree was proclaimed to the effect that Prince Ch'un [Tsai-feng] was to be regent. On the fourteenth the queen, going to see the emperor in his bedroom, found that he had died, the exact time of his death being unknown. She rushed out, crying, and reported the sad news to the empress dowager, who said nothing but heaved a great sigh. . . The empress dowager died one day after the emperor's death.
>
> (Li Chien-nung: 227-228)

II. The following is a translation of "The Nation is in Danger," a speech in which K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei) clearly bases his case for reform on nationalism. K'ang had a Confucian upbringing and, in the tradition of Confucianism, felt it was his mission as an intellectual to save China inthis time of trial.

Mao Tse-tung was a great admirer of K'ang. In a letter Mao wrote in 1930 he quoted "A single spark can start a prairie fire" in referring to the "dry faggots" or revolutionary potential which needed only to be set aflame. We can see the source of Mao's phrase in K'ang's speech.

> Our defeat during the Opium War was followed by similar defeats in 1849, 1856, 1858 and 1860. We paid an indemnity totaling tens of millions, opened eleven ports for trade, and allowed foreign ministers to reside in Peking. In one instance, foreign troops captured the nation's capital and Emperor Hsien-feng was forced to flee to Jehol. All these were extraordinary occurrences, and our intellectuals should have been awakened by them. But they were not. They continued to look down upon foreigners and shut themselves from foreign contact. . .
>
> However, no basic reforms were ever carried out after 1894. Here and there some suggestions were made, but these suggestions never went beyond the oratorial stage. Even reforms that were supposedly implemented were only partially effective; this was clearly the case in connection with the building of a strong navy, the construction of telegraphy and railroads, the strengthening of our merchant marine, and shipbuilding. The problem with reform is that one cannot change A without in the meantime changing B because A and B are closely related. In other words, the reform on A will come to nought if B remains unchanged. Even after our defeat in the

Sino-Japanese War, we have not purchased one single warship; nor have we doubled our efforts to strengthen our armed forces training program. In 1894, we had 600,000 men in the 'green battalions,' plus 300,000 under the jurisdiction of the 'eight banners.' All of these soldiers were either too old or too weak; many of them were actually engaged in their own respective occupations even though their names appeared in the military roster. The Western countries make soldiers out of civilians; we, on the other hand, make civilians out of soldiers. How is it possible for us to fight a successful war against them?. . .

What has happened to the authority of the Chinese emperor when he has to obtain approval from the German court before he can build a railroad through his own territory and when he in fact cannot even appoint or dismiss his own officials? This is exactly what Chia Yi (a Han dynasty essayist) meant when he said that it was a pity indeed that the emperor of China had become a vassal of the barbarians. In a period of two months, more than twenty national disasters have occurred that involve either loss of territories or encroachment upon our national sovereignty. There are days and years ahead; who knows what the future will bring? If the present situation continues, sooner or later we would have to follow the path of Burma, Annam, India, and Poland and cease to exist as an independent nation. Look at the situation in Poland. When it was partitioned, the foreign powers intimidated its king, insulted its high officials, and oppressed and abused its gentry members. Is Poland the road for us to follow? If it is not, what will enable us to escape the fate that has been destined for all weak nations?. . .

Yet the government today refuses to speak candidly on the cession of territories and the loss of national sovereignty; it hides them as if they were taboo. Moreover, there are no public media to enable the people to know how dangerous our position really is. In the Paris Museum there are paintings that depict the tragedy of defeat; their purpose is to arouse every Frenchman's patriotism and inspire him to better effort. Our countrymen, not knowing what has happened to their country, remain complacent. . . In short, if we 400 million Chinese really exert ourselves, how dare any foreigners look down upon us? Yet, instead of exerting ourselves, we are complacent and enjoy ourselves as usual. Who, would you say, are responsible for ceding territories to foreign countries? I, for one, will not blame either our government or the common people. I blame you and me, the intellectuals who have not expressed righteous anger and who in fact have remained undisturbed. If the nation is destroyed, the blame should be squarely placed upon the shoulders of each and everyone of us. If the nation is to be saved, every Chinese has both the right and the obligation to save it. . .

In short, there is no way of serving our country except to

> arouse and enhance our will power. Let not a single moment pass without thinking about our own duties. A prairie fire begins with the striking of a match, and every river originates from a trickle. If we 400 million Chinese bother to arouse ourselves, we can generate enough heat to do whatever we please, and succeed as well. Who, then, can say that our nation cannot be saved?" (Vohra: 4-11)

III. K'ang also strongly opposed the oppression of women. In this statement he sums up their position in society.

> Yet [men] have callously and unscrupulously repressed them, restrained them, deceived them, shut them up, imprisoned them, bound them, caused them to be unable to be independent, to be unable to hold public office, to be unable to be officials, to be unable to be citizens, to be unable to enjoy [participation in] public meetings; still worse, [men have caused them] to be unable to study, to be unable to hold discussions, to be unable to advance their names, to be unable to have free social intercourse, to be unable to enjoy entertainments, to be unable to go out sightseeing, to be unable to leave the house; still worse, [men have] carved (sic) and bound their waists, veiled their faces, compressed their feet, tattooed their bodies, universally oppressing the guiltless, universally punishing the innocent. These are worse than the worst immoralities.
> (K'ang Yu-wei: 149)

IX. J.

THE BOXER REBELLION

Key Concepts

The 1898 coup d'etat that followed the Hundred Days of Reform restored reactionary Manchus to positions of power in Peking. Indifferent to the realities of international politics, they began advocating that China adopt a policy of hard resistance vis-a-vis the foreign powers. Their words fell upon receptive ears. The Chinese, from the Empress Dowager to the ordinary citizens, were ready to vent their anger over a half century of foreign humiliation.

The Empress Dowager seized the opportunity to use the anti-foreign Boxer Movement to rid China of the despised foreigners. China's failure in the ill-fated Boxer Rebellion gave the court no alternative but to turn to constitutional government. The terms of the Peace Protocol that was signed the following year were extremely harsh and included a crippling indemnity. The Ch'ing (Qing) dynasty's ill-considered last-ditch effort to rid China of foreign influence ended in disaster.

Textbook Treatment

The Boxer Rebellion is covered by most texts. The origins of the Boxer movement, the circumstances that led to its rapid growth, and its endorsement by Empress Dowager T'zu-hsi (Ci Xi) and other conservatives at court are, however, only sketchily described or ignored. The indemnity demanded by the foreign powers at the end of the uprising is discussed in most texts but the terms of the Peace Protocol that called for further infringements of China's sovereignty are only mentioned in a few. Two texts wrongly state that the United States used all of its share of the indemnity paid by China to set up a scholarship fund for Chinese students. The United States set up the scholarship fund with the surplus funds that remained after claims were paid.

Current Interpretation

Background The Boxers were members of a Chinese secret society that was indirectly related to the White Lotus sect, the anti-Ch'ing society that had led a major rebellion in 1796-1804. Like the White Lotus sect, the Boxers were originally anti-Ch'ing but by the 1890s they became pro-dynastic and rabidly anti-foreign. Their program, which called for the practice of magic arts, was extremely popular among the superstitious masses. They claimed to be immune to bullets after 100 days of training and to be able to fly after 400 days.

The Boxers rapid and improbable rise to prominence can be attributed primarily to the wellspring of anti-foreign feeling in China ready to be tapped after half a century of humiliation. The Chinese bitterly resented the missionaries and their presence was a major focus of anti-foreignism. (See IX-G) The increased pace of foreign encroachment in the 1890s and the panic about the survival of China also heightened anti-foreign passions, as did the obvious economic hardships, caused by foreign imports, the fixed customs duty and the unemployment of bargemen and carters brought about by the construction of railroads. Finally natural calamities -- a series of severe floods followed by a serious drought in 1900 -- intensified hardships and turned even more Chinese against foreigners. Victims of these calamities as well as superstitious scholars and officials believed the foreigners had offended the spirits by propagating a heterodox religion. Foreigners were accused of damaging the "dragon's vein" in the land during railroad construction and letting out the earth's "precious breath" when they opened mines.

Rise to Prominence The Boxers were first supported on an official level by a reactionary governor in Shantung (Shandong). Reactionaries and T'zu-hsi, desperate for a solution to the foreigner problem, were won over quickly thereafter. Court decrees in early 1900 provided the Boxers with protection and emboldened their leaders. Warnings from progressive officials about the need to suppress the movement went unchecked at court. By spring of 1900 half of the regular government troops joined the Boxers.

On June 13 large groups of Boxers rushed into Peking burning churches, foreign residences, and killing all Chinese converts in sight. In Tientsin (Tianjin) the Boxer movement was equally out of control. On June 21, the court, reacting in part to a bogus 4-point demand from the foreign powers, declared war and formally ordered provincial authorities to organize the Boxers. T'zu-hsi stated "Now that they [the foreigners] have opened hostilities, the extinction of our country is imminent. If we simply fold our arms and yield to them, I would have no face to see our ancestors after my death. If we must perish why not fight to death?" The orders were ignored by provincial authorities in southeast China but in Peking, under the leadership of reactionaries at court, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations. They carried the "eight precious magic weapons" described in traditional stories and wore the dress and adopted the mannerisms appropriate to their magical-supernatural associations. With hair flowing they moved according to formulated steps while wreaking havoc and terror in the capital.

In early August an 18,000 strong international force, including 2,500 U.S. soldiers, set out from Tientsin for Peking and by August 14, had overwhelmed the Boxers and relieved the legations. T'zu-hsi and the Emperor, dressed as commoners, fled the capital in panic. This debacle, which left over 200 foreigners and many more Chinese Christians dead, thus came to an end. Most of north China and parts of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria had suffered enormous dislocation and the loss of Chinese life had been heavy.

The allies, however, insisted on formal punishment for China in the terms of the Peace Protocol signed in 1901. The protocol called for punishment of guilty Chinese officials, a crushing indemnity of $330,000,000, apology missions to Germany and Japan, establishment of a permanent legation guard, destruction of ports between Peking and the sea, prohibition of the importation of arms for two years, and the stationing of foreign troops in key points from Peking to the sea. Taken together, these provisions infringed severely on Chinese sovereignty and incapacitated China's economic growth. In a struggle for survival the Manchu court belatedly moved to set up a constitutional government but the dynasty had lost credibility not only in the eyes of the foreigners but also in the eyes of Chinese. The idea of forceful overthrow of the dynasty proposed by Sun Yat-sen, once rejected by respectable Chinese, gained acceptability and support. The pulse of the revolution had begun to quicken.

ENRICHMENT

I. The fury of the Boxer forces lashed out at all aspects of foreign influence. A Chinese Christian felt the wrath of his countrymen.

> In consequence of the many wild rumours, the evangelist Chou Yung-Yao had been advised to leave and go to his home; but he said he had been appointed to that station, and would not desert his post. As things became more threatening, he even sent in a petition to the magistrate, saying that if the Christians were in fault he was to blame, as he had taught them the doctrine. He asked, therefore, that he might be punished in some way to appease the anger of the people, and to allow the others to go unmolested. To this petition the official gave no heed; and the Boxers evidently knew that they had a free hand, for the storm burst suddenly on the little band on Sunday 1st July, after their service. The mob first attacked the chapel, breaking both the doors and windows, and then set the place on fire. They then sought and caught the evangelist, dragged him to the main street, and there beat him until he was unconscious. Regaining consciousness he attempted to rise, and was partially kneeling, when one cried out, 'See, he is praying even now. Drag him to the fire.' Immediately some of the bystanders caught hold of him and pulled him towards the burning chapel; but he said: 'You need not drag me, I will go myself.' He quietly walked to the chapel and entered the burning building, and almost immediately the roof fell in; death must have been instantaneous. But the mob was not satisfied, and sought everywhere for the Christians. Kao Chung-tang was caught in the street, beaten till nearly dead, and then thrown on the smouldering ruins of the chapel. He was still conscious, and after a time begged the bystanders to give him some water. 'Do you want it hot or cold?' asked one man. 'See, I will give you some lukewarm,' and then offered him some filth to drink. 'Others,' said he, 'would not even give you that.' Among all the crowd there was not one that took pity on him, and the poor fellow lingered on till the next day.
>
> (Edwards 1970: 190-191)

Western missionaries were particularly vulnerable:

> Six days' journey north of Hsin Chou is the large prefectural city of Ta T'ung Fu, occupied by missionaries of the China Inland Mission. So far as has been ascertained at present, "it was on 24th June that the storm first broke; and the hunted missionaries found shelter for a time in the yamen of a friendly Prefect, but not before Mr. and Mrs. McKie had been badly wounded by stones. . . A few days later, on 27th June, the helpless little band was escorted back to the Mission premises, and a guard placed to protect them. Under these painful circumstances a little son was born to Mrs. McKie --

born to receive a rude and cruel welcome from the land of his parents' adoption.

By 12th July the guard had almost disappeared, only two men remaining; and at seven o'clock that evening a small official arrived to take the names of the foreign inmates. This was not for purposes of protection, for only an hour later the house was surrounded by three hundred horse and foot soldiers, and sword and fire soon did their deadly work." The names of the martyred on that day were --

Mr. Stewart McKie
Mrs. McKie
Alice McKie
Baby McKie
Mr. Charles I'Anson
Mrs. I'Anson
Dora I'Anson
Arthur K. I'Anson
Eva K. I'Anson
Miss Margaret E. Smith
Miss Maria Aspden

(Edwards 1970: 98-99)

IX. K.

THE UNITED STATES' OPEN DOOR INITIATIVE

Key Concepts

The Open Door Notes were a confused foreign policy initiative by the United States which had little substantive effect. It illustrates U.S. failure to clarify its position regarding China.

Textbook Treatment

The textbooks are in disagreement about the Open Door Policy. Some perceive it as a genuine attempt by the United States to preserve the territorial integrity of China while others discuss U.S. concern with protecting American trading opportunities.

Current Interpretation

The U.S. Open Door Notes mark the second round in formal U.S.-China policy which began in July 1844 with the signing of the Treaty of Wang-hsia (Wangxia). This treaty gave the United States the same treaty port rights gained by the British in the Treaty of Nanking. (See IX-E) The concept became known as the Open Door.

During the latter half of the 19th century the United States managed to secure most of the benefits other nations had wrested from the Chinese without actually committing U.S. forces. The U.S. government was more absorbed in the Civil War and internal economic growth than in pursuing an active China policy. Its major interest in China was focused on a series of anti-immigration laws directed at the increasing number of Chinese coming to the West coast. Therefore, the American presence in China was primarily a private one of missionaries, educators, clipper ships and business interests.

However, when U.S. expansionism spread to the Pacific with the New Manifest Destiny, interest in the potential of China as a major trading partner began to develop. At the same time the British were concerned that the increasing German, French and Russian expansion, in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, would jeopardize their position of primacy and access to trade. In 1899, after a year of quiet diplomacy in which the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, John Hay, a great admirer of the British, played a major role, President McKinley sent the first Open Door Note to the major powers. He asked them to guarantee equality of commercial opportunity to all the powers involved in China and not to interfere with the already existing interests of each other.

This was followed by a second note in 1900. Concerned that the Russians and Germans would seize on the upheavals accompanying the Boxer Rebellion as an excuse to extend their spheres of interest, John Hay called for the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity. The United States got substantial diplomatic mileage out of this Open Door policy which called for equal treatment of the foreigners and the preservation of the integrity of China. In reality, it was a political rather than a legal statement which accepted the spheres of influence and foreign privilege as a given. Although it theoretically put a brake on additional expansion, in reality it had the effect of keeping the foreign powers from intruding any further on U.S. trading opportunities.

Subsequent U.S. efforts to use the Open Door as the basis of maintaining China's integrity were troubled and the doctrine was subverted by the secret negotiations involved in the Versailles treaty. These negotiations, which gave Japan control over the province of Shantung (Shandong), led to the May 4th Incident. (See X-E) The United States was the target of much of the general hostility generated by this violation of China's territorial rights. In the early 1920s, operating under the Open Door, the United States was able to maneuver Japan's withdrawal from Chinese territory but this proved to be only temporary. Increasingly absorbed with the Great Depression of the 1930s and pursuing a policy of isolation from foreign involvement, the United States was unable to call on the Open Door policy to counter further Japanese aggression.

ENRICHMENT

I. Jack Chen has written a comprehensive history of Chinese immigration to the United States. The following is a summary of some of the major points in his book, The Chinese of America, New York: Harper and Row, 1980. We include the summary as background to the anti-immigration laws passed by the United States in the late 19th century.

Hunger, civil disorder caused by the Taiping Rebellion and a dying Ch'ing (Qing) dynasty, growing oppression in Kuangtung (Guangdong) province -- the major source of Chinese immigrants -- and the quest for Western knowledge are generally cited as among the major reasons why the early Chinese immigrants undertook the hazardous and often wretched sea voyage which might last as long as 60 days. Some of the earliest immigrants came to join the Gold Rush or set up small businesses in California, paying their own way out of savings or family money.

The majority, however, came as contract laborers recruited by American mining and railroad companies. Jack Chen reminds us that this system of indentured labor "was no different from the method used by millions of European immigrants to the Eastern states."

There were, however, major differences between the Chinese and Eastern European immigrants. Many of the Chinese came as sojourners. They fully intended to return to their family and village in China as soon as they had paid off their debts to the company and had saved enough money to assure a living in China. In the meantime, they sent remittances home to the family. Jack Chen tells us: "Over half of the 300,000 Chinese who reached America before the 1880s returned to China."

He explains that they were bound to their country, not only by the usual ties, but also by religious beliefs which demanded that they tend the graves of their dead ancestors. They were under intense pressure to return home and meet their filial obligations.

Of those who remained in the United States, some "assimilated" easily. But for most it was a bleak existence and they were unable to realize their intentions. Sometimes a young man went home to marry the woman selected for him by his family. He soon left, better able to support his growing family from the United States.

Another difference from the European experience was that Chinese immigration which began as essentially male was forced to remain that way -- even after it became apparent that the immigrants were going to remain in the United States. By 1870 California law prohibited the entry of Chinese women unless they were the wives of merchants. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 banned the immigration of Chinese laborers and set the stage for subsequent legislation which made it very difficult for a Chinese woman to enter this country. Chinese in California were forbidden by state law to marry white people until 1948. (Such laws remained in some states until the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional in 1967.)

In 1924 National Origins Act set a numerical restriction on immigration to the United States. Highly restrictive national quotas were set at one-sixth of the total population of that national group in the United States in 1920. This had the effect of recognizing northern and western Europeans as the most desirable and Asians as the least desirable immigrant group.

In the following passage Chen describes immigrant life:

> Arriving in San Francisco, immigrants found that. . . the institutional network with its threads reaching back home was there to greet them the moment they stepped off the boat. In the very early days, Chinese merchant houses. . . provided interpreters, rough housing, community centers, and assistance in finding work. Later. . . clan [family] associations were formed to look after immigrants of one surname group. . . This type of organization. . . was traditional in China: a district mutual self-help society in a strange town. . .
>
> "The familiar physical environment and culture was of enormous importance: the open fronted shops, the smells and aromas of Chinese cooking, the Guangdong faces and clothes, the Chinese signs and speech -- a home away from home: Chinatown in the 1850s. Strangely lacking were women and children.
>
> (Chen: 27-29)

The 19th century immigrants from China were first welcomed in California. They brought their traditional crafts with them. The same expertise which built the Great Wall of China carved out the rock of the Sierra Nevadas and the Rockies so the Central Pacific railroad could link California with the rest of the United States.

"They knew the techniques of draining, reclamation and flood prevention. . . and they brought these techniques with them from their native villages." (Chen: 86) They reclaimed California's swamps and deserts. They built the levees and the irrigation ditches. Unable by law to purchase land of their own, they worked on the wheat, fruit and vegetable farms and in the vineyards of the rich Central Valley. Lacking families and accustomed to work in large groups, they became the first migrant workers.

They knew the sea and worked as independent fishermen catching shrimp, lobster, abalone and other seafood for California markets. When laws were passed regulating the size of Chinese nets and imposing special taxes on them, they moved on to the salmon canneries of Oregon and Washington. They worked as cigar makers and shepherds. And in a world without women, they cooked, they opened laundries and they worked in the households of the growing class of industrialists, merchants and bankers.

In the latter part of the 19th century many of the sojourners began to lose touch with their native Chinese villages. Time, distance and the growing perception that they would be unable to realize their dreams forced them to consider remaining in America. But by now times had changed and the Chinese became the victims of their own hard work and of the nationalist sentiment that was sweeping the United States. The nation of immigrants wanted to close the door on any intruders who might threaten the new "American culture." The Chinese had outstayed their usefulness. Their skills were less valuable in an industrializing society. The same railroad built by their labor now brought white people from the East who wanted jobs. A major economic depression in the mid-1870s limited opportunities. Ineligible for citizenship, the Chinese had no political power with which to protest increasing abuse and humiliation.

Chen continues with an account of changing U.S. perceptions:

> When there were few or relatively few Chinese in a community, each one could be judged on his or her own merits by the larger community. Later, as the number of Chinese increased or were concentrated more heavily in one area, individuality disappeared. The unthinking spoke not of Ah Chen or Lee Sung but of "the Chinese.' (Chen: 132)

Thus the scene was set for violent anti-Chinese demonstrations, riots and the legislation designed to stop the growth of Chinese society in the United States.

Eventually, in the 20th century, as the Chinese population began to decline, a new, more tolerant attitude slowly began to develop. And, in 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Acts were finally repealed and the Chinese were allowed to become naturalized citizens. Today, approximately 20,000 Chinese a year are permitted to enter the United States. (China Update, Midwest China Center: 9-81)

IX. L.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE 1911 REVOLUTION

Key Concepts

The year 1900 was a dramatic watershed in Chinese history. Reeling from almost a century of foreign and domestic crisis which had culminated in the disaster of the ill-conceived Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese had no choice but to take on the wholesale transformation of their society. Although events had finally swept away resistance to change, there still was no broad consensus on the type of reform necessary.

The period from 1900 to 1912 saw not only a remarkable growth of nationalism but encompassed reforms initiated by the Empress Dowager T'zu-hsi (Ci Xi); the growth of a constitutional movement; the beginning of provincial assemblies in which the aggressive role of the local elite came into conflict with the national government; the formation of revolutionary organizations, and finally a series of uprisings that lead to the forced abdication of the imperial family and the founding of a republic on January 1, 1912.

Dramatic changes in society also took placed. Communications improved rapidly and the press and its role expanded enormously. Dynamic new social groups -- youth, women, the modern military, the Overseas Chinese and industrial labor -- became important players on the political scene.

Foreigners in China during this period were struck with the enormity of the changes they were witness to. A veteran Sinophile, Calvin Matur, wrote in 1905 "The state of things today presents a great contrast with what it was when I arrived here forty-one and a half years ago. Then everything was dead and stagnant; now all is life and motion. . . [with] promise of great things in the near future. (Wright 1968: 1) The outgoing Hong Kong governor warned the Colonial government that the new governor "will require an entirely revised estimate of Chinese character from that which has been hitherto accepted [and must] recognize the significance of the remarkable reversal of what hitherto had been considered as essential characteristics of the Chinese and attach to them the importance they deserve. . ." (Wright 1968: 2)

Textbook Treatment

The texts devote very little space to the developments in China during the first decade of the 20th century. As a result, important ideas are left unmentioned or undeveloped. For example, the Ch'ing-instituted reforms, some of which had far-reaching consequences, are only sometimes alluded to. The struggle between reformers and revolutionaries is seldom touched on and the important role of student radicals in the revolutionary movement is ignored.

Sun Yat-sen and his activities are, however, covered in most texts. Unfortunately, the discussion of Sun without reference to other major events or figures of the decade tends to present an inaccurate picture of the man and his significance. The story of the first decade of the 20th century is not simply the story of Sun Yat-sen's rise to power. Sun did not play the central role that is widely attributed to him in the text.

Current Interpretation

The Aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion: The Rise of Nationalism

A great surge of nationalistic fervor followed in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion. The new nationalism was directed toward three goals: 1) stopping and then rolling back the tide of imperialism; 2) organizing a modern, centralized nation-state, capable of dealing with foreign aggressors as well as promoting change in political, social, economic and cultural life; 3) overthrowing the Ch'ing dynasty. (Wright 1968: 3-4) The first two goals were accepted by a broad range of Chinese; the third was a goal of the more radical student groups and the avowed revolutionaries. Emotions ran high. When a young student returning from Japan heard that the American consul had said that no Chinese was capable of acting except in self-interest, he poisoned himself on the step of the consulate. His martyrdom triggered demonstrations throughout China. (Wright 1968: 10)

Perhaps the most important aspect of the new nationalism was Rights Recovery Movement. The Chinese took steps to regain the various rights and privileges that the foreigners had wrested from China. The drive to recover China's railways, which had been built or at least heavily mortgaged by foreign interests, serves as a dramatic example of China's attempt to recover national independence by paying off national debts. Between 1900 and 1911 nearly every possible method of redeeming China's railways was tried. Few were left untouched by the efforts to raise capital -- gentry members and coolies alike took part in fund-raising drives. Public feeling became so aroused by the cause of saving China that the British consul in Chungking (Chongqing) warned that if any power intervened, "the resentment of the people will be so great that I doubt if any one person will leave this port alive." (Wright 1968: 19) Another aspect of The Rights Recovery Movement were campaigns to gain control of China's frontier areas as a means of resisting further foreign aggression and preventing partition.

The reform of the military was an important factor in the new nationalism. Military schools with specific standards were started. In the past the army had been considered a refuge for those who had failed. Now that a variety of career options -- rather than just training in the Confucian classics -- was open to the elite the army attracted members from a broad spectrum of society. Many young men joined the army out of patriotism and, in the Revolution of 1911, the mass defections of the New Armies to the revolutionaries can be attributed in part to their peception that a republican form of government was essential to national survival.

China was reacting to the threats against her with a sense of determination and urgency and few politically sensitive Chinese -- whether they were from China's highest social stratum or lowest -- failed to be drawn into the process.

Imperial Government Reforms

The politically astute Empress Dowager T'zu-hsi quickly realized after the debacle of the Rebellion that reform was necessary for China's survival and hers. Acting on the recommendations of high officials, she initiated a reform program that began in 1901 and ended in 1905. She hoped to counter the anti-Manchu element in the new nationalism by demonstrating that the dynasty could provide leadership and ideas. Instead her "structural reforms undermined the state even as they served it." (Wright 1968:

28) She discovered that to compromise with Confucianism destroyed it and the government it supported.

The content of the government's program closely resembled that of the ill-fated reform of 1898. Its stated aim was complete reorganization and self-strengthening. Old government offices were abolished, new ones set up, military reforms carried out and education reforms set in motion.

By far the most significant reforms were in the area of education. The abolition of the civil service exams, the establishment of modern schools and the sending of students abroad to study had far-reaching consequences. These reforms irrevocably changed the basis of gentry power and dramatically altered how the bureaucracy was recruited. The scholar-official class had, in the past, achieved its status through examinations in Confucianism and, in turn, had used its position to perpetuate the system. Chinese learning had been prized for its practical function. When the curriculum changed and Western learning and new methods were adopted, Confucianism -- and the system of governance it spawned -- began to decline. The bureaucracy began to be staffed with men trained in specific fields who had little vested interest in supporting the old system.

The first phase of government-sponsored reform was followed by a second. The wave of enthusiasm for constitutionalism that swept China in 1905 in the wake of Japan's victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese war again forced the Empress Dowager's hand. In response to intense pressures she sent Manchu princes and nobles abroad to investigate foreign political systems with a view towards introducing a constitution in China. While no fan of constitutionalism, she was far more afraid of revolution.

Between 1906 and 1908 T'zu-hsi issued a number of decrees supposedly designed to further pave the way for the adoption of a constitution. In fact she was merely buying time as she attempted to consolidate dynastic power and prolong the Manchu rule; she never contemplated introducing constitutional monarchy in her lifetime.

In 1908 the Empress Dowager's successor ordered the establishment of provincial assemblies. Once in place, these bodies began to push for the convocation of parliament. In 1910 representatives from 16 provinces went to Peking and presented three petitions to the government. Although the petitions were supported by huge numbers of signatures (250,000,000 in one case) the representatives were summarily dismissed. Angered by their treatment and discouraged about the dynasty's now-obvious lack of commitment to constitutionalism, they met in secret and decided to throw their support to the revolutionaries. Disillusionment with the Manchus and their reform program had reached a new level. Public feeling was clearly swinging toward a revolutionary cause.

The Revolutionary Movement The origins of China's revolutionary movement were in the urban areas -- not in the countryside. In the early part of the decade China's fledgling revolutionary groups attracted only a tiny minority of those concerned about China's future. The majority of politically involved Chinese still favored reform rather than revolution and were willing to support the dynasty's reform efforts. The revolutionaries did, however, have an impact beyond their numbers even in the very early years of the decade.

Prior to 1905, the revolutionary movement was divided into two distinct groups. The first was student radicals and intellectuals -- many were the youth of the scholar-official class -- from the region of the lower Yangtze (Yangzi). The majority of the men and women in this group had either attended modern schools which taught Western subjects or studied in Japan. They were driven by the idea that immediate steps must be taken to save China and overthrow the Ch'ing, and by 1903 they had broken with the government. Open verbal protests in the partially protected treaty ports and in Tokyo gave way to direct violence, unsuccessful attempts to organize revolts in the interior, and the establishment of clandestine, subversive organizations.

The second group was led by Sun Yat-sen. His first party, which never had more than 500 members, was founded in 1894 in Honolulu. Called the Revive China Society, it was made up of those on the fringes of society -- Overseas Chinese, secret societies, Christian converts, and missionaries. Sun's own background was atypical of Chinese society in that, although he was of peasant origin, he had received a Western as well as a Chinese education while living with his bother in Hawaii. After being involved in an abortive coup in Canton in 1895, he travelled abroad as a fugitive. Eventually, he was able to attract more followers from the mainstream of student radicals and in 1905 Sun's group and the student radicals decided to coordinate their efforts. The result was the Revolutionary Alliance, China's first modern political party. (The Alliance later became the Kuomintang (KMT) Party.) With the establishment of the Alliance, the center of revolutionary activity shifted from treaty ports and overseas communities to the heart of China where students rather than peripheral members of society became the prime agitators and leaders. Although the revolutionary movement was strengthened by this union, it still remained small -- 400 joined the initial group in 1905 and by 1911 membership stood at only 10,000. Importantly, its numerical weakness was not compensated for by tight organization or a well-developed program based on a coherent ideology. Sun was not an original thinker and his program was often vague and self-contradictory. It did little to provide coherence to the movement. However, prior to 1911 Sun was able to attract growing numbers of reformers as they became disillusioned by Ch'ing reforms and the dynasty's reluctance to adopt a constitution.

As the decade came to a close violence mounted. A series of attempts to seize power took place and lesser riots to protest increases in the cost of living occurred. Severe flooding and famines in Central China further destabilized the situation. The specific incident that precipitated the Revolution of 1911 was, however, the central government decision to buy, with foreign currency, a railroad line in Szechuan (Sichuan) province in which the local gentry had heavily invested. The announcement of the government's intention sparked an uprising that in turn triggered other disturbances. By September of 1911, imperial troops had to be transferred from Wuchang -- one of the cities of Wuhan -- to Szechuan, providing the revolutionaries with a perfect opportunity to seize control of this critically located area. Once this was accomplished the revolution spread rapidly -- approximately ten provinces were under revolutionary control by the end of 1911. In December Sun was proclaimed provisional president of the new republic despite the fact that he was out of the country. Two major problems still loomed, however -- how to end the Ch'ing dynasty and how to achieve national unification. The revolutionaries turned to a general in the government's New Army -- Yuan Shih-k'ai -- to negotiate a political compromise. Yuan had the political and military power to influence the old government. Yuan was able to secure the abdication of the Manchus and Sun resigned the presidency in favor of Yuan. On February 14 he was formally elected president of the Republic of China.

The rise of the Republic was an epochal event in Chinese history. Over 2000 years of imperial dynastic rule had come to an end. However, the revolution was also a failure in many respects. There was no adequate leadership at any level and power went by default to conservative local notables. The Chinese Revolution stalled because there was no class or group articulate and well-formed enough to replace the old elite and power fell to "an unstable amalgam of a gentry that had lost the old bases of elite status, the frail skeleton of a bourgeois class, and miscellaneous military adventurers." (Wright 1968: 59)

ENRICHMENT

I. Tsou Jung (Zou Rong) is representative of the more radical element in this period of rapid change. He wrote a pamphlet, "The Revolutionary Army," when he was 18 years old. Sentenced to prison for his subversive ideas, he died when he was 20.

The following paragraphs are taken from the pamphlet which was written in 1903. Clearly, Tsou Jung's words were designed to arouse the passion of his countrymen rather than to suggest any practical solution to China's problems.

> The single, supreme goal of revolution is to sweep away thousands of years of autocracy, cast off thousands of years of slavery, eradicate 5,000,000 nomadic barbarian Manchus, and wash away the terrible humiliation of 260 years of cruel oppression, so that the territory of China will be cleansed and the descendents of the Yellow Emperor will all become Washingtons. . . Revolution! How lofty and magnificent is Revolution!. . . .
>
> There are citizens, and there are slaves. Citizens are strong; slaves are hopeless. Citizens are independent; slaves are submissive. Under the Yellow Dragon flag of China, there exists a kind of people who are really neither citizens nor slaves, but a multifarious mixture organized into one huge race. Can they be called citizens? I dare to say that these 400,000,000 people all look like slaves and concubines. How can they be called citizens? To do them the honor of calling them "citizens" would besmirch this beautiful word. . . .
>
> We Chinese are enslaved by the Manchus, the Europeans, and the Americans, not because the Manchus, Europeans, and Americans wanted to enslave us, but because Chinese like being slaves. . . . We Chinese did not commence to like being slaves today. Some say that there were citizens before the Ch'in and Han dynasties, but none thereafter. I say that everyone living contentedly under an autocracy is a slave. The two great principles of loyalty and filial piety, interpreted to mean loyalty to the ruler and filial piety toward parents, have been handed on generation after generation by men with noble titles,

high officials, teachers, and great Confucians. . . Certainly, loyalty and filial piety are cardinal human virtues; loyalty to the country is entirely proper -- but not loyalty to a ruler. Why? Because without parents, no one would be born, and without a country, no one can survive. Hence, there are duties toward parents and country that must be fulfilled. But these duties should not be twisted, perverted, and perpetuated by one family or by its menials and running dogs. . . .

Being submissive and obedient, knowing one's place, keeping out of trouble, wanting to be an official, wanting to get rich. . . these are the textbooks that have made slaves of the Chinese people. No one in the whole country is not a slave, and no one is not a slave of a slave. Two thousand years ago they were all slaves, and now, 2,000 years later, they are still all slaves. . . .

Compatriots of the great Han race, men and women of all ages! Be revolutionary: each and every one of you, look upon this revolution as your duty, as necessary as daily food and drink! Don't deprecate yourselves! Your land occupies two-thirds of the Asian continent, your compatriots comprise one-fifth of the world's population. Your tea is more than enough to supply beverage for all the millions of the people of the world, and your coal can supply the whole world with fuel for 2,000 years. There are forebodings of your being the Yellow Peril, and you do possess the might of the sacred race. You have government; administer it yourselves. You have laws; keep them yourselves. You have industries; run them yourselves. You have armaments; marshal them yourselves. You have land; protect it yourselves. You have inexhaustible natural resources; you should exploit them yourselves. You truly possess all the qualifications for revolutionary independence. Lead your 400,000,000 compatriots forward, to save their own lives and to save the life of our ancestral land. . . Amidst the forest of spears and the hail of bullets, attack your hereditary foe, the Manchus, and your public enemy, the Manchu ruling clan. Then wipe out the foreign devils who have infringed upon your sovereignty, so that the stains upon your national history can be washed away, and your country's reputation will spread far and wide. . . .

Long live the revolutionary independence of the great Han people!

Long live the Chinese Republic!

Long live the freedom of 400,000,000 compatriots of the Chinese Republic!

(Gentzler: 132-134)

II. An editorial written in 1903 in a Chinese newspaper makes a strong case for a colloquial language newspaper written by the people for the people. Statements such as this which invited all the people to participate in government spelled the beginning of the end of Confucian government.

> It's turning cold. You can hear the howl of the northeast wind, and in the sky, huge banks of black clouds drift back and forth obscuring the sun. Along about this time of year, people getting on in years put on their fur-lined long gowns and stay at home, closing windows tightly, sipping their wine, playing mahjong, or puffing their opium, in relaxed comfort. Well, if you have read the reports during the past few days -- "Alarming News from Manchuria," "An Important Telegram concerning Russian Affairs" -- you know that Fengtien has already fallen and that several tens of warships are now off the mouth of Port Arthur harbor, and you know what an extremely precarious situation our China will be in once Japan and Russia start fighting. When you think about this, I'm afraid you may have no taste for even your very best Shao-hsing wine, or forget to win at mahjong, or you may even find the highest quality Cantonese opium insipid. . .
>
> Well, if there are actually so many people reading these papers, why does such ignorance still prevail, why are there so few enlightened individuals, and why is China still unable to strengthen herself? Now, let me, the Colloquial Master, explain this for all of you to hear.
>
> Scholars are the most hopelessly useless thing we have in China. Leaving aside for the moment those who have no ideas, no talent, and no learning, even those with excellent ideas, talent, and learning only mumble a few empty phrases or write a few empty essays. Besides this, what kind of important matters are they capable of handling? Those monthly and daily newspapers are all written for scholars to read, so regardless of how mournfully they are written, it's always like playing a lute in front of a cow — a complete waste of effort. Since scholars are useless, those among us who till the fields, do handicraft work, or engage in trade, as well as our brothers in the army, have all lived tough lives since our youth, lacked money for study, and we've had to spend the whole day running around doing all kinds of decent, honest work; so when we see all that "Yea, verily," "According to the Book of Odes," and "Confucius says. . ." we don't feel like reading those papers. And after a while when we do give a thought to reading them, not only our brothers can't understand all those peculiar essays and terms, even we feel a bit confused. . . .
>
> I've discussed this fully with friends over the past few weeks, and all said there was only one solution, to put out a colloquial language newspaper. It would be in absolutely first-rate Mandarin, each and every phrase very clear, all interesting and easy to understand. If this newspaper continues to be published, I guarantee that in less than three years each and every tiller in the fields, handicraft worker, business man, and soldier, as well as children and women, will

> all understand, will increase their learning and their knowledge, and then the prospects for China's self-strengthening will really be good. (Gentzler: 137-38)

III. The following poem was written by Ch'iu Chin (Qiu Jin), a woman revolutionary leader, five days before her execution in July 1907. Born in 1875 to a declining scholar-official family, she had an atypical upbringing in that she was both well-educated and enjoyed such sports as horseback riding. Strong-willed, independent and unusually attached to her family, she didn't get married until the then-late age of 21. Although it was an arranged marriage, Ch'iu Chin got along well with her husband and his family. Her activities were somewhat curtailed after marriage, but, upon moving to Peking with her husband and two children, she became involved with a group of women friends. They wrote poetry together and discussed national issues. This was both a liberating and exhilirating intellectual experience which persuaded her of her duty to participate in China's struggle for national survival. Thus her feminism was linked with nationalism.

Realizing that poetry, family and friends were not enough, she renounced her background and left for Tokyo where she became part of the radical student movement. From then on her life was involved with politics and feminism. She was a romantic and dramatic figure. Photographs show her dressed in men's clothing. She carried a dagger-like sword and she knew how to shoot and make bombs. Both dynamic and physically beautiful, Ch'iu Chin had a great sense of her own self as a romantic and heroic figure. It was this that separated her from later radical feminists (see ENRICHMENT II X-D) who believed that one's persona and individuality must be sublimated for the larger good of the revolution.

A member of Sun's New Revolutionary Alliance, she taught briefly at a girl's school in Shanghai upon her return to China, but soon became totally involved in a publication which questioned all aspects of the traditional woman's role. As with later radical women she believed that more than changing specific abuses was required. Feminism was to be part of the total revolution.

Increasingly involved in organizing secret societies and planning local revolutionary activities, she was arrested by the authorities who raided a school where she was working. She had been warned of the raid and chose to stay and face arrest. Rankin suggests the major motive was "the desire to climax a heroic life with a heroic death." She was beheaded in July 1907 after refusing to admit to any treason. The poem suggests little of her feminism. By the time of her execution, politics had clearly taken over.

The sun is setting with no road ahead,
In vain I weep for loss of country
Although I die, yet I still live
Through sacrifice I have fulfilled my duty. . .

(Rankin: 1)

IX.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA, 1750-1911

Bays, Daniel. "Women and Missionaries in Modern China." Paper delivered at Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1976.

Beeching, Jack. *The Chinese Opium Wars*. London: Hutchinson, 1975.

Bennett, Adrian A. "Young J. Allen . . .The Question of Cultural Imperialism." Paper delivered at Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1976.

Bodde, Derk. *China's Cultural Tradition*. New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1957.

Chen, Jack. *The Chinese of America*. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Chang, Hsin-pao. *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Chesneaux, Jean, director. *China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976*. New York: Random House, Inc., 1979.

China Update. St. Paul: Midwest China Center, September 1981.

Cohen, Myron L. "Chinese Society: Past and Present." Unpublished essay written for The Asia Society, 1980.

Cohen, Warren. "American Perceptions of China." In *Dragon and Eagle*, edited by Michel Oksenberg and Robert Oxnam. New York: Basic Books, 1978.

DeConde, Alexander. *History of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1963.

DeBary, William, Wing-Tsit Chan and Chester Tan. *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume II.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

Doolittle, Rev. Justus, ed. "The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal," Vol. 37, August 1871.

Ebrey, Patricia, ed. *Chinese Civilization and Society: A Source Book*. New York: The Free Press, 1971.

Edwards, E.H. *Fire and Sword in Shansi*. New York: Arno Press, 1970.

Edwards, R. Randle. "The Old Canton System of Foreign Trade." In *Law and Politics in China's Foreign Trade*, edited by Victor H. Li. Seattle: Univerrsity of Washington Press, 1977.

Fairbank, John K. *The United States and China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig. *East Asia: The Modern Transformation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965.

Fay, Peter Ward. *The Opium War 1840-1842*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.

Gasster, Michael. *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969.

Gentzler, J. Mason. *Changing China: Readings in the History of China from the Opium War to the Present*. New York: Praeger, 1977.

Gittings, John. *A Chinese View of China*. New York: Pantheon, 1973.

Greenburg, Michael. *British Trade and the Opening of China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

Hsu, Immanuel Chung-yueh. *The Rise of Modern China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Jones, Susan and Philip A. Kuhn. "Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part I*, edited by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

K'ang Yu-wei. *The One World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei*. Translated by L. Thompson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958.

Kuhn, Philip. "The Taiping Rebellion." In *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of China*, edited by Brian Hook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Li Chien-nung. *The Political History of China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.

Martin, W.A.P. *A Cycle of Cathay*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1897.

Michael, Franz. *The Taiping Rebellion*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966.

Rankin, Mary Backus. "The Emergence of Women at the End of the Ch'ing: The Case of Ch'iu Chin." In *Women in Chinese Society*, edited by Margery Wolf and Roxanne Witke. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Rankin, Mary Backus. *Early Chinese Revolutionaries*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Records of the General Conference of the Protestant Missionaries of China, Shanghai, China, May 10-24, 1877. Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1878.

Robinson, Charles H. *History of the Christian Missions*. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1915.

Schiffrin, Harold Z. *Sun Yat-sen, Reluctant Revolutionary*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980.

Taylor, Bayard. *A Visit to India, China and Japan in the Year 1853*. New York: G.P. Putnam and Co., 1855.

Teng, Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank. *China's Response to the West*. New York: Athenaeum, 1973.

Thomson, James C., Jr., Peter W. Stanley and John Curtis Perry. *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia*. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.

Vohra, Ranbir, ed. *The Chinese Revolution: 1900-1950*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974.

Wakeman, Frederic Jr. "The Canton Trade and the Opium War." In *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Part I*, edited by John K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Waley, Arthur. *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958.

Wilbur, C. Martin. *Sun Yat-sen: Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Wright, Mary. *China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

1911-1949 X

X.

FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION, 1911-1949: INTRODUCTION

This section of the guide reviews the major events and trends in China in the first half of this century. This was a momentous period in Chinese history. With the imperial system gone, contending political groups sought to devise an alternative which would restore the country's unity, independence, and national pride, and set it on the road to "wealth and power." The ultimate victor, the Communist Party, won the struggle by drawing strength from the Chinese countryside, channeling peasant discontent to national political ends.

As in the last section, we do not attempt to cover every major event and trend. We again focus on four major themes:

-- internal problems, in particular the fragmentation of political power and the rural question. These are addressed in the essays on warlordism and rural China.

-- foreign penetration This is examined primarily in the essay on Japanese aggression.

-- reform efforts, first in the wake of the 1911 revolution and second under the aegis of the Nationalist Party. This is discussed in the essays on the constitutional experiment and the KMT's Nanking decade.

-- revolutionary movements, especially the May 4th Movement, which occurred primarily in the world of ideas, and the Communist movement, which fought in the political and military arenas.

As in the previous section, it is not essential to cover all these topics to provide a feel for the dynamics of this period. Doing a few topics well is more important than skimming the surface of all.

X. A.

EXPERIMENTS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1912-1923)

Key Concepts

Although China's new political leaders were receptive to a constitutional government, attempts to implement one failed for a number of reasons. Most important were the lack of agreement among political leaders and the unresolved issue of the locus of political power. The give and take and the idea of a "loyal opposition" which are implicit in democracies with competing political parties were not easily grafted onto a tradition of authoritarian government.

Textbook Treatment

The period after the 1911 Revolution is extremely complicated. It is not surprising that the textbooks' generally sketchy coverage is confusing and prone to error. Incorrectly, some reduce the complexity to a personal struggle between Yuan Shih-k'ai (Yuan Shikai) and Sun Yat-sen. The former is often portrayed as a warlord, which he was not. The power of the latter during this period is usually exaggerated. Most texts do make the point that China was a republic in name only without elaborating on why that was so. Most note correctly that Chinese politics of this era quickly became a contest among various military leaders, or warlords (see X-B).

Current Interpretation

For a brief chronology of the constitutional experiment, see page 3. Here we focus on three broad interpretive questions.

Why was Constitutionalism Popular? First of all, constitutionalism promised to satisfy the political demands of China's social elite for a greater say in the affairs of the country than imperial autocracy had allowed them. Even government bureaucrats were not opposed, since they assumed they would continue to dominate the country's administration.

Second, most articulate Chinese of this time believed that a constitutional form of government was the answer to China's poverty, weakness, and instability. As K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei) wrote in 1898, "I have heard that the strength of nations both east and west is due to the establishment of constitutions and the opening of national assemblies. . . Can these nations be anything but strong when their rulers and the millions of their people are united in a single body?" (Nathan: 4) Like many Chinese, Sun Yat-sen assumed it was possible to skip over stages of political history when he wrote: "The future of China is like building a railroad. Should we use the first locomotive ever invented or today's improved and most efficient one?" (Nathan: 1) All that was necessary, it was thought, was finding the right set of constitutional provisions.

Why Did Constitutionalism Fail? Historians of this period have identified a number of reasons why constitutionalism failed as a solution to China's problems.

First was the absence of a solid agreement among the central political forces at the outset of the Republic. Although Yuan Shih-k'ai went along with the constitution drafted by the Alliance Party in Nanking (Nanjing), he considered it a "disaster" and did not feel bound by it. As president he decided to subvert the new charter, thereby setting a precedent for every leader that followed him. For its part, the Kuomintang (Guomintang) (which grew out of the Alliance Party) was quite prepared to boycott politics in Peking if it felt the rules of the game were being violated.

Second was the unresolved contradiction between the twin expectations of constitutional government: greater political power for the people, or at least the social elite, and building a stronger national government. This was particularly true during the time of Yuan Shih-k'ai. He felt very strongly that the way to enhance national strength vis-a-vis the foreigners was centralization of authority. The members of parliament wanted more power to flow to the provinces.

Third was the behavior of foreign governments themselves. Although some countries, the United States in particular, welcomed China's movement to republican rule, others preyed on China's weakness. Chief among them was Japan, which made its infamous Twenty-One Demands* on Yuan Shih-k'ai's government in 1915 and provided financial assistance to various warlord regimes. The May 4th Incident was a response to China's treatment at the Versailles Conference. The Chinese government was too weak to respond to both the foreign pressure and the public outcry it caused.

Fourth was the prevalence of factionalism during the periods when Parliament was in session. There were a number of parties, and parties within parties, which made it difficult to arrive at decisions. Money was often the glue that held these factions together, which did nothing for the prestige of the Parliament and constitutionalism in general.

Fifth was the fragmentation of China's military after Yuan Shih-k'ai's death. The leading generals, many of whom had been Yuan's subordinates, were not willing to sacrifice their personal political interests and those of their military machines for the sake of an untested impersonal system. Nor were they willing to let one of their number gain the upper hand. If their civilian allies lost a round in Parliament, they would continue the struggle on the battlefield.

What was Sun Yat-sen's Role? Sun Yat-sen was not terribly prominent during this period, even though he continued to be the leading figure in the revolutionary movement. He did not set a high priority on the parliamentary struggle in the first years of the Republic. After Yuan's death, he boycotted the constitutional changes engineered by northern leaders. At times, he was not even preeminent in Canton (Kwangchou), where the Kuomintang tended to take refuge, because local warlords sometimes refused to cooperate with him. It was only in 1923, as he moved toward the alliance with the Soviet Union, a united front with the Chinese Communist Party, and the creation of a Party-Army that he became a national political figure.

---

* In brief, Japan sought joint operation with China of China's iron and steel industry and placement of Japanese advisors in critical administrative posts as well as a special position in Shantung, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

Chronology: Political History of the Early Republic

1912-1913 Yuan Shih-k'ai vs. Parliament As provisional president, Yuan found it difficult to deal with the checks and balances to his power. He quickly alienated his premier and cabinet, who were responsible for carrying out policy. Then, in the winter of 1912-1913, the first national elections in China's history resulted in a victory for the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), as the reorganized Alliance Party was known. In March 1913 the leader of the Kuomintang (Sung Chiao-jen [or Song Jiaoren]) was assassinated, and responsibility was traced to Yuan's subordinates. Some provinces in the south, led by Kuomintang supporters, rose in revolt but Yuan's forces quickly put them down. Yuan then dissolved first the Kuomintang and then Parliament itself, and disregarded the provisional constitution under which the latter operated.

1914-1916 Yuan Shih-k'ai's Dictatorship Yuan Shih-k'ai now had supreme control of the government, and tried to centralize power at the expense of the provinces. Although he had served in a military capacity before 1911, his was not a military dictatorship. In 1915, in an effort to strengthen his political hold, he began a movement toward a monarchy with himself as emperor. This united the various opposition elements, civilian and military, and Yuan had to cancel the plan in March 1916. He died six months later.

1916-1917 Restoring Constitutionalism I The Parliament that Yuan Shih-k'ai had dissolved in late 1913 reconvened, but soon fell to intense squabbling over a variety of issues, including a permanent constitution. In July 1917, Chang Hsun (Zhang Hsun), a general fed up with republican ways, intervened and proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. Other military leaders quickly defeated him.

1917-1920 Restoring Constitutionalism II The victors decided that what was needed was a new Parliament, and elections were held in the late spring of 1918 in the northern provinces. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen and others, the southern provinces refused to cooperate; they preferred the old Parliament in which they had a majority. Through abuses like vote-buying (not unknown in the West), the country's most powerful general was able to gain a parliamentary edge. After an effort to end the rift between north and south ended in stalemate, the May Fourth (1919) Incident (see X-C) and other crises paralyzed the government. Contending military leaders sought on the battlefield the preeminence their civilian supporters were not able to gain in Parliament, and constitutional matters were shelved.

1922-1923 Restoring Constitutionalism III The military conflict continued off and on until 1922. The military group that came out on top then tried to return to the constitutional road to legitimatize its position. They recalled the Parliament of 1913, which wrote a new constitution. But that progress had a hollow ring since the Kuomintang continued its noncooperation. The presidential election of 1923 was marred by obvious vote-buying (the most powerful general won); and warlords waiting in the wings mounted a sucessful challenge to the new government.

X. B.

WARLORDISM IN 20TH-CENTURY CHINESE POLITICS

Key Concepts

China after Yuan Shih-k'ai's death resembled the period after the Han and T'ang dynasties in that the principal arena of political conflict was warfare. In the absence of any other unifying and legitimizing principles, "clubs were trumps." Although the Republican-era generals, usually known as "warlords," declined in importance after the late 1920s, military politics continued to be primary until the Communist victory in 1949.

Textbook Treatment

Most textbooks tend to gloss over the warlord phenomenon. Few draw the parallel with the post-Han and post-T'ang periods, and few provide any details on how warlord armies worked. All disregard the continuity of military conflict until 1949. The players and strategies changed but the game remained the same.

Current Interpretation

Where Did the Term "Warlord" Come From? Westerners in China during the early 20th century borrowed the term from European medieval history and applied it to leading military figures. Scholars today prefer the less pejorative term, "militarist." Roughly translated, the Chinese term commonly used -- chun-fa (zhun fa) — means "military clique."

Where Did Warlords Come From? As the national government declined in effectiveness after 1916, military figures became the centers of power at all levels of the political hierarchy. There were a small group of national-level militarists. Each province had a military governor who was a professional officer with formal command over units garrisoned in county seats and other major cities. More importantly, the commanders of these subordinate units were usually tied by personal relations to the provincial military governor. Below the county level, land-owning families formed private armies for their own protection and to keep order, as they had done during the Taiping Rebellion.

Before 1928, most nationally prominent militarists were former subordinates of Yuan Shih-k'ai. In the late 19th century, the Ch'ing government had assigned Yuan the task of building a modern, professional army (the New Army). In the process Yuan accumulated a number of proteges, each of whom had their proteges, and so on. After Yuan died in 1916, the New Army fragmented, and its principal figures all tried to amass power for themselves. The major forces included the Anfu clique, the Chihli (Zhili) clique, the Fengtien clique (all named after the province-of-origin of their leaders), and the army of Feng Yu-hsiang (Feng Yuxiang), probably the most colorful of all the warlords.

The mid-1920s saw an important development. First the Kuomintang and then the Communist Party realized that they would need an army if they were to have a chance of achieving political power. Even Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), who placed great importance on mass social movements, recognized the need to adapt to China's militarized environment. Mao said in 1938:

> In China war is the main form of struggle and the army is the main form of organization. Other forms such as mass organization and mass struggle are also extremely important and indeed indispensable and in no circumstances to be overlooked, but their purpose is to serve the war. . . Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". . . Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army. (SWMTT II: 221, 224, 225)

Mao understood that his rival Chiang Kai-shek had long since come to the same conclusion. Chiang, Mao observed, "values the army as his very life. . . He has held firmly to the vital point that whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect we ought to learn from him." (SWMTT II: 223)

Last but not least, the Japanese became warlords in China. Thus, all the major actors in the first half of 20th century China used military force as a major instrument of power.

How did a Warlord Army Work? No matter how large or small the army, its leader needed several resources. First was territory, preferably of a defensible sort. This was secured through fighting. Second was troops and some officers and noncommissioned officers to lead them. The troops were peasant youths who volunteered or were conscripted; the officers and NCOs were usually bound by ties of personal loyalty rather than to any ideals. Third was money, which was usually garnered through onerous taxation of land and trade, the sale of opium, and forced contributions from businessmen. Obviously, the richer the area, the more potential money was available. Fourth was guns -- these were available either from the arsenals present in most provinces and from foreign suppliers. Fifth was transportation facilities (trains and boats). Sixth were educated individuals who could do public relations work and staff government offices if necessary. And seventh was a modus vivendi with local power-holders and their private armies. (Occasionally a major warlord would try to capture Peking, for the chance to gain legitimacy through a constitution and the nominal recognition of the foreign powers.)

Each army was not necessarily a unitary organization. Rather it tended to be a confederation: each major officer and his unit was allocated a specific territory and the taxation that came with it. The soldiers and junior officers of each unit were loyal to its commander, not necessarily to the commander of the overall army.

Large warlord cliques had a confederative quality too. A national militarist would put together a coalition of provincially based armies, based on his personal ties and/or common interests with the army commanders. One national militarist often allied his coalition with another against a third. But these alliances between and within coalitions, and between and within armies, were not usually permanent. As circumstances changed and as interests changed, betrayals and realignments were commonplace. The shifting alliances, which continued through the Nationalist period down to 1949, are the main reason this period is so dizzyingly complicated and almost impossible to follow.

What was the Nature of Military Conflict? It is possible to simplify the picture somewhat. We have already mentioned that each province tended to be controlled by a separate army, particularly in the eastern half of the country. In the less developed and more rugged west, the scale of control was smaller, often a river valley. This was particularly true in the province of Szechwan (Sichuan), where each warlord's army controlled one of five major river valleys.

Another method of simplification concerns the struggle among militarists who operated on a national scale. They tended to move their armies by boat and train on China's major transportation grid (see map). This grid was basically A-shaped, with some railways and rivers shooting off at various points. The game called for first gaining control of one of the major cities on this grid, and then moving along the transportation arteries to gain control of others. The cities where north-south and east-west arteries intersected were especially important. Which armies or coalitions controlled which cities often determined major alliances.

As an example of this game, take the history of the Kuomintang from 1925 to 1949. The Northern Expedition in 1926-1927 was an effort to get on the grid at Wuhan, Shanghai, and Nanking at the expense of New Army warlords. Once that occurred, the Nationalist Party divided along ideological lines. But Chiang Kai-shek, working from Nanking-Shanghai, and in alliance with other warlords, was able to move north to Peking in 1928. He then turned on his allies and was able to gain better control of Eastern China. From 1931 on, his control of North China waned, and the Japanese invasion of 1937-1938 forced him off the river-railway grid. All during this time, the Chinese Communist Party was building its forces as far away from the grid as possible. With the end of World War II Chiang was able to move get his armies back to East China and the river-railway grid. But by this time, the CCP had built large forces in the remote areas, and were soon able to do what Chiang had never been able to do, occupy the whole country. It was Chiang's turn to retreat to the only relatively inaccessible place left, Taiwan.

ENRICHMENT

I. The warlords caused continual disruption in everyday life in 20th-century China. This copy of a post office report for 1917 comes from the China Year Book, 1917. It gives the reader some sense of the chaos in North China.

> Shanxi. The year opened with improved conditions in Shanxi proper, but these were not maintained. Revolting troops and roving brigands combined, by their lawlessness and depredations, to hamper postal operations. Besides pillaging and burning villages and hamlets, they twice looted Wanquanxian, took Yunghexian, and besieged Linjinxian and Zixian. Couriers were attacked and mails lost, but postage stamps and official funds were in all cases saved. In one case the courier managed successfully to arrest his attacker and bring him to the magistrate. Mail services were seriously affected by the floods in Zhili, mails from other districts

being on one occasion delayed for twenty days. Toward the end of the year preventive measures had to be enforced to meet the outbreak of pneumonic plague; the parcel service from the infected area was suspended and the fumigation of mails undertaken at various points. Beginning from June, martial law was declared in the provincial capital, and censorship of mail matter enforced throughout the province. The smuggling of morphia pills under the disguise of anti-opium pills was detected, and twenty-two seizures were made.

Shenxi. The year has been a very bad one from the point of view of postal operations. Bands of *tufei* (local bandits) roamed through the province, plundering and looting, and rendering frequent suspension of the mail services necessary. Towards the end of the year revolting troops added to the chaos by capturing a convoy of 250 camels, with guns and ammunition for Sichuan, which they proceeded to use for an attack on Sian. An attempt on the *dujun*'s (military governor) life failed, and after two days' fighting the rebel *tufei* combination was driven from the city. Most of the fighting during these two days, however, was in the neighborhood of the Sian head office, making the position of the staff, most of whom were unable to return to their homes, a dangerous one. After leaving Sian, the rebels fled west, looting towns and villages en route. Eight agencies lost practically all their postal funds and private effects. Offices and agencies looted during the year numbered nineteen. Trade is in many parts non-existent, the wealthier traders having removed elsewhere, while the remainder fear to resume business. On almost any of the main roads can be found the walls of what used to be thriving cities, but which are now merely walled enclosures of vacant ground.

(Chesneaux: 61)

River/Railway Grid of Pre-1949 Politics (ca. 1935)


Ha'erbin
Vladivostok
Shenyang
Beijing
Baotou
Dalian
Tianjin
Taiyuan
Yan'an
Yellow
River
Qingdao
Ji'nan
Xuzhou
Xi'an
Zhengzhou
Shanghai
Nanjing
Hangzhou
Wuhan
Yangzi
River
Guangzhou
Hong Kong

(Bush and Townsend: 26)

X. C.

THE MAY FOURTH INCIDENT (MAY 4, 1919)
AND THE FOUNDING OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (JULY 12, 1921)

Key Concepts

The cultural and intellectual awakening which occurred during the May Fourth Movement openly acknowledged that traditional Chinese values were directly responsible for China's national tragedy. What started as a student movement spread to a larger group of similarly concerned Chinese and was responsible for significant social change in urban China. A very small, radicalized segment of this movement, aided by the Soviet Union, secretly organized the Chinese Communist Party. Thus May Fourth became an extremely important factor in the social, intellectual and political development of China.

Textbook Treatment

Only one or two texts mention May Fourth. Although this is a period which should have universal appeal to students the texts provide only a brief recital of facts that fails to impart any sense of the urgency and passion which propelled the young Chinese students during this dramatic period. One of the texts gives more complete coverage and correctly identifies the participation of the foreign-trained students and discusses the open, widespread criticism of traditional society that distinguishes this movement from earlier protest movements.

Some of the texts make the linkage between May Fourth and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Others simply announce the introduction of Communism into China with no discussion of the reasons for the Russian interest or the Chinese response.

Current Interpretation

The May Fourth Movement The dates of the May Fourth Movement are imprecise. Generally, it refers to the period from 1915 to 1921 or 1922. The name refers to an incident which occurred on May 4, 1919. A mass meeting of over 3000 students from universities and middle schools in the Peking area got out of control. The students were protesting the secret decision of Chinese diplomats and other negotiators at the Versailles Peace Conference to return part of Shantung (Shandong) province to Japan rather than to China after World War I. The students marched on the residence of a Chinese official. In the fracas the house was set on fire, one of the students received fatal wounds and thirty-two students were arrested. The news spread throughout the urban student community on the east coast of China and was the catalyst for massive student and public demonstrations. Eventually the government was forced to release the imprisoned students thus illustrating what a popular urban protest could accomplish in China.

The intellectual and cultural aspects of May Fourth are, however, of more significance. Starting about 1915 large numbers of Chinese students who had been studying abroad began to return home. They had been alienated from traditional Chinese culture and exposed to a variety of intellectual and philosophical experiences. They were eager to put their new knowledge and ideas to use in seeking solutions to the problems of their country. Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu), who was to be one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, was representative.

Born in 1879, he had received a strict classical education but, influenced by K'ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei), he decided to seek a modern education. From 1902 to 1915 he spent periods of time studying in Japan, China and France. When he returned to China in 1915 he was 33 years old, a veteran revolutionary, a career journalist, and an anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai (Yuan Shikai) zealot. He was convinced that China could rid itself of warlord control only after the Chinese people, particularly the youth, had been ideologically awakened and basic changes had been made in the old society and civilization. Ch'en worked towards these ends by starting a monthly publication, which came to be called New Youth. Even its title was a statement about traditional Chinese values.

The following recollection of a student living in Shanghai indicates the tremendous impact of this magazine. . .

> It came to us (students) like a clap of thunder which awakened us in the midst of a restless dream. The name of the magazine was, first of all, very fascinating. Students rushed to the Commercial Press for copies, but they were all gone. Orders for more copies were sent post-haste to Peking. I don't know how many times this first issue was reprinted, but I am sure that more than 200,000 copies were sold. (O'Sullivan: 31)

Undoubtedly, what had most aroused China's youth in this first issue was Ch'en's lead article, "Call to Youth" (see ENRICHMENT). Arguing that all people were equal he urged the youth of China to free themselves from the "bondage of slavery." They were to be progressive, not conservative; aggressive, not retiring; cosmopolitan, not isolationist; utilitarian, not formalistic; and scientific, not imaginative. In his discussion of these principles, Ch'en lashed out at conservative attitudes and old customs and he called upon youth to destroy their foundation, Confucianism. Thus he went far beyond most of the current thinkers who, while casting out tradition "as a viable faith" also "pigeonholed it as a dead antique curiosity." Ch'en said, "If it is dead, it should not be pigeonholed. If we have lost confidence in it, it should be obliterated." (Levenson: 180)

This first and most important journal, New Youth, nurtured hundreds of subsequent pamphlets and periodicals which sprang up after the May Fourth Incident. Often one was suppressed by the police after one issue to be replaced by another the next month. Student arrests and demonstrations were commonplace.

This explosion in the printed word occurred as changes were taking place in the written language. Traditionally, writing was done in classical Chinese. Now, however, a vernacular was being adopted which was able to record spoken language in characters. Thus for the first time, educated Chinese were exposed to a wealth of competing thoughts and new values written in a language which was easily understood.

The change in the written word stimulated a revolution in literature. A generation of mostly young writers believed literature should realistically describe social conditions. The short stories and novels of Lu Hsun (Lu Xun) and Pa Chin (Ba Jin), among others, which expressed their loss of faith in the old values had wide appeal among the young intellectuals who identified with the subject matter.

The cultural aspects of May 4 were similarly exhilarating. Whereas the focus of discussion in the latter part of the 19th century had been Confucian attitudes and learning (see IX-F), now the Confucian-based social and family systems were the main targets. This was China's first "Cultural Revolution." Ch'en Tu-hsiu was particularly eloquent about the women of China. Pointing out that all modern constitutional countries had political parties, he questioned how women could take part in suffrage and politics if "the wife's words should not travel beyond her own apartment" and "a woman does not discuss affairs outside the home" (Gentzler: 173)

Individual Chinese families went through wrenching and painful emotional conflict as sons and daughters broke with the past and turned their backs on millennia of tradition. One of the children of May Fourth was Teng Ying-chao (Deng Yingxhao) who said of her marriage to Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai):

> We started our marriage in 1925. We had no marriage ceremony at all, only inviting our friends. We promised to love, to respect, to help, to encourage and to console each other, to have consideration for each other, to have confidence and mutual understanding. (Bailey: 40)

The contrast with the arranged marriages of the past was stunning.

Virtually every major figure of the period wrote about women's role in society. Even Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) entered the debates with a series of articles deploring the prevalence of female suicide. This open questioning of the role assigned to women meant that May Fourth became a liberating experience for some of the educated urban women. They found careers in journalism, in business and in finance and demanded the right to vote, to marry freely and to own property.

The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party The internal upheavals of May Fourth provided a perfect environment for the continuing radicalization of politically active young intellectuals. Not only were they concerned about the inhibiting and stultifying social norm but they believed China's weakness could also be attributed to the continuing and overwhelming foreign presence.

Historians loosely refer to this presence as imperialism and define it as the use of foreign capital and the political privilege that accompanies it to penetrate and distort an economy to the disadvantage of the local people. It is also the use of the same privilege to dominate local industry and to exclude local capitalism from developing in an indigenous fashion.

However, historians are divided over the extent to which China's economy was distorted and adversely affected by foreigners. There is little argument about the dislocation which the foreigners caused in the 19th century. The question is how much the orderly modernization of agriculture and the simultaneous development of Chinese-owned and indigenous industry was inhibited.

Some historians believe that the indemnities, special concessions and tax privileges for foreigners, tariffs which encouraged the importation of foreign goods, and the broad extension of most-favored-nation status hindered indigenous industrial development (see IX-E). They maintain that the flow of capital out of China and the importation of foreign manufactured goods discouraged a private entrepreneurial class which operated independently of both government-sponsored and foreign-aided industrial development.

These scholars also raise questions about the new urban elite class of Chinese bankers, industrialists, lawyers and merchants. Their response to the Western and Japanese presence was confused and ambivalent. They held both Chinese and Western values. They were angered because their country was too weak to stand up to foreign demands; but, on the other hand, they recognized that their individual well-being depended upon doing business with the "aggressors."

There is, however, another opinion about Western "imperialism." Other historians present evidence of the growth of indigenous mining operations, increased handicraft production and increased production of low-grade cotton material as proof that the traditional economy could not only co-exist with foreign investment but be stimulated by it. They maintain that foreign capital was invested mainly in those areas that required modern technology. They believe that remittances from overseas Chinese and foreign investment made up for the outflow of capital China was required to pay as indemnities.

These historians refer to Japan, which modernized successfully in spite of an anti-foreign bias similar to China's. Japan was able to mobilize this sentiment to support rapid change even though this demanded accommodation with technologically superior forces. China, on the other hand, mobilized its anti-foreign sentiment against the cooperative effort required for effective modernization. The fault, this group believes, lies not in the West but in China, whose ethnocentricity prevented her from absorbing and making the most appropriate use of new processes. They argue that the real imperialism was not to occur until the 1930s with Japan's invasion of China.

However, what is most important in explaining the appeal of Communism in China is the perception of the young intellectuals who were to be the catalysts for drastic change. Whether or not China's development was in fact controlled and manipulated by foreign interests, a politically aware urban segment associated the foreigners with China's national humiliation.

These young Chinese saw a numerically tiny but extremely visible minority of Western foreign residents in the major cities retaining Western culture and enjoying a standard of living unattainable by most Chinese. Foreigners lived in concessions which they treated as extensions of their own country. One can still see the remains of English country manors and French villas on Shamian island in Canton (Kwangchow) today.

They saw foreigners in high positions in quasi-government agencies such as the Customs Service. Foreign troops were stationed on China's soil. Foreign interests controlled large segments of the railways. Revenues from Chinese customs were deposited in foreign banks. And Japan clearly had an interest in expanding in East Asia. Overcome by nationalist sentiment and patriotism and convinced that the Western model of development held little hope for China, these concerned young Chinese acquired more than a passing interest in Marxist-Leninism. Initially their major concern was not so much with social injustice as with the disunity of the country.

Some of these young intellectuals were members of the Society for the Study of Marxist theory at Peking University. Many of them worked and studied in Japan and France where they became familiar with socialism. The successful Russian Revolution seemed proof of the validity of Marx.

Lenin is responsible for transferring Marxist theory to a global scale. He believed that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism, as the industrial powers invested their excess capital in underdeveloped areas. He equated these economically backward countries with the proletariat exploited by the owners of the means of production or, on an international scale, by the large industrialized nations. Thus nations assumed the roles of capitalists and workers.

Lenin's theory of imperialism was the ideological justification for the Communist International, or Comintern, which was established by the Soviet Union in 1919. The purpose was to sponsor and control the development of Communist parties in other countries and eventually to overthrow capitalism throughout the world.

In 1920 the Soviet Union identified China as ready for a Communist movement. It was impressed by the organizational possibilities the May Fourth Movement indicated; it perceived China as a classic victim of imperialism; and it hoped to gain an influential position in the Far East to counter the expansionism of the Japanese. An agent, Gregory Voitinsky, was sent to Peking to circulate among intellectuals and explore organizing possibilities. On July 12, 1921 a handful of political activists and a representative of the Comintern secretly met on a houseboat near Chiahsing (Jiaxing) in Chekiang (Zhejiang) province to organize the Chinese Communist Party.

ENRICHMENT

I. "Call to Youth," written by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, was the first shot fired in China's intellectual revolution. It is of some interest to compare the values he advocates to those attributed to the Chinese Communist leadership in 1944 (see X-I). Many of those leaders were active in the May Fourth Movement.

> The Chinese compliment others by saying, "He acts like an old man although still young." Englishmen and Americans encourage one another by saying, "Keep young while growing old." Such is one respect in which the different ways of thought of the East and West are manifested. Youth is like early spring, like the rising sun, like trees and grass in bud, like a newly sharpened blade. It is the most valuable period of life. The function of youth in society is the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human body. In the process of metabolism, the old and the rotten are incessantly eliminated to be replaced by the fresh and living. . . As for understanding what is right and

wrong, in order that you may make your choice, I carefully propose the following six principles, and hope you will give them your calm consideration. . .

1. Be independent, not servile All men are equal. Each has his right to be independent, but absolutely no right to enslave others nor any obligation to make himself servile. . . Emancipation means freeing oneself from the bondage of slavery and achieving a completely independent and free personality. I have hands and feet, and I can earn my own living. I have a mouth and a tongue, and I can voice my own likes and dislikes. I have a mind, and I can determine my own beliefs. I will absolutely not let others do these things in my behalf, nor should I assume an overlordship and enslave others. For once the independent personality is recognized, all matters of conduct, all rights and privileges, and all belief should be left to the natural ability of each person; there is definitely no reason why one should blindly follow others. . .

2. Be progressive, not conservative "Without progress there will be retrogression" is an old Chinese saying. Considering the fundamental laws of the universe, all things or phenomena are daily progressing in evolution, and the maintenance of the status quo is definitely out of the question; only the limitation of man's ordinary view has rendered possible the differentiation between the two states of things. . . All our traditional ethics, law, scholarship, rites and customs are survivals of feudalism. . . I would much rather see the past culture of our nation disappear than see our race die out now because of its unfitness for living in the modern world. . .

3. Be aggressive, not retiring While the tide of evil is now rushing onward, would it not be rare virtue for one or two self-respecting scholars to retire from the world, to keep themselves clean? But if your aim is to influence the people and establish a new tradition, I suggest that you make further progress from your present high position. It is impossible to avoid the struggle for survival, and so long as one draws breath there can be no place where one can retire for a tranquil hermit's life. It is our natural obligation in life to advance in spite of numerous difficulties. Stated in kindly terms, retirement is an action of the superior man in order to get away from the vulgar world. Stated in hostile terms, it is a phenomenon of the weak who are unable to struggle for survival. . .

4. Be cosmopolitan, not isolationist Any change in the economic or political life of one nation will usually have repercussions over the whole world, just as the whole body is affected when one hair is pulled. The prosperity or decline, rise or fall of a nation today depends half on domestic administration, and half on influences from outside the country. . .

> 5. Be utilitarian, not formalistic. . . In all that concerns the administration of government, the aims of education, and the fashions in literature and the crafts, there is nothing that is not focusing on the road of better livelihood and greater usefulness, like ten thousand horses galloping toward the same point. Meanwhile all things that are formalistic, utopian, and useless to practical life are almost completely rejected. . . Generally speaking, concern for usefulness and better livelihood, respect for actuality and disdain for illusion were characteristic of the ancient people of our country, whereas our present social system and thought are inherited from the Chou and Han dynasties. . . As for praying to gods to relieve flood and famine, or reciting the Book of Filial Piety to ward off the Yellow Turbans (i.e., bandits) -- people are not infants or morons, and they see through these absurdities. Though a thing is of gold or of jade, if it is of no practical use, then it is of less value than coarse cloth, grain, manure or dirt. . .
>
> 6. Be scientific, not imaginative What is science? It is our general conception of matter which, being the sum of objective phenomena as analyzed by subjective reason, contains no contradiction within itself. What is imagination? It first oversteps the realm of objective phenomena, and then discards reason itself; it is something constructed out of thin air, consisting of hypotheses without proof, and all the existing wisdom of mankind cannot be made to find reason in it or explain its laws and principles. There was only imagination and no science in the unenlightened days of old, as well as among the uncivilized peoples of today. Religion, art, and literature were the products of the period of imagination. The contribution of the growth of science to the supremacy of modern Europe over other races is not less than that of the theory of the rights of man. . . Our scholars do not know science, therefore they borrow the yin-yang school's notions of auspicious signs and of the five elements to confuse the world and cheat the people, and the ideas of topography and geomancy to beg for miracles from dry skeletons (spirits). . .
>
> (Teng & Fairbank: 240-246)

II. This description of the May Fourth Incident evokes student demonstrations in the 1960s in the United States.

> . . . They (the students) beseiged Chao (Tsao) U-Lin's house and beat Chang Chung-Shiang almost to death, while Chao and Lu under the protection of the police fortunately escaped. More than thirty students were arrested, universities were put under military guard, martial law was declared, and more than two thousand students suffered arrest subsequently. As the jails were not big enough for all these students, the university buildings were temporarily used as prisons and surrounded by policemen and soldiers. What a terrible and wonderful scene it was! The gendarmes patrolled the roads and streets, the

students made speeches to the crowds of soldiers armed with guns and swords. Some of the students were struck and whipped by the soldiers, but hundreds and hundreds of them continued their propaganda and public speeches incessantly and vigorously. The number of students was far more than could be arrested, no more rooms in the prisons and temporary jails could be found, the government was powerless to deal with the students, and at the end of this farce, the gendarmes did not imprison the students, but only confiscated their circulars and pamphlets, and drove the public who happened to attend their lectures out on the roads, and permitted the students to make their speeches only in the streets. But in order to prevent disorder, the imprisoned students still remained in the jails. Representatives of the Peking students were sent to various provinces which echoed everywhere the slogan, "Down with the traitors. Oppose the Japanese and World Militarism." Throughout the whole Chinese nation a general strike of students took place. Several thousand young men returned to their homes telling the story of the outrage. Meetings were held in the classrooms, revolutionary resolutions were passed by the students throughout the whole country, and they refused to attend lectures. The merchants and intellectuals, oppressed by the power of Japan and crushed by the militarist party, sympathized with the students, and strikes were planned to take place in such important ports as Tientsin, Shanghai, Hangkow, etc., if the demand that the traitors such as Chao U-Lin, the minister of foreign affairs, Chang Chung-Shiang, the minister to Japan, should not be dismissed and the imprisoned students released. The government, fearing a coup d'etat was obliged to set all the students free, to expel the two ministers, and the revolutionary storm was temporarily calmed. (Ch'en: 77)

X. D.

THE UNITED FRONT AND THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION (1923-1927)

Key Concepts

The need to reunify China was so compelling in the 1920s that factional differences were put aside and a bona fide coalition government was established. Once the immediate issue of reunification was resolved, there was no question of sharing power. There could be only one ruler with a monopoly on government. There could be no "loyal opposition" for to suggest an alternative questioned that there was one basic orthodoxy. This assumption was a legacy of the historical past.

The Chinese Communists were committed to a social revolution as essential to the reconstruction process. Because the culture of the aristocracy of the scholar-officials had been so effective in maintaining traditional China, the Chinese Communists reasoned that it had to be eliminated before a new culture based on the working people of China could be introduced. The appropriate relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists became a highly controversial issue. This question affected policy making in the 1920s just as it does today.

Textbook Treatment

By and large the coverage is limited to a few paragraphs describing the power struggles between the KMT and the CCP and the successful Northern Expedition ending in Chiang Kai-shek's assumption of power. Many of the texts ignore the collaboration between the CCP and the KMT. This oversimplified view establishes a "win or lose" model which is essentially dull and disregards motives. The texts do not use the term "United Front," a decision that makes it difficult for the student to recognize a strategy continuing to the present time. The texts fail to explain the role of Sun Yat-sen in the United Front; they disregard the uneasy relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party and they overlook the CCP's role in organizing an urban labor movement which added to the Communists' credibility as protectors of China's integrity.

Current Interpretation

The first United Front was a collaborative effort involving three elements -- the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang and the Soviet Union.

In the early 1920s the program of the Chinese Communists was defined by both national and social goals. The national objectives were to unify the country by eliminating the warlords and by casting off the yoke of foreign domination. The social objectives were to uproot the vested interests which, it was believed, perpetuated the system of hierarchy and privilege which persisted after the Revolution of 1911. It was understood that the social revolution would involve a class struggle between the different classes dividing Chinese society. Thus, the revolution was to be "anti-imperial and anti-feudal."

The ideological base of the Nationalist or Kuomintang Party was the Three Principles of the People as developed by Party leader Sun Yat-sen. The first principle, nationalism, was rooted in anti-imperialism. Its objectives were reunification and the reconstruction of a strong China. Sun was ambivalent about the West. He resented the presence of foreigners in China but he recognized the necessity for economic and technical assistance.

His second principle, democracy, anticipated the future. Clearly, Sun said, the people of China were not ready for self-government. They needed a period of instruction to learn how to make correct decisions. During this period political power would have to be located in the Kuomintang Party. Its members were, by education and experience, more able to govern. Eventually, Sun explained, a bona fide constitutional government would be established.

The people's livelihood was Sun's third concern. He maintained that the state should own and control industrial development. Agriculture had to be modernized and an equitable system of rents and land management must be put into effect. Sun was vague on details of implementing this program but he opposed the violence involved in class struggle.

The Soviet Union's interest in China has been discussed previously. (See X-C)

In August 1920, at the Second Congress of the Comintern in the Soviet Union there was heated debate as to the appropriate revolutionary policy for underdeveloped countries which had a weak urban proletariat. It was decided that the best strategy was to cooperate with existing revolutionary movements. Sharing power would give the newly emerging communist movements time to grow.

These were the circumstances under which the first United Front -- a coalition government between the KMT and the CCP -- was established. It was the result of the Sun-Joffe agreement (January 1923), which was engineered by the Soviet Union. Sun was particularly inclined towards the new Russian government because it had renounced extra-territorial rights in China and special privileges in Northern Manchuria. Although the CCP was a key element in the United Front, the arrangement was made between the representatives of the Soviet Union and Sun Yat-sen.

The immediate advantages to all parties involved seemed obvious. The similarities between the KMT and the CCP were many at this time. Their fundamental differences were not yet an issue. The KMT received professional help from the Soviet Union in reorganizing its demoralized party along the efficient, disciplined lines of the Soviet model. The Soviet Union also agreed to help train and equip a national revolutionary army to fight the warlords. It was clearly understood that the KMT would be the leading force.

In return, the KMT allowed the CCP members to join and work with the KMT as individuals. This gave legitimacy to the CCP which was just beginning its organizing effort. At this time there were about 300 CCP members as compared with 50,000 in the KMT. The agreement placed the leaders of the CCP in influential positions within the new joint government and the CCP was able to participate in the campaign against the warlords.

The United Front also spoke to the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet

Union who sought allies in the Far East. However, the Comintern had a hidden agenda. This was to eventually maneuver an alliance between the more radical members of the KMT (the left KMT) and the CCP. It was hoped that such an alliance would force the "bourgeois" elements out of the joint government leaving the CCP in a position of leadership.

There was, however, considerable disagreement within the CCP as to the wisdom of a strategy devised in Moscow about people who knew little about China. Was collaborating with the KMT, which was associated with the propertied "bourgeois" class, going to be effective? Some Chinese Communists questioned whether capitalism had to exist before socialism. There were strong objections to the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. Was this another manifestation of "imperialism"? Would it not be better to try and seize power sooner so both national and social goals could be pursued simultaneously?

Similar strains soon developed in the KMT-CCP relationship. The KMT, which upon the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925 was controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, dominated military operations while the Chinese Communists were in charge of political work, propaganda and mass organization. Increasingly wary of the strength of the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek in March 1926 succeeded in limiting the influence of the CCP. However, the Soviet Union had to move quickly to restrain the Chinese Communists from retaliating by withdrawing from the United Front.

There were advantages to the CCP in maintaining a relationship with the KMT. It gave them authority and credibility while continuing to organize various sectors of the society. For instance, the CCP was able to effectively mobilize anti-imperialist sentiment by using the growing militancy of the urban workers. In May 1925 a Japanese foreman killed a Chinese worker at a Japanese owned cotton mill that was on strike. English police subsequently shot and killed ten Chinese demonstrators protesting the incident at the cotton mill. Chinese of all classes and political persuasions united as nationalists to close down Shanghai. However, as the strike began to affect Chinese business adversely, merchants and industrialists began to put their business interests above their nationalism and withdrew their support. Membership in the CCP grew to about 10,000 in 1925 and, again, to 58,000 in the spring of 1928 as this and subsequent strikes against foreign-controlled business interests demonstrated the Chinese Communists' commitment to anti-imperialism.

Although the major thrust of the Communists' organizing activity was in the industrial sector, the organization of the peasant unions was beginning. Contrary to popular opinion, this was not Mao Tse-tung's unique contribution to the theory of revolution. The Peasant Movement Training Institute opened in 1924 by order of the KMT Central Executive Committee. Its first leader was P'eng Pai (Peng Pai), who had established the first Chinese Soviet (or government) in rural Kwangtung while organizing militant peasant associations. He was killed by the KMT in 1929.

The Northern Expedition In July 1926 the first phase of the joint Northern Expedition against the warlords took place. Starting out from Canton, the CCP and one group of the KMT went north to Wuhan. Early in the next year Chiang took the remainder of the National Revolutionary Army to Shanghai. By April 1927 the rich Yangtze (Yangzi) Valley was under the control of the Revolutionary forces.

Some historians refer to this part of the Northern Expedition as the first truly all-encompassing revolutionary mass movement in China. It involved the military, the workers and the rural peasants. The motivating force was nationalism. The organizing techniques that the Communists had learned during the early years of the United Front mobilized the cities and the countryside along the route in support of the Revolutionary Army. Although the resistance was stiff, the warlord armies were no match for the advancing forces, well-trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. A few of the warlords even decided to cooperate with the revolutionary army rather than risk defeat.

However, the Northern Expedition was a disaster for the United Front. Chiang Kai-shek, no longer dependent upon the Soviet Union and increasingly alarmed by the strength of the Communist-dominated government in Wuhan, decided the time to move against the Communists was at hand. On April 12, his troops began the attack against the Communists and the labor movement in Shanghai. This coup shattered the trade union movement in Shanghai and left the CCP decimated. Terror gripped Shanghai as all Chinese suspected of Communist sympathies were rounded up and executed. Chiang Kai-shek set up his own revolutionary government in nearby Nanking (Nanjing). The United Front had collapsed.

A year later, in June 1928, the National Revolutionary Army with the help of the armies of two warlords who had joined forces with Chiang entered Peking. The reunification campaign was over.

> The only way the coalition could have worked would have been for the Communists to renounce their goals and devote all their energies to the Kuomintang. Indeed, the fiction that they would was part of the rickety basis of the coalition. But if they had renounced their goals, what justification would there have been for the continued existence of the Chinese Communist Party? What could the party have looked forward to after the country was unified inasmuch as the Kuomintang program called for a period of tutelage during which it would exercise a national dictatorship? The Communist Party, of course, did continue to exist because its members never intended to limit themselves to Kuomintang goals. And that policy too, had its own iron logic: if they were to pursue Communist goals while members of the Kuomintang, they would be virtually compelled to try to dominate the Kuomintang.
> (Sheridan: 148)

Aftermath The Chinese Communist Party was in disarray. Its membership dropped from a high of 58,000 in early April 1927 to approximately 10,000 by the end of the year. Many of the Wuhan Communists scattered in the hinterland. The leadership went underground in Shanghai. The details of their existence are still unclear but their survival depended upon strict discipline, tight organization and acts of violence.

Although the failure of the Chinese Communist Party to gain control in China was also the Comintern's failure, the Comintern continued trying to control Chinese Communist policy. Chinese Communists who had been studying in Moscow were sent back to China with instructions. The urban proletariat -- not the peasants -- were to be the leading force in the revolution, even in the rural area. The Comintern was not, however, adverse to rural organization. The argument that evolved was over the leadership. The next few years saw a succession of accusations, counter-accusations and political in-fighting within the Chinese Communist Party and within the Comintern as the leaders tried to salvage what little remained of the Party. The confusing Soviet-dictated policy of building rural bases under the direction of the urban leaders, while restraining the peasants from excessive militancy, and at the same time, fomenting urban insurrection was -- given the reality of the precarious situation of the Chinese Communist Party -- impossible to implement. In 1931 the entire leadership of the Party retreated to Juichin (Ruijin), a small town in southern Kiangsi (Jiangxi), where Mao had gone several years earlier.

After 1927 the urban proletariat never regained the momentum and influence it had enjoyed during the early years of the CCP. This was not only because of the repression by the KMT in the aftermath of the Shanghai Coup, but also because government controlled labor movements were started which successfully co-opted the urban working class.

ENRICHMENT

I. A western woman made the following observations in Shanghai in 1916. They give some sense of the values of the traditional elite which the Chinese Communists, among others, believed were an impediment to modernizing China.

> One of the hopeful signs of these later days in China is the changing attitude of the people toward physical exercise, for it means better health and better morals for the nation. Not long ago, really only a very few years, round shoulders were by every one highly commended, in the women as indicating modesty and in the men scholarly habits. A girl who held herself erect, with well developed chest, would have been set down at once as bold and forward, and not only that, but any kind of physical exertion was regarded by the upper classes, young and old alike, as coolie's work and quite beneath their dignity. Some Chinese girls were watching a game of tennis for the first time, when one turned to her companion with a puzzled expression and the remark, "Can't they get coolies to do that for them?". . . (Gentzler: 161)

II. The following analysis helps explain what the Communists meant by a total social revolution. Although some urban, middle class women were beginning to be educated and/or step out of traditional roles in the first part of the 20th century, this was irrelevant to Hsiang Ching-yu (Xiang Jingyou), the leading woman communist of this period. Hsiang's views are summed up below:

> Hsiang was highly critical of most educated Chinese women. She classified them as three types: family reformers, business women, and "romantics." The former, she claimed, were mainly Western-educated women and/or wives of rich educators or politicians. Hsiang considered their goal of a Western-type small family too individualistic and irrelevant to the needs of the broad masses of women. Business women deserved some credit, Hsiang felt, for their role in changing the life style

> of Chinese women, i.e., in breaking out of the home and participating in community life. In their efforts to succeed in business, however, they often became conservative in their thinking, too specialized and mechanical. Hsiang's sharpest criticisms were for the "romantics," young girls who espoused free love and placed highest emphasis on individual liberty and happiness. Hsiang labeled these girls dangerous and undisciplined.
>
> She was also critical of contemporary women's movements. Again, she made three divisions: working women's groups, suffragettes, and Christian groups such as the YWCA. Passing off the YWCA as historically important but too tied to the West to be relevant in the 1920s, she concentrated her attack on the suffrage groups. Her criticisms were many: such groups ignored the masses and the idea of universal participation in politics; they were poor organizers, feeling that "all they had to do was make a few phone calls or write a few letters and that would be a women's movement." Their only goal was to become legislators, that is, to participate in the corrupt politics of the time, and they completely forgot that China was in the midst of a revolution! (Leith: 50-51)

III. The article from which this paragraph is taken was written in 1961 by a former member of the KMT. It was published in Taiwan. It illustrates KMT frustration with the Communists' strategy of combining social revolution with reunification during the Northern Expedition.

> The Kuomintang troops in Hunan remained weak even after the Northern Expeditionary Army had reached the Wu-Han metropolis. This gave the Communists a golden opportunity to engage in lawless activities: they were more active in the various counties of Hunan than they had been in Kwangtung and Kiangsi provinces. At that time they were quite numerous; and, using our policy of cooperation with them as a protective shield, they interpreted "alliance with the Soviet Union and acceptance of the Communists" to mean "alliance with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists." Wherever they went, they posted such slogans as "upholding the three fundamental policies," namely, the policies of allying ourselves with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party, and the workers and the peasants. They in fact had successfully employed these slogans to agitate youthful students and ignorant peasants and workers. Beginning in the fall of 1926, they went all over the Hunan province -- in every county, township, and village -- to organize the so-called peasant associations and general labor unions. Since the Communists were also Kuomintang members, they participated in the work sponsored by the provincial or county Kuomintang headquarters and were thus in a position to create dissensions and divisions within the party itself. As Mr. Wu Chih-hui (a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek) once remarked, the Communist infiltration of the Kuomintang was as deadly as the Monkey God's infiltration into the stomach of Demon Ox (a reference to a Ch'ing fable). How frightening the situation really was! (Li: 91)

The map below illustrates the routes of the Northern Expedition before and after the KMT-CCP split.


MAP 2
THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION
Kuomintang base areas
Expedition routes before Kuomintang-Communist split
Expedition routes after the Kuomintang-Communist split
Provincial boundaries
The Great Wall
Scale of kilometers
0 100 200 300 400 500
INNER MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA
Mukden
Kalgan
Tatung
PEKING (June 5, 1928)
Chuchou
Tientsin
Paoting (May 31, 1928)
(June 12, 1928)
GULF of POHAI
Kaoyang (May 31, 1928)
Tsangchou (June 2, 1928)
HOPEH
Taiyuan
Shihchiachuang
Hsingtai
Techou (May 7, 1928)
Tsinan (May 1928)
SHANTUNG
SHANSI
Tzuyang (April 20, 1928)
YELLOW SEA
Hsuchow (April 1, 1928)
SHENSI
Loyang
Chengchou
Sian
HONAN
KIANGSU
Pangfou
ANHWEI
Nanking (March 24, 1927)
Shanghai (Mar 21, 1927)
Henyang
Wuhu
Wushengkuan (Sept 18, 1926)
HUPEH
SZECHUAN
Yingshan
Anking
Hangchow (Feb 19, 1927)
Hanyang Sept 6, 1926
Hankow (Sept 7, 1926)
Wuchang (Oct 10, 1926)
Kiukiang (Nov 5, 1926)
Chungking
CHEKIANG
Yoyang (Aug 22, 1926)
Chuchou
Changsha (July 10, 1926)
Nanchang (Sept 25, 1926)
Yichun
HUNAN
KIANGSI
Kuangche
KWEICHOW
Chian
Henyang
Kweiyang
Nanping
FUKIEN
Foochow (Dec 3, 1926)
Kanchou
Yungting (Oct 10, 1926)
Changchou Nov 8, 1926
Chuanchou (Nov 23, 1926)
Taipei
Shaokuan
Meihsien
KWANGSI
TAIWAN
KWANGTUNG
Nanning
Si (West) River
Canton
SOUTH CHINA SEA

(Li: 64)

X. E.

RURAL CHINA IN THE LATE 1920S AND EARLY 1930S

Key Concepts

During this period China faced a worsening rural crisis involving a number of elements, some cumulative and some unique to the 20th century. Differing assessments of the root causes were to influence future policy decisions.

Textbook Treatment

The texts pay scant attention to actual conditions in rural China and do not discuss the reasons for the agrarian crisis. A sequence of events is laid out but nothing more.

Current Interpretation

In the first three decades of the 20th century rural China continued much as it had during the late Imperial period. (See VIII-F) The peasant's culture evolved around the family and the ritual which sustained it. Comparatively isolated from large cities the peasants lived intimately with their neighbors with whom they worked their widely scattered plots surrounding the villages. The villages ranged in size from twenty to several hundred households. The market town, where the peasant went about once a week, was as much a social as an economic unit.

The family also continued to serve both economic and social functions.

> Unlike contemporary America, in ownership, decision-making, work and distribution of income, the extended Chinese family as a unit was much more important than the individual. As an economic institution, the Chinese family was similar to an American family business; the head of the family buying and renting land on behalf of the family, and seeking out other new opportunities for making more money, allocating family labor and hiring labor to work in the family's income-earning activities, borrowing and lending money on behalf of the family, distributing and selling output produced to maintain and increase the standard of living of the family members. Not all families, of course, were equally successful and some sank into poverty. However, they sank into poverty or rose to great wealth as a unit and each member of family contributed his labor and best efforts to increase the family's well-being.
> (Dernberger: 6)

The peasant's life revolved around agriculture and income from the sale of handicrafts. Private property and free markets remained a basic feature of rural China. What little capital the peasant had was measured in land and animals rather than liquid assets. Credit depended upon a personal association with the better-off members of the community rather than on a modern banking system.

Politically, the peasant's involvement extended only as far as the village or, occasionally, the market town and county seat. Vaguely aware of pressures from the state and from "outside" events, the peasant had little control over them. The magistrate was the key figure in local government which functioned at the county level while the largest landowners had considerable influence in the village.

By the 1920s, however, China was approaching an agrarian crisis. The causes were varied. For one, continuing political instability and internal warfare meant there could be no recovery from the internal decline described earlier. (See IX-B)

Another reason is that the land was in increasingly short supply. With a steady population growth of one to two percent all the arable land in the villages was being cultivated and much of that had been exhausted by centuries of use. However, contrary to popular impression, the land was not all in the hands of large landowners. As the following table indicates, in the mid-1930s approximately 48 percent of the rural households surveyed farmed and owned their own land. This pattern was most prevalent in North China -- a matter of some significance since this is the area where the Chinese Communists began land reform in earnest. (See X-G)

Land Tenure Conditions, Tenant Households, 1935-1936
(Based on survey of 20% of the counties in each of 22 provinces)

Land Tenure Conditions	A		B	
	Households (thousand)	Percent	Adjusted Households* (thousand)	Percent
Owner-farmers a/	831	48	1202	69
Tenant households b/	704	40	333	19
Landlords, agricultural laborers without land, other rural households without land c/	210	12	210	12
Total rural households	1745	100	1745	100

*Adjusted column B moves 350,000 part owners and 21,000 permanent tenants from the tenant household to the owner-farmer category.

a/ This category of owner-farmer contains only those households owning and farming all of their land.

b/ Tenant households include households that own some land and rent land, that farm rented land, and that rent land and also work as farm laborers.

c/ This category includes 1) landlord households leasing out all or part of their land; 2) households neither owning land nor farming rented land -- their income came entirely from wages; and 3) households earning income from non-farming occupations. (Myers 1982: 41)

A third reason for rural distress was that improvements in transportation and industrial growth, stimulated by the opening of China to trade and by foreign investment, began to change the nature of some Chinese agriculture. Specialization in industrial crops such as tobacco and cotton encouraged investment in land to grow these crops. Land tenancy and unequal land ownership multiplied in the central, east and southeast provinces. Full and part-time tenant households accounted for around 32 percent of the total 40 percent in the above figure. These peasants lost their traditional self-sufficiency as they relied on market conditions and price fluctuations outside their control. The following table of income and expenditures for a family of three in Szechwan (Sichuan) shows that over 50 percent of income was spent on rent and interest.

Income and Expenditures, Tenant Household, 1933

Annual Expenditures:		
Seed (Y 0.10/mu)	Y	1
Fertilizer (Y 0.20/mu, 2 seasons)		4
Planting & Transplanting (Y 0.60/mu)		6
Waterwheel work (Y 0.30/mu)		3
Food (3 persons, daily Y 0.10/person)		108
Clothing (total 3 persons)		12
Interest on rent deposit (Y1.6/mu)		16
Rent (1 dan 2 dou/mu)		132
Total Expenditures	Y	282
Annual Income:		
Food grains (2 dan/mu, 2 seasons)	Y	260
Firewood gathered from hills		15
Total Income	Y	275

(Gunde: 41)

This figure is not too atypical. It is estimated that rents were generally about 20 percent more than a "fair share" would indicate. (Myers 1982: 45) Lacking a margin, the tenant farmer had little power to bargain with the landlord who could change the contract to minimize losses in a bad year and to cover increased land tax assessments. In extreme cases, such as Szechwan in 1925, the whole community felt the burden when annual land taxes began to be collected two or three times a year. (Gunde: 41)

A fourth factor is that by the 1930s technology had been stretched to the limits of available scientific knowledge. Although the peasant was accustomed to working hard with limited resources, further applications of labor had a minimal effect on yield. This had a deadening effect on morale and incentive.

Therefore, in the early 1930s, rural China was basically a society of poor people barely making a subsistence living. There were geographic variations but a pattern of increasing inequality in income distribution was emerging. Even relatively better-off families were in a precarious position. It is unclear whether the standard of living was appreciably lower than in the previous century. The status of individual families fluctuated considerably as different economic groups functioned in their own best interest in a market economy. As in the past, there was a collapse of law and order as the lingering effects of warlordism in certain areas provided a milieu within which roving gangs of bandits victimized the population.

The ever-recurring drought had devastated large areas of North China in 1928-1931. And, unlike the past, imported manufactured goods began to compete wtih locally produced handicrafts.

After 1931, two major events shook rural China. Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the worldwide depression upset the economy. Farm prices went down as interest rates went up. The distress signals grew as the marginal farmer-owners, who were hardest hit by rising taxes, sold their land and became tenants. The poorest tenants became migrants. Measures taken to counteract the international depression were futile in the face of full-scale Japanese invasion in 1937.

Historians disagree about the root causes of this agrarian crisis. Since identifying these causes is a prerequisite to effective solution, their differing opinions are of some interest.

The "distributionalists" believe -- as did Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) -- that the unequal land distribution and the privilege that went with it created a system so heavily tilted in favor of the landowner that it was very difficult for the small farmer to acquire any surplus or to avoid going into debt. Rather than invest in technology, the monied class found it more profitable to acquire income-producing land and more enjoyable to spend their money in "luxury consumption" in the Westernized coastal cities. Thus the traditional pattern of peasant dependency was maintained. These scholars use data which suggest the standard of living in rural China had been steadily declining since the mid-19th century.

The "technologists" believe that rural productivity was discouraged by insufficient government inputs into the development of new seeds, fertilizer and machinery.

Proponents of each theory cite statistics to buttress their arguments. This suggests that serious methodological impediments remain in analyzing this period. Definitions are imprecise and incomplete. However, all historians recognize the overwhelming effect of the Japanese invasion and the chaos caused by the warlords on China's economy.

ENRICHMENT

I. The control of water is a recurring theme in China's history. Whether Szechwan's irrigation system was simply inadequate in the face of the spreading drought or whether the collapse of responsibility and accountability in these times of political turmoil was the cause of the provincial disaster described below is unclear.

The writer, a young Western man who was traveling through China in 1936, recognizes the pervasiveness of superstition -- an example of an old attitude that many felt stood in the way of modernization.

In Chungking in January I'd been told that the number of local beggars was already swelling with famine refugees. When I was in Chengtu in February, the situation became serious enough for the municipal government to declare a period during which it would be illegal to slaughter animals -- a Buddhist remedy for drought. In March and April the need for rain became more acute, and even though the Chengtu plain was fully irrigated, various other means of attaining it were tried. The Rain-Gods were taken out of their temples and placed in the sun in the hope that this would make them so uncomfortable that they would summon rain. A great image of the Rain-Dragon was constructed of bamboo and pine branches and carried through the streets by young men naked except for loin cloths; crowds followed them, throwing buckets of water on the dragon.

At the same time harrowing reports came in from the northern part of the province where the situation was already acute. Many farm families were reduced to eating mud; it was alleged that a certain kind of white clay was even quite palatable when fried with vegetables. There were rumors of cannibalism, and desperate farmers were said to be exchanging children with their neighbors so as not to be forced to kill and eat their own young.

When I began traveling in the country I heard of misery which seemed blacker because of the ignorance which accompanied it. In Kiating just before I arrived, a pig with a malformed snout had been discovered and in the belief that its freakishness was the cause of famine, it was placed in a flower-decked litter, conducted by a rejoicing crowd to the execution ground, and formally shot.

From the back country came the story of a mob of frantic farmers who had rushed into the magistrate's compound in the local market-town, chopped down the official flagpole, and burned it. The explanation was that the Chinese characters meaning flagpole (ch'i kan) also meant "all drought."

By the time I returned to Chungking, the grain from the fall harvest had been consumed throughout the countryside and the deadly business of mass starvation was well underway. Refugees were flocking to the city. Some committed small crimes in order to be thrown into prison where they would eat regularly, and hundreds pilfered among the food stalls on the streets, thinking the flogging they received as punishment a cheap price for a handful of food. During April and May the police removed from the streets of Chungking an average of one hundred corpses a day.

It may seem odd that I could have lived four months in the province without detecting signs of this catastrophe, but in

> the crowded cities it was hard to distinguish famine victims from the many wretches suffering from more usual causes, and when I did go into the country I traveled almost entirely along rivers where the effects of drought were naturally small. Going away from the Yangtze on that last day in Szechuan, however, the extent of the disaster was only too apparent. The earth was baked like a brick and on it all vegetation was brittle and brown, filmed over with dust. The paddy-fields by the road, which at that time of the year should have been full of water dotted with green shoots of rice, contained nothing but cracked, dry mud. In the barren, sunstruck fields whole farm families sat drearily hacking and hammering at the clay, pulverizing it so that if some rain should fall these shards might soften more quickly into useful earth again.
> (Peck 1940: 244-245)

II. This translation of an article which appeared in 1939 in a Chinese magazine speaks for itself. It is a clear illustration of the trade-offs and complexities involved in specialization of agriculture.

> In the middle of October 1936 the writer of the present article was sent with his colleagues to collect tobacco leaves in the production regions of eastern Shantung. . .
>
> The first industrial company to operate in this tobacco district was a foreign one which, as early as 1915, distributed American tobacco seed in the villages along the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway. . .
>
> Many peasants took up tobacco cultivation, not primarily because of the expected returns but rather because, in the midst of their poverty, tobacco planting was the only way to obtain seed and loans. For this reason agriculture in eastern Shantung is rapidly being commercialized and as this process goes on the prices of commercial crops affect the lives of the peasants to an ever greater extent. . .
>
> The growth of tobacco from seedling to harvest takes about ninety days, from May to the middle of August. After harvesting the leaves are baked in an underground house kept at a definite temperature. This is a bare house of about eight feet square, without light. It is thickly hung with tobacco leaves which are usually looked after by a woman, who stays there throughout the baking process. If it were possible to look into such a house one would probably see a figure with dirty face and uncombed hair, wearing a pair of red trousers tied tightly just above her tiny feet. She has to watch the leaves for about a week, being most of the time on her feet, and all the time in the hot, moist atmosphere. When baking is finished the leaves are taken out to be sorted according to their lustre and each leaf is inspected before tying them in bunches of five or six. All this involves a great deal of labour. More than ten days are necessary for one person to handle the leaves from one mow (.116 acre).

The total cost of production per mow usually amounts to eighty-five dollars including the cost of seedlings, bean cake fertiliser, coal for the leaf baking, cash wages and taxes. This far exceeds the cost of grain production, for not counting other items, cash has to be laid out to buy the coal. Thus the tobacco producers are forced to make loans, the prevailing form being in credit purchases. The usual monthly interest is three per cent, but it is often higher than this. . .

The collection of tobacco leaves begins in October when tobacco merchants connected with factories from different directions come to the production region. Suddenly every collection station is turned into a very busy market with colourful banners flying on high poles to announce the agencies of the different business concerns. Nearby, various shops are set up for the season, carrying in their stock numerous varieties of cheap Japanese goods, chiefly porcelain and cloth. Some of these shops operate victrolas, playing discarded and obsolete records to attract the crowd. These shops, however, have no easy time with their peasant customers who, owing to their financial stringency and consequent caution, will not buy anything until they have gone through a long process of bargaining. Almost every bargain is only made as a result of persistent persuasion from the shopkeeper and frequent visits by the customer.

During the collection season, long processions of wheelbarrows and carts drawn by oxen or horses move slowly along the winding, bumpy and dusty roads. The transportation of tobacco leaves to the market is made more difficult by the wind which frequently rises, carrying with it the thick, yellow dust which makes the way hard to find. At other times, sudden storms reduce the roads to thick mud which makes it hard for wheels to move, and huge pools form through which the peasants have to wade. To cover distances of as much as thirty miles over such roads is no mean feat, and considering further the food and other accommodations that have to be found for the journey, carrying tobacco leaves to the market becomes a large item of cost to the producers themselves. . .

Arriving at the leaf collection ground, the peasants have to line up in one of the many queues, some of which are as long as two-thirds of a mile. Confusion seems unavoidable and the police beat them into line with thonged whips. Exposed to hunger and cold they have to wait with the utmost patience, and those standing at the ends of the queues often have to wait for twenty-four hours and even then are unable to push through the crowd to the doors. Every year there are tragic incidents; some get trampled down by the crowd, some are fatally injured, being rammed by the shafts of the carts, and occasionally boys who are too young to hold their own in the crowd get smothered.

The collection house resembles a big barn with rows of wooden counters covered with bamboo stretchers upon which the peasants have to dump their leaves. Being afraid that the leaves will dry up and lose their lustre in the long interval before the inspector comes round, the peasants often take off their coats, in spite of the cold, and use them to cover the leaves. They stand there with outstretched necks and tense expressions, eagerly awaiting the inspector who, in their minds, is the pronouncer of the final verdict of fortune or doom for the following twelve months. When the inspector finally arrives he quickly classifies the leaves by inspecting a few bunches, but if the peasant should hesitate to sell any one grade or any one stretcherful, all his leaves will be refused. Sometimes when the inspector finds several bunches of lower-grade leaves among those of a higher grade, he will confiscate the leaves as a warning. Should the peasant make any verbal protest, he gets roughly handled, and should he resist this actively, the police are immediately called in to arrest him on charges of theft or disturbance of the peace. The peasant is invariably blamed for starting any such affair and in addition to possible fine and imprisonment he is severely cautioned at the time of release...

The largest part of upwards of $10,000,000 worth of tobacco leaves produced in eastern Shantung is collected by this foreign company which has virtual control over the entire market. Every year it has the initial power to decide the prices of leaves, and the other collectors are more or less bound to follow its lead. Thus during the years of economic depression, particularly when the Manchurian market was almost lost, it has been able to drop the collection prices of leaves on the strength of its monopoly. But what has been conceded to the consumer in the market price has been taken from the peasant producer, who has almost the entire burden shifted to him.

It is true that this particular commercial crop has already increased productivity, has enlarged rural markets and has further extended money economy, all of which is definite evidence of progress. It is equally true, however, that this increasing commercialisation of agriculture, under the present circumstances, has driven the peasants to take the risks of leaf prices which are more and more manipulated by the factories and collectors. The fortunes and indeed the very lives of the peasants have become absolutely dependent upon the tobacco market. (Gittings: 100-105)

III. The impending confrontation with Japan prompted the Nationalist government to shore up China's transportation system. This selection, written by a Chinese in May 1936, gives a sense of the "bureaucratic penetration" into the life of rural China as well as of the calibre of local authorities. Relying on the traditional means of conscripting labor, misguided local leaders imposed inappropriate orders on an unwilling populace.

Early in the morning, the powerful sound of brass gongs clanged madly in certain farming villages around Wuxi. A few minutes later over thirty thousand peasants with iron hoes over their shoulders reached the fields. There were waves of wheat but no ripe kernels to kiss the peasants' stocky legs. They swung their iron hoes and slowly transformed their wheat fields into a big road. They seemed to be very experienced at this kind of work. In fact, they have built public roads, ward roads, and rural township roads, all with their own hands.

The ground was covered with green wheat kernels and bean pods. On the side of the road in disorderly piles were pitiful green corpses -- trees that had been cut down from the graveyard and mulberry bushes.

Last night the township head attended a meeting at the army's company headquarters and did not return until eleven o'clock. It was announced that on either side of the road a water ditch two feet five inches deep had to be dug. The surface of the road has to be covered with cinders, which the common people have to transport from the city. The work has to be completed before June 10. The company head said that this is construction for "national defense," in preparation for fighting the XX [Japanese] people. Therefore, who could say anything about it?

At noon more than thirty township heads, foreign-style black umbrellas in hand, inspected the entire road up and down and called the roll -- one person from the roster on the doorplate of each household. (The number of people in each household was registered on the doorplate.) Twelve soldiers who sat in the shade of the trees supervised the construction work and asked girls passing by for tea and water to quench their thirst. Under the sun, the peasants worked themselves to death, digging up, removing, and piling up their own land. The sweat, the curses, and the anger of thousands upon thousands of people mixed together with thousands upon thousands of baskets of dirt. This was the foundation for six big roads for "national defense."

Yesterday Ah X from X Family Village was beaten almost to death by the construction supervisor for disobeying orders. If it had not been for everybody begging on their knees, he would be dead as a dog! This bizarre piece of news happening in this world of great peace immediately spread up and down the entire road.

'Those mothers! When the XX [Japanese] come, it will be no worse than this!' someone swore under his breath.
(Cochran et al.: 98-99)

X. F.

THE KMT'S NANKING DECADE (1927-1937): ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

Key Concepts

Although the Nationalists were better equipped to institute badly needed reforms than the warlords they replaced, they suffered from several handicaps. They could not wipe out the warlords and communists and so unify the country militarily. The KMT was unable or unwilling to pursue reforms that tampered with the existing social structure. And, the Nationalists had to contend with a new round of imperialist aggression by Japan and the inevitable nationalistic response that followed.

Textbook Treatment

Some of the texts surveyed generally give Chiang's Nationalists credit for instituting some reforms, but fault the KMT for being too beholden to business and landlord interests. They tend to exaggerate the extent of Chiang's military control (suggesting that he unified the country militarily) and political control (alleging that he was an all-powerful dictator).

Current Interpretation

From the KMT's internecine quarrels of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's more conservative wing of the party emerged victorious in early 1928. Allied with several warlords, Chiang led a march on Peking, the nominal national capital. It fell in June 1928, and the foreign powers recognized the Nationalist regime, with its capital in Nanking (Nanjing), as the government of China.

The Military Struggle These victories did not mean that Chiang controlled all of China. Indeed, his forces held sway over just the southeast corner of the river-railway grid (see X-B) and the adjacent provinces. He was only partly successful in his efforts to eliminate warlords in other sections.

By 1931, he faced three new military problems. First, Japan occupied the northeastern region of Manchuria. Chiang had not controlled this area, which was far from his base, but he came under severe criticism for not mounting a resistance. Furthermore, Japan threatened to assert control over North China.

Second, the Communist armies were growing in strength in Kiangsi (Jiangxi) province, in south-central China (see X-G). They threatened to march toward the Yangtze valley and capture the city of Wuhan to which the Nationalists would have to retreat if the Japanese attacked Shanghai and Nanking.

Finally, an independent regime had emerged in Canton, composed of KMT politicians and generals Chiang had alienated. If they were to march north and capture Wuhan as the CCP had done in the Northern Expedition, Chiang's forces would lose their route of retreat.

Although Chiang opposed the Japanese aggression, he believed that he had to eliminate these internal threats first to better fight the Japanese when the time came. He focused on the Communists, mounting several campaigns to drive them from their Kiangsi redoubt. He succeeded in late 1934, and the Communists began their Long March. However, the CCP was never wiped out. The Canton regime was overcome in June 1936 when one of its principal figures died. Having ended the major internal military threats, Chiang prepared to fight the Japanese.

Reform Efforts The continuing military struggle is important, for it reinforced the preference of many in the Nationalist movement to correct the problems of the existing social and economic structure rather to than change it. It seemed ill-advised to overhaul the system when national survival was at stake.

There was, however, a more radical strain in the Kuomintang ideology which had an influence early in the Nanking decade. Sun Yat-sen had advocated a three-prong economic policy: state sponsorship and control of infrastructure projects such as communication and transportation; government restraint on business exploitation of labor; and an egalitarian redistribution of land to those who farmed it which was highly reminiscent of the equal-field system of the T'ang dynasty.

This group, which had been closely allied with Sun, tried to promote aggressive reforms in the late 1920s. Targets included the landholding system, the inhumane treatment of factory workers, religious superstition, Chinese traditional medicine, and unequal tax systems. In all cases, however, the group was opposed by those with vested interests who had conservative allies in the Nationalist government. Other impediments were the absence of strong institutions to push through the reforms and the preoccupation with military affairs.

The reforms for which the Kuomintang has received credit were those that improved the Nationalists' ability to fight. Most notable was the progress in government finance. Where others had failed, the KMT recovered China's right to collect and dispose of customs duties. This right had been assumed by foreigners as a result of the Opium War. The KMT also rationalized the taxes on business and generally increased government revenue. The destination of these funds was clear, however: sixty to eighty percent of the KMT's official budget was spent on present or past wars. Little was left for economic development, and of that some was spent on highways and railways that would make the military tasks easier. (See ENRICHMENT III, X-E)

In the early 1930s, some in the Kuomintang realized that the rising Communist challenge fed on social and economic problems, and there were limited efforts to devise conservative alternatives. One was the rural reconstruction movement, which sought to ameliorate the peasants' plight without reforming the system of land ownership. For instance, the amount of rent a tenant was to pay was limited to 37 1/2 percent of the main crop. New agencies promoting technical improvements and reforestation projects were established. The program was moderately successful in the areas where it was tried, but it was only tested on a small scale. The financial resources and institutional muscle to spread it more broadly was lacking. Also, the Great Depression, over which China had little control, worsened the crisis in the 1930s. A new marriage law designed to free women from the restraints of the old society and to recognize the freedom of marriage was passed but it was never enforced or publicized.

The Nationalist government was particularly active in promoting higher education and the quality of university teaching. Rapid growth occurred at this level at the expense of broadening primary education.

Another attempt at conservative reform was in the realm of values and behavior. In 1934, Chiang Kai-shek launched a "New Life Movement," which was a blend of Confucian, YMCA-type Christian, and Fascist elements. The thrust of the movement was to eliminate bad habits and to get people to internalize the Confucian ideals of benevolence, obedience, and humility. Chiang's effort, which was ultimately ineffective, is often criticized for its conservative orientation and for focusing on such mundane habits as spitting. However, the Chinese Communists were later to make a major commitment to behavioral change. Spitting, which spread tuberculosis, was the object of a popular play performed by school-children. Fostering social change through value change accords with traditional Chinese ideas about the relationship of thought and action.

Weakness of Political Institutions The underlying cause of the failure of the New Life Movement and other social and economic reforms was the weakness of the Nationalist political institutions. It was one thing to formulate policies and draft laws and regulations, which the Nationalists did very well. It was something else to implement the new arrangements among a varied and often resistant populace.

The KMT's formal political structure was a mixture of various traditions. It had five bodies (yuan): executive, legislative, judicial (copied from the United States), examination, and control (drawing on the imperial government's examination system and censorate). Coequal with the government was the Nationalist Party itself, which had been reorganized along Marxist-Leninist lines as a vanguard party, supposedly made up of ideologically committed and politically dedicated individuals. The army was to be under the dual control of Party and government.

In reality the system was very different. The central element was Chiang Kai-shek. His power flowed to him not from occupying a certain office but from the military, which he commanded, and whose officers he had trained. He depended on the loyalty of a corps of political allies. If specific organizations or individuals were useful or expedient to his political purposes, he gave them support. The military and its mission was never deprived. For much of this period, he ignored the party organization and much of the government. The agencies continued to exist, often as sinecures, but they did very little of any substance.

Because of Chiang's emphasis on military goals and on personal loyalty, the KMT regime was prey to all manner of debilitating influences. Since the agencies that were supposed to select, train, and monitor public-spirited officials had no power, personal relations governed who secured a government position and how they behaved once they took office. Because public and private interest were blurred, money influenced political decisions and it was acceptable for politicians to make money. The number of people wanting government posts as a source of wealth had not really changed since the late Ch'ing (see VIII-F), and some of the imperial checks were missing.

Although this could be considered the period of tutelage or training in democracy (see Sun Yat-sen in X-D), Chiang remained uninterested in building institutions designed to foster more democratic participation.

ENRICHMENT

I. Clearly, old marriage customs persisted in spite of the National government's legislation that prohibited it. A school teacher writes to his brother in 1936.

> On May twenty-first a tragic death occurred in the village. These are the facts: Early last month in our village, Old Xian's family took a wife for his second son. The bride was the granddaughter of Sun Boyuan and came from Guzhu Village. Naturally, this marriage was the kind of union entirely "dictated by the father and mother and arranged by the matchmaker." Predictably, after the bride joined the family, the young couple did not get along. In addition, there was discord between the groom's mother and the daughter-in-law. Someone said it was because she "had a face that was nothing special, couldn't read a word, and brought a dowry that was too meager." Not only did the couple initially lack the courage to resist this kind of unreasonable and disagreeable marriage, but subsequently they were unwilling to surrender to old teachings of proper conduct. As it turned out, the bride's husband's family ruthlessly cut her down and made it seem that everything was her fault. In the end, early on the morning of May twenty-first, she could no longer stand her cruel life. She was so incensed that she hung herself from the (carving of the) lion over the bed. Once the curtain was raised on this tragedy, her clan got the bad news and immediately sent a large group of people to lodge their complaints. There were thrity-five sedan chairs,* and each chair was escorted by one person and had a total including occupant and bearers of four people. Another fifty or sixty men came on foot. Including the occupants of the sedan chairs, the bearers, and the escorts, there was a grand total of about two hundred people.
> (Cochran et al: 22-23)
>
> * According to the customs of Yi County, whenever a daughter marries and she unfortunately commits suicide within her husband's family — for whatever reason -- then the woman's clan always gathers together many clan members and goes to hold an inquest. No matter how far the distance, everyone goes by sedan chair. The cost of hiring a sedan chair varies from two to three dollars to seven to eight dollars, all of which is paid by the husband's side. This is not only to make a show of force but also to increase the expenses for the husband's side. This is a way of venting anger.

II. The Nationalists also looked to the West for help during the Nanking Decade. Foundation representatives, educators, missionaries and scientists were among the reformers dedicated to helping China enter the Western, industralized world. William Overholt, a Methodist missionary who was involved in agricultural development in Fukien, quotes from the report of a survey he and his colleagues made in cooperation with the Provincial Agricultural Department and the Nationalist government in the spring of 1937. The report suggests that some rural redevelopment -- on a very small scale -- was occurring. It also hints at some problems.

> Futsing was the first county to be studied. Lunch the first day was eaten in the spotlessly clean Yamen of the magistrate. We were told by our missionaries that this place up until last year had been a wreck of bare mud walls and broken tiles. Space does not permit the description of the jail which we were shown. Crowded, it is true, but clean and with several workrooms in which prisoners were polishing rice, making cane furniture, straw shoes and so forth. The wastelands of Futsing County are mainly tidal flats formed where the sinking coast cannot keep up with the deposition of sediment from the drainage of interior lands. These lands present a problem in diking and drainage, freeing from salt and adapting crops that are salt tolerant. Such lands at present grow a heavy crop of grass, which might graze large herds of cattle to provide an abundant supply of beef once the superstitious prejudice against eating beef is overcome. Only these grasslands now represent the greatest source of fuel for the area. Forests must be established on surrounding hill land, and the new roads must be used for carrying in fuel to the locality before these lands can be released for more efficient production either as fields or grazing lands.
>
> The most promising area seen, however, in this county was a five-mile wide shallow bowl which at present is a no-mans-land in a clan war between the Yu and the Wang families. For years this land has been entered only at the peril of life to the entrant. The school role posted in the hall of the primary school in which the party was quartered showed 90 students, all but three of whom were Wangs. On the other side of a low ridge running down to the sea lived the Yus and between the two clans is eternal war and a valley which under proper management might support many of these quarrelling villages in ease and abundance. (Overholt: 85-87)

III. Graham Peck, both a keen observer and a sensitive, articulate writer, travelled throughout North China in the late 1930s and 1940s. He recorded the steady deterioration of a people and a country ground down by the Japanese war; by political disintegration as the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang engaged in an uncompromising battle for power; by inflation; and by centuries of tradition. His classic book, Two Kinds of Time, is readable, humorous and extremely thought-provoking. In Chapters 7 and 8 he describes first his initial enthusiasm for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (CIC) and then his profound disillusionment. He begins to realize why such local democratic organizations were doomed to failure. The excerpts describe his inspection trip with one of the founders of the CIC, Rewi Ally.

> It took the CIC truck I rode one week to get from Chungking to Paochi. Apart from its own debility, it was greatly slowed by

> the road, a narrow dirt track which wound tortuously over the hills and mountains. . . Since the whole route was indirect, with a two hundred mile western detour through Chengtu, the road-miles must have totalled nearly a thousand. . . .
>
> All the rest of that day we travelled through higher hills, rocky and mostly denuded of trees, and as the cultivated valleys dwindled, Rewi pointed out how the grave mounds were always located in the good farmland. . . .
>
> Rewi remarked on the brakes the carts used -- heavy wooden beams pressed on the outer surface of the tires. They had been invented an unknown number of centuries ago, he said, for wooden wheels with iron tires. He pointed out how they were ruining these rubber ones, expensive and irreplaceable now. With some discouragement he said this was typical of a problem he was always meeting in the Co-ops. He would introduce a new Western method or device, and would later find that an ancient habit or technique he never dreamed of warning against had been tacked on, cutting into the improvement.

In a subsequent passage in his book Peck enthusiastically describes a Co-op in Paochi, a relatively large city located on the Wei River. The CIC organizers set up small co-operative industries, financed by the workmen who shared the profits, and by government help. They manufactured ordinary consumer goods, using local materials. The goods were sold at affordable prices. The owner-workers, many of whom were farmers working during seasonal slack periods, learned individual and group responsibility. In some of the more successful Co-ops the members funneled profits into medical care or simple literacy programs. The following excerpts illustrate some of the things that went wrong.

> At first it was only the smaller details which did not seem promising: a rope making Co-op had misappropriated funds to whitewash its buildings for Rewi's visit; one shoemaker's Co-op had begun making luxury styles for higher profits. . . .
>
> It seemed the Kuomintang was fearful and suspicious because of the CIC aims which would be most commended in America: its progress towards better working conditions, its efforts in education, health and social services. That the CIC was trying to teach workmen to secure these benefits by unity and democratic cooperation, instead of waiting for a paternalistic government to award them was a political explosive. . .
>
> Though it still contributed to the CIC budget, the Kuomintang had failed to increase its allowance to keep step with the inflation and in 1941 its monthly grant for administrative expenses, equaled only eight thousand American dollars. Of that, three thousand was for the bureaucratic Central Headquarters in Chungking.
>
> If all else failed to keep the Co-ops in their assigned place of weakness, the Kuomintang could haul out its favorite political weapon, the accusation of communism. . . When, for

example, the Generalissimo's nephew rode out to inspect some Co-ops near Sian and fell off his horse, breaking his collarbone, this was rumored to be a CIC-Communist plot, possibly involving a Communist-trained horse.

In the artisan class in the towns, Co-op organization could be almost as difficult because of the tradition of extremely hard, sly, self-interest which these city dwellers had adopted to protect themselves in China's modern dog-eat-dog era. . . In one shoemaker's Co-op, for example, the elected foreman. . . had bullied three members into leaving, reducing the number below the CIC's stipulated seven, and had then browbeat the young boys who were left into letting him run the Co-op as his own sweatshop, for personal profit.

What was needed was a group of men or women who could patiently explain and coax, inspiring interest and confidence. To be willing to undertake such public work, particularly since the CIC paid low salaries, these men and women had to have a clear understanding of the CIC's motives and place in the country's history. . . They had to be educated.

It was always rather improbable that a society like the American one could be established in China, because of the vast difference in the size and nature of the classes. All that we think best about America -- democratic government, a relatively decent industrialization by private interests, a fairly strong tradition of Christian behavior -- had to be developed painfully in Western Europe and America over the course of several centuries. The only thing which made this possible was the growth of a middle class with enough economic security for public interests and enough education to use increasingly complex ideas and techniques of our civilization.

X. G.

THE SHIFT TO RURAL REVOLUTION (1928-1945)

Key Concepts

The Chinese Communists organized the rural peasant using a broad and flexible program based on national as well as social issues. The Red Army; the Communists' ability to seize political advantage; high morale and commitment; and the linkage of peasant discontent to national goals were all involved in the process. During the Yenan (Yanan) period the values that came to be associated with the Chinese Revolution were first identified and the sinification of Marxism began. The similarities which exist between the Russian Communist movement and the Chinese Communist movement have value and utility in and of themselves, rather than because the Chinese Communists always accepted Soviet-dictated policy.

Textbook Treatment

The texts, with the exception of two, raise far more questions than they answer. Few of them explain how or why the Chinese Communists were able to organize rural peasants in North China. In fact, those texts which stress the mass trials and executions would cause the average reader to perceive the Chinese peasant as addle-brained to support the Communists.

The Communist program is presented mainly in economic terms with no mention of the social or political aspects. Nor are the eight or nine years of moderate reform which gave the Communists credibility before the more drastic class struggle after 1945 mentioned. Peasant nationalism is ignored and one of the texts states flatly that the Russian Communists "advised the Chinese Communists what to do."

Clearly, the texts devote too little time to this period which is essential to understanding acceptance of Communism in China.

Current Interpretation

Mao's move to the province of Kiangsi (Jiangxi) in 1928 marked the inception of self-sufficient rural territorial bases in China. From the beginning, policy was determined as much by necessity as by ideology.

Clearly, a strong army was primary. Drawing on the experience of the successful National Revolutionary Army, the new Red Army had political and military components. Chu Teh (Zhu De), a tested military officer, and Mao, well versed in political organization, were the key figures in this army -- as well as in the soviet.

What the army lacked in resources, it made up for in commitment and strategy. Firm discipline and training in literacy and politics instilled purpose and direction. Circumstances demanded an unconventional approach to warfare. Unable to mount full-scale operations, units of the army had to settle for destroying individual enemy units. Basic Red Army tactics were summed up by Chu Teh in this classic statement of guerilla warfare:

> If the enemy advances, we retreat.
> If the enemy halts and encamps, we harass.
> If the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
> If the enemy retreats, we pursue.
>
> (Wilson: 67)

In initiating a radical land redistribution policy, a mutual relationship developed between the army and the peasants. The army provided protection to the peasant from landlord reprisal and the peasant, in turn, helped feed and supply the army.

This shift to rural revolution was haphazard and controversial. Mao, who sought broad based local support, favored a less excessive land reform. The arrival of the CCP leadership from Shanghai in late 1931 introduced new personnel with their ideas. The Soviet Union continued to try to influence strategy.

However, the main priority was physical survival in the face of increasing pressure from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. In the fall of 1934 the Communists were forced to concede defeat and the short-lived first Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin (Ruijin) was abandoned.

A year later approximately 8000 exhausted survivors of the 100,000 men and 50 women who had fled Kiangsi arrived in northern Shensi (Shaanxi). The details of the 6000-mile Long March which took the Chinese Communists through some of the most primitive, rugged terrain in China can be found in other sources. Pursued by the Nationalists and facing hostile native tribes, it seemed that the Chinese Communists' only victory had been over death. Their peasant supporters and some 28,000 soldiers who remained behind in Juichin were killed. Mao's brother was among those killed on the March and two of his children were left with peasants along the route. Their whereabouts remain unknown.

In retrospect, the Long March can be perceived as a turning point in Chinese Communist history. During the March Mao successfully bested the Soviet Union-dominated CCP leadership and began to assume control.

> The psychological effects of the Long March are much more intangible. For Mao, at least, the experience served to reinforce his voluntaristic faith that men with the proper will, spirit, and revolutionary consciousness could conquer all material obstacles and mold historical reality in accordance with their ideas and ideals. For those who survived the ordeal -- and for those who were inspired by the story of their survival -- the experience however bitter it was at the time, gave rise to a renewed sense of hope and a deepened sense of mission. . . (the Long March) provided the faith that determined men could prevail under even the most desperate conditions. . . The now familiar Maoist virtues of unending

> struggle, heroic sacrifice, self-denial, diligence, courage, and unselfishness were values espoused not by Mao alone but carried and conveyed by all the veterans of the Long March. . . For Mao, the experience undoubtedly contributed enormously to the perception of himself as a man of destiny who would lead his followers to the completion of their revolutionary mission. (Meisner: 34)

The decision to go to Shensi had been made during the Long March. A small Chinese Communist soviet had been established there and an agrarian revolution in 1935 and 1936 had started to eliminate the largest concentrations of wealth. By December 1936, Mao had made his way to Yenan. It was an isolated, poverty-stricken outpost with a sixty percent infant mortality rate and a one percent literacy rate. It was estimated that two and a half million people had died in Shensi in the famine of 1928-1930. This was where Mao started to rebuild the Communist movement and establish a revolutionary society.

The second United Front (see X-H) postponed the impending confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek. The natural isolation of Yenan as well as that imposed by the Nationalist blockade permitted an environment where Mao could both study and experiment with Marxist-Leninism. Rarely have revolutionaries had such a laboratory in which to test their strategy.

Since land tenancy was not a major issue in North China (see X-E) and injunctions had been placed on land reform by the United Front, Mao's rural revolution took another turn. Class struggle gave way to creating stable institutions. Rent reduction, drastic tax reform and readily available credit were among the new economic programs. A wide variety of small industrial enterprises were started. Although a relatively small number of people were involved -- 3,991 out of the approximately 1,400,000 who lived in the affected area -- their work in these factories promoted self-reliance as well as providing such simples items as shoes, cloth, crude tools, paper and soap. Ownership patterns were mixed. Subsidiary production in the household was also an important source of goods and income. This primitive industrial sector turned the economic blockade which the Nationalists imposed in 1939 into ideological advantage. Pride in self-sufficiency became an incentive to increase production.

Land reform was also perceived as having social and political -- as well as economic -- aspects. The power of the rural elite was to be replaced by local government. A Border Region government which reached from the headquarters in Yenan down through provincial, county, district and village assemblies was the nucleus of what Mao referred to as the New Democracy. Reflecting the need to unite all elements in common cause against the Japanese, universal elections in May 1937 elected delegates to these assemblies. Although efforts were made to assure heaviest representation from the lower socio-economic classes, there were instances of former landlords being returned to power.

This initial experiment in citizen participation depended upon mass organizations. Communities of people sharing interests were organized both to involve them and to educate them in the programs of the CCP. Childrens' Brigades, Womens' Associations, Young Vanguards, and Peasants' Unions were clearly an arm of the Party and of the government with alternate periods of activity and inactivity depending upon the central government's priorities.

During this period the Party began the laborious process of social change. Striking at an obvious inequity, the CCP had announced a new Marriage Law in 1934. The law attempted to give women equal political, civil and property rights. However, the conservative peasant who was more interested in economic reform felt deeply threatened by female emancipation and enforcement was spotty at best.

Educational reforms met with similar response. Peasants saw little value in "book learning." They feared it would remove their children from their rural roots and encourage their daughters to resist housework. After a long period of experimentation with curriculum, administration and instructional methods, a realistic educational program designed to provide basic literacy and train low-level administrators evolved.

By the end of 1938 the Japanese advance had stopped and the enemy controlled most of North China -- the locus of Chinese Communist activity. The Communists were in a favorable position to mobilize an effective resistance program.

With the enemy holding the cities, the Chinese Communists began to transfer the model of reforms initiated in Yenan to rural villages behind the Japanese lines. The Communists and the army moved into Shansi (Shanxi), Hopei (Hebei) and Shantung (Shandong), setting up anti-Japanese border region governments.

The strategy was not to occupy Japanese held cities but to disrupt supply lines and railroads which supplied the cities.

The Japanese response was brutal. A "three-all" policy -- "kill-all; burn-all; destroy-all" -- savaged portions of North China. Supported by the army and given direction by the Chinese Communists, the Chinese peasant retaliated. He farmed by day and fought by night. Rather than submit, he defended his own home and, by so doing, became a link in the broad anti-Japanese movement.

This deceptively straightforward account masks a scholarly debate which has forced participants to take a narrow view of the Chinese Revolution. The question is: What was the primary reason for the success of the CCP in organizing the rural peasantry? Did they arouse the peasants by appealing to their nationalism or by their record in initiating rural reforms?

While not denying the impact of the latter, one view is that just as economic distress alone does not promote spontaneous revolution, material reforms are not enough to galvanize an entire peasantry into effective action. The Japanese atrocities in North China created the conditions which permitted the Communists to mobilize the peasantry. The peasant was forced to look beyond his private economic concerns and expand his horizon to take in national issues.

Historians discuss how some of the former elite encouraged this process by collaborating with the Japanese invaders who allowed them to retain their land. Thus the peasants perceived the landlords as national traitors as well as local tyrants.

"The loose grains of sand," as Sun Yat-sen had once described the Chinese people, were now given a sense of common purpose. Having made the linkage between self and nation, the peasant was a giant step removed from his traditional origins.

The other view points to the effective reform program of the Chinese Communists. The peasantry was well on its way to becoming a revolutionary force without the added impetus of the Japanese presence, it is argued.

The importance of the debate may be that it emphasizes the integrated totality of the Chinese Revolution. There may not have to be a primary reason for the success of the CCP. The Communist reform programs gave them the credibility to mobilize the peasant in the anti-Japanese war. Communism thus became identified with nationalism.

This combination of nationalism and social reform -- both of which depended on the 8th Route Army -- effectively aroused the energy and passion not only of the peasant but of other patriotically inclined Chinese. Large numbers of idealistic young students made their way from the cities to Yenan which was becoming the symbol of resistance to Japan. This flood of young intellectuals presented a problem for the Party. Although well educated and enthusiastic about participating in the revolutionary government, they lacked any grounding in Marxist-Leninism or familiarity with rural China.

At the same time, the Party's ranks were swelling with an influx of local leaders drawn from rural society. Possessing innate political skills and leadership ability, they too had little knowledge of doctrine or any vision of the future.

The question arose whether these recruits would become a new elite mired down in the bureaucracy and the attitudes of the old traditional power structure. Would their "Commandism" or perception of themselves as leaders stifle peasant initiative upon which the revolution depended? The growth in Party membership from 40,000 in 1937 to 800,000 in 1940 illustrates the magnitude of this problem.

Mao believed it was time for a reaffirmation of ideological solidarity and Party discipline. The military cooperation between the KMT and CCP during the United Front had been limited and by mid-1940 the KMT and CCP troops faced each other in open confrontation. By 1941 the collaboration was essentially over. This was a reminder that the ultimate political authority in China was yet to be resolved. The difficult times which lay ahead would demand an extraordinary effort.

The revolutionary consciousness or mind-set of the Party members was the central issue in the first Party rectification drive called the cheng-feng (zhengfeng) movement. In February 1942 Mao made a keynote speech. He said the decisive factor in determining events was how people thought. This was as important as economic status in deciding if a person was a revolutionary. Thus "bourgeois" elements could be educated to participate in revolution. This was a departure from Marx and Lenin who believed revolutionary consciousness was determined by existing economic conditions.

Mao said it was necessary to give up former beliefs and attitudes before an intellectual or any other member of the former elite could acquire this "proletarian consciousness." Past mistakes can be corrected:

> "Our object in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings is like that of a doctor in curing disease. The whole purpose is

> to save people, not to cure them to death. . . If a person who commits an error, no matter how great, does not bring his disease to an incurable state by concealing it and persisting in his error, and if in addition he is geniunely and honestly willing to be cured. . . we will welcome him so that his disease may be cured and he may become a good comrade. . ."
> (Mao in Compton: 31-32)

In another deviation from Marx and Lenin, Mao expressed reservations about the Party. He was uneasy about the relationship between the leaders and the led.

The rectification movement was implemented by a two-year-long program which spread to all the base areas. All Party members were involved in study and self-criticism sessions. Party documents, referring for the first time to the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), as well as to Marx and Lenin, were studied and discussed. Leadership styles were defined. Party cadres were assessed on their skills in motivating others to take action. Rural revolution had to come from the villagers, not the cadres. Old and new cadres alike were involved in frank and emotionally painful criticism sessions. As many as three or four hours a day could be spent in this new School of the Revolution.

The theoretical and educational aspects of cheng-feng were reinforced by practical measures. Administrative tasks were simplified; urban intellectuals were sent to live in remote villages; and decision making was decentralized. During this process of Party reorganization, Mao staffed key positions with his supporters and removed the lingering influences of the pro-Soviet Union faction.

The cheng-feng movement bore down heavily on a nucleus of writers and other literary figures who had been working in the Communist-controlled areas. Although an important source of favorable commentary on Yenan, they were also sometimes critical and reluctant to conform to the ideological solidarity Mao demanded.

One of the more outspoken of the Yenan writers was the novelist and short story writer, Ting Ling (Ding Ling). As a woman, she was impatient with the Party's ambivalent policy towards women which discouraged any militant feminism that might conflict with Party policy. In discussing her essay, "Thoughts on March 8," in which she raised questions about the treatment of women in Yenan, historian Jonathan Spence writes:

> What was especially ironical, Ding Ling continued, was that having been forced by pressures within Yanan society to give up their careers, to marry and to bear children, these women were then sneered at as "Noras who came home". . . Some married women tried to avoid having children and sought abortions, or else tried to find full-time nursemaids so they could go back to political work — but if they did they were accused of being "backward." (Spence: 290)

However, Mao was uncompromising. In his talk at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature (see VI-A), he established guidelines for conformity:

> ". . . everything is good that is helpful to unity and resistance to Japan, that encourages the masses to be of one heart and mind, that opposes retrogression and promotes

> progress; on the other hand, everything is bad that is detrimental to unity and resistance to Japan, foments discussion and discord among the masses and opposes progress and drags people back. . ." (Mao in Chai: 221)

Thus, we see that the shift to rural revolution took many twists and turns. In Yenan, the society had been transformed. But throughout the rest of China obvious economic inequalities and old attitudes persisted and a landed elite retained some of the power. However, it was during the Yenan period that the strategy that came to be associated with the Chinese revolution was first initiated. Mass participation, self-reliance, co-operative organization, the steps towards egalitarianism and the mass line anticipate the ideal society Mao hoped to build in post-revolutionary China.

Another legacy of the Yenan period was the perception of many Western observers who visited the Border Region that the Chinese Communists were basically agrarian reformers. As the anti-Japanese war came to an end and the United Front collapsed, the rural revolution took another direction. (See X-J)

ENRICHMENT

I. Although the following incident took place during land reform in the early 1950s, it could well have happened in the first elections in Shensi. Voting was baffling to an electorate with no history of participatory government.

> A land reform team sent by the Party has finally persuaded 15 candidates (including one woman) to run for seven positions on the People's Council. The candidates are sitting on a stage facing the voters with an empty bowl behind each candidate. A district cadre addresses the gathering. . .
>
> 'Comrades!'
> 'Who is Comrades?' An old woman, perplexed and a little deaf, spoke loudly and querulously.
> 'You are', the old man beside her answered knowingly.
> 'My name is not Comrades', said she. . . .
>
> [The leader keeps on determinedly. . . .]
> 'Walk up here on the stage behind the candidates. You will be given seven beans. Put your beans in the bowls of the candidates you wish to elect. Every bean counts as one vote. . . .'
>
> 'They only gave me seven beans.' The woman next in line. . . went on sewing the sole of a cloth slipper. 'But there are 15 bowls. What shall I do?'
> 'You only need to choose seven of them.'
> 'Good Heavens! What will eight of them say just because I

prefer the other seven? Oh no!'
'But the candidates can't see what we're doing. They don't have eyes in the back of their heads'. . .

[An old man is the first to vote..]
. . in a flurry of excitement he threw all his seven beans into the first bowl he came to. . .
'One bean for one bowl!' the district cadre shouted. . . Someone took six beans out of the first bowl and returned them to him. He put the remaining six beans into the next six bowls. Then he turned his face to the others..and threw his empty hand out as if to say, 'Sorry I have no more beans left. It's not my fault if I can't elect all the candidates. . .'
(Chen: 212-213)

[Finally the district cadre suggested that the voters put their hands in every bowl but only release a bean in the bowl of the candidate of their choice. In this way 192 voters elected 7 Council members and representative government was off to a shaky start in northwest China.]

II. An American educator traveling in Yenan describes his impressions of Mao.

. . . We found him very, very easy, very low-keyed, low posture in every way. Immediately, all of us, I think, were impressed with the intellectual giant that we found him to be. He talked to us, in particular, about what the aim and the objectives of the Communists were in China at the time: to fight Japanese aggression, to rally the peasantry, to rally the people against the encroachment of the Japanese into China. He felt that in meeting with us he hoped that we would help spread the word among our associates and friends, among Americans as well as Chinese, as to the real purpose and real objectives of the Chinese Communist movement. I recall we felt that, on the one hand, we were used as a channel for this man Mao to get some of his propaganda out to the outside; but, on the other hand, we had seen enough to know what they were doing. In fact, every day we saw new groups and individual Chinese coming into Yenan from all provinces. They were pouring into Yenan because of their desire to lend their support to the efforts to what the people in Yenan were doing.

We were first introduced to the loess caves -- caves cut into the hillsides of the loess that exists in all that area. There were fascinating things that the Communists were doing there. There was a hum; there was a feeling of a genuine esprit de corps that existed there that we had not experienced even in Sian and in the other parts of Shansi and Shensi that, at least, I had been in. We could see how Chinese would be drawn to this area, and especially to align themselves with Mao and what he attempted to do.

You must understand that at that time (it was early in the war, you see) there was a general feeling throughout Chinese (sic) to resist the aggressor, to resist Japan. This I found

> to be very much in contrast to when I returned with the U.S. Army again in 1941, '42, when much of this had changed. But at that time, there was a whole-hearted feeling of cooperation and resistance against the Japanese. Even though many of the Chinese did not know quite how they were going to do this without assistance from the outside, nevertheless, there was this whole-hearted feeling of resisting the invader and the aggressor. In fact, our students constantly were active in speaking to groups of people in the city about things that they should attempt to do in resisting the invader and working with and assisting the Chinese effort against the Japanese. This was very strong in '37 and '38, '39, and '40, all through that period. (Domke: 24-25)

III. "The Song of the Hoe" is typical of the music the CCP encouraged in Yenan. Drawing on Sun Yat-sen for legitimacy, words speak to national and social goals. The "weeds" have social as well as agricultural significance.

With our hoe we till the fields, hei!
Rid the fields of the wicked weeds, hei!
Rid the fields of the weeds.

Our ancient nation must arise, hei!
With our hoe once more we'll be free, hei!
With our hoe we'll be free.

Heaven sent us our great Sun Yat-sen, hei!
Calling us with our hoe to arise, hei!
Calling us to arise.

Our Revolution shall succeed, hei!
With our hoe we will be the victors, hei!
With our hoe we'll be the victors.

(*China Update*, Midwest China Center, 5-78)

IV. Mao Tse-tung: The Early Years

Mao was both a product and a part of the revolutionary change in 20th-century China. He was born December 26, 1893 in the small village of Shao-shan in Hunan province. Although he described his father as a "rich peasant," the family clearly had to work hard for a living. Psycho-historians who delve into early personal relationships to uncover motivating forces make much of Mao's stormy adolescence. He and his hot-tempered father had a tempestuous association while he was devoted to his mother. After her death in 1919 he never returned home.

Years later he said: "There were two 'parties' in the family. One was my father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition was made up of myself, my mother, my brother and sometimes even the labourer. In the 'United Front' of the Opposition, however, there was a difference of opinion. My mother advocated a policy of indirect attack. She criticized any overt display of emotion and attempts at open rebellion against the Ruling Power. She said it was not the Chinese way." (Snow: 125)

From an early age, Mao was a voracious reader and he particularly liked the popular historical novels concerning rebellions and unconventional military heroes. At age thirteen, after five years of education in the local primary school, he was forced by his father to leave school and return to the farm. Mao continued to study on his own and at age sixteen left home to complete his elementary school training in the Hunanese capital of Changsha.

It was here Mao began to experience the powerful revolutionary waves engulfing Chinese society. He read the works of nationalist reformers such as Kang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei). He developed an admiration for the strong emperors in earlier Chinese history and for certain Western statesmen including George Washington. Mao watched as China's last dynasty crumbled:

> "After the Wuhan uprising occurred. . . martial law was declared in Hunan. The political scene altered rapidly. One day a revolutionary appeared in the middle school and made a stirring speech, with the permission of the principal. Seven or eight students arose in the assembly and supported him with vigorous denunciation of the Manchus, and calls for action to establish the Republic. Everyone listened with complete attention. Not a sound was heard as the orator of the revolution. . . spoke before the excited students.
>
> "Four or five days after hearing this speech, I determined to join the revolutionary army...." (Snow 1961: 136)

Mao's career in the army was brief and uneventful. From 1913-1918 he was in the First Hunan Normal School in Hunan. His reminiscences indicate he took himself and his convictions seriously.

> "But gradually I did build up a group of students around myself, and the nucleus was formed of what later was to become a society that was to have a widespread influence on the affairs and destiny of China. It was a serious-minded little group of men and they had not time to discuss trivialities. Everything they did or said must have a purpose. They had no time for love or 'romance' and considered the times too critical and the need for knowledge too urgent to discuss women or personal matters. I was not interested in women. My parents had married me when I was fourteen to a girl of twenty, but I had never lived with her -- and subsequently never did. I did not consider her my wife and at this time gave little thought to her. Quite aside from the discussions of feminine charm, which usually played an important role in the lives of young men of this age, my companions even rejected talk of ordinary matters of daily life. . . My friends and I preferred to talk only on large matters -- the nature of men, of human society, of China, the world, and the universe."
>
> (Snow 1961: 145-146)

In 1918 Mao graduated from Normal School and travelled to Peking where he became caught up in the intellectual and political activity of the May Fourth Movement. He received a minor post at the Peking University Library where he was exposed to Dean Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu) and Librarian Li Ta-chao (Li Dazhao) who later became founders of the Chinese Communist Party.

Moving between Changsha and Shanghai in 1919-1920, Mao picked up odd jobs but devoted his energies to reading, writing and talking about revolution. By 1920 he described himself as "a Marxist in theory and to some extent in action" and in July 1921 he was one of the small group which founded the Chinese Communist Party.

Mao became a major participant in the United Front. Of great importance to his later career was his apppointment as head of the KMT Peasant Movement Training Institute. His work at the Institute, which included ideological and organizational instruction for peasant leaders, opened his eyes to the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry.

In 1921 Mao married Yang K'ai-hui (Yang Kaihui), the daughter of one of his mentors at Peking University. She was later executed by the Kuomintang in 1930. However, in 1928 Mao had begun to live with a young girl of eighteen, Ho Tsu-chen (He Zizhen). Over the next nine years they had five children. In 1937 he divorced Ho and married Chiang Ch'ing (Jiang Qing).

1927 was a cataclysmic year for everyone involved in the Chinese Revolution (see X-D). After the April Shanghai coup Mao and his Communist cohorts were involved in the futile uprisings in southern China. This experience led to a lifelong distrust of Soviet advice and intentions, a deep animosity towards Chiang and the Nationalists, and a search for new approaches to a mass-based revolution.

Mao retreated with a small band of followers to Chingkangshan, a mountainous, forested region in the southeastern province of Kiangsi (Jiangxi). It was here he faced the reality of rural revolution.

X. H.

JAPAN'S AGGRESSION IN CHINA: CHINESE COMMUNIST RESPONSE

Key Concepts

China responded to Japan's aggression with a second United Front and a surge of nationalism. Although China survived, the most populous and productive areas of the country endured seven years of Japanese occupation. Chiang tried to direct operations from the war-time capital of Chungking, deep in the interior. By accident of geography, the Chinese Communists were in the middle of Japanese-controlled territory and they were well prepared to continue a war of resistance.

Textbook Treatment

The texts give a brief description of the Japanese invasion of China. Several discuss it as a catalyst for unification but once again there is little reference to the United Front -- with one exception -- nor is there any discussion of the war's effect on domestic politics.

Current Interpretation

After the successful Japanese attack on Manchuria in September 1931 the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), whose troops had been unable to stop the Japanese, retreated to Sian (Xi'an). The seriousness of the threat from the Japanese grew as they continued military operations in the area north of the Yellow River.

At this point, domestic politics began to be affected by mounting international tension. The rise of Fascism in Europe presented severe problems for the Soviet Union, concerned about the possibility of fighting a two-front war against Germany and Japan. The Comintern urged the CCP to consolidate the anti-Japanese resistance movement by organizing a second United Front with the KMT.

The Chinese Communists perceived the advantage. Edgar Snow quotes Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) discussing his hopes for a United Front: "The first day of the anti-Japanese war. . . will mean the beginning of the end for Chiang Kai-shek." (Snow 1962: 76)

However, Chiang resisted the idea of a United Front and instead ordered Chang Hsueh-liang to attack the Communists in North Shensi. Chang had grave reservations about "Chinese fighting Chinese" while his home territory was occupied by Japanese. In December 1936, Chiang flew to Sian to force Chang to proceed against the Communists. In one of the great dramatic moments of recent Chinese history, he was kidnapped by Chang's troops.

The details of the negotiations which led to Chiang's release are unclear but the end result of this incident was the understanding that the CCP and KMT would cease hostilities and join in a second United Front against Japan.

Concessions were made by both sides with the Communists agreeing to stop its land redistribution policy and to permit the incorporation of the Red Army into another National Revolutionary Army under the leadership of the KMT. The Nationalists promised to cease military operations against the Communists.

In July 1937 the incident at Marco Polo Bridge outside Peking was the beginning of the full-scale invasion of China. Chiang Kai-shek rapidly became the symbol of national resistance to the Japanese aggressors. The major political parties as well as a myriad of other minor parties supported by urban, western-educated intellectuals and business interests came together under his leadership in the struggle for national survival.

The reality of the United Front was quite different. The CCP continued their organizing in North China, although on a moderate level. (See X-G) The KMT was understandably wary about allowing Communist forces into the territory it controlled. Each side was anticipating the ultimate struggle. The world was largely uninformed -- particularly since it was to the advantage of both sides to present a picture of cooperation if they were to continue to receive foreign aid. The KMT needed help from the United States to finance the anti-Japanese war and the CCP was receiving small amounts of supplies from the Soviet Union.

The Japanese military campaign had two foci. One was to establish puppet governments in North China. The Chinese Communists, with their experience in guerilla warfare and peasant organization were, were well located to mount a major resistance campaign. (See X-G)

The second focus was to advance south from Peking along the major railroad lines. The KMT forces were able to hold Shanghai for six weeks before retreating, but by the end of 1937 the capital, Nanking (Nanjing), was in enemy hands. In late 1938 the KMT made the decision to abandon Wuhan, the next line of defense after Nanking, and went inland along the Yangtze (Yangzi) River to Chungking (Chongqing), in mountainous Szechwan (Sichuan). That retreat, which is further evidence of the will of the Chinese to survive, has been recreated by historian Barbara Tuchman.

> Another movement, a huge slow-motion upheaval, was relocating the working capacity of Free China to the west. A steady trudging toiling stream of people carried goods and equipment and themselves out of the area of the invader into the independent zone. Boats, trains, carts, pack animals and coolies, under repeated bombing, shared in the inland trek from Canton, Nanking, Hsuchow and other cities. Factory machinery, government records, university libraries, the contents of hospitals, arsenals and offices, were transported in boxes slung on shoulder poles or packed in sampans and pulled upstream by straining teams moving foot by foot over the rocks and roadless banks. In the age-old method of moving vessels up the rapids, the great-muscled coolies, hundreds to a load, bent double against the ropes, slowly hauled the burdens to the free land beyond the Yangtze gorges. A whole textile mill was packed into 380 junks of which a third sank in the rapids, were raised, repacked and started on their way again. Some factories were more than a year en route before renewing

> operation. Faculty and students of the universities, organized into marching sections with foraging squads, police units and pack animals, walked to new locations in the west and southwest. Stilwell watched some of the procession through Hankow and Changsha. "A single coolie would trot by with a length of pipe over his shoulder. A cart would creak along with a load of parts. A boiler would be pulled along on rollers. Some of the machines were pulled by manpower over wooden rollers for 500 miles. When they had gone far enough they dug caves in the rock cliffs along the Yangtze and duplicated the arsenal that six months before had been operating in Canton." The migration, no less extraordinary than the Communists' Long March, was proof of the indomitable labor of China. (Tuchman: 196)

The violence of the Japanese campaign and the pillage of Nanking aroused the West. The extent of human suffering as well as the growing U.S. awareness of the implications of a Japanese victory resulted in a shift in U.S. policy to China. (See X-I)

From 1938 to the end of the war in 1945 the anti-Japanese war was essentially a military stalemate. The Japanese held the plains of north and central China and the coastal cities. By 1944 they occupied the eastern one-third of China with the exception of Fukien (Fujian) province, the northeastern corner of Kwangtung (Kwangdong) and the eastern half of Kiangsi.

Life in occupied China stumbled along with Chinese collaborators often working with the Japanese authorities. The Japanese economic exploitation of the cities further impoverished an already suffering urban population. The KMT's urban support splintered as many of the salaried intellectual and business classes faced economic ruin. Oppressed and worn out by war and discouraged by the seeming incompetence of the KMT, much of this support withdrew leaving the party to Chiang Kai-shek and his hand-picked military advisors.

In Chungking, the CCP and the KMT kept up the charade of the alliance. Although subject to continual bombing, the city managed somehow to survive. The KMT remained the international and national symbol of Free China but it was unable to attract solid domestic support or capitalize on its resistance movement in occupied China. (See X-F)

The war in the Pacific ended abruptly with the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and peace came in August 1945. Chiang returned to Nanking but the situation was greatly changed from when he had left eight years earlier.

ENRICHMENT

I. In May 1936 a man living is East Hopei (Hebei) wrote about life in China under the Japanese occupation. He discusses the rewriting of textbooks to promote "a spirit of coexistence and coprosperity among China, Japan and the puppet state of Manchukuo, and he describes economic collapse. Then he analyzes the people. He clearly identifies the traitors in group one with the "elite" and the patriots with the progressive, liberal group.

Finally, let me comment on the reactions of the people in this country to the present situation. In general, the people can be divided into three groups. The first group is the big gentry and landlord class and some intellectuals affiliated with this class. In order to protect their own property and status, they have willingly become the filial sons and submissive grandsons of imperialism. They were the first to welcome Japan. They are also the ones who invoke the enemy's power and oppress people in their own country. Now is a happy time for them. Sometimes their schemes are even more terrifying than those of their masters!

The second group lives without a sense of purpose, numbly, having lost all feeling. Included in this group are intellectuals, workers, and peasants. They are people who are utterly submissive. They are not Chinese traitors, but they don't dare resist. They are barely holding on and keeping up day by day. If someone will encourage these pitiful and weak people, they are not unsalvageable.

The third group consists of the dangerous elements whom the "friendly power" (Japan) most fears. Included in this group are progressive intellectuals and awakened workers and peasants. They know that they have suffered the tragedy of losing their country because imperialists have invaded and Chinese traitors and thieves willing to sell the country have shamelessly sold out. The Chinese nation has absolutely no way out, and the individual has no way out unless these people are eliminated. With this awareness, the dangerous elements are brave even under extraordinarily hazardous circumstances. Right now they are using various methods and opportunities and are bravely and decisively marching down the road toward national liberation. They will deliver the deathblow to the imperialists. They are the saviors of the Chinese nation. For them, the future is unlimited. Come, let us give them our blessings and pray for their ultimate victory! That's all there is to it. I salute you! (Cochran et al: 214-215)

X. I.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA (1937-1953)

Key Concepts

U.S.-China relations varied enormously during the 1937-1953 period. In the summer of 1937, when Japan invaded China, the United States had a limited relationship with China. Less than five years later, the two countries were allies in World War II. After the war was over the United States tried unsuccessfully to mediate the continuing conflict between the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) and the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. However, by late 1950 American and Chinese soldiers began fighting in Korea, and a U.S. policy of "containment of China" changed to open hostility between the two countries.

Textbook Treatment

Different textbooks cover different parts of the story of American relations with China during this sixteen-year period. None does so comprehensively, nor do they provide the rationale for the actions taken by the parties involved. None makes glaring errors, but an unjustified anti-Communist bias can sometimes be detected.

Current Interpretation

Background In 1937, the United States had a limited relationship with China. In terms of trade, Japan was far more important. There were more American missionaries in China than from any other country, but their greatest accomplishments were confined to education and medicine. Diplomatically, Washington had shown no interest in supporting its verbal protests against Japanese aggression with action. During 1934 and 1935 a U.S. policy of artificially raising the price of silver -- designed to help the American mining industry -- nearly devastated China's silver-based economy. Preoccupation with the Great Depression and a traditional isolationism reinforced by the experience of World War I discouraged Americans from immersing themselves in the troubles of other countries -- even those like China for which there was some sympathy.

1937: Japan Attacks China The U.S. government responded to the July 1937 attack on China with sympathy, some relief for civilian victims and verbal comdemnation. As the Chinese resistance crumbled, Washington extended loans to the Nationalist government to discourage Chiang Kai-shek from making a separate peace with Japan. American concern grew with the beginning of the European war in 1939 and Japanese advances in Southeast Asia. However, the Neutrality Act and pacifist sentiment inhibited any assistance from Washington other than cutting off trade which would feed Japan's war machine.

Wartime Allies Pearl Harbor and the American entry into World War II made allies of the United States and China. American military units were dispatched to China under the command of General Joseph Stilwell. American financial and material aid to the Nationalists increased substantially and the United States was immersed in China as never before.

The alliance relationship was marked by disputes and unfulfilled expectations. A fundamental problem was China's low position on Washington's list of priorities, after Europe and the Pacific. Chiang Kai-shek was never satisfied with President Roosevelt's commitment. Americans, on the other hand, were well aware that Chiang was not exclusively committed to defeating Japan. He worried increasingly about the Chinese Communists' territorial and manpower growth. American material was not used against Japan but stored up for a post-war fight against the CCP.

Complicating the U.S.-Nationalist conflict was a division among the Americans about the best strategy for involving China in the war against Japan. General Stilwell favored building up China's infantry forces for the day when they could regain East China and later participate in the invasion of Japan. A rival approach, advocated by General Claire Chennault, leader of the "Flying Tigers," emphasized air power capable of bombing Japan from bases in West China. Both had supporters in Washington; each had allies in China. Chiang tended to favor Chennault. Neither got the resources necessary to implement their plan effectively. Chennault's approach was made superfluous by the rapid American naval advance across the Pacific which provided better bombing bases, and Stilwell's by the development of the atom bomb. Stilwell did have the satisfaction of seeing Japanese army units capture Chennault's poorly defended air bases in 1944.

American confidence in the alliance with China also waned as it became obvious that the Nationalist regime was too weak, unpopular, and corrupt to fight the Japanese and rule China (see X-J). Simultaneously, the American evaluation of the Communists improved. The CCP seemed to be a more effective fighting force with mass support, committed to objectives of social betterment and general economic progress. The American journalists, soldiers, and diplomats who travelled to the Communist base areas saw a vivid contrast between Communist and Nationalist territory. Many also believed that American arms should go to the Communist forces, who could then be brought into the general effort against Japan.

This was anathema to Chiang Kai-shek, who feared that the arms would be used against him eventually. Many Americans were similarly concerned. The Nationalists played on these fears as vigorously as Communist spokesmen like Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) tried to allay them. Thus began a contest for American opinion that continues to this day. Thus also did the United States get drawn into the Chinese civil war.

Attempts at Mediation Initially, Washington tried to bring the two sides together. The U.S. government feared that once Japan was defeated the Nationalists and Communists would resume the fighting which a common enemy had kept at low levels. Only a peaceful, unified China devoted to economic development would assure stability in Asia.

The most significant American mediation effort was led by General George Marshall, wartime Army Chief of Staff. President Truman sent Marshall to China in 1945 after fighting between the CCP and KMT had already broken out. He quickly arranged a ceasefire, which was to be monitored by inspection teams with Nationalist, Communist, and American representatives. Marshall also tried to facilitate political negotiations between the two sides which, it was hoped, might lead to a coalition government. (The same type of arrangement -- stand-still ceasefire plus political negotiations -- was to be tried again in 1973 in Vietnam.) Mao Tse-tung flew from Yenan to Chungking (Chongqing) for six weeks of discussion with Chiang. This was the first time the two leaders had met since 1926.

But the political talks got nowhere; the ceasefire quickly broke down; and the United States' position as an honest broker was jeopardized. The two Chinese sides had too much at stake and too much mutual mistrust to quickly settle their differences. The United States was caught in a conflict of roles. On the one hand it was genuinely concerned with helping the Chinese work out a fair, honest solution which would maintain the integrity of China. On the other hand, the United States assumed the responsibility of assisting the Chinese government, its wartime ally, in accepting the surrender from the Japanese. By moving Nationalist units into North China, and especially into Manchuria, the United States helped put Nationalist forces into position to fight the Communists who had already gone into the area to accept the Japanese surrender.

Neither the CCP nor the KMT was in the mood for concessions. The mediation effort failed and the fight to the finish began in the summer of 1946.

On the basis of the Marshall Mission, the Nationalists regarded the American government as naive but basically supportive; the Communists saw it as well-intentioned though unwilling to give up old commitments. Relations became increasingly tense after the Manchurian airlift and they erupted in a confrontation between CCP forces and U.S. Marines in July 1946. Marshall blamed both the KMT and the CCP for the failure of his effort, but singled out Nationalist rigidity as particularly inhibiting.

The Civil War, 1946-1949 From the end of the Marshall Mission to the Communist victory, Washington provided the Nationalists with grudging military support. The primary motivation was the desire to quiet conservative U.S. critics who charged that the Truman Administration was not doing enough to save China from Communism. Nationalist representatives in America promoted the accusations of this "China Lobby."

Those officials and observers who understood China better realized that the Nationalist cause was doomed (see X-J). The only way the United States could stop a Communist victory was to take over the war, and that President Truman was unwilling to do. He provided as little military aid as necessary to silence his Republican critics and tried, unsuccessfully, to tie the aid to Nationalist political reforms.

Letting the Dust Settle, 1949-50 After the Communist takeover, the Truman Administration was prepared to recognize the new People's Republic "once the dust had settled." It was willing to accept Communist control of Taiwan, to which the Nationalists had fled, and had withdrawn the U.S. 7th Fleet from the Taiwan Strait.

China and America at War The start of the Korean War in June 1950 changed everything. The Truman Administration perceived the North Korean invasion as part of a global Communist advance. In addition to committing U.S. troops to the U.N. force in Korea, Washington also took steps to protect Taiwan. The U.S.

fleet was reinserted in the Taiwan Strait, thereby blocking any invasion attempt.

The next step came late in 1950. The U.N. forces under General MacArthur had regained the military momentum and were marching up the peninsula. As they crossed the 38th parallel and moved progressively closer to China, the new government in Peking sent out signals that it might have to intervene. The United States chose to ignore these warnings and Chinese "volunteers" (actually regular soldiers) entered the war. The U.N. forces were thrown back, and Washington responded by imposing a trade embargo on China and freezing all Chinese assets in the United States. The United States also deterred Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the mainland.

Under General Ridgeway, who replaced MacArthur, the U.N. forces again regained control of the military situation. By the time the armistice was signed in Korea in 1953, China and the United States were the bitterest of enemies. The Democrats lost the White House to the Republicans, partly because they had "lost China" (never America's to lose in the first place). Senator Joseph McCarthy had begun a media hunt for government officials who had "sold out China's interests out of loyalty to Communism." However, he never found any. And the Communists worst anti-American fears were realized. U.S.-China relations were frozen in a hostility which would not thaw for almost two decades. Tragically, Senator McCarthy's "witch hunt" effectively removed those State Department advisors who would have been in a position to turn their Asian experience to strategy considerations in the Vietnam War.

ENRICHMENT

I. General Stilwell's relationship with Chiang Kai-shek was difficult at best. Historian Barbara Tuchman draws on Stilwell's papers to provide illustrations.

> In private notes Stilwell added, "He (Chiang) wanted to keep all his subordinates in the dark because he didn't trust them. . . If they all knew nothing they couldn't very well get together and dicker." Describing the factors that were one day to become his own frustration, he wrote that the Generalissimo "never assigned good artillery to divisions because he didn't want to let any get away from him -- divisions had only MGs and TMs (machine guns and trench mortars). The same old mistrust kept him from making his army efficient. He was always thinking of what he could save for later on when perhaps his own position would be threatened." Further, he never had a proper information service. "He had a ring around him, half-informed, and they gave him a distorted view of everything. He never went to see for himself. . . real supervision was always lacking." (Tuchman; 197)

II. Benjamin Welles, a former correspondent for The New York Times, writes about the Marshall Mission which he covered in 1945-46.

> In Peking Marshall created "executive headquarters" with its own radio network and fleet of C-46 military airplanes.

Its function, like that of his own commission, was to bring the rival Chinese face-to-face, to thrash out problems and to send three-man "truce teams" into warring areas to enforce or at least report on -- the cease-fire.

In true American fashion the initially austere headquarters began to expand. Marshall, remembering that the Chinese revered age, cabled home for senior colonels -- preferably with gray hair -- and the War Department fobbed off on him many of his misfits. In time the irreverent Chinese began to nickname the graceful Rockefeller-built Peking Union Medical College, where executive headquarters met, as the "Temple of Ten Thousand Sleeping Colonels."

My press colleages and I always felt this was manifestly unfair. There were, more accurately, about 300 U.S. colonels, and at least half were not "sleeping." Executive headquarters, in fact, worked well -- when the rival Chinese factions allowed it to. It sent out across China, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria 26 three-man truce teams, each comprising an American colonel as the "honest broker," a Chinese government colonel and a Chinese Communist colonel.

The truce teams often patrolled an area the size of Pennsylvania moving by jeep, truck, horse, or whatever other local transport could be scrounged. They halted much fighting, they prevented fighting, and thanks to their radio reports via Peking, Marshall in Chungking or Nanking had vitally accurate information for his negotiations.

The teams roughed it, usually in rude mud homes in tiny, isolated villages. The arrival of the C-46s with mail, reading matter, supplies -- and sometimes with newsmen -- every few days was eagerly anticipated. The work of the truce teams was hard, lonely, and often dangerous, yet the Americans, Chinese Nationalists and Communists got along surprisingly well.

(The Washington Post, 2-10-73)

III. In June 1945 the Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. War Department made a survey of the Chinese Communist movement. In the summer of 1949, critics of the Administration drew on parts of it to justify their position.

Careful and dispassionate examination of the record shows that statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the behavior of the Kuomintang toward the Communists has been more moderate than that of the Communists toward the Kuomintang. Several times during the war the Kuomintang has considered invading Communist defense areas in the same way that the Communists have actually invaded several Kuomintang defense areas. Some observers have maintained that the Kuomintang could have defeated the Communists. In October 1943, during a serious inter-party crisis, the American Military Attache in China reported: "In point of fact, the Communists could be crushed by force of arms. They have not had any equipment from the Central Government for four years. They have not had any pay for three." Nevertheless, no general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas has been launched; each crisis has

> been resolved through the moderating influence of the Generalissimo and others affiliated with Chungking, who have maintained that a civil war must be avoided at least until the end of the war against Japan. That the Kuomintang has proved more sensitive than the Communists to this latter consideration does not necessarily prove greater virtue on the part of the Kuomintang, nor less on the part of the Communists. Certainly a powerful factor in the situation has been the attitude of the United States, which has been the chief source of vital supplies to China. Both the United States Government and the press have made it very clear to the Kuomintang that a military liquidation of the Communists, during the war with Japan, would be frowned upon by American opinion. It does not appear, on the other hand, that the Communists have had to fear similar disapproval of their activities in extending their areas at the expense of the Kuomintang. (Van Slyke: 104-105)

IV. John Service, a U.S. Foreign Service officer who worked in China in the 1930s and 1940s, went to Yenan in 1944 as part of the Dixie Mission, a U.S. Army Observer trip. Service was among those members of the Foreign Service who believed Civil War and an ultimate Communist victory were inevitable. He said continued U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek kept Chiang from making necessary reforms and would give the Communists cause to pursue a policy of hostility towards the United States when they gained power. This point of view was rejected by U.S. policy makers. Service became a victim of Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack and was dismissed from the Foreign Service.

The following dispatch gives his general impression of the leadership of the Chinese Communists in Yenan. It is of some interest to compare his comments with those of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu) who called on the youth of China to assume certain qualities during the May Fourth Movement (see X-C).

> A first impression is that of youth. Almost all are in the middle forties; a few in the upper thirties. . .
>
> With this youth there is physical vigor. As a group, they are active and fit; none seem soft, flabby or indolent. The half-starved, anemic Chinese intellectual is missing; so is the overfed official and bureaucrat. These men have never had a chance to lead an easy life. . .
>
> This vitality is not only physical, it is also intellectual. The proportion of men with an academic background is very large. Many became Communists while doing postgraduate study in Europe. They arrived at their views logically, they have been schooled in years of debate and discussion, and they have spent their lives in convincing others of the rightness of their unpopular cause. Communism, especially in China, it seems to me, is chiefly an intellectual cause. . .
>
> The knowledge, interests and experience of these men are well-rounded. Politics, economics, education, propaganda and culture are to them inseparable parts of a single whole. To these they have been forced to add military science in order to survive. There is among them no one who is merely a military

man or an expert in one field such as economics. Every Communist is required to have military training. . .

All are men of unmistakably strong conviction. The weaker ones have long ago left them. Those remaining are sure that they are fighting for something worthwhile: their sincerity, loyalty and determination are patent.

This strong conviction seems to give them an assurance, a certain pride and a strong self-confidence. They are not troubled with doubts about themselves or their general policies. They neither apologize for the past, nor obsequiously seek your favor in the present. They are cordial and friendly -- but not demonstratively anxious to make a good impression. They seem to know that they have been through hard times and accomplished creditable things, and they are confident -- in a quiet but definite way -- that they are now on the winning tide.

Related to all these characteristics is what, for lack of a better word, can be described as toughness. One realizes that they have patience (they have had a long, hard schooling in that); that they will compromise, if it is decided to be for the best long-term interest of the Party; that they will fight when the need arises; and that they can be hard and ruthless if that becomes necessary. One feels that fear or personal interest do not enter into consideration. Their personal courage cannot be questioned.

A rather unexpected, and yet strong impression that grows with acquaintance is their realism and practicality. Far behind are the days when they may have engaged in heated youthful debates on alien and impractical theories. The pure visionaries have left their ranks or been submerged; those who stayed had to be doers. . .

A part of this realism is constant self-examination and self-criticism. This is not of the general objectives and policies, but of the specific measures and policies being carried out to advance toward those goals -- of the reasons why they failed in the past or are not working out as intended now. . .

This consideration of policies is based on an objective and scientific attitude. Most of these leaders have a foundation of Western social science. Their outlook impresses one as modern. Their understanding of economics, for instance, is very similar to ours. There is no mysticism in their make-up, no vague mouthings of the beauties of ancient Chinese culture, and no rigid adherence to a hardened dogma. . .

Once a specific measure or policy has been found unsuccessful or unsuited to conditions, and after discussion has produced what seems to be a better substitute, there is no hesitation in admitting failure by making a change. This adaptability and willingness to change has been apparent in every field -- military strategy, taxation, land policy, education, mass organization, the promotion of the modern drama and dance, the attempt to romanize the Chinese written language. When it was found that the measures being taken were not suitable to the actual conditions in China, and hence not successful, they were dropped or changed.

Another important characteristic is a systematic orderliness. This is both mental and physical. Thinking is logical. There is a strong sense of organization. Speeches are direct and easy to follow. It is taken for granted that you take notes during an important conversation. People you call on like to know beforehand what you want to discuss so that they can be prepared. Decisions reached are put into writing and confirmed so that there can be no misunderstanding. There is a general businesslike atmosphere and apparent efficiency. For every task some particular person is made responsible. Things seem to get done with less fuss and talk than one is accustomed to in China. . . (Esherick: 193-196)

X. J.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE VICTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Key Concepts

The record of the KMT was as important to the outcome of the Civil War as the activity of the CCP. The KMT were defeated militarily and lost the confidence of the Chinese people in its ability to govern. The leaders were unwilling or unable to make the transition necessary to move China from its traditional past into a modern future.

The CCP presented an alternative to rural China. To what extent they had the support of the rest of China is unclear. Suspicious of the Communists and despairing of the Nationalists, urban China reserved judgment.

Textbook Treatment

The texts vary widely in their discussion. One acknowledges Mao's attempts to sinicize Marxism and another stresses Russian military aid as an important factor in the victory of the CCP. Another repeats the now discredited thesis that the U.S. must share a large part of the blame for the KMT failure.

The accounts are very brief. They mention the unsuccessful Marshall mission, the poor morale of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, corruption in the KMT and Mao's appeal to the peasants as the major factors in the ultimate success of the CCP. Few discuss military strategy or the general disillusionment with Chiang's failure to govern effectively.

Current Interpretation

Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed a measure of public confidence when he returned to Nanking (Nanjing) in the late summer of 1945 to begin the reconversion to peace. However, his position had been diminished by the growing conservatism of the KMT and by Mao's increasing stature. By co-opting the national resistance movement, Mao's image had changed from a wild-eyed extremist to a potential national leader.

The unsuccessful attempts of the Marshall mission to organize a coalition government are discussed elsewhere (see X-I). Clearly, the immediate cause of the Civil War was the failure to reach a political settlement. However, the war was fought on military as well as political-economic fronts.

The Nationalists had the military advantage in 1946. American officials estimated their troops outnumbered those of the Communists three to one. The KMT also had the lion's share of equipment and an air force. However, the Chinese Communists had access to heavy armaments left behind by the defeated Japanese.

Initially the Nationalists took the offensive and advanced into North China seizing the Communist capital of Yenan. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to reoccupy and defend Manchuria has been perceived as a major strategical error. He believed the political significance of reasserting authority over the locus of China's national humiliation, which was now controlled by the Communists, was more important than any logistical considerations. Although American military advisors were unanimously against this move, Nationalist troops fought their way into Manchuria and occupied the major cities. For the next year and a half Chiang doggedly held on while the Chinese Communists cut the railroad lines and effectively isolated the troops and the urban population. A government airlift of supplies further depleted the national treasury. ". . . The whole allotment of the military budget for the latter half of 1948 had been completely spent on air-supplying a single city, Changchun, for two months and four days." (Liu: 11)

Refusing to withdraw when opportunity arose or to mount an offensive, Chiang finally conceded the loss of Manchuria in November 1948. With mounting self-confidence and additional equipment captured from the Nationalists, the Communists broadened their strategy to include conventional, offensive warfare. Yenan was recaptured and several other cities north of the Yangtze River were taken.

In late 1948 Chiang made a dramatic effort to reverse the Communist momentum. He threw 51 divisions into a 200 mile-long front near Suchow (Suzhou). One million soldiers, on each side, were engaged in direct combat. Once again the Communist flexibility and rapid maneuvers routed the Nationalist forces -- in spite of the support from the air force. The Communists crossed the Yangtze River in April 1949, and by October, less than a year after the fall of Manchuria, they arrived in Canton.

In January, 1949, Chiang had acknowledged his failure by resigning as President of the Republic of China. He and a portion of the Nationalist troops went to the island province of Taiwan where he resumed the presidency, leaving the remaining KMT forces in a defenseless position.

No one defends the dismal military record of the Nationalists in the Civil War. Errors of strategy were compounded by personal rivalry among the leading generals. Chiang's criteria for assignment of command posts was personal loyalty rather than competence. The troops were demoralized by failure and constantly shifting commands. They responded with defections to the enemy.

A frustrated U.S. military advisor summed it up:

> No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. (The Nationalist) military debacles in my opinion can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale destroying factors that lead to a complete loss of will to fight. . . (Eastman: 666)

No less a figure than Chiang Kai-shek concurred. In late 1947 and 1948 he is quoted as saying:

> If we speak about the level of most officers' spirit and morality, knowledge and ability, and the level of understanding of ourselves and the enemy, then we today should long ago have been defeated by the bandit army. (Eastman: 661)

> Today I must pitifully point out from the latter part of the

> war against Japan to the present, the corruption and degeneracy. . . manifested within our revolutionary army has been truly fantastic, truly unimaginable. (Eastman: 663)

This should put to rest the myth that the United States somehow "lost" China.

Turning to the economic and political fronts, the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were in quite different positions. In 1946, as the government in power, the KMT had the responsibility for a host of problems. An extensive record documents the inability of the KMT to meet them.

Popular discontent with the KMT grew as officials from Chungking returned to the cities which had been occupied by the Japanese and took advantage of the instability to turn a personal profit. The government was slow to remove Japanese officials and to punish Chinese collaborators.

Military expenditures continued to burden the economy and inflation went out of control as the budget was balanced by printing press rather than by sound fiscal policy. Factories were shut down in the transition from the anti-Japanese war. Unemployment coupled with rising prices and continuing Communist underground agitation spurred a rash of strikes and labor unrest. The KMT capitulated with wage increases which further accelerated the wage-price spiral and alienated businessmen. Elections for the National Assembly and Parliament were rigged. A cumbersome apparatus designed to oversee the restoration of property and to reorganize financial institutions in the cities recently vacated by the Japanese was so mismanaged that once again Chiang commented:

> It has been reliably brought to my knowledge that the military, political and party officials in Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping and Tientsin have been leading extravagant lives, indulging in prostitution and gambling, and have forcibly occupied the people's larger buildings as offices under the assumed names of various party, military or political organizations. They have resorted to every perverse act, even including blackmailing.
>
> (Pepper: 20)

In contrast, the CCP had responsibility only for the people in the liberated areas. Reaffirming that the revolution was both "anti-imperialist" and "anti-feudal" and having completed the "imperialist" war against the Japanese, they now turned to the "feudal" countryside.

Land reform was replaced by a program which would eliminate the wide variety of ownership patterns and return the land to the peasant farmer. However, during the previous period of moderate land reform it had become apparent that peasant militancy was soon replaced by peasant conservatism. Having received a little help, the peasant was interested only in moving up the socio-economic ladder, leaving his less fortunate neighbor behind. Thus the CCP objective was not simply to equalize land holdings but also to change attitudes. This would require a total revolutionary upheaval.

Building on past experience and with growing credibility, the Chinese Communists began the rural revolution in 1946. By 1947 an Outline Agrarian Law unequivocally laid down the rules:

> . . . all land in the village belonging to the landlords and all public land is to be taken over by the village peasant association and together with all other land in the village, is to be equally divided up among the total population of the village without distinction between men and women or young and old. In terms of quantity land is to be taken from those with more and given to those with less; and in terms of quality, it should be taken from those with better and given to those with worse, so that all people in the village will receive a comparable amount of land. . . (Pepper: 288)

Class struggle was involved in this redistribution. Raising living standards and developing political consciousness had to proceed simultaneously. The peasant was not receptive to the latter unless there was assurance of the former.

The process was as follows. Outside Party organizers established contact with peasants so poor they had nothing to lose. Together, they established an informal peasant association which, under the guidance of newly appointed local Party members, classified the villagers. The principal criteria for defining class was the extent to which people were exploiters or exploited by others. The former were those who relied on rent, interest and labor while the latter supplied them. The landlords and rich peasants were clearly in the first group and laborers and poor peasants in the latter class. This left the owner-farmer or middle peasant in an ambiguous position. He was constantly the focus of shifting policy.

All the villagers were involved when the initial classification was posted. By agreeing or disagreeing with the assessment, they sorted themselves into revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries. The poor peasants justified their analysis with explicit examples of their suffering. The response "set the masses in motion" as the peasants "aired grievances." Once a militant group was organized it "settled accounts" with the exploiters. Those who did not willingly agree to the confiscation of their property and goods were "struggled against." These struggles varied in intensity. Estimates of landlord deaths during the civil war and the land revolution vary from 500,000 to one million. (Selden 1979: 32). Finally, the confiscated goods were distributed equally to all villagers, including landlords who had cooperated and not committed crimes.

The peasants had to assume responsibility for the land revolution for several reasons. Once committed there was no turning back. Having participated in the basic struggle, they had a vested interest in maintaining the results. Therefore the local peasant party apparatus became the political structure which collected taxes, organized production and oversaw social control. The political power of the former elite had vanished.

In reality the rural revolution demanded much of the Party cadres. Peasant extremism had to be checked if production was disrupted. Peasants had to be persuaded to "turn over" the village structure. Often the landlord had been only marginally better-off and had shared the peasant's misfortunes. Long standing peasant-landlord relationships were not always adversary. Or, on the other hand, fear of reprisal inhibited peasant initiative.

By 1949 20 percent of the peasants in North and Northeast China had completed their land revolution. The process continued after the Communists came to power and by the end of 1952 the ownership of property in rural China had been essentially changed.

Land Transfer in the Land Revolution

		Percentage of crop land owned		Average size of landholding (in mou)*	
	percent of households	before reform	after reform	before reform	after reform
landlords	2.6	28.7	2.1	116.1	12.0
rich peasants	3.6	17.7	6.4	35.7	26.3
middle peasants	35.8	30.3	44.8	15.8	18.5
poor peasants & farm laborers	57.1	23.5	46.8	6.2	12.1

Sources: John Buck, Land Utilization in China (Nanking: University of Nanking, 1937), pp. 271, 368; and T'ung-chi kung-tso (Statistical Work) 10 (1957): 31-32, cited in Peter Schran, The Development of Chinese Agriculture 1950-1959 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969), pp. 21-22.

*1 mou is equal to 0.166 acres or 0.07 hectares.

(Selden 1979: 37)

In urban China the issues were far less clear-cut. There had been little relief for the suffering of the general populace during the Civil War. Although urban-based intellectuals and liberals were too small a minority to make any statistical impression, their ambivalence about the KMT helped damage Chiang's claim to political legitimacy.

Some of this urban group went to North China where they were integrated into the revolutionary movement. Mao believed that because of their background and education they followed a middle road and would be unwilling to commit immediately to revolution. However, he said that given time, they too would support the Communists and he offered them a role in the new society.

The intellectuals who remained in the KMT controlled areas favored reform. Familiar with democracy, they appreciated political freedom and hoped for a two-party government. Although their respect for the Communist accomplishments was high, it was tempered with misgivings and apprehension about the process which they perceived as authoritarian and as rigid as that of the KMT. They saw the individual was lost in the masses. Therefore, by 1949 the intellectuals and the CCP were basically at a stand-off.

Although the underground had been active in the cities, the Communists had less experience in urban revolution. As they assumed control from the KMT they concentrated on establishing order, providing essential services and organizing a broad base of support. Local party members had stockpiled essential food and supplies and organized protection for the industrial sector so the basic infrastructure was generally operative. The Communists made an effort not to alienate KMT sympathizers in their bid for popular support. The competence, commitment and austerity of the Chinese Communist leadership was in striking contrast with the inept and self-serving KMT government.

However, the Communist record was not blameless. The economic crisis and inflation did not lend themselves to quick solutions. The behavior of the peasant troops was often questionable and required strict discipline and punishment.

The ultimate victory of the Chinese Communists was military. They were not propelled by a massive popular uprising. However, this military victory was successful not only because of tactics or the default of the KMT. It also succeeded because Mao Tse-tung had been able to touch the Chinese peasant. In October 1949, the founding of the People's Republic of China heralded the end of the 20th-century period of disunity.

ENRICHMENT

I. We remind teachers to refer to VII-B for ideas on how to teach about the issues raised by the revolution. Here we extract from a report written in 1923 by P'eng Pai, a very early CCP rural organizer. It describes the problem of organizing the peasant. After several days of frustration P'eng made contact with two villagers who introduced him to their friends. He promised a magic show and phonograph music if they would come to a speech.

> One day in May I decided to launch my own peasant movement, and the first village I visited was Ch'ihshan. I had on a white, Western-type uniform generally worn by students and a white gentleman's hat. As I approached my destination, I saw a peasant about thirty years old who was mixing manure in front of the village. "Please sit down, sir, and have smoke," said he, while continuing his work. "Do you come here to collect money for the theater? But we have no theater in the village at this time."
>
> "I did not come here to collect money for the theater," I replied. "I came here to be your friend. Because you have worked so hard, I thought you might wish to have a chat with me."
>
> "Life has always been very difficult," said the peasant. "I would like to invite you for a cup of tea if I were not so busy. Please forgive me for not having time to chat with you." Having said this, he fled as fast as he could. . .
>
> On the third day I invited all the peasants in the nearby

> villages to a performance of magic in addition to, of course, a speech. More than 200 peasants -- men and women -- attended the meeting and applauded loudly my role as a magician. While their enthusiasm was still lingering on, I began my speech which also turned out to be very good. I followed the same pattern for about two weeks and achieved a great deal of success. . .
>
> To persuade the peasants to join the peasant association was more difficult than anything I had experienced. They would say: "We approve this thing called the peasant association, but we will not join it until all others have joined." I explained to them that if everyone acted in the same way as they did, there would not be any peasant association for a thousand years. The purpose of establishing a peasant association was to promote mutual assistance among the members, I added. One of the peasants would say: "All right, all right, I will join," and I would put his name in a book. Others, however, were so scared that they immediately ran away the moment I started to put their names in the book even though they had come with the intended purpose of joining the association. They were afraid that once their names were registered in a book, some kind of tricks would be played upon them. From then on I did not dare to use a registration book anymore. But the peasants who chose to join remained few in number, averaging only two a week. We continued to work for more than a month, but the total membership was only a little more than thirty. (Li: 72-74)

II. Henry Refo, a U.S. science teacher in China, discussed the inflation during the late 1940s.

> The inflation was really very horrible. Now, if we think inflation is hurting us in America, we really can't imagine what went on in China. For instance, I had one friend who had a life insurance policy with an insurance company for $5000 and it would have been quite a sum of money for him when he retired. However, when my family and I returned to Shanghai in 1946, a dinner for one person in Shanghai cost $5000. . .
>
> My salary amounted to about a million dollars a month. I would go to the bank with a wicker basket and put the money, which was in packages of thousands of dollars, in my wicker basket and take it home. Then I would dispose of it as fast as I could. But everyone who had money stood to lose on it. . .
>
> (Refo Oral History: 33)

X.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION, 1911-1949

Bailey, Ann C. Teng Ying-ch'ao: The Story of a Revolutionary Woman in Twentieth Century China. Unpublished paper.

Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.

Bush, Richard C. and James R. Townsend, compilers. The People's Republic of China: A Basic Handbook, 3rd edition. New York: China Council of The Asia Society and Council of International and Public Affairs, 1982.

Chai, Winberg, ed. Essential Works of Chinese Communism. New York: Bantam, 1969.

Ch'en, Kung-po. The Communist Movement in China. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966.

Chen, Yuan-Tsung. The Dragon's Village. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

Chesneaux, Jean, Francoise LeBarbier and Marie-Claire Bergere. China: From the 1911 Revolution to Liberation. New York: Pantheon, 1977.

China Update. St. Paul: Midwest China Center, May 1978.

Cochran, Sherman and Andrew C.K. Hsieh with Janis Cochran. One Day in China, May 21, 1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

Compton, Boyd, translator. Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-1944. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952.

Dernberger, Robert. "China: The Economy." Unpublished paper written for the Education Department, The Asia Society, n.d.

Domke, Paul Clifford. "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project." A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews. Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection (St. Paul, Mn: 1976).

Eastman, Lloyd E. "Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies." In The China Quarterly, no. 88, December 1981.

Esherick, Joseph W., ed. Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service. New York: Random House, Inc., 1974.

Fairbank, John K. The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Gentzler, J. Mason, ed. Changing China: Readings in the History of China from the Opium War to the Present. New York: Praeger, 1977.

Gillin, Donald G. "Peasant Nationalism in the History of Chinese Communism." In Journal of Asian Studies XXIII, no. 2, February 1964.

Gittings, John. A Chinese View of China. New York: Pantheon, 1973.

Gunde, Richard. "Land Tax and Social Change in Sichuan, 1925-1935." In Modern China, Vol. 2, no. 1, January 1976.

Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage, 1966.

Johnson, Chalmers. "Peasant Nationalism Revisited: Biography of a Book." In The China Quarterly, no. 72, December 1977.

Leith, Suzanne. "Chinese Women in the Early Communist Movement." In Women in China, edited by Marilyn B. Young. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1973.

Levenson, Joseph. "History and Value: The Tensions of Intellectual Choice in Modern China." In Studies in Chinese Thought, edited by Arthur Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Li, Dun J. Road to Communism: China Since 1912. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969.

Liu, F.F. "Defeat by Military Default." In The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949, edited by Pichon P.Y. Loh. Boston: D.C. Heath, 1965.

Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume II. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965.

Meisner, Maurice. Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic. New York: The Free Press, 1977.

Myers, Ramon. "Land Property Rights and Agricultural Development in Modern China." In Chinese Agricultural Economy, edited by Randolph Barker and Radha Sinha with Beth Rose. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1982.

Myers, Ramon. The Chinese Peasant Economy. Taiwan: Rainbow Bridge Book Co., 1970.

Myers, Ramon. "Wheat in China — Past, Present and Future." In The China Quarterly, no. 74, June 1978.

Nathan, Andrew J. Peking Politics: 1918-1923. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

O'Sullivan, Susan W. The Debates Over the "Women Problem" During the May Fourth Period of Modern China. Unpublished paper.

Overholt, William. "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project." A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews. Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection (St. Paul, Mn: 1976).

Peck, Graham. Two Kinds of Time. New York: Sentry Printing Co., 1967.

Peck, Graham. Through China's Wall. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940.

Pepper, Suzanne. Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949. Berkeley: University of California, 1978.

Pfeffer, Richard. "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution." In The China Quarterly, no. 52, December 1972.

Refo, Henry. "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project." A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews. Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection (St. Paul, Mn: 1976).

Schram, Stuart R. Mao Tse-tung. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967.

Selden, Mark, ed. The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Selden, Mark. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Seybolt, Peter. "The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education." In The China Quarterly, no. 48, December 1971.

Sheridan, James G. China in Disintegration, The Republican Era in Chinese History 1912-1949. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

Snow, Edgar. The Other Side of the River. New York: Random House, 1962.

Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961.

Spence, Jonathan. The Gate of Heavenly Peace. New York: Viking Press, 1981.

Teng, Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank. China's Response to the West. New York: Athenaeum, 1973.

Thornton, Richard C. China: A Political History, 1917-1980. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970.

Van Slyke, Lyman P., ed. The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Vohra, Ranbir, ed. The Chinese Revolution 1900-1950. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974.

Welles, Benjamin. "Recollections of an Asian Truce." In The Washington Post, February 10, 1973.

Wilson, Dick. The Long March. New York: Viking Press, 1971.

XI.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1983: INTRODUCTION

As was the case with each major period in Imperial China, this part of the guide organizes the material dealing with post-1949 China using a topical rather than a chronological approach. We believe this framework will provide some answers to the three questions most commonly asked about the PRC:

1. How do people make a living?
2. How do they live together?
3. How do they think of themselves and their world?

We urge teachers to reread Section IV -- Geography. Much of the material refers to the PRC. We also urge them to look at the chronology of post-1949 China. This will be a guide to the periodization in the essays and mentions a few of the key events. The essays on Politics and Government and Economic and Social Development will be the most useful in responding to the above three questions. Therefore, they are longer. The remaining essays deal with the standard topical themes introduced in Section VIII.

Because an awareness of the past is essential to understanding China today we hope teachers will read the introductions to Sections VIII, IX and X. Much of that past has vanished since 1949. The classical written language has been replaced by simplified characters. Basic education is for everyone rather than for a select few. Superstition and ritual no longer dominate everyday life. Rapid, unpredictable change has become the norm as policies affecting the entire country are adopted and discarded with unsettling frequency. With growing contact with other cultures, many of the people have become aware that there are alternative ways of ordering a society. And, whereas in the past it was not in the Chinese culture to look elsewhere for solutions, the process of self-strengthening by learning from the West, which began in the mid-19th century, dominates Chinese policy making today.

What has not vanished throughout the 3000 years of history is the importance of social groups and the relationship of the individual to these groups. Nor has the authority which commands a broad role in peoples' lives gone away. China never had and still does not have a government by the people. The Chinese are still trained to follow the rules of propriety and to play the role expected of them. By so doing, they will help the government function most effectively. There is still a mechanism to staff the bureaucracy which penetrates the whole society -- although the candidates now come from every level. The Chinese continue to go to great lengths to keep foreigners in separate compartments and they remain acutely sensitive to their neighbors on the border regions. What is perhaps most surprising in this era of bio-engineering, microchips and jet airplanes is that China is still a predominantly family-based agricultural society.

Having said this, it must be noted that what makes the study of China both fascinating and frustrating is that, as travellers constantly comment: "Everything has changed and nothing has changed." The hierarchy and inequality central to Confucianism has been abolished by fiat but China remains a society of classes. However, the visible symbols which were so important in the past are now less discernible. Harmony and order are highly valued but, during Mao's tenure, this was achieved by struggle. The ultimate objective of today's active trading policy and contact with the West is the self-reliance of China's past. The Chinese still have enormous pride in their heritage and civilization but with the destruction of Confucianism this pride was transferred to the nation-state and has become nationalism.

Recent historiography on the PRC reflects the increasing contact and scholarly exchange between the two societies. Many of the U.S. scholars of the '60s immersed in the passion of the Vietnam War and the turbulence of the social change occurring in America transferred their political activism to their scholarship. China was admired as a model for all developing countries or reviled as an extension of the Soviet Union. These same observers have now lived and worked in China and those who speak with the assurance and certitude of the past are few. And, it is in that spirit that it is probably best to approach the study of the PRC today.

XI.

I. CHRONOLOGY OF CHINA UNDER MAO

1949: The Communist Red Army defeats the Nationalists in a civil war. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is established on October 1. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists retreat to the island of Taiwan.

1950: Signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty. China enters the Korean War; Marriage Law promulgated, providing freedom of marriage and divorce.

1952: Basic land reform completed after a five-year campaign. All land deeds destroyed and land redistributed (roughly two million landlords executed).

1953: Korean War armistice. Inauguration of PRC's First Five-Year Plan, relying on Soviet model of industrial development.

1954-55: Zhou Enlai plays a major role at the Geneva Convention and the Bandung Conference, establishing a new diplomatic prominence for the PRC. First constitution of the PRC is promulgated. Collectivization of agriculture is stepped up.

1956-57: In the wake of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and political explosions in Poland and Hungary, Mao calls for a "Hundred Flowers Movement" to improve the relationship between the CCP and the people. Critics soon attack the legitimacy of CCP rule. The Party responds with an "anti-rightist campaign," suppressing the opposition.

1958-59: Mao promotes a "Great Leap Forward" in economic development, relying on mass mobilization, the commune system, and indigenous methods. The effort fails for the most part because of administrative weakness aggravated by bad weather. PRC attacks offshore islands under Nationalist control (September). Defense Minister Peng Dehuai ousted after he criticizes Mao's sponsorship of the Great Leap Forward; replaced by Lin Biao.

1960: Withdrawal of the Soviet technical advisors, widening the Sino-Soviet rift. Return to more conventional economic development policies to deal with the post-Great Leap Forward depression.

1961-65: The CCP becomes increasingly divided over how to pursue economic development, with Mao and his more radical associates pitted against Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and other moderate leaders. Lin Biao, defense minister and one of Mao's allies, leads campaigns to increase political consciousness in the military by stressing the study of Mao's thought. China detonates its first nuclear device (1964).

1966-69: Mao leads the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," to attack the Party bureaucracy that was frustrating his initiatives and to revive revolutionary commitment. Millions of students (the Red Guards) are mobilized and a host of Party veterans — most notably Liu

Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping -- are purged. Mao is forced to call the army in to end the endemic disorder.

1969: The Ninth National Congress of the CCP issues a new Party Constitution that names Lin Biao as "Comrade Mao Zedong's close comrade-in-arms and successor."

1971: The beginning of Sino-American rapprochement. Death of Lin Biao after alleged coup attempt (September). PRC succeeds to China's seat in the United Nations (October).

1972: Nixon visits the PRC. Shanghai Communique signed.

1973: Deng Xiaoping reappears in public for the first time since the Cultural Revolution (April). The CCP's Tenth Congress issues a new Party Constitution, eliminating clause naming Lin Biao as Mao's successor.

1974: Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and other moderate leaders chip away at policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution. Radical forces mount a campaign to "criticize Confucius," ostensibly to eliminate feudal ways of thought but actually to defend the Cultural Revolution and indirectly attack Zhou.

1975: Fourth National People's Congress is convened. Zhou Enlai outlines an economic modernization plan for the PRC, but radical opposition is apparent. Deng Xiaoping elected to Politburo Standing Committee, but his approach to economic development, education, and science comes under increasing attack by Mao's more radical followers.

1976: Zhou Enlai dies (January 8). Hua Guofeng is named acting premier (February 7) amid expectations that Deng Xiaoping would succeed Zhou. A mass demonstration occurs in Beijing's Tiananmen Square over the removal of wreaths honoring Zhou Enlai (April 5). The Politburo strips Deng of all his posts and names Hua Guofeng full premier and first vice chairman of the CCP (April 7). Zhu De dies (July 6). The northern city of Tangshan is struck by a massive earthquake (July 28) that kills close to a million people. Mao Zedong dies (September 9). Four weeks later (October 6), Hua Guofeng leads the arrest of leading radicals, including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan (soon labeled the "gang of four"). Hua becomes chairman of the CCP and chairman of its Military Affairs Commission.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF POST-MAO CHINA

1976: Mao Zedong dies (September 9). Four weeks later (October 6) Premier Hua Guofeng leads the arrest of the leading "radicals," including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan who are dubbed the "gang of four." Hua Guofeng is named chairman of the Party and of its Military Commission. In November the new leadership reinstates the "four modernizations" as the central focus of economic policy.

1977: The Anti-Confucius Campaign of 1974 is denounced as a political plot by the "gang of four" against Zhou Enlai and other moderate leaders. The CCP Central Committee confirms Hua Guofeng's Party posts, rehabilitates Deng Xiaoping, and expels the "gang of four" (July). The Eleventh Party Congress is held, a new Central Committee and Politburo are selected, and Hua Guofeng announces the end of the "first Cultural Revolution" (August). During the fall 60 percent of Chinese industrial workers receive wage increases, and bonuses reemerge to spur productivity. Academic entrance examinations are restored, and high school graduates no longer have to work before entering college.

1978: February-March The Fifth National People's Congress is held. Hua Guofeng announces an ambitious program of industrial, agricultural, and scientific modernization.

June At an army political work conference, Deng proposes "seeking truth from facts" rather than taking Mao Zedong's ideas too literally.

Fall China modifies its foreign economic policies to permit more liberal credit arrangements, compensation trade, and direct foreign investments. Negotiations proceed with foreign corporations on a broad array of projects.

October The verdict on the Tiananmen Incident is reversed; it is now termed a "revolutionary act."

November Amid contentious Party meetings on a broad range of issues, a vigorous "wall poster" campaign begins, attacking the Cultural Revolution and policies of Mao Zedong.

December The normalization of U.S.-China relations is announced. From December 18 to 25, the third plenum of the CCP Central Committee meets. It calls for a focus on "socialist modernization," liberalizes agricultural policies, exonerates Deng Xiaoping of charges made against him in 1976, approves of the Tiananmen Incident as a "revolutionary" action, rehabilitates Peng Dehuai, calls for a strengthening of the legal system and Party discipline, and promises an evaluation of the Cultural Revolution.

1979: January China enunciates a new policy on the "reunification" with Taiwan, whereby much of the status quo on the island could continue in return for Nationalist acceptance of PRC sovereignty. Deng Xiaoping leaves for the United States.

February China invades Vietnam and begins a reevaluation of the scope of the modernization program.

March Wall posters are restricted and leading dissidents arrested.

April-May Deng Xiaoping comes under attack on a range of issues (modernization, political dissidence, social unrest, the opening to the United States, the Vietnam War, and his views on Mao).

June Deng and his allies counterattack and regain the political momentum. The second session of the Fifth National People's Congress endorses an economic "readjustment," abolishes the revolutionary committee structure, and passes laws on the criminal legal system and joint ventures with foreign firms.

October Wei Jingsheng, a leading dissident, is sentenced for 15 years. Cultural Congress convenes, the first in 19 years; calls for greater freedom of artistic expression.

November China admitted to the Olympics.

December Beijing "Democracy Wall" moved from downtown area.

1980: January New laws governing local governments and the legal system go into effect. On the 16th Deng Xiaoping gives a major speech on China in the 1980s and recommends that the display of wall posters no longer be constitutionally protected.

April Zhao Ziyang becomes a vice premier and takes charge of the day-to-day work of the State Council. China is admitted to the International Monetary Fund.

May China is admitted to the World Bank.

August Most public portraits of Mao are ordered removed.

September At the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua Guofeng resigns the premiership and is replaced by Zhao Ziyang.

November The "gang of four" and former military figures associated with Lin Biao go on trial for their activities.

December Hua Guofeng reportedly resigns his position as Party chairman; Deng Xiaoping replaces him as chairman of the Party's Military Commission. Serious inflation forces the government to reduce spending, through canceling or postponing capital construction projects and reducing military spending.

1981: January The trial of the "gang of four" and other Cultural Revolution leaders ends. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao receive the harshest sentences -- execution, suspended for two years.

June The Party Central Committee holds its sixth plenary session. Hu Yaobang replaces Hua Guofeng as chairman, and Deng Xiaoping is confirmed as chairman of the Military Commission. A major resolution on the 30 years of Communist Party rule is released. It commends Mao for his contributions to the Chinese revolution, but asserts that he increasingly lost touch with reality, causing the country great harm.

August Official announcement that deputies to the county people's congresses had been elected directly by the people in 2,368 of the nations 2,756 county-level units. The acting minister of culture reaffirms the relationship between art and literature and politics and criticizes "bourgeois liberalization in literature and art." Torrential rains and floods hit Sichuan and southwest Shanxi provinces and cause the most serious flooding on the upper reaches of the Yangtze river since 1954.

Fall Sino-American disagreement continues over American policy regarding sale of arms to Taiwan. China becomes the major communist trading partner of the United States with the announcement that in 1980 China's trade surpasses that of the Soviet Union. Premier Zhao Ziyang gives a generally favorable report on economic progress in 1981 and announces a slower rate of economic growth during the country's Sixth Five Year Plan (1981-85). The Central Committee of the CCP says the state will no longer guarantee employment for urban workers, that they can find their own jobs. The Central Committee also comments favorably on those enterprises discharging workers for failing to meet their responsibilities.

1982: March Zhao Ziyang announces procedures to simplify and streamline government structure. Zhao stresses that while the individual household has become the basic economic unit under the new responsibility system, production teams must still retain their duties.

April The draft of the Fourth State Constitution is released. Analysts observe that it reflects the moderate tone of the Deng Xiaoping leadership. The Constitution identifies the principle contradiction in China as "between the growing material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of the social production." It also opens the way for a collective leadership and stronger local level government by separating governmental responsibility from the commune which retains economic responsibility. A new Central Military Council is formed, which some speculate may diminish the power of the Party Military Commission.

August An impending crisis between China and the United States over the sale of arms to Taiwan appears to be averted by a joint communique which reaffirms that the guiding principle governing relations between the two countries is "respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs." The United States states it does not pursue a policy of two Chinas and "intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan."

September Deng Xiaoping reaffirms the importance of economic construction at the 12th National Party Congress and announces a Party rectification drive will begin in fall 1983 to improve Party style and discipline. A new Central Advisory Commission is established to which older Party members will be assigned. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Hong Kong sets off an argument about the validity of the 19th century treaties signed between Great Britain and China. Important questions are raised about the future of the colony. China announces that upon resumption of Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong's administrative and economic systems will remain unchanged.

Fall The State Statistical Bureau gives preliminary figures from the 1982 census. (Two previous census were taken in 1952 and 1964.) The mainland's population totals 1,008,175,288 -- an average increase of 2.1 percent per annum since 1964. Family planning is stressed as a fundamental national policy. The need for a "gigantic" education program which gives priority to primary education, vocational training and higher education is announced.

1983: Winter The death sentences of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao are reduced to life imprisonment with deprivation of all political rights.

Spring Zhang Wenjin, China's new ambassador to the United States, arrives in Washington.

Summer Li Xiannian is named China's president at the sixth National People's Congress. Deng Xiaoping is named chairman of the new Central Military Council which, according to the new constitution, will be in charge of the army. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge tells Chinese leaders the United States will ease regulations on the sale of high technology to China. The United States and China reach an agreement of quotas for textile exports. China responds with "restraint" to the U.S. announcement that the Reagan administration will sell $530 million worth of arms to Taiwan. Twelve million copies of The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping go on sale in China.

XI. A.

CHINA IN 1949

(See also Section IV, Geography)

Physical Overview

Population Approximately 480 million peasants and 60 million urban residents. The death rate was 33.4 per thousand and the birth rate was 45.4 per thousand. The natural increase was 12 per each thousand persons. Average life expectancy was 45 years. Infant mortality rates in Shanghai were 150 per thousand births.

85% of the population was illiterate.

Industry With the exception of Manchuria, most of the Chinese industry was located in coastal treaty port cities and in a few major cities along the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. During World War II heavy industry had been emphasized rather than the traditional consumer goods such as cotton textiles. Therefore, by 1949, the nucleus of an iron and steel industry was in place. A major portion of the industrial base was state-owned.

Although industry had continued to grow at around 7-8 percent a year from 1912 to 1943, by 1949 China had only experienced the beginnings of a true industrial revolution. Production was internally consumed with little left over for investment, growth or the acquisition of foreign exchange. There was no electricity in rural areas and little in the cities.

However, the potential was there. Large deposits of coal and iron could support a steel industry comparable to that of the United States and both oil and hydroelectric potential were impressive.

About 2 million of the 550 Chinese were employed in industry.

Manchuria had been developed by the Japanese as a large industrial complex but it had been dismantled by the Russians at the end of World War II. All the essential machinery and equipment had been removed.

Transportation In late 1949 China had 13,500 miles of railroad with 100 different gauges and 63,000 miles of road -- mostly unpaved. The transportation system had been abused by war and lacked fuel and equipment. The railroads have been compared to those of the United States during the Civil War. The complex canal system had been damaged during the war. There were no major bridges spanning the Yangzi River which effectively divides China.

Communication The telephone and telegraph system was primitive and war-damaged. Inadequate service was available in parts of Manchuria and in a few sections of major cities.

Agriculture About 11 percent of the land mass of China (3.7 million square miles) was arable. About 58 percent of the United States (3.6 million square miles) is arable. The land revolution was still taking place. It is estimated that in 1949 108 million metric tons of foodgrains were produced (Ashbrook: 5) as compared with 117.5 million metric tons produced in 1917-1918 (Myers 1978: 298).

By 1953 rural China was essentially a world of owner-farmers cultivating small plots and producing barely enoguh to support their families and the urban population.

Human Overview

Derk Bodde, a U.S. scholar living in China, relates his wife's experience in Peking in September 1948. It illustrates both the economic and social dimensions of China on the eve of the Communist takeover.

> Last Monday when Galia was taking Theo to school for the first time, she passed a young may lying prone on the street. When she returned he was still there. Stepping from her pedicab, she made inquiries of the crowd which had by now gathered. 'He is very sick,' someone said. 'He must have been sick a long time and apparently has no family.' The cause, they thought, was lack of food.
>
> On returning home, she asked our cook what could be done. He suggested the police. She made a trip to the nearest police station, but on explaining the situation as best she could was told that such a matter does not fall within their province and that she should go to another organization (perhaps the Bureau of Social Affairs?) some distance away. This meant a long extra trip, and by now it was time for her to go back to school to pick up Theo. On the way she again saw the man and stopped. She offered money to a pedicabber if he would take the man to a hospital. 'Hospitals won't accept cases who have no family,' was the reply.
>
> While she was talking, a Chinese in Western dress appeared, who turned out to be a doctor on his way to a patient. Using a stethoscope, he decided the man was not ill but suffering from starvation. 'Hospitals won't take such a man unless he is ill,' the doctor declared. He tried to talk to the man but received only incoherent mumbles in reply. By then he had to proceed on his call, leaving Galia alone to cope with the problem. She got the crowd to lift the man to the side of the road and persuaded a woman to bring tea and gruel from her house some distance away. Part of this the man managed to swallow, but the rest was spilled on his trousers. Galia then gave the man three dollars, which a pedicabber put into the man's pocket for her. With this she hoped he could be taken somewhere for food and sleep. But by now she herself had to leave. Later, when she passed by the same place again, the man was no longer there. Next day, however, she again saw him lying as before, though this time in another hutung (alley). Whether his money had been taken from him or not she did not know. At any rate, he himself was too weak to make use of it.
>
> Galia was much upset by this incident and we talked about its causes. No doubt these are both economic and social. Economically, the struggle for life is so keen in China that it

> leaves scant surplus for help to any individual unfortunate enough to become separated from his own social group. Socially, the cohesion of the family is such that it gives a man strong claim upon his relatives and immediate friends, but very little upon society as a whole. Therefore, many functions which in Western society are performed by the government are left to family and friends. In structure, moreover, the government is like a magnified family in which each unit has its own status and functions, distinct from those of every other unit. That is why the police will not pick up a starving man, nor a hospital accept him.
>
> The familial structure of Chinese government and society also brings with it the concept of personal and group responsibility. Since each family is responsible for its own members, anyone outside the family who accepts that responsibility is held accountable for whatever happens when he has thus overstepped the bounds imposed by his social status. Nobody in the crowd to whom Galia spoke dared to assume care of the starving man because each knew that by so doing he would be held responsible for expenses in case of death.
>
> (Bodde: 33-34)

In 1949 the revolutionaries became the rulers with both the authority and responsibility for China's reconstruction. Since 1947 the leadership had been planning for the takeover. They had proposed general ideas in a series of statements which, while lacking in specifics, stressed unity and the transition to socialism.

Their ambivalence towards the Soviet Union continued. On the one hand, the Chinese Communists resisted Soviet interference in their affairs and had gone to some lengths to distance themselves from the Russian Communist movement. On the other hand, as Marxist-Leninists, they looked with favor at the accomplishments of the Soviet Union. By 1949 this was the only country which had successfully industrialized following a non-capitalist model.

Nor was the experience of the Chinese Communists in organizing the peasants in North China considered irrelevant (see X-G). By 1949 the Chinese Communists had solid background in both motivating the rural peasant and in rural reconstruction. They now had definite ideas about how to proceed with social change.

The new leaders faced three major tasks in 1949.

One task was the national unification and integration of the disparate elements in China. Years later Mao was to say: "In 1949 our armies crossed the Yangtze but our ideology did not cross the Yangtze." In other words there were large areas of both rural and urban China with little familiarity with the Chinese Communists. Regional and geographic differences also loomed large because there was no governmental structure connecting the regions with the center. And, the province of Taiwan was yet to be integrated into the new government.

National unification was assisted by several factors. People were worn out by the past century of chaos and yearned for stability. Secondly, the CCP had the power and knew how to use it. And a third factor was the discredited KMT government. Therefore, although not overly enthusiastic, the national mood was clearly not hostile. Many Chinese students who had been studying in the United States returned home at this time to participate in the national recovery.

Another task was to secure national independence and define China's relationship with other countries. For the most part, the Chinese Communists -- with the exception of Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) who had worked closely with the U.S. military in World War II -- were both inexperienced and unfamiliar with foreign affairs. Mao's perspective was particularly limited since he had spent the last twenty years isolated from all but his "comrades-in-arms." With the Republic of China holding a permanent seat in the Security Council of the new and highly prestigious United Nations, the international position of the new nation was ambiguous. As Marxist-Leninists the Communists perceived themselves as a proletarian nation surrounded by a capitalist world. By mid-1950 the U.S. blockade denied China any transfer of aid or technology (see X-I).

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries were quick to recognize the new government. Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and the Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Burma were among others who followed suit.

The third task concerned the economic development of China and the social transformation of the people. Ideally, they were to occur simultaneously as had been the case during land redistribution (see X-J). This was to become a divisive issue among the leadership over the ensuing years. Whereas there was universal agreement on the ultimate goals of attaining Communism, the unification of China, and building a stable and independent country, there was to be ongoing disagreement about how to do this.

XI. B.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Textbook Treatment

The texts all point out -- correctly -- that China has a one party government. Only one mentions the nature of the relationship between the people and the government. Nor is there discussion of fundamental Chinese values which makes it difficult for a teacher to involve students in a discussion of cultural or motivational differences.

Key Concepts

The basic institutions of government have remained constant since 1949 with the People's Liberation Army, the government and the Party each in ascendancy at various times. Although conflicts within the leadership continue over many policies and issues, the emphasis today is on a collective leadership.

The relationship between the citizen and the government is close with active participation by the citizen perceived not simply as a right but as a duty.

(This essay was adapted from material prepared by Andrew J. Nathan for The Asia Society's Education Department in 1979.)

In June 1949 Mao set the tone for the immediate future in a speech, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in which he said that achieving communism would be postponed until later. Realizing that his support was based on nationalism rather than on communism, he called for a "domestic united front" of "the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie." He said there would be "democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries" whose rights would be curtailed.

Mao served notice that the state would use its power to implement its program; that the people had a responsibility to support the state; and that a broad spectrum of the people would participate in rebuilding the country. Although the leadership was to be shared by "the working people and the Communist Party," he left no doubt that the four and a half million Communist Party members would play the major role.

These comments which set the tone for the new government continue to have relevance as the Chinese once again stress national unity as essential to the Four Modernizations.

From earlier essays (see VIII-B, Religion and Philosophy; D, description of elite) it is apparent that traditional Chinese society was neither democratic nor politically participant. It is also clear that during the period of experimentation with constitutional government (see X-A) Western institutions like competitive elections, uncensored political debate, and independent interest groups, did not seem to work for the Chinese. They posited an adversary relation between state and citizen that appeared irrelevant to a nation trying to unify and strengthen itself. And they seemed to encourage self-seeking and factionalism, which only prolonged the country's weakness. The Communists came to power with a conception of the citizen's role that owed as much to traditional ideals as to Western models.

Citizenship in China Today Mass mobilization of the rural peasant had helped the Communists gain power in 1949 and the Party continues to believe in the masses' energy as the key force to drive modernization.

In the Chinese communist view, therefore, active participation is not just a right but a duty. The passive citizen is seen as depriving the state of his full energies and possibly as harboring rebellious thoughts. The citizen who questions Party policy or who seeks to pursue personal interests through politics opens the door to renewed political infighting and national weakness. "Socialist democracy," the Chinese say, is democracy with order and discipline -- not the chaotic, self-seeking Western-style democracy founded on "bourgeois human rights." It is democracy under Party control exercised for the realization of socialism.

In bourgeois society, the Chinese argue, one class uses the state to suppress another, so an individual may need to protect his rights against state encroachment. In Chinese society, there are also rights such as the right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of person, the right to work, and others. But since the Chinese people, the Party and the state all share one interest -- national strength and prosperity -- such rights are granted by the state rather than wrested from it, and are to be enjoyed on condition that the citizen also fulfills certain duties. These include: to support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, safeguard the unification of the motherland, observe labor discipline, observe public order, and respect social ethics.

The correct relation between people and rulers is supposed to be one of "democratic centralism," defined as open discussion of policy choices until they are made, and unified execution thereafter. However, the "democratic" component of this process is constrained by the power of the "center" to define what issues can be discussed, when, and within what limits.

The necessity for the government to win popular approval is expressed in the idea of the "mass line." As Mao explained it,

> All correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses." This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideals), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action. (Mao 1965: 119)

Mao explained that policy cannot be determined by the masses themselves but should be decided by the Party in view of the people's real and long-term interests, which they may not see themselves. By explaining this to the people, the Party can arouse their enthusiasm and can carry out policy more effectively than could be done just by issuing orders.

This raises a number of questions. With rights balanced by duties and democracy by centralism, does the Chinese citizen have the right to say and do only what the Party thinks is constructive? Is it safe to trust so much in the benevolence and farsightedness of rulers? On the other hand, centralization and social discipline may be needed for national development. In America individual rights are more clearly defined and better protected than in China, but some people argue that our social problems and declining civic morality are symptoms of too much personal freedom.

Chinese Political Life Today Virtually every Chinese citizen belongs to some kind of "basic-level unit" -- rural production teams or increasingly, the township or village, urban residents' committees (in city housing complexes), factory-floor work teams, school classrooms, academic departments, administrative offices, or People's Liberation Army companies. Reflecting the traditional Chinese stress on group identity, the individual is not a free-floating political atom but exercises his political identity through his "unit."

Each unit has in it one or more Party members, Youth League members or political "activists." The unit's administrative leaders or "cadres" (e.g., production team leader, factory team supervisor, class president, etc.) are usually selected from among the Party or League members or activists. The cadres not only supervise the day-to-day business of the unit -- production, daily life, academic study, or whatever -- but its political life as well.

The unit is also responsible for urban apartment assignments, distribution of ration coupons for cooking oil, meat, grain and cotton cloth (rationing is becoming less widespread) and dispensing special privileges such as permission to buy a television or a bicycle. The unit gives its consent to marry and mediates in divorce cases and neighborhood disputes. In some areas it decides which of the young couples will have babies. It organizes sports events and outings. In short, one's unit provides a person with the identity that is critical to living.

Unit Meetings All members of the unit meet to discuss how to carry out work as well as how to handle details of ordinary living. Job related decisions are affected by state plans (see Social and Economic Development).

Small Group Study Members are organized into groups of eight to fifteen people for regular study (weekly or more often) of policy and ideological documents appearing in the press. In the countryside, small groups meet only irregularly, but elsewhere they are an important part of life.

At various times since 1950 these group study sessions used the process of "struggle" to criticize individuals with "counter-revolutionary" tendencies. They were urged to confess to "bad attitudes" before reforming their thinking. This process, which had its beginning in the Zheng-Feng (cheng-feng) movement (see X-G), was a Maoist innovation aimed at socializing intellectuals to CCP theory. Mao believed in human perfectability and felt that out of the struggle would come harmony. Such sessions were common during the period of consolidation after 1949 and were directed mainly to intellectuals. The practice was severely abused during the Cultural Revolution and currently is not part of the political process.

Elections Yearly or less often, some kinds of units elect their leaders.

Usually after a long process of discussion both within unit and with the higher administration levels, a slate of candidates is selected. (Until recently, only one candidate per slate was offered.) The election offers a chance to canvass members' views of their leaders. Such elections have long been held in production teams and school classrooms and are now being introduced on the factory floor as well.

Movements The central government frequently designates problems that should be urgently attacked. Immediately following the takeover Mao announced a series of nation-wide campaigns to implement agrarian reform, to encourage support for the Korean War, to punish counter-revolutionaries as well as to implement other social and economic reforms. The Cultural Revolution, which was the most comprehensive of all campaigns, was followed by the campaign to boot out the followers and ideas of the "Gang of Four." Today, the country's birth control policy is a central topic of discussion and study in all the basic level units. However, these campaigns no longer dominate the whole society as in the past nor do they disrupt the regular routines of work and living.

The discussions that accompany the campaigns reveal each citizen's attitudes to the cadres and activists. . . thus they are a way of monitoring political loyalty. The leaders of the unit classify each citizen as "left" (progressive), "middle" or "right" and treat him accordingly. The cadres maintain secret dossiers on each person who works in party and government offices, the army and schools.

The political institutions mentioned so far are for participation in the basic level unit. How about participation on a higher level? The National People's Congress is the highest level of state/government. It is highly centralized with descending levels of peoples' congresses -- each responsible for electing the level above. Recently, the leadership instituted direct popular election of representatives to the peoples' congresses up to the county level and is permitting more than one candidate to run for each seat. The rural township and village are acquiring added significance as they assume governmental functions formerly lodged in the commune. (See XI-C)

Citizens may reach out of their local political arena by writing letters to newspapers or to higher party officials, or by drawing attention to their complaints with wall posters and demonstrations. While the right to do this is formally recognized, it has proven risky in the past to do so. An unobjectionable letter to the editor (for example, arguing that restaurants near all-night factories should stay open late) may be printed with favorable comment, but a letter or poster that attacks a high official or key policy may bring retribution under the doctrine that the writer is attacking socialism.

From the above it is clear that local political life in China is much more intense than in America. The citizen has a chance to influence his community's or work unit's decisions but only within the constraints set by higher policy. But he is also more vulnerable to pressure from leaders.

When the comparison turns to the national government the American citizen through lobbying and voting clearly influences national policy more forcefully than the Chinese, whose views are taken into account only insofar as cadres report popular opinions to the top leadership. On the other hand, through the propaganda media and study-group system, the Chinese government pays more attention than the American to justifying its policies to the people.

It is also apparent that the quality, personalities and skills of the local leaders are critical to achieving an honest consensus or, alternatively, to forcing citizens into compliance. They are the conduit through which the policy established by the Party is transmitted to the people. The structure of The Chinese Communist Party parallels that of the National People's Congress with party congresses at every level. Only about 4 percent of the Chinese belong to the Party but this membership is widely distributed through the society at large.

Party membership requires years of training and hard, dedicated, selfless work. However, people want to join the Party for a variety of reasons. Since it is the legitimate policy-making mechanism, it is only through Party membership that a person can affect national policy. The status and perquisites of office are many. With Party membership come travel opportunities, better apartments and schools for one's children, tickets to the best theaters and access to special stores and sometimes even a private telephone. If one avoids serious mistakes, one can occupy one's position for life.

Recently the top leaders, recognizing the importance of the cadres in implementing the new policy changes critical to China's modernization, have been re-examining the cadre selection and education process. Stressing merit rather than favoritism and the need to attract cadres with high intellectual capability, the Party is attempting to develop a corps of Party members, "more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated, and more professionally competent." (China Quarterly #94: 394)

The 12th Party Congress in September 1982 addressed the issue of China's increasingly aged and top heavy bureaucracy with special measures. Older leaders were encouraged to relinquish their posts and join a newly-established Central Advisory Commission. A three-year party rectification drive during which all Party members will participate in ideological re-education is supposed to start in late 1983. It is possible this will lead to re-registration of the approximately 40 million Party members. However, past experience suggests it will be quite difficult to streamline the Party apparatus if loss of power and status are involved.

Institutions of Control China, of course, has a police (or "public security") system. The local precinct handles criminal cases (including some that Americans might think of as political dissent) and if necessary sends offenders to prison or a work camp. In 1979 laws were passed to protect citizens against arbitrary police action but the implementation is still uneven. In addition, the precinct registers all births, deaths, and movements of citizens, issuing documents before a citizen may travel or change his residence.

The state also controls citizens' careers. Until recently, upon graduation from middle school, the citizen was assigned to a job, the Army, or higher education. Political attitude and class background effect these assignments although the latter is theoretically no longer relevant. Whereas the 1978 constitution said, "To ensure that citizens enjoy this right (to work), the state provides employment in accordance with the principle of overall consideration . . .", the 1982 constitution simply says, "citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right as well as the duty to work." Now that a job is no longer guaranteed, the way has been opened for more individual enterprises. (See XI-D)

The government-controlled mass media shape the citizen's information and ideas. Newspapers and magazines are not very widely read, but especially in the countryside, television, radio and movies are even more effective means of reaching the people. On the theory that propaganda should be encouraging or should teach a useful lesson, the mass media do not carry much bad news or two-sided discussions of issues. They emphasize reports of the "positive" and "negative" experiences of various units in carrying out government policy.

Detailed coverage of a landslide which killed 236 persons in Gansu (Kansu) province in March 1983 suggests a shift in policy which had formerly considered coverage of disasters as "unhelpful" to building socialism. More sensitive information is restricted to classified and semi-classified documents available to cadres. Foreign radio broadcasts are extremely popular with the people because they provide new not available in the Chinese open media.

The effect of these various institutions of control depends on a person's position. Those trying to get ahead in life -- through higher education, Party membership or a government career -- are watched more closely than the average peasant or worker, and are expected to show more "activism." The average peasant, who has no reason to travel or hang a wall poster, may feel no constraint on his freedom; the city middle-school graduate assigned to work in a remote state farm may have the opposite feeling.

Most American students will probably agree that individual liberties are broader and better protected in the United States than in China. But if they could debate a Chinese official on this point, he would probably say that the institutions of control are in the public interest and are repressive only to those who oppose or do not understand that interest. The state must act forcefully to assure such "positive" rights as adequate nutrition, housing, health care, and education. The legal niceties of the American system, he might contend, allow justice to be delayed and crime to flourish.

What Do the Chinese People Think? We have seen how comparison of the American and Chinese political systems raises a host of difficult value questions. These issues crystallize if we ask American students to consider how they would feel about living in China. In such a discussion three views will probably emerge. Some will decide that they value the active political life of the local unit and are willing to circumscribe their freedom so the nation can be unified for economic development. Others will feel that they might just go through the motions in such a system, concentrating on job, family and recreation while paying as little attention as possible to politics. A third group would become dissidents, either forming secret links with others of the same mind or risking everything by publicly opposing the government. But how about the Chinese people? How do they feel about their own system?

Because China has been a closed system, no clear answer is available. But there is evidence the same three sets of attitudes exist. No doubt, the largest group is the first -- those reasonably satisfied with the system. Eighty percent of the Chinese live in the countryside and a secure, moderately comfortable life is their top priority. Politically unambitious, they speak their minds frankly about local issues. They are involved in national affairs only to the extent the Party mandates. They know little of international affairs except, perhaps, that China has "stood up" in the world, is recognized at the U.N., and has received visits from heads of state, including the American President. Much the same attitudes may characterize many factory workers -- with the additional incentive that their standard of living, medical and retirement benefits, and recreational programs are superior to those of the rural majority. Students selected for higher education -- a very elite one percent of their age group -- and others on the way up in society may also feel satisfied with their political opportunities.

The second largest group is probably the cynical and apathetic. They are sensitive to the frequent policy shifts and leadership changes and are aware that the Party often contradicts itself. If they got heavily involved in some campaign only to be criticized when the direction changed, they may have decided it is safer to sit on the sidelines. This happened to millions of young people who joined the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution, only to be "sent down" to the countryside when Mao decided to restore public order. Open dissidence is dangerous, but if one meets minimal demands for study group participation and performs well in one's work, one can make sarcastic comments in private to family and close friends. Many analysts believe that this apathy and disillusionment will be a major impediment to the creative thinking and risk-taking involved in modernization. Determined dissidents are fewer, but they definitely exist. In the late 1970s they made themselves known by putting up wall posters, demonstrating in the streets, speaking to foreign tourists, circulating "underground literature" including novels exposing the corruption of high officials, and -- in some cases -- escaping from China to Hong Kong, where some told their stories to American researchers.

If American students could meet one of these dissidents, they might be surprised at how far their values still differ from ours. Instead of calling for more individualism and freedom, many dissidents demand greater revolutionary discipline and sacrifice, especially an end to the special privileges enjoyed by officials. They often see democracy as a "fifth modernization" -- another way to make China strong, rather than as a chance for individualism to flourish.

The Party has never been able to satisfactorily resolve its relationship with the intellectuals. In 1957 Mao, believing national unity was relatively secure and wanting to involve intellectuals in the social aspects of the reconstruction, asked them to comment on the Party's record. During what was called the Hundred Flowers Movement, they raised probing questions about the treatment of counter-revolutionaries the misuse of power by public security officers and the rights of the minority. This movement was cut short when Mao became concerned by the intensity of intellectual comment. Similarly, in 1980 the Party arrested the leader of the Democracy Movement which echoed many of the same issues raised in the Hundred Flowers Movement.

The People's Liberation Army, by virtue of historical experience, should be included in a discussion of government and politics. It is now in the process of transition from the political military force which was instrumental in the successful revolution to a professional fighting force. During its post-1949 history it was called on to help administer the regions during the period immediately following the takeover, to defend the country during the Korean War, to participate in large-scale construction projects as necessary, and to take part in a national campaign during the Cultural Revolution.

Presently it is the world's largest armed force with 4.5 million persons. Of these, 3.6 million are in the land forces. China's navy and air force rank third in number of personnel after the Soviet Union and the United States. The army's technology is considered less impressive -- as much as 20 to 30 years behind that of its potential adversaries. The ground forces lack equipment which would give them mobility; the navy is limited and vulnerable; and the air force may be weaker than it was in the 1950s. (Dreyer: 30) It has successfully tested an ICBM but does not have a first strike capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or the United States.

There is mounting controversy within the Party as to whether the pre-1949 strategy is still appropriate. An attack by the Soviet Union would probably occur on the northeastern borders. "To lure the enemy in deeply" would mean the destruction of some of the PRC's major industrial and transportation centers. Similarly, abandoning the cities and retreating to the countryside is no longer a viable option.

One of the Four Modernizations -- albeit the one with the lowest priority -- is the modernization of China's defense. The future of the PLA is a touchy issue. Many of the old line officers made their careers with Mao and share his belief in moral rather than material incentives. They are wary of the current economic policies and moves designed to limit some of the privileges they enjoy. Even within the army there is conflict about which sector should receive the most resources.

The new rural economic policies make the army less attractive to the peasant. However, the army continues to be a highly desirable career and it has no difficulty recruiting members.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Key Concepts

The Cultural Revolution was both an internal power struggle and Mao's attempt to totally reorganize the political structure and socially transform the people of China. By so doing he hoped to check what he perceived as a dangerous regression to the private and individual values associated with capitalism. Endowing the people with proper revolutionary consciousness was essential to the development of China. Once politics and ideology were in command, Mao believed the peoples' energies would be "liberated." Unlike the Great Leap Forward, which was based on economic principles, the basic premise was ideological.

Textbook Treatment

All the textbooks cover the Cultural Revolution in varying detail and emphasis. The majority of them perceive it as a power struggle initiated by Mao to purge China of his enemies and to permit him to recapture control. One of the texts calls it simply a purge of intellectuals.

Mostly the material is too limited to permit student discussion of this definitive event in the history of the PRC. There are no examples or specifics and only one text provides explanations. None of them indicates the extent of the personal tragedy and suffering or suggests any long-range effects.

We propose the following framework as a possible way to involve students in making their own judgments. We select material which has relevance to students and also presents an overview.

Current Interpretation

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the fusion of two distinctly Maoist techniques. It was both a mass campaign and a class struggle of immense magnitude. The years of the most intense activity were from late 1965 to the end of 1968 but the Cultural Revolution period is usually referred to as extending to 1976, the year of Mao's death. During this latter stage many of the policies resulting from the Cultural Revolution were still in place.

The name is misleading. Westerners tend to think of culture in terms of art, literature or music. Mao thought of culture in the broadest sense of beliefs and peoples' perception of themselves and their place in society.

The Issues Identifying Mao's targets in the Cultural Revolution clarifies the issues. One was the Chinese Communist Party. Mao was afraid that China was becoming revisionist or reverting to policies which were standard in the Soviet Union. He saw a permanent elite of bureaucrats and officials who used their position for their own personal advantage. This elite had a vested interest in perpetuating itself by adopting policies which put their children in the better jobs and schools and by securing symbols of power such as better housing. Mao also was concerned that economic programs which encouraged material rather than moral incentives and returned rural decision making to a smaller group encouraged the workers to think of their -- rather than the country's -- priorities. Since the bureaucracy was largely made up of Party members who were suppposed to be models for successor generations, Mao feared that their "erroneous" thinking would have serious long-range implications for the future of the revolution. The Cultural Revolution was to be a party rectification movement on a grand scale (see cheng-feng movement in X-G) to assure that the revolutionaries did not assume the character of past bureaucracies.

Another target of the revolution was the old thinking and culture. In a style reminiscent of the May 4th Movement (see X-C) Mao criticized, among other things, the old marriage customs that still prevailed. For instance, the idea that a bride should move to her husband's home made it unlikely that a rural production team would "waste" time giving a woman special training since it would, in the end, benefit her husband's team.

The third target of the Cultural Revolution was China's educational system (see XI-C for more on this). Entrance examinations favored the children of urban officials who had more advantages. Rather than teaching practical information such as how to wire a house, high schools and colleges emphasized theory. The stress was on training urban-based scientists and technicians who Mao feared would become another class removed from the masses -- just as Confucian officials had become a distinct elite. Basic literacy suffered as scarce resources were diverted to higher education. Mao felt an educational system should be designed to eliminate the differences between rural and urban areas and between "those who worked with their minds and those who worked with their hands."

Mao's concerns were not completely unjustified. People were responding with enthusiasm to 1960 policies which gave them the opportunity to work for private gain. Peasants were reported to have said: "The private plot is like a son to us, the rented field like an adopted son, and the field belonging to the commune is an orphan." (Guillermaz: 337) The education system did favor a specialized sector rather than the workers and peasants. The revolutionary spirit had been severely damaged by the economic failure of the Great Leap Forward (see XI-C), which had left rural China physically exhausted and, in some areas, close to starvation.

In discussing the Cultural Revolution, the distinction between the goals or the issues and the methods used to reach these goals is important. The former can be understood when examined within the context of Mao's vision or priorities. The latter are questionable.

The Participants Mao called on the youth of China to be the agent of his revolution, which was to "spontaneously" erupt from below. He felt that only a fundamental upheaval would destroy the existing institutions and reveal new solutions. The youth of China were easy to mobilize and identified easily with his targets. Given little instruction except to "seize power from below" and told that "to rebel is justified," the young people initiated the violent struggle which took China to the brink of civil war and anarchy.

> The red guards were allowed the free run of the streets . . . and on August 20. . . Peking began to suffer an alarming week of violence, murder, and destruction, for which the red guards were wholly responsible. Their victims were the remnants of the former bourgeoisie, many of whom still lived on in the capital, cadres, often senior ones, in the Party and the administration, large numbers of teachers, and intellectuals in general. At the same time, these pseudo-revolutionaries also attacked many vestiges of the old folklore and culture.
>
> Mobile groups went about either on foot or on bicycles, accompanied by drums and gongs, accosting passersby whose clothes, shoes, or hair styles were less uniform than those of the majority, chasing them, handling them roughly, or sometimes arresting them, while the police studiously kept out of the way. Groups of youth, often mere children, armed with the portrait of Mao Tse-tung, organized raids on houses on their own initiative; they seized and often destroyed anything reminiscent of the "feudal" past or of Western influence -- books, phonograph records, works of art, family photographs and papers, and "black documents." (Reference is to pre-1949 books and archives.) Some people, chiefly old people, were beaten for hours on end, punched, kicked, and thrashed with belts by adolescents, while girls had their heads shaven and pet animals were killed. In many cases, individuals or whole families were sent back to their native villages, with notices hung around their necks and packs on their backs. They were to be seen on the roads, or gathered at the stations, or chased through the streets. The red guards invaded the shops, forcing the managers to change traditional names for "revolutionary" ones. Restaurants, barber shops, tailors, photographers, secondhand book shops, and the rare antique shops still surviving were

> hunted out with special care and covered with posters in the form of an ultimatum. Decorated or carved facades and statues were disfigured with hammers; colored tiles were wrenched off, and the stone lions and dragons guarding old doorways were roped up and dragged off like captives to their destruction.
>
> The last three churches in Peking were closed to worshippers and stripped of their ornaments and furnishings; Buddhist and Taoist temples near the capital were badly damaged; and stone statues of animals or people lost their heads, while stone tablets were smashed. In some places, particularly in front of the Convent of the Sacred Heart where a few foreign nuns still lived (they were publicly humiliated and whipped), the demonstrations became distinctly xenophobic. The tombs in the Western cemetery were damaged, their religious symbols were torn off, and the graves of Western soldiers were destroyed.
>
> In the old quarters, the names of streets and lanes reminiscent of the past, whose origins nearly always recalled former customs or past events, were changed to fit in with the new vocabulary. Even cars had their model names changed, absurdly, to "antiimperialist" or "antirevisionist," depending on where they came from. (Guillermaz: 393-394)

This was the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. The violence became much more intense as the regular Party apparatus organized teams to counter the Red Guards as they moved to take over schools, offices, publishing houses, newspapers, industry — in short, every segment of urban society.

Although the activity in the countryside was less extreme, many rural communities were affected. The following is William Hinton's description of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on a village in Shanxi (Shansi).

> Longbow peasants followed the lead of local high school students and split into two factions, each of which felt that victory for the opposition meant the end of the revolution. Actually both were made up of hardworking peasants and cadres who split more along old clan and neighborhood lines than over any political issue. Two organizations named Stormy Petrel (after the bird in Gorki's famous poem "Storm") and Shangan Ridge (after a battle in the Korean War) formed in the south end of the village that had once been dominated by the South Temple Association, while five organizations named Mao Zedong Thought Red Guards, Defend Mao Regiment, Truth Fighting Team, Defend the East Red Guards, and Expose Scheme Fighting Corps formed in the north end that had once been dominated by the North Temple Association.
>
> The southenders became "rebels" who moved to overthrow the brigade administration by occupying the brigade office and seizing the seals. The northenders stood fast as "loyalists" who defended the cadres in power, opposed the seizure carried out by the southenders, overthrew their short-lived administration, and restored most of the original brigade committee members to their posts. The restored cadres, propelled by a factional wind in the region and the province

> that denounced all opposition as enemy inspired, proceeded to suppress the "rebels" as "landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, and counterrevolutionaries." Their leaders were arrested, beaten, and driven into flight. When they ran through their grain, their grain coupons, and the hospitality of relatives in distant counties, they returned to Longbow only to be beaten and driven out again. The conflict went on for years. It tore the village apart and made a mockery of any plans for increased production or enlarged social services.
>
> In January 1968 the factions that grew up at the regional level, know as Red and United, confronted each other in civil war. Before the People's Liberation Army could impose peace, 800 people had been killed and thousands wounded, buildings had been shelled and smashed, vehicles destroyed, thousands of tons of grain burned, and production brought to a standstill. Whatever happended in Longbow Village, it was less extreme than that which happened in Changzhi City, the Southeast Region of Shanxi, or Shanxi Province as a whole. At least in Longbow nobody killed anyone. (Hinton: 107-108)

It is very difficult to understand why the people of China actively participated in this reign of terror, murder and personal abuse. It was passion run amok after fifteen years of control. It was group hysteria and it may have been a release and explosion over the frustrations of the failure of the Great Leap Forward. For a few it was an opportunity to settle old scores. Not only students but other young people (some no more than 15 or 16) who were either unemployed or had been denied access to education were among the Red Guards. They were, by definition, volatile and restless. The excitement of travelling around China (a rare experience), the group living far removed from parental authority and the attendant sexual freedom and independence were heady and exhilarating. Personally instructed by Mao, the father of the revolution, they took their charge seriously. Wei Jingshen, a former Red Guard and now a political prisoner in China for his role in the Democracy Movement, said: "At the outset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 I was 16 and almost ready to graduate from junior middle school (in Peking). When scores of my comrades and I joined the Red Guards that year, the Red Guard groups were fanatically Maoist but also -- and most significantly -- dissatisfied with reality, with the inequalities in society. It was this feeling of disaffection that inclined us toward rebellion and martyrdom." (The New York Times, Nov. 16, 1980)

China was torn by attempts to restore order. There were continuing outbursts of violent activity as different factions took advantage of the disorder to seize the initiative. In late 1967 Mao appointed new elements of political power -- revolutionary committees with representatives from the workers, the Army and pro-Maoist cadres -- to assume government functions. In the summer of 1968 the Red Guards were disbanded and told by Mao to "go to the countryside and learn from the peasants." Many urban youth were relocated in rural areas to "assist" the peasants and remained there -- often reluctantly. The workers and peasants replaced the students as the major force of the revolution. With the help of the Army, the Cultural Revolution came to a slow and violent end. The struggle officially ended with the 9th Party Congress in April 1969.

The Legacies of the Cultural Revolution Since 1976 China has been coping with the aftermath of this tumultuous decade. The effect on the people's psyche, particularly in urban China, lingers. Mistrust and cynicism have replaced much of the revolutionary idealism of the past as the perversions of the Cultural Revolution come to light. For instance, Dazhai (Tachai), Mao's showcase commune during the Cultural Revolution, was cited to illustrate how people dedicated to a higher goal will make the heroic effort that transfers a wasteland into a prosperous community. It was subsequently revealed that the production figures were falsified and the "bitter toil" was that of forced labor. Arbitrary arrests and the pressure to conform ideologically bred an atmosphere of fear and mistrust which is slow to dissipate. Today's young dissidents and activists are the disillusioned children of Mao's China who were denied schooling during the Cultural Revolution. They fought his revolution and then were sent to the countryside. Middle level managers and administrators who were wounded in the ideological crossfire are understandably wary about taking any visible, creative role. Apathy and caution are safer.

The nation's modernization process is believed to have been set back ten years as the rate of industrial and agricultural growth declined and scientists and technicians were denied critical education.

Some of the issues of the Cultural Revolution, however, remain important in the 1980s. Corruption and misuse of authority by Party cadres; rigid bureaucratic structures in industry; rural-urban differences and the need for more decentralization of authority are all being addressed by new policies and programs.

Mao and the Cultural Revolution Mao's acute political sense which had told him to withdraw after the Great Leap Forward was put to the test in the mid-1960s and was found wanting. Scholars suggest that by the time of the Cultural Revolution Mao may have been living in a limited world where his dream of a China peopled with dedicated selfless workers was not that of his compatriots. In his seventies and fearful that when he died what had now become his revolution would also die, he attempted the ultimate social transformation. He knew his had been a unique revolutionary experience and he thought he could artificially recreate it. His ideals became perverted as the struggle turned into self-seeking opportunism, the settling of personal vendettas and a national tragedy — all in the name of the revolution.

Scholars have commented that Mao was successful in organizing the rural peasants in North China because he offered a concrete goal which they would respond to. His credibility carried him through the collectivization of agriculture and into the Great Leap Forward. However, his vision failed him when he didn't realize a war on the poverty-stricken China wouldn't continue to generate the same enthusiasm as a war for physical and national survival. The one can be a mission. The other is a job. And they do not necessarily respond to the same strategy.

Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) Although Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, first became known to Westerners as the cultural ideologue during the Cultural Revolution, she had been highly visible for a brief period in Yanan (Yenan) in the late 1930s. She had gone there in 1937 to participate in the revolution. A former movie actress from Shanghai, she was representative of the young cultural and intellectual faction which was attracted to the Communists. She arrived there when she was 24 years old and soon attracted the attention of the 45-year-old

Mao. Jiang Qing's biographer cites a Western woman who knew Mao well when she was reporting from Yanan: "Mao was the type of man who liked women, but not ordinary women. He liked a feminine woman who could make a home for him, and he appreciated beauty, intelligence and wit, as well as loyalty to himself and his ideas. He was not afraid of independent-minded people and would not have objected to lipstick and curled hair." (Witke: 161)

Whether or not Mao was divorced from his current wife at that time is unclear. However, she was soon sent to the Soviet Union for medical treatment and Mao declared his intention to marry Jiang Qing.

This became a divisive issue in the Party. Some of Mao's colleagues perceived his infatuation with the attractive woman as romantic, self-indulgent individualism which was incompatible with the discipline and dedication he demanded of others.

Following her marriage to Mao, Jiang Qing kept a low profile. It has been suggested this condition was imposed on her by the rest of the Party leadership. She and Mao had one daughter. She lived a secluded life coping with illness until the early 1960s when she persuaded Mao to let her work with the Ministry of Culture establishing ideological guidelines for revolutionary drama and dance.

Her energy and her commitment were formidable. Her biographer suggests that after twenty years of virtual isolation she was anxious to prove her abilities. During the Cultural Revolution she seized the opportunity to send veteran Party members who had been involved in the controversy about her in Yanan to political oblivion.

It is believed that she and Mao separated in the late 1960s over the issue of continuing the Cultural Revolution which had been a vehicle for her political ascendancy. It wasn't until four years after the death of Mao and her arrest that she was brought to trial as a member of the Gang of Four, the people credited with directing the Cultural Revolution.

The trial began in Novembmer 1980, and received extensive coverage on television and in the press. Mao's former secretary and five military officers associated with Lin Biao (Lin Piao) were also involved. By PRC standards the trial stuck fairly close to established procedures. More significant was the political impact, documenting in detail how a political system had gone awry.

The trial, which lasted six weeks, was in the nature of a public catharsis for China. It was a re-involvement of the Cultural Revolution so as to finally rid the people of it. Jiang Qing and her colleagues were not accused of mistakes. . . as Mao was to be in 1981. They were accused of the crimes of directly or indirectly causing the deaths of 34,800 people and the wrongful persecution and torture of 76,000 others during the first 18 months of the Cultural Revolution. The strong response of the Chinese people to Jiang Qing's crimes implies she may have served as the lightning rod to attract pent-up emotion which might otherwise have been directed to Mao.

At the trial of the Gang of Four, Jiang Qing put up a stubborn defense asserting that she had only acted on the orders of Mao and Zhou Enlai. The prosecution was hard-pressed to distinguish between her culpability and that of her husband. Nonetheless, the revelations of the trial fostered sentiment for executing her. In the end the leadership decided on a suspended death sentence. In early 1983 her sentence was reduced to life imprisonment with permanent deprivation of political rights.

Teaching Suggestion

I. "A Cultural Context for Chinese Law" was prepared by Linda S. Wojtan, Indiana University's Asian Outreach coordinator. It was published in Intercom 100: Through the Legal Looking Glass: Reflections of Peoples and Cultures, Global Perspectives in Education, Inc.

Purpose

This lesson will help students understand the role of the collective identity in Chinese culture and, through comparison, the philosophy of individual freedom which forms the cornerstone of our legal system in the United States. They will have the opportunity to hypothesize about a culture's values through a look at its legal terminology.

Objectives

Students will:

-- recognize the importance of implicit values in word meanings -- specifically in legal terms.

-- analyze a culture's influence on the ways in which people perceive themselves in relation to their society.

-- examine and practice new ways of resolving a dispute.

Suggested time: 1 to 2 class periods.

Suggestions to the Teacher

In the United States, much of our legal system is built around the rights of the individual. Individual freedom is central to both our law and our culture. In China, the group is more important than the individual, whether the group is defined as family, working group, commune, or the state as a whole.This difference in how people perceive themselves in relation to others can be a very difficult idea for students to comprehend. Yet without some understanding of the importance of the collective, no one can hope to have even an elementary understanding of the Chinese, their history, or culture. In these two readings and the activities that follow, students will have the opportunity to think about how language — specifically, legal terminology — reflects the values of a culture. They will also learn about the purpose and function of the Chinese "small groups" and will practice this problem-solving method with their own classroom problems.

This lesson is perhaps best used as a culminating activity for a study of China. The concept of group identity will probably be something you have emphasized throughout your guided look at China. These readings give students an opportunity to use their understanding of the group concept and enhance their comprehension of the profound effect it has had on the Chinese people.

A good way to start this lesson is by asking students to discuss the concept of privacy. What does privacy mean? Why is there public debate over the question of where privacy ends and public knowledge begins? When do the rights of an individual conflict with "group" rights or the common good? What are some current privacy issues being discussed in the media? (For example, the extent of knowledge about individuals held in computer banks, files held by the CIA and FBI, national security vs. public knowledge of defense issues, etc.) Would these be issues in the Soviet Union or China? Why or why not? Where does our concept of privacy originate?

What differences in historical experience might account for the differences in the way privacy is perceived in China and in the United States? (When did population size first become a problem in China? In the United States?) How does the English language reflect the concept of privacy (i.e., private, private eye, no trespassing, keep out, etc.)?

Introduce the first reading. Ask students to list the words in the Chinese language that have different meanings from those we commonly hold for the same terms. Discuss the questions which follow the reading. Brainstorm some situations where individual rights conflict with the group welfare. Have students write their "legal opinion" on an issue involving an individual/group conflict. Have students follow this issue in the media.

To introduce the second reading, ask students whom they discuss their problems with. How would they feel if they had to discuss their problems with fellow students who monitored their behavior at school? After you have fielded the students' initial reactions to this idea, ask them what some advantages of dealing with their problems in a peer group might be, especially if there were no adults involved in determining punishments. What are the disadvantages? Introduce the reading and ask them to look for some advantages and disadvantages of the small group structure in China. Discuss the questions at the end of the reading and ask students if they would like to try group sessions as a method for resolving classroom conflict.

Student Reading I: The Language of Law

The "language of law" is often a key to the values held by a society. The reverse also holds true. The values of a people, especially as reflected in their language, can help us understand the terms and concepts to be found in the legal system of that society. Language -- the everyday parlance of the people -- is an especially effective prism for viewing the role of law in any society. China is no exception.

Consider common U.S. legal terms and the concepts they describe such as individual or self, courts, lawyers, sanctions, privacy, and due process. These common U.S. terms provide clues to our own societal norms and values -- to expected behaviors and expected outcomes. Indeed, many in our society take these concepts so much for granted, they would call them "universals."

Keeping in mind that we bring the above "U.S. legal baggage" with us when we study another people's legal system, consider that (1) there is no Chinese word for "privacy" and (2) the Chinese term for self is usually considered an antonym for "the public good"! These differences in the Chinese language signal preference for the group over the individual. Indeed, throughout Chinese history, societal orientation has been toward group welfare and the welfare of the entire state.

Ying, a common Chinese word, is translated as either "ought" or "must." The hours and volumes of U.S. litigation devoted to defining the "distinct difference" between these two terms is mind-boggling; yet in Chinese they are equivalents!

It is also enlightening to look at Chinese legal terminology. For example, the Chinese have for centuries had a term to describe a position roughly analogous in the United States to a fledgling lawyer. The term is song shi, which taken literally, means "litigation trickster"! Would you want to be one?!

Questions for Discussion

1. List the Chinese words used in the reading. How do the Chinese meanings differ from the meanings of the English translations?

2. Why might the term for "self" be considered the opposite of the public good? What major trends in Chinese history might have influenced the development of this meaning? (Hint: Think about the differences in population patterns between the United States and China.)

3. What is the difference between the meanings of "ought" and "must"? (Use a dictionary if you are unsure.) If you had to make one word for these two, how would you define it? What meaning do you think the Chinese give to the word ying? Why?

4. Throughout Chinese history, the settling of disputes has predominantly been through social means with the tribunal or later court setting used as a last resort. The strong sense of community exhibited by the Chinese was essential to the success of this method of resolving conflict. Given this background, why might the song-shi or "litigation trickster," be viewed as a social parasite? Are there any similarities in the way we view lawyers in the United States? Are there any differences?

5. Give some examples of individual rights in the United States which might conflict with collective rights, or the well-being of a society. When are individual rights more important than the group welfare? When is the group welfare more important?

Student Reading II: Small Groups in China

Small groups play a very important role in Chinese society. In fact, the bulk of civic life is conducted in a group context, whether it be groups of students, co-workers, farmers, or neighbors. Citizenship responsibilities --

knowing the Communist Party's political theory, Chinese law, and government policy — are taken very seriously by most Chinese. Small groups devote themselves to intensive study of Mao Zedong thought, written Chinese law, and new policies issued by the government. As a result, the bulk of Chinese citizenry is well-informed of their own political and legal system.

Another important function of small groups in China is to conduct informal surveillance. In a sense, these groups act as informal law enforcers on the local level. They try to detect abnormal behavior among the group's members and alleviate whatever pressures are causing it. In this way, they hope to confront problems that -- if unresolved -- could lead to criminal behavior.

Group members may come up for consideration by the group in at least two ways. The group may decide, on the basis of observation, that a member has a problem that should be addressed. Individuals may also request group help for their problems.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76), small groups were often abused or misused. They stifled anyone who wandered from a very strict interpretation of "normal," and punished those who were thought to exhibit "counterrevolutionary habits," i.e., those who criticized the government or showed preference for anything slightly resembling Western ways. Productivity, or how much work a group accomplished, was a test of loyalty to the Chinese state. Individuals with poor production records were considered "counterrevolutionaries" and seen as "against" the people.

One example of the failure of a small group is the 1956 case of Worker Guo. Worker Guo was a textile worker who kept "messing up." Peer pressure simply caused Worker Guo to perform even worse and finally the inevitable small group meeting to discuss his behavior was held. Unfortunately, this often helpful strategy degenerated into an abusive "struggle" meeting or a "character-criticism session." Instead of helping Guo, the members of the small group dissected his personality, criticized his "bad" habits, and otherwise demoralized him. Guo succumbed to pressure and confessed to "sabotaging" the textile production. Once a confession was forced, the criminal law procedure began. Guo was tried and found guilty by a judge who was convinced of his innocence, but who had also fallen victim to public pressure. Despite the guilty verdict, the court gave Worker Guo only a reprimand and he soon returned to his factory.

There was much public complaint about the trial and the protest eventually reached the extrajudicial government and party officials. Finally, Guo was exonerated and the entire process became a lesson on the evils of "subjectivism" and "bureaucratism."

Not all small group sessions have such problems, however. Many small groups have successfully functioned as "self-help" sessions, where problems are resolved in a friendly and informal manner. If Worker Guo's small group had really tried to help him, a dialogue much like the following would have occurred.

Group Member: Do you understand the importance of your work for the welfare of the country?

Guo: Yes.

GM: Have you had sufficient study?

Guo: Yes, I have had 3 months of political study and a half year of technical study and in March, 1959 I passed the examination to enter No. 3 Cotton Factory.

GM: Guo, have you been having trouble keeping up with your work?

Guo: My comrades have told me so.

GM: Did you not request that an additional number of looms be added to your work load?

Guo: Yes, I did.

GM: Worker Guo, what prompted you to ask for additional work if you could not handle it and the situation merely resulted in an increased number of errors?

Guo: I have mouths to feed.

GM: How many in your family?

Guo: I have five in my family -- in order to feed all of them I sometimes come to work on an empty stomach.

GM: Have you worked hard and tried to save money?

Guo: I have but after a month or two of employment, due to some transfers and the lack of raw materials, I was laid off. I did not work for nearly eight months.

GM: What is your current salary?

Guo: About 30 RMB ($15) per month.

GM: Worker Guo, do you understand that you have violated the manual labor regulations?

Guo: Yes, but it is because I am lacking in high technological skill and my mind has not been on production. I plan to train hard and devote myself to my work.

GM: Comrades, what can we do to assist Worker Guo?

GM: We cannot simply punish him because that would be to use punishment as "a thing of ten thousand uses" (a panacea), and to use punishment to simply scare workers.

GM: We could offer him some financial assistance so that he can feed his family and himself and therefore perform better at work.

GM: Worker Guo needs additional technical training -- let's give him training and help during our break.

GM: Worker Guo, what have you to say?

Guo: Thank you comrades, with your help I can perform well at my job and care for my family.

Questions for Discussion

1. What are small groups in China? Who is in them? What are their functions?

2. According to Worker Guo, what problems were contributing to his poor job performance? How did Worker Guo's poor job performance affect his co-workers? What kinds of help did the members of Guo's small group offer him?

3. Do you think small groups are an effective way to deal with problems? For what types of problems might a small group approach be effective? For what types of problems might it be ineffective?

II. One of the best ways to introduce a student to life in urban China is to assign "My Neighborhood" from Mao's People, by B. Michael Frolic. (See Bibliography, Section XII) After reading this story, students can develop their own comparisons and contrasts with comparable institutions in U.S. society.

XI. C.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Key Concepts

The economic and social development of China since 1949 has been affected by a wide variety of vacillating policies. The task of the CCP leadership has been to provide for the people's livelihood without sacrificing values basic to the Chinese revolution. At the present time China's modernization is deemed essential to national survival. The urgency is compounded as China's population multiplies. Therefore, all social and economic policy is directed to the national goal -- The Four Modernizations.

Textbook Treatment

This is one of the weakest sections in the textbooks. Each covers the high points -- agricultural collectivization, the Five Year Plan based on Soviet aid, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution -- in conventional terms, but it is very difficult to get a sense of the dynamics and pressures which have built up during these 34 years. There are few examples and little accurate sense of people or motivation. Nor is there much material the average student might identify with. In general China is portrayed as one vast highly disciplined work force. Any reader who has been in China recently would find it hard to accept such a statement as: "One no longer sees peasants in groups of 2 or 3 smoking and going slowly and leisurely to the fields." This quote in a textbook was taken from a 1958 source which indicates the obsolescence of some of the texts.

Introduction

In 1949 Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) believed that just as the country had been "liberated" from feudalism and imperialism, the people were now free to determine their own future. Being basically good, once they had discarded the old values and attitudes which had inhibited them in the past, they would make "correct" decisions. Therefore, all activity should be organized to help this process.

Since economic planning should encourage equality as well as growth and profits, it was important to invest in poor and substandard areas. These areas could be physical regions, like the famous (and now infamous) Dazhai (Tachai) commune (see The Cultural Revolution); they might be social classes, like the uneducated who had not had the advantages of the former elite; or they might be factories in the interior far removed from transportation systems and with marginal energy resources. This was unorthodox development policy but the differences between rural-urban sectors; between mental and manual labor and between the leaders and the led would be diminished. The structure and organization of both the industrial and agricultural sector, state investment policy, resource allocation, production and marketing should be directed to achieving equality, self-reliance and mass participation -- those values which had served the Communists so well during the Yanan period (see X-G). With economic development and the social transformation of the people occurring at the same time a new China would arise.

However, the reality of China in 1949 demanded more than theory. Mao and his colleagues, whose considerable experience had been in rural organization, turned to the Soviet Union which was the only comparable country with experience in building socialism and economic development. In 1949 Mao took his first trip outside of China when he went to the Soviet Union. He returned two months later with a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance which provided for loans and technical aid.

Whereas in the pre-1949 period, the Chinese Communists had been involved primarily in the agricultural sector, in 1949 Mao announced that "the center of gravity of the party's work has shifted from the village to the city." Following the Soviet model, the rural areas were to provide the food and raw materials for the development of the city. Major investment would be directed to the industrial sector.

Recently, based on the perspective of thirty-odd years and greater access to information, some scholars question whether Mao ever actually stressed rural or even balanced development. Instead, they claim Mao practiced "campaign economics." "Steel and defense came first. They were the priority items. The rural sector was slighted. It was a residual concern. Peasants may have been first in Maoist hearts but they were last in the budget." (Friedman: 23) These scholars suggest that the present policies under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) may have broken further from the Soviet model than those of Mao.

Economic Development

Agriculture In 1949 the radical land revolution which had started in the late 1940s continued (see X-H). The process did not go smoothly. The landlord class was eliminated as a social and economic group in the violent and often uncontrolled destruction. Those who did not cooperate were often killed. The number of deaths is unclear but estimates reach into the millions. Surviving former landlords were integrated into the new order but were deprived of political rights and carried with them the stigma of a "bad" class background.

All the texts discuss the subsequent transition to collectivized agriculture which began in 1953. The land acquired by the peasants during the initial land reform and redistribution policies as well as their labor and capital goods were organized into a common pool. This is referred to as the collective stage of rural reorganization. The communes were not started until the Great Leap Forward (see below). The social rationale of collectivization was to eliminate the income disparities which were developing between farmers with advantages and their less fortunate neighbors. The economic rationale was the efficiency in pooling resources and, in the absence of technology, labor could be more easily mobilized for large-scale projects such as road building and irrigation.

The state was in charge of controlling production and the distribution of goods. Private handicraft manufacture and trade were reduced to minimal levels with traditional peasant market fairs severely restricted. The vicissitudes of the market were replaced with annual quotas of specific crops which were to be delivered to the state and fixed prices for excess production which could be sold only to state monopolies. By eliminating the rent payments and tax evasion of the past the government was able to collect substantial revenue from agriculture which was then invested in industry.

The locus of decision making has always been problematic. In 1958, during the Great Leap Forward, it was decided this would take place at the commune level. The allocation of work assignments and the distribution of income would be organized on the basis of one big unit. As a result there was a much less intimate connection between what a peasant did and the end result. Also, the traditional close association between villagers working together was lost. The inefficiencies and the loss of incentive which characterized this brief experiment are discussed below (see The Great Leap Forward).

In the late 1950s the Great Leap Forward was reversed but the commune was retained. . . with modifications. It became the three-tiered structure presently associated with rural China. The individual peasant is a member of a production team which, in many cases, is simply a different name for the village he or she always lived in. A number of teams make up the production brigade and, in turn, a number of brigades make up the commune. The size of the individual communes varies widely -- depending on cropping patterns and geography.

Up until the late 1970s the production team continued to be the basic decision making unit (see Government and Politics). During this period small private plots were allocated to each family with the produce being consumed by the household. The commune retained governmental and economic control with the production brigade functioning as "middle management." The middle schools, hospitals, and medium-sized industries were generally organized at the commune level while clinics and smaller social and production units were administered at the brigade level.

From 1952 to the mid-1970s agricultural output increased by about three percent. (Dernberger: 23) For the most part this was accomplished by relying on traditional labor-intensive technology although a modest beginning was made in the modernization of agriculture. The government kept the price of agricultural goods low but the peasant paid relatively high prices for fertilizer and any mechanized equipment.

Most observers in the early 1970s had the general impression that the Chinese rural sector although poor was not impoverished. Recently, however, the Chinese released figures which indicate that although the improvement contrasts with pre-1949 China, "living standards and food consumption have not improved for 20 years after collectivization in 1956. In 1978 some 200 million peasants lived below China's poverty line, and 120 million 'did not have enough to eat'" (Butler, Asia Magazine: 6)

The government's response has been dramatic. Changes in agricultural policy which respond directly to the problem of incentive and the locus of decision making are given much of the credit for the record harvest of 1982. This is how what is now called "the responsibility system" works in Fengyang County in Anhui (Anhwei) province. This county is considered one of the new showcases of rural China.

> 'Under the new household farming system, a family is allocated a portion of the village's land, from one-third of an

> acre to a full acre per person in Anhui, and required by contract to sell minimum amounts of produce to the state at set prices, pay an agricultural tax and deliver some grain to the collective reserves.
>
> Altogether, this rarely comes to more than 7% or 8% of the harvest, based on quotas pegged to the harvest back in 1977, and the family is free to consume or dispose of the rest as it wants. Families get a mix of good and bad land and have been promised they will be able to keep their plots for eight to 10 years before any adjustments in order to encourage improvements.
>
> At the same time, the state raised its prices for most produce and began paying premium prices for above-quota production, increasing the peasants' incentive to grow more and, equally important, giving them sufficient money to finance the purchase of fertilizers, quality seeds and agricultural equipment they needed. (Parks, Los Angeles Times, 5-19-83)

And, in another policy change,

> Farming families are now allowed to exchange labour and hire seasonal or casual labour. They may purchase agricultural machinery, tractors, boats and motor vehicles. 'Specialized households' are encouraged to engage in services such as transport, marketing, and mechanised ploughing and harvesting with their own equipment. (Delfs, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4-28-83: 40)

First tried on an experimental basis, these agricultural innovations are now being adopted by nearly eighty percent of China's rural households. They do not, however, spell the end of the commune system. The brigade and commune continue to play important administrative functions in the management of banks, medical care, education, road construction, small industries, irrigation and other non-agricultural enterprises. The production team makes the contract with the family and the team, as a collective, still does necessary labor intensive work. However, the governmental functions of the commune are being transferred to the township, as mentioned earlier (see Government and Politics).

These reforms go a long way towards reviving two features of traditional Chinese agriculture -- family farming and free markets. And they also assure the meticulous care and management which has prompted observers to say that the Chinese are a nation of gardeners rather than of farmers.

Nonetheless, there are fundamental differences with the past. The state goes to some lengths to emphasize that the land is still owned collectively and the people receive most of their income from their own work rather than from rents or investments. There are other controls. Although the free markets are heaped high with a great variety of fresh produce and trade fairs are once again part of the rural scene, there is a ceiling beyond which prices cannot go and the location and frequency of these entrepreneurial activities are carefully monitored. And, the mechanism is in place for a return to centralized decision-making.

Mechanization is slowly reaching rural China. There were 2.5 percent more medium-sized and large tractors in 1982 than in 1981, while the number of walking and small tractors (much more suitable for China's relatively small fields surrounded by mud banks) rose 12.3 percent. (Beijing Review, 5-9-83)

Perhaps most important for the Chinese peasant these reforms are bringing a slow rise in the living standards. Average annual net per capita rural income was 270 yuan ($175.50) in 1982 as compared with 223 yuan ($144.95) in 1981. (Beijing Review, 5-9-83 and Klatt: 48) Individual families with many working members have made much more — some as much as $6,000 a year. (Parks, Los Angeles Times, 5-19-83)

Anyone driving by night along the narrow highways in the rich Yangzi delta in the late spring of 1983 could see that the traditional ingenuity and practicality of the Chinese peasant has responded to these new incentives. Whole families were spending the night clustered by the roadside engaged in a non-stop threshing operation. Not wanting to wait to use the commune threshing machine, they tossed huge bundles of grain on the road and waited for the weight of the passing vehicles to separate the kernel from the chaff. Periodically all the vehicles came to a halt while family members dashed out with brooms and dustpans to sweep up this grain which had been grown in excess of the amount promised to the government. Under the new responsiblity system they were anxious to get it to the market as soon as possible.

The rural landscape is dotted with new brick houses in more prosperous areas. They are privately owned although the land belongs to the commune. Such simple amenities as window glass, electricity, fans, and running water rather than hand pumps, are evidence of a slow rise in living standards. And, more movies come to the central meeting hall.

Industry The socialization of industry proceeded somewhat differently than described in the texts. At the end of the Japanese War the Guomintang (Kuomintang) had taken over the large Japanese-run industries and mining operations. Although there had been ample opportunity for private profit the mechanism was there for a relatively smooth transition to state ownership and control when the Communists took over. Also, the new government was unskilled in commerce and finance and went to some lengths to encourage existing businessmen to remain in their jobs. These businesses were carefully regulated by the state and profits were heavily taxed so that by 1956 all the urban economy was state-owned.

As the section on geography indicates, China has a strong enough resource base to permit modern industrialization. Under the slogan of "Let's be modern and Soviet" and leaning heavily on aid from the Soviet Union, China made impressive gains in heavy industry in the first decade of the new government. Major investment in iron and steel plants and machine-tool industries, centralized control and the development of a corps of highly trained technical workers all contributed to this growth.

However, in the late 1950s the leadership began to question a development policy which leaned so heavily on the Soviet Union and favored heavy industry. The Great Leap Forward (see below) was, in part, Mao's attempted alternative to the Soviet model.

Seesaw politics continued in the 1960s as Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) and Mao's then heir-apparent Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) attempted to reverse the Great Leap with a variety of measures designed to encourage incentive and more even economic development. This is when Deng supposedly said, in defense of his pragmatic policy proposals: "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice and is a good cat." And, Zhou Enlai first mentioned the need for "The Four Modernizations" in December 1964.

One indicator of China's basic industrial strength and potential is that output continued to grow during the five most violent years of the Cultural Revolution. The 9.5 percent growth rate from 1965-1970 (Howe: xxiii) was far less than the 20.5 percent rate for 1952-59, but it indicates that the industrial sector continued to function during the period when "politics was in command."

In the 1970s economic planners acknowledged that foreign trade, new technology, and changes in the structure and management of industry were basic to the modernization and growth of the industrial sector. The human element was an imperative. Whether we accept the Chinese estimate of a population in the year 2000 of 1,202,000,000 or the World Bank's projection of 1,230,000,000, China will in twenty years have 225,000,000 more people. That increase is comparable to the 1980 population of the United States. These people must not only be fed but housed, clothed, educated, employed, and kept occupied. The need to show continuing evidence of material progress -- after the initial gains following the 1949 revolution -- is particularly compelling since seven out of ten people are under thirty-five and do not recall the misery of pre-revolutionary China.

The Work Place It is estimated that about 25 percent of the Chinese work force is in non-agricultural employment. Most of these workers -- exclusive of those in government, education and health services -- work in production which is owned, organized and controlled in a number of different ways. The state owns most of the plants with large amounts of capital equipment. These plants produce the steel, the trucks, the chemicals -- in short, all the heavy industry. Although under the overall direction of the central government, county and provincial governments, in a departure from the highly centralized Soviet model, often have had considerable input in operating decisions.

Recently two basic structural reforms were announced. The large industrial plants or state enterprises will pay a graduated income tax to the central government rather than turn profits over to the state for its subsequent investment. The plants can retain their profits and use them as they see fit -- for bonuses, investment, maintenance, etc. The enterprises will also be able to apply for bank loans rather than receive automatic allocations from the government, as is usually the case in planned command economies.

The second major reform will permit a large degree of autonomy and flexibility in all stages of the planning process. They will make their own arrangements for procuring raw materials and marketing the product.

Other industry is owned and largely controlled by collectives. In rural areas this is a small-scale industry owned by a commune or a production brigade. Ideologically, rural industry is important because it satisfies the commitment to build up rural areas and diminish the rural-urban gap. Economically, the small-scale rural industry is important because its labor-intensive organization absorbs workers displaced by rural mechanization; it utilizes local raw materials; and it provides products needed locally. This relieves an overburdened transportation system.

In the urban areas small industries are owned collectively by the local district or neighborhood. They produce simple goods -- clothing, light bulbs, toys -- which do not require sophisticated skills or machinery.

In 1982 the government announced it couldn't assume the responsibility for providing jobs for the workers of China. Thus it is encouraging a large variety of collective and private enterprises, to absorb some of the 6 million urban unemployed -- most of whom are high school graduates. There are twice as many small private businesses in China in 1983 as in 1979. Tailor shops, shoe repair stalls, bicycle shops, beauty parlors, small laundries -- a host of small service industries have sprung up in all the cities. Sensitive to the past history of exploitation of workers by private industry, the number of employees that can be hired is limited. Often these little shops are family-operated. They are taxed and licensed by the government and are proving a highly effective way to provide much-needed services and jobs.

Innovation is clearly the name of the game as other ownership patterns stimulate industrial growth. Individuals can invest private funds in companies owned jointly with the government. Joint ventures with foreign companies help the Chinese acquire new technology and skills as well as increase the production of goods available for sale.

In 1982 industrial production increased 7.7 percent over the 1981 figure . . . a 4 percent increase over the projected rate. (Beijing Review, 5-9-83) However, there is concern about the imbalance as heavy industry far exceeded the planned target and light industry failed to meet its goals. Present development strategy gives priority to light industry which will provide chemical fertilizers, energy development, transportation facilities and plant and equipment maintenance.

The Worker The factory job in a state-owned enterprise has been an iron rice bowl -- a guarantee of cradle-to-grave security -- for the Chinese worker. The local labor bureau assigns the jobs although with the increased local plant autonomy there are cases of plants advertising directly for employees.

The worker has little to say about the job assignment although middle school graduates can sometimes indicate three choices. The worker will probably remain in the same factory for his or her working life and the chances of becoming part of management are extremely limited, except for workers with special skills or highly trained professionals who are assigned employment away from their homes. These workers get three to four weeks vacation a year. Other employees -- the vast majority -- get seven days of vacation a year to celebrate Chinese holidays. There is an eight-hour day with time off for lunch and a midday nap. Women retire when they are fifty to fifty-five years old and men when sixty to sixty-four years old. Both receive a pension of about seventy to eighty percent of their salary.

As in the agricultural sector, a "contract employment" system has been introduced into China's factories. However, unlike the rural situation, it is beginning on a limited basis in selected factories. Under this presently experimental system the rights and obligations of the worker and the employer are spelled out in a contract which is renewable generally every one to three years. The contract covers pay, job requirements and a variety of insurance benefits. Presumably, failure to meet obligations will result in discipline or termination. Although management is currently urged to dismiss unsatisfactory workers, it has been extremely reluctant to do so. Enrolling new workers in the labor contract system may eventually address this problem.

The worker becomes part of a work group (see Politics and Government) which varies in size according to the production process.

There are substantial benefits associated with employment in a state enterprise. In 1982 the average annual wage was 836 yuan ($543) as compared with 671 yuan ($436) for the worker in a collective. (Beijing Review, 5-9-83) Child care facilities and cafeteria service which offers "take-out" food relieve women workers of some of their domestic chores. Not only are coupons issued for haircuts and trips to the public bathhouse, but the employee receives a transportation allowance. Medical treatment, surgery, and hospitalization are paid for. There are good disability and sick-leave payments.

Low worker productivity remains an ongoing concern in China. Direct wage increases, overtime pay and bonuses have all been applied to stimulate production but since they are often distributed regardless of individual performance, their effect on production has been minimal. However the growing variety of personal possessions and new clothes one sees in China in the early 1980s attests to the pleasure people have in spending this money. Chinese cities are alive with bright red and emerald green sleeveless T-shirts.

Trade unions are in an ambiguous position in China. Union leaders are appointed party officials and unions play a minor role in worker-management relations. Perceived as the conduit between the Party and the worker, unions have been told to instill discipline and purpose in the employee. On the other hand they are supposed to represent the workers in such areas as improving working conditions and industrial safety. Their major responsibility is planning on-site vocational schools, organizing recreational activities and helping administer benefit plans.

Since 1949 strikes in China have generally been associated with political unrest and local power struggles rather than with economic demands. Specific complaints about working conditions, wages or job assignments are cloaked in general attacks on a political faction. Once the issue is resolved, the leaders of the losing faction are removed for reeducation.

Living Arrangements Most of China's workers live in apartment buildings relatively near their plant. Space is precious with a family of four often living in two rooms and sharing a small kitchen and toilet facilities with two other families. Average rent might be 5 1/2 yuan a month. Gas is around 3 yuan. Electricity and water would come to another 5 yuan a month.

Individual families are organized into residents' small groups which are in turn organized into a residents' committee with about 100 to 600 households. The small groups select a leader who usually serves as the representative on the larger committee. The committee reports to the neighborhood office which is the lowest formal level of municipal government. The residents' committee operates child care facilities, local sanitation, maintenance of public facilities, clinics, small workshops, political education and local cultural programs.

The present collective leadership has staked its political life on the success of these economic reforms. At the 12th Party Congress which met in September 1982 Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang delivered a consensus report which stated the long range goal of quadrupling output by the year 2000. Concern about the direction the new industrial reforms are taking is, however, cause for leadership debate. Large steel mills and other state owned enterprises are evading the government price control regulations, thus making it increasingly difficult to finance critical government construction projects. Profits are being directed to increase production rather than to plant maintenance or more efficient technology. Heavy industry continues to grow at the expense of light industry.

Ideological concerns are less pressing at the moment. What Westerners may perceive as "a return to capitalism" is, according to the Chinese, simply replacing egalitarian values with those that are equitable. People who work harder and areas which produce more will get more. The two basic dimensions to socialism are still intact, they say. The bulk of ownership of the means of production is public and the major organizing force is the state.

Nonetheless, ideology should not be discounted. In arguments which evoke the debates which whirled around the 19th-century Self-Strengthening Movement (see IX-F), theorists ask just how much free decision making and material incentives can be tolerated in a socialist society. The questions is: When will these practical solutions with functional relevance begin to undermine the orthodoxy?

The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960

Key Concept

The Great Leap Forward was a Maoist policy which was to "attack all fronts at once." Although the basic premise was economic, Mao believed that people would also be socially transformed.

The Reasons On the domestic front, Mao was beginning to question whether the industrial and agricultural policies of the mid-1950s would assure a continued high growth rate. The rate of increase in cotton and grain production -- two key indicators -- was beginning to decline. As the agricultural sector continued to support the cities, the rural-urban gap was widening. Increased illegal migration to the cities suggested rural depression and discontent. In the cities an elite of trained technicians and plant management was at some social and economic distance from the urban worker.

There were also international considerations. Mao had been angered when Nikita Khruschev, Stalin's successor, had made his famous de-Stalinization speech without prior notification to the Chinese Communists. Mao also felt that the Soviet Union's "peaceful co-existence" policy affected the world Communist movement and should have been developed in consultation with other Communist nations. The estrangement came to a head when the Soviet Union announced in 1957 that future exports to China would have to be on a cash basis. The implication was that Russia was in a position to manipulate the rate of China's economic development by withholding necessary credit.

Thus Mao saw the Great Leap Forward as a radical, creative policy which would bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism and develop the industrial and agricultural sectors of China by using her richest resource -- the power of the people. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to find a short cut to economic development and to minimize the negative effects of a growing urban industrialized sector.

The Program The communes were planned to remove peasants from their traditional lifestyle, to raise their political consciousness by channeling their interests to the larger unit, and to develop China's agricultural sector. The texts describe in some detail the merging of all private property and the organization of the people so they could work most efficiently. The idea was to create a basic self-sufficient unit which could supply all the needs of the unit and have enough surplus to feed the cities.

The "down to the countryside" movement was another feature. Workers and students from the cities were sent to the rural areas to gain respect for manual agricultural labor and to bring their educational and technical skills to the rural population. With their help it was hoped that the small rural industries could take over some of the production of light industry and consumer goods then being produced in the city.

"More, better, faster and more economically" was the slogan which propelled China's urban as well as her rural sector. Middle level management and technicians were transferred to the production line and workers were given technical training as well as management responsibilities. Universal wage policies for categories of workers replaced piece-rates and bonuses.

Results This purposeful disorganization of China's production structure was a failure in human and economic terms. The Chinese peasants resented being uprooted from their social base and the workers were stretched beyond their capacity.

The immediate failures were obvious. Inferior raw materials, unskilled labor and inadequate machinery produced shovels that broke, steel that snapped and cables that frayed. Improper maintenance of transportation facilities caused communication breakdowns. Poorly constructed dikes, dams and reservoirs collapsed. In the compulsion to prove their commitment local cadres prepared false statistics. Future planning was based on this faulty information thus compounding the confusion.

The long term failures were yet to come. Serious drought added to the agricultural crisis and in the 1960s the famine that struck parts of rural China was tragically similar -- although on a far smaller scale -- to that of 30 years earlier.

A brigade leader in a North China village who was 20 at the time of the Great Leap recently looked back on the experience:

> We were like children and did not understand our new collective organizations. We had no experience. We steered off the correct path. Wages were issued whether you worked or not; so were meals. The commune set up a steel furnace, which used a tremendous amount of labor. This affected agricultural production, and the quality of the steel was low.
>
> The village had no mature trees. During the Great Leap Forward we cut down every tree in the commune to supply fuel for the blast furnace.

And an analyst comments:

> A kind of insanity seemed to grip the village. With so many people working on the blast furnace, Dahe lacked the manpower to harvest sweet potatoes by hand. So the villagers ran plows through the fields, slicing and smashing most of the crop as they turned over the earth. They planted wheat seeds three feet deep, causing winter wheat yields to plummet. And the next year's sweet potato crop failed because the villagers had planted the potatoes in spirals on small mounds of earth, reasoning that the mounds would increase the planting surface area. The potatoes only grew to the size of an index finger.
>
> New evidence from other parts of China confirms that Dahe's experience in the Great Leap Forward was not unique. Everywhere -- on the theory that bigger is better and more socialist -- local officials expanded collectives of about 200 people to include as many as 50,000. The new communes could manage big labor brigades, but they could not deliver the careful management needed for China's intensive cultivation system. (Butler, Asia Magazine)

The Great Leap Forward also had serious results for Mao. He was forced out as the President but he emerged the winner in a serious power struggle with the Minister of Defense. Threatening to go off with his supporters and fight another guerilla war, Mao won the final showdown. From then until 1965 he withdrew from active policy making while his more practical colleagues tried to revive the economy. The Cultural Revolution was to be Mao's final attempt to structure the development of China in his image.

Debate continues over the Great Leap Forward. Was it a too rapid and too comprehensive implementation of a basically sound policy which reflected China's particular situation? Or was it a basic misjudgment about the most effective structure and process necessary for economic development? Although it was abandoned, one does see legacies of the Great Leap Forward today. The commitment to small and medium sized industry in rural China; the acknowledgment of the need to give the work force technical skills; the commune structure, and the decentralization of certain sectors of the economy were all facets of this short-lived experiment.

Social Development

Women A quick review of the history of Chinese women helps Westerners understand how the Chinese women may feel about themselves and their position in society. There are a number of elements to consider.

First of all, although there was a true feminist movement in China during the first few decades of the 20th century, it was short-lived and rapidly became subsumed by political struggles and the Japanese war. Even these early feminists were motivated by nationalism as much as by self-interest. For instance: education was valued not only because it would help the women but because it would also strengthen China (see IX-L; X-C, D).

Second, the Chinese Communist Party wanted to involve women in the revolution because they felt women were both the victims of and part of the oppression which had crippled China. They saw the women as a resource and, in order to maintain their legitimacy, they needed the participation of all the people. Thus, the initiative for organizing the women came from the Party -- not from the women themselves, as in the United States. The Chinese women often responded to organizing attempts with passivity and some apprehension (see X-J). Not the least of their problems were their husbands. From the mens' limited cultural perspective women who went out alone for any atypical reason were suspect.

A third factor to bear in mind is that, in spite of this intimate relationship which developed between the women and the CCP, when it was decided that women were to be an integral part of the revolution, the needs of the state or of the revolution were to have priority. An illustration of this occurred in the early 1930s when a Marriage Law was enacted in the Jianqxi (Kiangsi) soviet (see X-G). Its implementation was decidedly casual when it developed that the peasant men had reservations about joining a movement that allowed their wives to leave them.

And, lastly, China is presently under great pressure to modernize her economy. This raises a question whether it is valid to use the same measuring stick to compare women in an advanced democratic society with those in a communist underdeveloped country.

Over the years the women's movement in China has had its ups and downs. The Marriage Law -- enacted in 1950 -- based marriage on a free choice of partners and gave equal rights to both sexes. The parent-child relationship was clarified; both husband and wife had the right to participate in work and social activities; divorce was permitted and concubinage forbidden. The Marriage Law legally destroyed the male dominated family power structure that had characterized Chinese society for 2000 years.

The All China Democratic Women's Federation (ACDWF) was organized to coordinate the organization of women and to begin the consciousness raising and literacy training which would permit women to enter the workforce. However, by the mid-1950s urban unemployment -- caused by population increase and migration from the rural areas -- reached such proportions that the Party announced: "The problem of female employment can only be met gradually. Doesn't doing the housework and caring for the children count as work?" (Davin: 169)

These swings in policy towards women have been repeated throughout the history of the PRC to reflect shifts in the national goals. Women -- as women and not as part of the society -- have generally profited by all encompassing revolutionary movements involving the whole society such as the Great Leap Forward (see above). By demanding that everybody participate in economic reconstruction, the government legitimized the idea that women could and should work outside the home. Women were among those enrolled in work-study programs. And, as during land reform, it was obvious that support services were needed to permit women to work. It wasn't until the Great Leap Forward that a major commitment was made to day care facilities, nurseries and maternal health.

Following the Great Leap Forward, the government had to cope with an economic crisis. In a poor country, with a labor force and a government historically dominated by men, the effort which might have been diverted to special programs for women was directed instead to restoring production. The ACDWF turned to political training to sensitize the women to their larger responsibilities. The response from this woman was honest and human.

> I was quite enthusiastic about the study of Marxism-Leninism at the outset, but I lost heart with the study of Marx and Lenin as I was unable to understand some of the long names. I thought that perhaps only university graduates could study such works whereas I only had a primary school education. But then I thought that what was adding to my difficulties was that I have these kids at home. My eldest son is in a nursery. They are quite naughty; their clothes soon tear. They like to imitate the People's Liberation Army and fight with each other! They make a mess at home. So faced with such a situation I did not know whether to laugh or cry. Furthermore I suffer from arthritis. Therefore I thought that since I failed to stop the civil war in my family why should I study the civil war in France. I became quite discouraged. But this time my leading colleagues came to my help and encouraged me to persevere. They told me that I should think of the past. In pre-liberation days women had no political status, were not even allowed to speak in the presence of men let alone join political groups. (Croll: 303-304)

It is harder to assess the effect of the Cultural Revolution on the women's movement. Certainly, women could have benefited by the attack on the four olds: old habits, old ideas, old customs, and old culture. The tenacity of tradition in China is well illustrated by a girl who says simply and without apology that in 1966, when she was 17, she was unable to cook or sew. Her mother and grandmother attended to all that so she could study. Some of the young women who participated in the Cultural Revolution found it truly liberating as they learned they had organizational skills and could manage outside the family unit. For others who found themselves isolated in rural areas and victims of sexual abuse it was a tragedy.

On January 1, 1981 a new Marriage Law was passed. The official explanation for it was that during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution many people had reverted to feudal marriage practices. It was now necessary to reinforce the 1950 law. Whatever the time frame observers have commented on the persistence of old marriage customs -- particularly in rural China.

Today, the slogan is "Women need the Four Modernizations and the Four Modernizations need the women. . ." thus reaffirming the relationship between women's and China's goals. This is nicely illustrated by a book currently being distributed in China. "Seven Contemporary Chinese Women Writers" is a collection of short stories discussing love, social injustice, and human problems. The status of women is dealt with only by inference. For instance, a woman doctor discusses her guilt at being a bad wife and mother and not meeting all her professional obligations. The problem is presented as hers. Purely women's issues are peripheral to the stories.

Women and the Family The Chinese family is not only very much intact but it is considered such an important social institution that the government is organizing Marriage Introduction Services. Many of the state-owned enterprises have special bureaus which put people with compatible interests together.

The family performs a variety of necessary functions. It cares for the aged which, thanks to the pension, is no longer a financial burden unless the parents happen to be indigent. Under the new responsibility system in the rural ares (see Agriculture above) the family is becoming an important production as well as consumption unit. The majority of China's pre-schoolers are still cared for in the home and the family is considered a stabilizing social force.

The offical comment about the new Marriage Law suggests both the importance the government attaches to a marriage which is truly based on a free choice of partners and the persistence of old attitudes and traditions.

> . . . choice may take two different forms. The first, which prevails in urban areas, is based on love and the mutual attraction between two people. The major problem is how to create more opportunities for young people to meet one another . . . This sort of free choice is also common in the more developed rural areas, and commune and production-run enterprises where young people from different villages work together. . .
> A second form of free choice in marriage, somewhat modified, allows the couple to decide on marriage with the help of the parents and a go-between. This form is more prevalent in China's rural areas. . . It is still not based initially on geniune love but rather on material considerations. Introduced by a go-between, the parents of both parties first consider how many members in each family share the family income and property, how many people in each family can work, and its annual income before they ask their children's opinion. Then a meeting is arranged. . . (Tan: 18)

> "A survey. . . revealed that it costs an average young peasant 3,000 yuan to marry, two-thirds of it for building a three-room house and buying furniture. The parents of a boy begin to collect lumber, bricks and tiles for their son's home when he enters his teens. Bethrothal gifts and a wedding banquet will require at least another 1,000 yuan from the groom's family. After the engagement, the young man must give his intended 200 yuan for new clothes, and sometimes even a wristwatch, bicycle and sewing machine. In the Beijing area a television set has

> become a customary gift. . . Because of these practices, many people fall into debt which may take several years to pay off. . . In cities, young men with higher incomes or whose parents are cadres or intellectuals with more modern ideas never bother with bethrothal gifts. (Tan: 18)

And, as in the 1930s, divorce continues to be a controversial subject.

> . . . both the earlier law and the present one state that if attempts at reconciliation fail, divorce should be granted when husband and wife both desire it. But the new law makes it easier in cases where only one party wants a divorce. The old law read: 'divorce may be granted' if mediation fails. The new law states that in such a situation it 'should be granted.' (Tan: 20)

The assumption is that it is usually the man who will want a divorce.

> It is true that it is easy for divorced or widowed men to remarry, but under the lingering influence of feudal ideas, not so easy for a woman to do the same. . . But legal personnel have stated that even when the breakup is caused deliberately by the man, the court has no right to punish him by refusing divorce. (Tan: 20)

The extent to which men "share" rather than "help" with domestic duties seems, as in other countries, to be both generational and geographic. There are as many fathers as mothers at Parents Day at an urban nursery school. A young college instructor does the marketing, makes breakfast and takes the child to and from kindergarten. In the countryside the old ways linger on. The men sit on the stoop and smoke a pipe or drink a beer while the mother makes supper after having put in a number of hours working in the fields or family plot.

There is concern at all levels about a) the population crisis which China faces and b) the implications of the one-child family. Nor are the contradictions between the current stringent family planning campaigns and the responsibility system which provides an incentive to have large families overlooked.

Chinese society is bombarded with guidelines for family planning, political propaganda, education, and peer pressure. In some cases there is forced sterilization after two children. Incentives such as a guarantee of quality education for the only child and discipline such as no rations of grain for the second child are all part of the government's unrelenting commitment to control the population and thus realize economic gains (see Section IV, Population).

The implications for women are troublesome — particularly as the Chinese press has revealed that female infanticide is once again occurring. It is no longer the problem that it was in 1900 when there were an estimated 122 men for every 100 women. Today the ratio is 106 men to 100 women (Far Eastern Economic Review, 4-28-83) but nonetheless there is a clear preference that the one child be a son.

The long range implications for the family are less immediately apparent but also real. For instance, in the next generation it is possible that a young couple could have four parents living with them. Moving these elderly people to special government-run homes would be a dramatic social change.

Women and Work (The following is an excerpt from Women and Work in China, a report of a study team of American women. It was published in the Notes from the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (Fall, 1981).

> Nearly all Chinese women under the retirement age of 55 are engaged in productive labor. Even 'retired' women are active in the work of the Residents' and Neighborhood Committees, or in caring for their grandchildren. While a substantial proportion of China's unemployed youth are girls, the impression was that they fully expected to be assigned employment.
>
> Working women (at least in State enterprises) enjoy generous maternity leave, health care, child care, and other support services enabling them to participate in the labor force. While tending to be concentrated in areas of work traditionally performed by women, they are also well represented in non-traditional fields. But despite the impressive achievements Chinese women have made they must still cope with great inequalities in the work place.
>
> Discrepancies can first be seen in the educational opportunities available to boys and girls. . . The percentage of girls as compared to boys declines with each level of education. Although girls do as well as boys in primary school, by senior middle level some schools report that only one-third of the students are female. At one key middle shcool in Nanjing the larger number of boys in the school and of boys going on to higher education was attributed to the fact that boys do better than girls on the examinations. . . Although girls and boys take the same classes throughout primary and secondary school, administrators in a Shanghai middle school reported that boys excel in math, chemistry and physics while girls do better in calligraphy, Chinese language, and photography (areas not of importance on the college entrance examination). It was noted that girls were burdened with household chores, and that by the time girls reach senior middle school they are "physiologically different from the boys; more easily distracted."
>
> Women are even more under-represented in higher education. Middle school administrators indicated that some colleges prefer men to women and that technical schools may take 25 boys to 5 girls (ultimately meaning there is a smaller chance for women to get jobs requiring technical skills). Teacher-training schools have higher percentages of women than other institutions of higher education. . . The medical colleges also have a high percentage of women students; in some instances nearly one-half. . .
>
> Everywhere the statistics given indicated that women are grouped lower on the occupational ladder than men. The higher one looks at the organization, the fewer women are to be

> found. . .
>
> The study team had the opportunity to visit a number of industrial enterprises, some representing trades that have traditionally been dominated by women, and some representing more non-traditional areas. Again we found women in large numbers on the lower rungs of the ladder, but few at the top, even in those industries where the overwhelming number of workers are women. At Number 2 Woolen Mill in Huhehot, 2,007 of the 3,060 workers are female, but only 22 of 84 cadres above section chief and 14 of 41 engineers are women.
>
> In the government arena, women are found in large numbers at the lowest levels. Residents' Committee, the lowest level of government, are staffed primarily by women, frequently older retired women who receive no pay for their services. The next step up, the Neighborhood Committees, still have a fairly large number of women staff members. . . but the numbers dwindle quickly as one moves to the district, municipal, commune, provincial and national levels of government. Most women in prominent positions within the national government are veterans of the revolutionary period or are married to men of high rank. Three women head ministries of government. . .
>
> Although the delegation did not collect data on salary differences between men and women, it is obvious that as women are concentrated in the lower levels of the work force they also earn less. . .
>
> Women are further hampered in industry by the segregation of occupations by sex. It is commonly felt that certain occupations are suited to each sex. . . The early models of women powerline workers and locomotive engineers, we were told, were important to give women the confidence that all fields were open to them, but the emphasis has now changed to generally encouraging women to take part in productive labor in order to promote the Four Modernizations.
>
> (Note: In the spring of 1983 visitors who persisted in questioning why women employees who performed the demanding task of threading the silk from cocoons immersed in boiling water were paid on the low side of the wage scale were told, "It's just unfair but that's the way it is." Also, 6.9 percent of the members of the Central Committee of the CCP are women.)

The effect of the new responsibility system on the rural Chinese women is yet to be seen. The Chinese press suggests it will increase her visibility as a wage earner and quotes a husband whose wife earned 1,700 yuan one year, "I never expected you would earn more than I do." (Wu: 18)

This was obviously an exceptional case. Whether men will permit their wives to engage in more renumerative tasks is unclear. The pattern has been for the men to have the more skilled jobs and there are few women handling the hand tractors or driving the big machines. The following exchange with a peasant woman may be closer to the reality.

> "What do you do?" I ask.
>
> "Me? I don't do anything. I can't do anything. I have

no skills at all."

"Well, how many days did you work last year?"

"About 300."

"But what did you do?"

"Nothing. I just farmed."

(Butler, The Washington Post, 10-19-80)

Education

(Note: The following historical overview is taken from "An Introduction to Education in the People's Republic of China and U.S.-China Educational Exchanges" by Thomas Fingar and Linda A. Reed. . . a joint project of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China and the National Association for Student Affairs. Much of the material in the section on the structure of education came from the same publication. Additional copies of the publication can be obtained from the publisher, U.S.-China Education Clearinghouse, 1860 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. Reprinted by permission of the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1860 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.)

Restoration, Reform and Expansion (1949-66) Like their Nationalist predecessors, the Communist officials who took power in 1949 regarded the education system as critical to the success of their effort to transform China. Accordingly, they immediately set out to restore and transform the schools. The return of peace made it possible to enroll more students and to refurbish classrooms, libraries and laboratories. Teaching techniques and materials developed in Communist base areas (see X-G) were introduced throughout the country, but major transformation of the system had to await rehabilitation of existing facilities and formulation of overall plans and policies.

Beginning in 1952-53, China adopted the education system that had been developed in the Soviet Union. Many elements of the Soviet approach (e.g., emphasis on science and technology, early and narrow specialization and central control of the school system and curricula) were also part of the Chinese system that had evolved since 1905. Others, such as reorganization of existing schools and creation of new colleges and universities to achieve greater institutional specialization, the establishment of separate research institutes under the Academy of Sciences and various ministries other than the Ministry of Education and the establishment (and/or assignment) of secondary schools subordinate to production ministries with the goal of training workers for particular industries, were new.

Enrollments in primary and secondary schools increased steadily and the quality of instruction improved as new teachers were trained and more materials, many of them translated from Russian originals, were made available. College enrollments also increased, but at a much slower rate. Selection was based primarily on academic achievement as demonstrated by performance on standardized examinations. The desire to concentrate resources to ensure high quality while simultaneously expanding enrollment opportunities led to the creation of a hierarchy of schools at all levels of the system. "Key" schools were assigned the best teachers and best students, and graduates of the best schools were assured the most important positions.

As in preceding decades, thousands of young people went abroad to study; whereas they had previously gone to the West and Japan, they now went to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Perhaps 40,000 Chinese were trained abroad (in the 1950s). . . Chinese colleges and universities concentrated on the training of undergraduates; only some 15,000-20,000 graduate students were enrolled prior to 1966.

Cultural Revolution In mid-1966, China entered a ten year period of political and social turmoil known as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," or, in more recent parlance, the "lost decade." Every facet of Chinese society was affected, but the educational system suffered the most severe disruption and the most serious consequences. Schools were closed entirely for periods ranging from a few months (in the case of primary and most secondary schools) to several years (colleges did not reopen until 1971-72). When they reopened, they were radically different than they had been in the spring of 1966.

Primary and secondary enrollments increased dramatically, but the quality of instruction dropped precipitously because experienced teachers were withdrawn but not replaced and classroom discipline evaporated. According to official PRC reports, 160 million young people were victimized by misguided education policies that reversed past emphasis on academic achievement; many of these young people are said to be barely literate.

The impact on higher education was even more serious. When colleges did reopen, programs were reduced from four-six to only two-three years, political cant and "practical experience" were substituted for theoretical or substantive courses in science, economics, engineering or other specialities and enrollments were based on peer recommendation and "class background" rather than academic achievement. Senior faculty were critized and often assigned to menial jobs within the university or in remote locations. Highly trained younger faculty were unable to conduct research, pursue their specialities or stay abreast of developments in their fields.

Perhaps the easiest way to summarize the changes in the education system that occurred during the Cultural Revolution is to contrast the objectives and practices of that period to those of the preceding decades. For example, emphasis on science and engineering was displaced by injunctions to study politics and apply the "Thought of Mao Zedong." Steady centralization and standardization in the realm of education was reversed; individual schools and teachers prepared their own materials and local units took responsibility for schools. Concentration of resources and an emphasis on quality gave way to dispersion and pursuit of absolute equality. By and large, education was reduced to the lowest common demoninator.

While it is true, as is now acknowledged by Chinese officials, that the country and its education system will pay a heavy price for the misguided policies and unintended consequences of the Cultural Revolution, the situation was not entirely bleak. Some of those selected to attend colleges by peer groups were quite intelligent and did maximize the opportunity to study. Some, perhaps several thousand, youth unable to attend formal classes were tutored by friends or relatives or simply read everything available. But these and other bright spots exist despite, not because of, the measures adopted by the Party leaders now derisively labeled the "Gang of Four."

Recovery and Transformation (1977-) One of the first tasks undertaken in late 1976 by the leaders who assumed power after the death of Mao and purge of the "Gang of Four" was restoration of the educational system that had existed on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. . . Academic achievement has been restored as the primary criterion for admission not only to colleges and universities but also to the best ("key") middle schools. Science and engineering have regained preeminence in the curricula of secondary and tertiary schools, and enrollments in primary and secondary schools have been reduced in order to improve the quality of instruction. On a rotating basis, teachers are being released from classroom duties so they can return to school for additional study. Once compelled to spend endless periods in meetings and "political study," specialists now are assured that they can devote most working hours to their professions. Whereas very few students studied abroad during the Cultural Revolution, thousands now attend classes in Western and Japanese colleges and universities. Graduate training in China has been restored, but the government still sponsors thousands of carefully selected graduate students enrolled in foreign institutions.

Restoration is not the only objective of current policies in education. Gradually, and on a very small scale, China is beginning to transform the educational system that has evolved over the past several decades. For example, students are beginning to be offered a larger number of electives and are given opportunities to take courses outside their own departments. Research in universities (as well as in separate institutes) is assuming greater importance in terms of both student preparation and faculty enrichment. The rigid and exclusive institutional divisions introduced during the 1950s are being questioned and, in a few cases, replaced by plans to expand the number of "comprehensive" universities and interinstitutional links. Such experiments are still quite limited, but a few years ago they would not even have been considered.

The Structure of Education Although 93 percent of the school-age children are enrolled in primary school, only 65 percent complete the five year compulsory course. The drop-out rate is higher in the countryside where the distance between the school and home, problems "keeping up," and difficulties financing local schools are cited as reasons for the lower attendance rate. The classes are large -- averaging around 40-50 students. Instruction includes Chinese language, arithmetic, "general knowledge" or civics, physical education, and art and music. Classes are six days a week, six hours a day. The "key" primary schools which provide better educational opportunities are being eliminated in some cities. However, observers note that "experimental" schools are being established to permit educational innovation.

There are two levels of secondary education. At the lower level is the three-year junior middle school, which until 1982 had a mainly academic program based on civics, science, math and Chinese language. The student continues his/her education in the two year senior middle school. Admission to the "key" academic college preparatory middle schools is usually by examination -- but it can also be determined by residential area. There is no "busing" program in China.

In late 1982 it was announced that the secondary school curriculum is being significantly altered to accommodate to the 92-96 percent of the senior middle school population that is not college-bound. Although the "key" schools are being retained for those students whose academic record indicates they should receive college training, the number of regular, academic middle schools is being substantially limited to provide for a greatly expanded number of secondary vocational and technical schools. Officials comment "it is necessary to train skilled workers, not just top scientists and engineers." In 1981 there were 60 percent fewer students in the academic middle schools than in 1977 and the secondary technical school enrollment was up 55.3 percent. (Wen: 25)

Authorities at all levels of government are disturbed about the concept of key schools and concern about educational elitism has stopped the tracking of primary school children in a number of areas. Nonetheless, key schools are considered essential at the secondary level. "Having limited resources, it is necessary to concentrate manpower and funds by investing somewhat more in those schools which have better foundations."

Students in a key senior middle school are under great pressure to achieve. They are exposed to better teachers, more resources and demanding courses. The school day starts at eight and is over about four. The core curriculum involves Chinese and foreign language, math, science, Chinese and world history and courses comparable to United States civics courses. Students do a major portion of their homework in the school study hall. However, as the July examination date approaches, anxious students can be seen on quiet corners of parks or studying under street lights at night. There are organized sports events and some extra-curricular activities such as stamp collecting.

Students typically live with their families and unlike their American counterparts they do not have part-time jobs. Any spending money comes from their family. Recreation involves school outings, movies, sports events and endless window shopping and talking with friends. A record album or tape with eight songs costs about 3 yuan or $1.95. The music would seem outdated to an American teenager but for the Chinese student whose exposure to Western music has been very limited, the tangoes and waltzes and ballads are a new experience.

The examination which is required for all students who wish to enter college is given on two consecutive days in July in 2000 widely scattered test centers. There are six parts. All the candidates take a two-hour exam in each of the following subject areas: politics, math, Chinese language and literature (2 1/2 hours) and a foreign language. Students with a concentration in science then take two-hour examinations in physics and chemistry; those with a concentration in the liberal arts are tested in history and geography. The passing scores are adjusted yearly to assure there will be places for all students who pass. They are also adjusted regionally to guarantee wide geographic representation.

The 4-6 percent of the senior middle school graduates who go on to higher education are assigned to college on the basis of their scores, their desires, physical well-being, the colleges' preferences and "cultural heritage," which means that special consideration should be given to "national minorities, overseas Chinese and compatriots from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao." Class background is no longer said to be a consideration. (Note: Copies of The 1978 National College Entrance Examination in the People's Republic of China can be purchased for $4.00 (prepaid) from the Supt. of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402; stock number 017-080-02049-1. It includes comment by American analysts.)

College students have a large responsibility to themselves and to their country. Upon graduation students are immediately assigned to jobs which will use their talents. The chance to travel, to meet with foreigners and to generally have a more sophisticated experience is much greater for the college graduate.

The typical day for a college student begins at 6 with exercises and breakfast and an hour of study before 8 o'clock classes. There are four hours of class in the morning followed by a two hour midday break for lunch and a rest, classes or study in the library in the afternoon, an hour of sports, supper at 6 and then two to three more hours of study in the evening. Six students usually share a room which is crammed with bunk beds and desks. The students bring their own wash bowls and eating utensils from home. Electricity, heat and hot water are limited. Housing and course work is free and each student receives a stipend of 19.5 yuan ($12.70) a month to pay for food.

Undergraduates start work in their major area of concentration in their freshman year. For the next three years they take five courses a semester following a standard curriculum. In the last year they may take electives. The college year is ten months long.

Master's and doctoral degress are now being awarded in selected fields.

China attaches great importance to a large variety of part-time schools, work-study arrangements, correspondence schools, on-site vocational training, and other facilities outside the "traditional" educational structure. People of all ages and backgrounds participate in these educational opportunities, which are aimed at compensating somewhat for the opportunities which were lost during the Cultural Revolution.

A quick look at recent policy statements which emphasize the priority being given educational development suggests that increasing rural primary school enrollment, assuring a larger representation of college students from rural areas, providing more opportunities for technical and vocational training at the secondary level, more professional training in the graduate schools and increasing evening courses and television and radio courses, are the educational priorities for the coming years.

ENRICHMENT

I. The following letter was written by a Chinese college student studying in Iowa. It was reprinted in China. Ask your students to read this letter and try to identify the message for Chinese readers.

> When I walked into the elevator, it was already packed. The students were carrying brightly colored knapsacks, some with letters of the university embossed. I could tell what

some of them studied by their dress. One student had a stethoscope hanging out of his white jacket pocket. I noticed that none of them wore ties or flared pants. Some had tattered sleeves, and others, patches on their elbows. I only recognized one student. He was an economics major from Lisbon. Once at the library I saw him, reading a huge textbook. It was after 11 p.m. Rubbing his tired eyes he said, 'Can't catch up. We're supposed to ready twenty-five chapters a week. . .'

It was already rush hour, and the cars dashed toward downtown trying to get to work. Just as I finished my exercise, the Blue Route, a free bus provided by the University, pulled up to the bridge. I got on the bus with the others. The young driver had a thin jaw, reminding me very much of Keats'. His knapsack was pale blue.

When the bus reached Washington Street, I got off with a group of students. 'Keats' got off behind me. A blonde girl who replaced 'Keats' at the driver's seat said "Hi," then put her back pack on the floor. I decided to walk with 'Keats' a little. 'Are you a work-study student?' I asked. 'That's right,' he smiled. As we walked toward the University, he told me that he made four dollars an hour, which was barely enough to cover the cost of room and board in his cheap apartment. The rent was a little over a hundred dollars.

'How about tuition?' I asked. He looked at his watch and started to walk faster. 'I've taken out loans and will have to pay them back after I graduate.' When we parted, he turned the corner near the tennis court. I watched him as he ran toward a brick building, concerned that I may have made him late with my meddling questions.

I walked away from the University and toward the plaza area of this small town. I perused the lovely displays in the shop windows: the latest fashions, shiny jewelry, and plush furniture. Suddenly, I heard an 'Excuse me;' it was a young man wearing a flannel shirt, sweeping the sidewalk. 'Working and going to college?' I asked. 'Sure,' he relayed proudly...

'Eating breakfast, sir?' A young computer major from Shanghai sat down across from me. His family lives in Cedar Rapids and his father is a famous scientist. . .

'How are you doing in school?' I was concerned about him.

'Oh, it's not easy,' he replied, frowning. 'The scholarships here are not like those back home. They don't come automatically, they depend on your grades. If your grades are poor, you might not get the money next year.' I pointed out the waitress who was pouring coffee. 'All these students workers, where are they all coming from?' He then told me an interesting story.

Last winter he worked as a dishwasher in a large restaurant. There were three girls working with him. On Christmas Eve, one girl took off her apron, grabbed her check, put her fur coat on and said good-night. She left in a large luxurious car. Later, he found out that her father was the president of a large insurance firm in Chicago and that her family owned a villa and a private airplane. He pondered why she needed to take up a menial job washing dishes and concluded that young Americans are proud of being self-reliant, and are reluctant to depend on their parents for money. This girl took a job washing dishes to satisfy her need to feel independent.

On the way home, I walked down Jefferson and Dubuque Streets. Around me people were busy doing their lawnwork. One brawny kid was cutting firewood with an electric saw. They were all working hard. I decided not to bother them with questions.

I thought about the earlier years in the times of Franklin and Lincoln, then tried to assess the present situation in my own country. There, a cadre member's job is like an "iron rice bowl" — his position is assured lifelong. Scholarships are given regardless of the student academic record. Without competition, without challenges of any kind, how can we catch up with the advanced countries?"

(Translated by Marilyn Chin and Agnes Lee Sullivan. Reprinted in China Update, Midwest China Center, Jan. 1981, with permission of the editor of China Exchange News, Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China)

These comments of one classroom provoked a wide ranging discussion.

1. American students are hardworking and serious. They are not rich.
2. Unlike in China, there is no free education or room and board. Things are expensive in the United States.
3. Everyone works very hard in the United States but the amount of merchandise available in the shops indicates there are rewards for this hard work.
4. There seems to be a minimum of "class distinction" between those who work with their hands and those who work with their heads. Indeed, the students see nothing unusual in doing a variety of jobs -- studying, driving buses, sweeping sidewalks and cutting firewood.
5. The children of financially secure parents want to be independent and self-reliant.
6. Too much security, such as that which is implicit in the "iron rice bowl" concept where workers seldom get discharged, can inhibit progress.

II. These two lessons are from current textbooks used nationally in the People's Republic of China. The questions come from the texts.

"Eight Coins" (from a second grade reader)

"When comrade Zhou En-Lai was young, he studied in the city of Shen-Yang and lived in his uncle's house which was quite a distance from the school. His uncle didn't have much income and could afford only a few coins for Zhou En-Lai each day to buy lunch. Zhou En-Lai often bought two buns and put some vegetables in between as lunch. When it was cold, he would take the buns to the boiler room of the school to be heated.

An old man took care of the boiler. Zhou En-Lai often helped him chop wood and add water. The old man liked the hard-working young man very much.

One day Zhou En-Lai was heating his buns. The old man found that he did not have anything between the buns and asked in concern: 'How come there is no vegetable in between? Are you out of money?' Zhou En-Lai said, "No. I am saving money to buy books and newspapers.' The old man said movingly, 'What a nice kid!'

Another time, the old man was sick and did not come to work. The students did not have water to drink, so Zhou En-lai went to the boiler room and boiled water for the students to drink. After school he took the eight coins he saved for books and newspapers and went to the old man's home. He wanted the old man to have the money to buy medicine with. The old man understood that it was not easy to save those coins and insisted on declining the offer. Zhou En-Lai said sincerely, 'It's more important than anything else for you to recover from the illness.' The old man accepted the eight coins and, with tears in his eyes, embraced Zhou En-Lai in his arms."

Answer the following questions:
1. Why did the old man like Zhou En-Lai?
2. How did Zhou En-Lai care about the old man?

"Silkworm and Spider" (from a fourth grade reader)

"The silkworm and the spider are both weaving experts,
They decide to have a contest to see who has better results.
The peacock offers his beautiful feathers
As a prize for the winner to keep.

The spider first climbs up to the eaves,
It circles around and spins without stop.
Before long it has woven a web
It is complex and small, the silk interlocking.

The spider immediately explains to everybody
The webs I spin are strong and durable.
It can capture many insects everyday.
Three meals a day, I don't have to worry about food.

The fat white silkworm climbs up the grass hill,
Left one step, right one step, it climbs up without haste.
Before long it has spun a round cocoon
The snow-white cocoon is bright and shiny.

The silkworm also tells everyone:
'The silk I put out is never kept by myself.
I want to give it to people.
To weave into colorful fabrics.'

The peacock fulfills everyone's wishes,
And hands over the prize to the silkworm.
'Silkworm works for everybody, spider only works for himself.
This glorious reward should be kept by silkworm.'"

After reading the chapter, think what the spider and the cocoon (silkworm?) were contesting about. How did the spider spin the web, how did the silkworm spin the cocoon? Pay attention to the third, fifth, sixth paragraphs; think about how the spider and the silkworm introduced their results to everybody. They were both weaving experts. Why did the peacock award the prize to the silkworm?

III. In 1981 rural expenditure per capita was cited as:

Foodstuffs	59.7 (percent)	113.8 yuan per annum
Clothing	12.3	23.6
Housing	9.8	18.7
Other necessities	10.2	19.5
Fuel	5.6	10.6
Cultural expenses	2.4	4.6
	100 percent	190.8 yuan

Total income per capita was 223.4 yuan. Thus the person had a savings of 32.6 yuan. (Data from Klatt: 48)

These figures can be compared to those of a Tenant Household in 1933 (see X-E). Students can compute percentages to arrive at comparable figures. The data can also be used to make rough percentage comparisons with an American family budget.

XI. D.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Textbook Treatment

The discussion of China's foreign policy is mainly confined to an accurate overview of the initial alliance with the Soviet Union and the subsequent Sino-Soviet split. The one text that deals with foreign policy in any detail stresses the recovery of the territory held by the Manchus -- with the exception of Taiwan and Russia's Far Eastern provinces -- and the development of the atom bomb. The more recent texts mention rapprochement with the United States as a step toward world peace.

China's Changing Role in the Contemporary World

(In order to provide teachers with some indices which can be used to analyze specific events -- both past and future -- we have adapted a long essay with the above title, written by Harry Harding, co-chairman of the China Council of The Asia Society. This essay examines continuities and change in China's foreign policy. In our adaptation we present the continuities, which in the author's view are fundamental, and we discuss change, or specific events, within the framework of these continuities. We have omitted the author's long overview of the complex history of China's foreign relations. Readers can obtain a complete copy of the essay from the China Council of The Asia Society, 725 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021.)

Introduction

Seen through Western eyes, there has been great change and volatility in Chinese foreign relations over the past thirty years. Consider the following examples:

-- In the mid-1950s, China and the Soviet Union had an extremely close civilian and military relationship, with the Soviet Union providing extensive assistance to the modernization of both China's economy and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. (See Economic and Social Development.) Today, the two countries have terminated their treaty of friendship and alliance, the Soviet Union has deployed forty divisions along the Sino-Soviet frontier, and the Chinese describe the U.S.S.R. as a hegemonic power that is the greatest threat to world peace.

-- In the 1950s, China was locked in confrontation with the United States. The two countries went to war on the Korean peninsula, and engaged in two dangerous confrontations in the Taiwan Straits. China was using a combination of diplomatic overtures and revolutionary subversion to encourage the smaller Asian states to turn away from the United States, and was calling for a worldwide struggle against "American imperialism and its lackeys." The United States, in turn, refused to extend diplomatic recognition to Peking, sought to embargo China from trade with any Western country, tried to encircle China with a network of military alliances in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, and stated that its long-term policy was to "hasten the passing" of the Communist regime on the mainland. In the late 1970s, in contrast, the two countries established diplomatic relations, developed a wide range of commercial, scientific, and cultural exchanges, and found common ground on a wide range of international and regional issues. Some Americans -- and even some Chinese -- found it possible to consider Peking as very nearly an ally of the United States, Japan, and NATO in a coalition against the Soviet Union, and as a possible recipient of American and European arms.

-- In the early 1950s, immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic, the new Chinese government undertook a variety of measures designed to eliminate the Western economic presence in China and to eradicate Western influence in Chinese scientific and educational institutions. Now, in the early 1980s, Peking appears to welcome investment, scientific cooperation, and loans from Western governments, multinational corporations, and international economic institutions, and is sending large numbers of students and scholars to study in universities and research centers in the West.

-- In the early 1950s, and especially in the 1960s, China called for an upsurge in armed struggle around the world, directed against "reactionary" governments aligned with the United States, held up its own experience in revolution and development as models for leftist groups in other countries, and provided extensive rhetorical and material support to such movements. Today, China has attenuated its links with most national liberation movements, foresworn any attempt to "export revolution" to other countries, and warned that other communist parties can expect to receive only moral support from Peking.

Looking at examples such as these, most Western observers emphasize the changes in Chinese foreign policy since 1949. China has shifted from an alignment with the Soviet Union to an alignment with the United States, and from a posture of rejecting the international order to basically accepting it. And that shift has been one of the most fundamental transformations in the post-war era -- and one of the most beneficial to the United States.

Examining the same record, in contrast, the Chinese themselves usually stress the continuities in their foreign relations. China, they say, has consistently followed a number of basic principles in its foreign affairs. It has opposed hegemonism and imperialism, and supported the process of de-colonization and opposed the remnants of colonialism. It has attempted to preserve its own sovereignty and independence, and to develop its economy and military strength through a policy of self-reliance. It has sought peaceful coexistence with other countries, even while expressing support, in a spirit of "proletarian internationalism," with progressive forces abroad. In short, Chinese leaders insist that their country's foreign policy has been unvarying in its basic orientation and goals. As Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang put it in his report to the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, "China follows an overall long-term strategy, and is definitely not swayed by expediency or by anybody's instigation or provocation."

This difference in perspective invites a closer examination of the issue of change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy since 1949. The basic thesis of this essay is that both viewpoints are correct; that China's foreign relations have experienced both continuity and change; and that understanding China's contemporary foreign relations demands attention to both the enduring and the transient. Similarly, predictions of China's future roles in international affairs require an estimate of whether the changes of the past thirty years have now ceased, or will continue; and whether the apparent continuities of past decades are enduring, or ephemeral.

Continuities

Of the continuities which have dominated Chinese foreign policy, none is more important than China's concern with its security and sovereignty. In part, this reflects the modern history of China: the fact that China was the victim of repeated military pressure from foreign powers from the Opium War of the 1840s through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s. Over the course of a century, this pressure resulted in the opening of increasing numbers of Chinese ports to foreign trade, the extension of extraterritorial privileges to foreigners, the steady loss of territory around the periphery of China, the opening of China to foreign investment and missionary work, the cession or lease of ports along the Chinese coast to foreign countries, and the division of China into informal "spheres of influence." Ultimately, the pressure led to the Japanese invasion, first of Manchuria, then of China proper, in an attempt to make China a semi-colony of Japan. (See Section IX)

Since 1949, China has continued to have understandable justifiable concerns about its security and sovereignty. Parts of Chinese territory, including Taiwan, Hong King, and Macao, are ruled by authorities other than the government in Peking. The two superpowers have, in succession, attempted to construct networks of bases and alliances that would encircle China militarily and isolate it diplomatically. Few other major powers have felt so threatened, for such a long period of time, and by such powerful adversaries, as has China. (The United States was the first offender through its system of bilateral and multilateral alliances, which followed the Korean War.)

Peking considered the American advance north of the 38th parallel in the Korean War to be so threatening as to require its own intervention in the conflict. What was worse, Washington used the occasion of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, even before Chinese involvement, to interpose the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Mainland. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the United States began to construct a network of bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements in Asia -- security treaties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; multilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia (SEATO) and Oceania (ANZUS) -- that were directed, at least in part, against China. And Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described American policy toward China as an attempt to "hasten the passing" of Communist rule on the Mainland.

All these developments provided China with further evidence that the United States presented a significant threat to its security. Washington, in Peking's eyes, was interested in thwarting the complete reunification of China under Communist rule by its support for Taiwan, in encircling the PRC with a network of military bases and alliances, and ultimately in the destruction of the People's Republic. Given this situation, it might have seemed only logical for China to maintain its alliance with the Soviet Union as a counterweight against the United States. (The affect of the Sino-Soviet Alliance on the industrial development of China is discussed in Economic and Social Development.)

In the security sphere, the Sino-Soviet alliance, embodied in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance of February 1950, involved extensive military cooperation between the two countries. Moscow extended its nuclear umbrella over China, transferred both weapons and military doctrine to help modernize and professionalize the Chinese armed forces, and aided China to develop a capacity to produce its own conventional weapons. The degree of trust between the two countries was reflected in a 1957 agreement on nuclear cooperation, in which the Soviet Union agreed to proved the PRC with a sample atomic bomb and the technical data concerning its manufacture. In return, Peking agreed to identify China with the socialist camp, acknowledge (and, at crucial points, promote) the Kremlin's leadership of that camp, and coordinate China's foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union.

And yet, China never seemed completely comfortable with this alignment with the Soviet Union. For one thing, it was not the first choice of a number of leaders of the CCP, including both Zhou Enlai and, at least for a time, Mao Zedong. The relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists during the Chinese civil war had been quite strained, with Stalin repeatedly giving his Chinese comrades unwise and self-serving advice on how to conduct their revolutions against the warlords and the Nationalist government.

For another, while the Soviet Union was generous to China in many ways -- particularly in its willingness to assist the PRC develop nuclear weapons -- Moscow also struck a hard bargain in its relations with Peking. In exchange for the military alliance of 1950, Stalin demanded, and received, continued privileges in China, including the formation of four joint-stock companies and the retention of Soviet port facilities and naval bases in Dairen and Port Arthur. During the First Five Year Plan, the Chinese complained of Stalin's rather clumsy attempts to incorporate the Chinese economy into Soviet economic plans. And once Nikita Khrushchev began to speak of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Peking began to worry that Moscow might choose to sacrifice Chinese interests for the sake of improving its relations with the United States. (This perception that China might become a pawn in Moscow's game of international relations was one of the reasons for the Sino-Soviet split which effectively ended the trading relationship between the two countries in the early 1960s and set the stage for an exchange of polemics. China's pursuit of an independent foreign policy which would provide for security while maintaining her sovereignty was manifested in establishing diplomatic ties with Gaullist France in 1964.)

But the main theme of Chinese foreign policy (in its quest for security) in the 1960s was a radical attempt to mobilize the Third World to join an international united front against both superpowers, and the international system which they allegedly dominated. Peking encouraged Third World countries to support Indonesia's call for the creation of a new United Nations organized around the "newly emerging forces" of the developing world, to take Djakarta's side in its "confrontation" with Malaysia, to refuse economic assistance from the Soviet Union and the United States, to support national liberation movements working against the remaining colonies and apartheid regimes in Africa, and to oppose the partial nuclear test ban treaty negotiated between the Soviet Union and the West. China also began to provide greater rhetorical -- and, in some cases, material -- support to revolutionary movements in countries whose governments refused to recognize the PRC, voted against Peking's admission to the United Nations, or maintained close military and political ties with the West.

The Chinese efforts did not produce much support. China did not have the military or economic capability to provide large amounts of assistance to most national liberation or revolutionary movements, except in Vietnam. And the issues around which Peking chose to construct its united front -- essentially opposition to the United States, the Soviet Union, and all pro-Western developing countries -- were simply not attractive to many Third World governments.

By the end of the 1960s, however, the Chinese concluded that the international isolation produced by the Cultural Revolution was becoming increasingly dangerous. Throughout the latter part of the decade, both China and the Soviet Union had reinforced the military forces deployed along their common frontier, thus introducing a military element into what had originally been a political and polemical conflict.

The possibility of a large-scale Soviet attack against China, in the name of preserving socialism in Peking (threatened China's security and forced a reappraisal of policy options. One of them was rapprochement with a) new American administration, under Richard Nixon, which seemed willing to seek an accomodation with Peking as a means to bolster its deteriorating strategic position.

By the beginning of 1983, however, the policy of close cooperation with the United States (which evolved over the ensuing decade and culminated in formal diplomatic recognition in 1979) seemed to be undergoing significant modification.

The immediate cause of the problem, of course, was the reemergence of the Taiwan issue to complicate the relationship between Washington and Peking. (China's sovereignty over Taiwan is a consistent theme in its foreign policy.) The Chinese suspected the Reagan Administration of wishing to upgrade American relations with Taipei, and of following what was tantamount to a "two China" policy. What is more, Peking was also disappointed that neither the normalization of Sino-American relations in late 1978, the publication of its position on the reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland, nor the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty a year later, had persuaded Taipei to begin negotiations with Peking over the future of the island. Thus, in the fall of 1981, China demanded that the United States agree to a timetable for halting the sale of all weapons to Taipei.

The Reagan Administration's response was quite conciliatory. In early 1982, it announced that it had decided not to sell an advanced fighter aircraft, the so-called F-X, to Taiwan. And in August 1982, China and the United States issued a joint communique in which the United States pledged that its future arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, in quality or quantity, the level since normalization, and that it intended gradually to reduce those sales over an unspecified period of time. For their part, while still refusing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, the Chinese described their proposals for a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland as representing a "fundamental policy."

(So, as the above overview would suggest, most of China's major foreign policy moves have been influenced to a great degree by her concern with both her sovereignty and security.)

(A second consistency in Chinese foreign policy is) the Chinese image of the underlying nature of international politics. It is an image of struggle: an image of the rise of hegemonic powers, the formation of a united front of weaker powers against them, their eventual overextension as they encounter the determined resistance of the anti-hegemonic united front, and their gradual decline into passivity. It is, in a way, a volcanic theory of international affairs, dealing with the emergence, and ultimate extinction, of explosive threats to international peace and stability. This leads Chinese leaders to ask a consistent set of questions as they analyze international affairs. Which powers are rising, and becoming hegemonic? What are their strategies for global domination? What are their strengths and weaknesses? What united front can be mobilized against them?

As a result of this view of the world, the Chinese always placed their own security and sovereignty in a global context. Rather than viewing their security concerns purely in local terms, they have tended to see them as part of the broader global strategy of the hegemonic power(s) of the moment. Thus, the United States contained China in the 1950s as part of its attempt to maintain hegemony over the rest of Asia. (Once that hegemony was irretrievably lost with the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Washington was finally ready to come to terms with Peking.) While Peking never said so formally, some Chinese scholars implied that the United States had, in effect, been so weakened by its experience in Vietnam that it was no longer an active imperialist power, but had fallen, like Britain and France before it, into the ranks of the Second World.

Similarly, the unsuccessful attempts to mobilize the Third World in the mid-1960s (discussed earlier) can also be considered a response to the rise of the hegemonic powers. Dissatisfaction in China with their country's growing reputation as a status quo power closely aligned with the United States (a great power was also one of the causes of a reorientation of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1980s).

There were repeated assertions of Chinese independence from the United States. China, Hu Yaobang declared in his report to the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982, adheres to an "independent foreign policy," and "never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power."

These developments permitted Peking to move closer to an equidistant position -- or, as the Chinese preferred to describe it, an "independent" position -- between the two superpowers. As one Chinese journal put it, China will

> totally oppose hegemony, no matter who seeks it or where it is sought. . . On the Afghan and Kampuchean issues, both China and the Soviet Union oppose the United States in supporting Israeli aggression and the South African apartheid rule. This does not mean that China 'allies' with the United States under some circumstances, or become a Soviet partner under other circumstances. [Instead,] this precisely proves that. . . China is independent of all the superpowers.

(The move to this equidistant position can also be attributed, in part, to China's perception of a less threatening Soviet Union. Previously, in the mid-1970s) the continuing expansion by the Soviet Union and its allies -- exemplified by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one year later -- raised the threat of a Soviet diplomatic and military encirclement of China. In the early 1980s, however, many Chinese appear to have concluded that the momentum that the Soviet Union had established in the mid-1970s was now fading, as Moscow became bogged down in an inconclusive conflict in Afghanistan, in a chronic crisis in Eastern Europe, and in its own economic and administrative inefficiency. That, coupled with the resurgence of American military strength under the Reagan Administration, led the Chinese to the assessment that the Soviet Union was not likely to achieve the strategic breakthrough over the United States that Peking had been predicting in the late 1970s. In the Chinese analyses, the Soviet Union remained the major threat to world peace and stability, but the threat of the "polar bear" was not described in as apocalyptic terms in 1982 as it had been a few years earlier. As a consequence, the need for a universal united front against Soviet hegemonism had somewhat declined.

The globalism of Chinese foreign policy doctrine can be traced to several mutually reinforcing sources. From traditional China comes the perception of a single world of "all under heaven," that can be comprehended by a single doctrine of governance and organized through a single system of relationships. From Leninism comes the theory of global imperialism (see X-C), and the concept of a united front against it. And from the earliest days of Chinese Marxism comes the conviction that Chinese history represents not an exception to universal patterns of development, but rather a direct reflection of them.

China's concern with its own security has not, however, led China to seek, in a continuous or unquestioning way, more powerful patrons and protectors in the West. Indeed, a third continuity in Chinese foreign policy. . . is China's ambivalence about turning to the West for economic assistance, advanced technology, or modern institutions. Even those who have advocated doing so have often warned that China might lose its traditional cultural values, or become economically and culturally dependent upon its foreign patrons. (This concern was carried to extremes during the Cultural Revolution with the revival of) a strongly xenophobic Chinese nativism, similar in some regards to the anti-foreignism of the Boxer Rebellion of the turn of the century. The avowed domestic purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the institutionalization of privilege and elitism; in foreign affairs, it was to ensure the country against corrosive influences from abroad. The recall of every Chinese ambassador, save one, during the Cultural Revolution was, in part, occasioned by the organizational chaos within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, to an equally significant degree, it was also a symbol of the radicals' desire to insulate China from the corruption of contact with foreigners.

The xenophobia and nativism of the Cultural Revolution was reflected in other ways, as well. Red Guards surrounded the Soviet Embassy in Peking, submitting it to a constant barrage of revolutionary rhetoric broadcast from makeshift loudspeakers. The dependents of Soviet diplomats, seeking to leave China for home, were forced to crawl on their knees to the airplane waiting for them at Peking airport. The British legation in Peking was burned to the ground; and a Reuters correspondent was seized and placed in solitary confinement.

(And, in 1982, this anxiety about jeopardizing Chinese values persists. Local newspapers state:

> We must seek only advanced foreign culture and art and make foreign things serve China. . . But we must resolutely resist corrosive capitalist ideas and bourgeois ways of life and can never allow them to spread unchecked. [Lampton: 21])

In the same way, despite the ancient tradition of "using barbarians to control barbarians". . . modern Chinese have often been skeptical about the reliability of using one foreign power as a diplomatic counterweight against another. As a result, China has tended to be a somewhat querulous ally, suspicious that its major protector might decide to reach its own accomodation with their common enemy, sacrificing China's national interests in the process.

Thus, while China has undergone cycles of alignment and isolation, reflecting its ambivalence toward interaction with the West, the center of gravity of modern Chinese politics is a commitment to strategic independence and economic self-reliance. While engaging in economic and strategic relationships with stronger powers, these principles require that China take care to preserve the initiative, protect its sovereignty, and ensure its own independence of action. As one overview of Chinese foreign policy in late 1982 put it, "our right to maintain independence and keep the initiative in our own hands is the fruit from ground irrigated with the blood of numerous martyrs. It is the most precious thing in the world. No one can damage it."

While mistrustful of stronger allies, China has sought to identify itself with what it considers to be weaker "progressive" forces abroad, and encourage them to join in a united front against the hegemonic powers of the time. On occasion, as during the Cultural Revolution, Peking has defined "progressivism" extremely narrowly, to include only a handful of radical Maoist insurgency movements. More commonly, China is believed by all (or at least most) Third World governments to constitute this international progressive force. This reflects not only China's reading of Marxism-Leninism, but also its strong sense of a common history with the other developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Together, China's mistrust of larger powers and its orientation toward the Third World have led it to identify itself more as one of the developing countries of the Third World than as a member of either the socialist bloc or the Western camp.

And yet, China has often appeared to be somewhat aloof and detached from the very causes it espouses. Even during the radicalism of the 1960s, China assigned relatively few resources to the support of friendly revolutionary movements abroad. As part of its support for a new international economic order in the 1970s, Peking promoted the formation of producers' cartels and cooperation among the Third World countries, but it simultaneously refused to join either OPEC or the Group of 77. China explains its reticence in terms of limited material resources, and a desire to avoid detailed involvement in contentious issues that might split the united front that they wish to form. But perhaps the deeper explanation is China's underlying desire for independence of action. That same force that prevents Peking from too close an alignment with either superpower has also prevented it from forging too close a relationship with the Third World.

A final continuity worthy of note is China's toughness and self-confidence in its international behavior, even in dealing with more powerful adversaries. It is one of few countries that has been willing to declare its open opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union. While showing flexibility in its day-to-day diplomacy, it has displayed a rigid attachment to its basic principles and goals. It states forceful and well-articulated positions on virtually every major international issue, from Soviet-American relations to regional conflicts within the Third World. Whether this reflects a pride in China's history and culture, a faith in the innate strength of a billion people, or a confidence in the accuracy of judgements made in accordance with official Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Chinese leaders have usually conveyed a sense of determination and certitude that few other countries have matched.

Conclusion

Chinese foreign policy since 1949, then, has contained elements of both change and continuity. Its degree of involvement with the rest of the world, its position in the ongoing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, its international status and influence, and its relative satisfaction with the present international system have all undergone significant change over the last thirty-odd years. At the same time, China continues to view international politics as a struggle for hegemony among the superpowers, to seek ways of preserving its security and sovereignty, to treat stronger allies with a good measure of mistrust, and to orient itself principally toward the other developing countries of the Third World.

What has remained relatively constant thus far, in other words, has been the fundamentals of Chinese foreign policy: its basic organizing principles, its general foreign policy goals, and the style with which it conducts its international affairs. What has changed, in contrast, has been China's policies toward specific issues, and its relationship with particular countries.

The question for the future is not whether similar changes will continue, for they are certain to do so. Rather, the issue is whether the continuities will change. As Chinese politics continues to cast aside the constraints of doctrine, and move toward greater pragmatism, will the basic organizing principles of Chinese foreign policy -- the concern with hegemonism and united fronts -- also be modified? As China attains greater international status, achieves stronger military power, and assumes an even more active role in the international economy, will its obesssion with security and sovereignty gradually decline? If so, will these defensive goals be replacd by a more relaxed attitude toward the rest of Asia, or by more assertive, even expansionist objectives? And, as a new generation of leaders come to power -- leaders who reached maturity after the birth of the People's Republic -- will they maintain the same style as their predecessors: the same mistrust of stronger partners, the same empathy with the Third World, the same self-confidence?

No one can answer these questions with certainty. But the continuities are not superficial. They are deeply rooted in the historical experience of generations of Chinese. Change may come, but it will not come easily.

HONG KONG

(Anticipating increased discussion of Hong Kong's future, we include this analysis written by Terrill E. Lautz, Yale-China Association.)

The Future of Hong Kong

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong now stands at a turning point in its history. A 99 year lease on Hong Kong's New Territories is due to expire in 1997, and China's leaders have decided that the time has come to reestablish Chinese sovereignty over this small but highly prosperous territory on its southeast coast. This issue has come to a head and it is not so much a question of whether Peking will take control, but under what terms it will reassert its authority.

Hong Kong has created a booming export economy over the past 30 years, rapidly becoming a regional center for trade, industry, banking, and communications. Its economic success has served China well. Hong Kong has been an important window on the capitalist world, and entrepot for goods and services unavailable on the mainland, a buffer zone between Western business and Chinese socialism. China earns nearly half of its badly needed foreign exchange (from the sale of water and vegetables, among other things) and receives technology and expertise essential for its modernization drive through Hong Kong.

Peking is aware that the collapse of Hong Kong's economy could set back China's efforts for economic development. It has often stressed the need to maintain Hong Kong's "prosperity and stability." What is required is a formula which will permit the Chinese flag to fly over Hong Kong while business continues to thrive, but achieving this will not be easy.

Negotiations over Hong Kong's future were initiated when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited China's capital in September 1982. When she pointed to three 19th-century agreements with a weak Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty as the basis for discussion, Peking's leaders refused to acknowledge the validity of such "unequal" treaties. Attempting to reassure the 5.5 million inhabitants of Hong Kong (98 percent of whom are Chinese), Thatcher promised that Britain would safeguard their welfare. Peking responded that welfare of the people of Hong Kong was not Britain's concern.

The economic freedom in Hong Kong has not been matched by political democracy. Hong Kong is run by a colonial British governor and civil service, and the Chinese of Hong Kong have had very little experience in running their own affairs. Furthermore, they have very little faith that China will actually allow them to do so. Thus, Peking's proposal that Hong Kong become a semi-autonomous territory of China with a Hong Kong Chinese governor has met with confusion and uncertainty.

The key word is confidence, and confidence in the future is sorely lacking. The great majority of Hong Kong's population are refugees or the sons and daughters of refugees who have come over the border legally and illegally since the Communist takeover in 1949. Based on their experiences, the idea that China might be able to accommodate the colony's rampant capitalism within a socialist state has met with cool skepticism. As a result, the Hong Kong dollar has declined dramatically, the local stock market is down, and property values have taken a nose dive. Capital investments are being siphoned off to Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Immigration out of Hong Kong, particularly to the United States, Australia, and Canada, is on the rise.

China has tried to reestablish confidence, inviting a number of prominent Hong Kong citizens for discussions in Peking, while secret negotiations continue with Britain. Members of these delegations have been reassured that their present style of life will continue, including the ever popular past-time of horse racing.

But no one is yet sure where the political, social and cultural lines will be drawn under a future Chinese administration. This raises a number of sensitive and complex questions. For example, will school textbooks be rewritten to reflect Peking's political viewpoints? Will the present legal system, which is now written and applied in English, be retained? Will newspapers be censored by the Communist authorities? Will the Hong Kong dollar be convertible into other currencies? Will people be allowed freedom of movement in and out of Hong Kong?

What London seems to want most is a peaceful and orderly transition of power. It is highly unlikely that Britain would go to war over Hong Kong. China is not Argentina and Hong Kong is not the Falkland Islands. First of all, Hong Kong could not easily be defended with military might. Second, the New Territories, which represents 92 percent of the colony's land but far less of its population, will legally revert to China if the so-called lease (the British have never paid any rent) cannot be renewed. In addition, Hong Kong depends on the Chinese mainland for water supplies, foodstuffs, and other raw materials. London's options are thus circumscribed.

But for China the question is a knotty one. There is no desire to kill the golden goose, and the economic collapse of Hong Kong would make it that much more difficult to convince Taiwan of Peking's intentions for peaceful reunification. Yet even the most pragmatic Chinese leader cannot afford to be accused of being soft on the issue of national sovereignty. It boils down to a question of economics versus politics, and in contemporary China, politics has usually taken the upper hand.

It is too soon to predict Hong Kong's future. This vibrant city will certainly not become a ghost town overnight; most of its residents have nowhere else to go. If compromise and accommodation with China are possible, then the resourceful people of Hong Kong will surely find a way to do so. Ultimately the future of Hong Kong will depend mostly on the Hong Kong Chinese themselves and whether they are willing to take up the challenge now facing them.

XI. E.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Nineteenth-century reformers identified the study of science and technology as prerequisite to mastering the techniques to make China strong enough to maintain her place in the world. (See IX-F) A century later China's leaders said science and technology was one of the Four Modernizations and once again stressed urgency. But this time, in contrast to the 19th century, the reasons were not just defensive but were also for the overall development of the economy and the general prosperity of the people.

After the new government took control in 1949, the training of scientific personnel assumed a high priority and a Chinese Academy of Sciences was established to coordinate scientific research and overall national development. During the years of Sino-Soviet cooperation, China's scientific sector grew to such an extent that a State Scientific and Technological Commission was established to handle nationwide coordination. Scientific institutions and professional organizations continued to proliferate at all levels. In October 1964 China successfully detonated a 20-ton nuclear device. With the Sino-Soviet split came a nationwide debate over the role of science. Was it to be linked with revolutionary change relying on input from the workers who were most intimately involved with the practical application of scientific inquiry, as Mao advocated? Or, were the professional scientists and trained administrators to establish policy?

During the Cultural Revolution the first point of view prevailed and, as the Cultural Revolution grew in intensity, the scientists and professionals were among the major victims. It wasn't until 1978 when the PRC's first national science conference convened that the commitment of the new leadership to science and technology became unquestionably clear.

The modernization of science and technology cannot be discussed in islolation. A great many interrelated factors -- many of which have been alluded to in other essays in this section -- are involved. Most importantly there is an intrinsic relationship between this modernization and the industrial sector to which it will be applied.

Initially, in 1978, the Chinese got off to a rocky start in identifying the direction technological and industrial development should take. The original planning was based on assumptions which, at the time, were not unreasonable. The Chinese believed that the country's large oil and coal potential could -- in the light of the prevailing opinion that a world energy crisis was imminent -- be the mechanism to finance and provide fuel for the Four Modernizations. The sale of oil would earn the foreign exchange to buy complete industrial plants and advanced technology. The leaders assumed that the techniques which they had developed over the years -- the mass mobilization of manpower and use of indigenous resources -- could be applied to future oil production.

In making their projections the planners were unaware that China had reached the limits of existing technology. Oil fields, located near the industrial sector, were wearing out. Other untapped resources were both far from the user and required different technology. The demand for domestic use of energy was greater than anticipated and the transportation sector which had deteriorated was stretched to the limits of its capacity.

The Baoshan Iron and Steel Complex is an illustration of China's over-optimistic assessment of her ability to build and absorb enormous industrial complexes. It was only after the plans were drawn up and construction was under way that the Chinese concluded they had neither the energy, the skilled labor nor the capital to proceed with such an ambitious undertaking. Nor was it feasible to invest limited resources in a product which could not be directly applied to more pressing needs -- such as the people's material welfare.

After these false starts the leadership established priorities which they hope will provide a solid base on which to build in the future. Energy resources, transport and communication, agricultural research, consumer goods such as new technology in the development of synthetic textiles and printing and dyeing techniques, large-scale integrated circuits and computer technology are areas where the planners believe the potential for success is good and the impact will be substantial.

A battery of inputs is being directed to the energy field. . . from stressing conservation and focusing on the inefficiencies in the major energy-consuming industries such as chemical and metallurgical plants to starting construction on China's first nuclear power plant. The station is being built near energy-poor Shanghai, which is far removed from existing oil and coal fields. Negotiations are under way with the French for aid in building a second station -- probably near Guangdong.

China's energy output is expected to increase with the signing of agreements with Atlantic Richfield Company to begin offshore oil drilling south of Hainan Island and with Occidental Petroleum Corporation to drill for oil in the large unexplored basin of the South China Sea. Occidental is also involved in helping develop a huge coal mine in Shanxi Province. The government is presently engaged in a feasibility study for two large dams on the Hongshui River in the Guangxi Autonomous Region which would add to China's already considerable hydroelectric power production. And, on a much smaller scale, indigenous resources such as biogas, small hydrogenerators and local coal mines are promoted as a way of meeting the rural area's needs.

Analysts who comment on China's plans to double its energy output by the year 2000 say such an achievement will require extensive modernization of transportation facilities. To that end, for example, a large dam and system of locks was recently completed at Ichang on the Yanzi River which permits larger vessels to travel up the river.

Advances in China's technology are not only affected by the need to coordinate the development in different sectors but also by other countries' priorities. It was only in June 1983 that the United States announced it would liberalize regulations governing the sale of sophisticated computer technology to China. This has been a controversial subject because of the potential for converting such technology to military as well as civilian uses.

Constraints on the ability of the Chinese to absorb the new technology are another factor governing its direction. Large agricultural machinery is not particularly suited to the relatively small fields and the American Motor Company official who, when announcing a joint agreement to produce a four-wheel drive civilian vehicle to be made and sold in China, exulted "a nation with a billion people, a billion bicycles but no cars" may be in for a surprise. China's substandard roads are few and already choked with trucks, handcarts, wagons, bicycles, buses and people.

Technological development can also be a domestic political football. High level bureaucrats, as everywhere, have a vested interest in particular projects for their constituencies. There is also an historical dimension to consider. The extent of foreign involvement remains a divisive issue. Western businessmen voice frustration at the arduous and time-consuming negotiations involved in making agreements with the Chinese. The Chinese, however, do not want to follow in the footsteps of their 19th-century predecessors who were unaware of the implications of treaties they signed with the Westerners. (See Section IX-E)

The rate of technological change will also be affected by the ability of the industrial sector to make structural changes which encourage innovation. In the past product development was determined by administrative fiat. Some of the new economic policies which lead to a more direct relationship between producer and buyer and enterprise autonomy may remove some of the existing restraints to practical technological change. (See Economic and Social Development)

There are also cultural impediments to technological breakthroughs. Richard Baum believes that the main strengths of Chinese science "past and present, have been in the areas of observation rather than conceptualization, concrete thinking rather than induction." (Baum: 161)

He attributes this, in part, to classical Chinese philosophy which, as in the two forces of yin and yang (see VIII-B) emphasized "a patterned organicity of all natural phenomena." Thus, a conclusion follows necessarily from the premise or observation. There is no reason to make an informed guess or to postulate a theory to be tested over a period of time. The latter requires a healthy skepticism which is lacking in the traditional Chinese background. (See Chen Duxiu's comments in ENRICHMENT I, X-C)

Baum cites traditional and contemporary China's "over-riding concern with preserving doctrinal orthodoxy" as encouraging intellectual rigidity, which is anathema to scientific inquiry. And, he discusses the "highly ritualized" behavior of the Chinese culture and adherence to propriety. Baum says these elements resurfaced in the PRC in the form of class distinctions encouraged by Mao to distinguish between "heroes and villains" (or revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries) and in group sessions which seek to inculcate political orthodoxy. Baum concludes:

> "Science cannot flourish in a culture which strongly emphasizes formal propriety, individual dependency, and the denial of ambivalence and doubt. Ritualism is a mask used to obscure reality, to avoid uncertainty and to resolve ambiguity. But modern science takes ambiguity and uncertainty as givens, and strives to penetrate the mask of the apparent in order to ascertain the nature of the real." (Baum: 167)

By way of illustrating Baum's thesis, it may be helpful to consider the comments of a U.S. businessman who was teaching at the first business school in

China. Reviewing his experience at the National Center for Industrial Science and Technology Mangement Development in the Dalian Institute of Technology he said:

> I think one of the main things we taught them is (that) a major part of good management is sitting down and systematically analyzing the problem, the priorities and your options. Some of them thought we were going to tell them the "best way to do things." That is what the Russians did. As one of them said at the end of the course, "I think you have finally gotten the message across that one knife doesn't cut everything.' (Feder, The New York Times, 1-24-81)

It is concerns such as these that cause observers to question the extent to which the Chinese can effectively make use of technology transfers from the United States.

> It is a working assumption of American scholarship that there are no theories without knowledge of the historical facts which make them so, as well as knowledge of the methodologies through which these facts are brought to bear on theoretical formulations. Many Chinese seem willing to believe otherwise, thus allowing China to borrow and adapt to its purposes theories, models or research techniques -- while rejecting some of the associated premises and features of the intellectual system which produced them. This mode of cross-cultural borrowing can be traced to the 1880s and the earliest Chinese encounters with Western technology. At that time, the Chinese hoped to borrow Western learning for its use (yung), while preserving a Chinese essence (t'i). (See IX-F) The t'i-yung distinction, which many Western scholars question, remains one with which many Chinese remain comfortable. (Prewitt: 11)

Meanwhile, the need for trained scientists remains critical. In 1983 only .5 percent of the population is classified as scientific personnel. Of these less than one-half, or 5.7 million people attended college and only one half of the science teachers have a university education. (Kulkarni: 50) The facilities and equipment are outdated and limited. Although scientific research is more generally directed to those areas of highest technological priority, every field is represented among the approximately 4200 exchange scholars in the United States. Biology, computer science, engineering, pest control, physics, plant genetics, forestry, agronomy. . . the variety is great. Scholars who study in the United States usually return to teach in China, so it will be a number of years before there is any return on the investment.

For all the above political, cultural and economic reasons, Western observers, while endorsing the direction in which Chinese scientific and technological development is moving, are cautious about China's ability to move ahead as fast as projections might indicate.

XI. F.

ART AND CULTURE

The second part of the essay, "The Arts in China," discusses the relationship between politics and art since 1949. The liberalization of all forms of artistic expression is continuing contemporaneously with the new candor with which the government discusses shortcomings and inadequacies. For example, the plot of a recent prize-winning novel suggests that one of the social functions of a writer today is to interject a note of hope of optimism. In A Small Town Called Hibiscus, the author skillfully presents the story of a woman who eventually gains financial security in spite of the difficult years when she was subject to political struggle. It also is a rich story of rural life.

The bookstores in China are crowded; the theater is flourishing, particularly regional opera and theater companies; the Chinese film companies are offering a varied fare; and imports of selected Western films are well-received. To compensate for the shortage of books, enterprising entrepreneurs buy up a variety of best-sellers and set up a few folding stools to create a lending library on a street corner. Readers spend only a few pennies an hour to rent the books.

There is no formal censorship mechanism other than the approval of the editors of the government-sponsored publishing house. Two subjects, however, are taboo; explicit descriptions of sex and direct criticism of the top leadership.

The essay on Religion and Philosophy alluded to a small group of alienated writers who "during the past decades. . . (were) taught to believe in the distinct categories of black and white, good and evil. Responding with intense commitment to what they believed were socialist goals, they struggled relentlessly against 'enemies' of the system." As a result of the political "twists and turns" they now see "shades of grey," and are expressing their frustrations and anger in various mediums.

> During the past three years, 1979-1981, their concerns have shifted from anger over individual fortunes to a sharper, deeper questioning of the basic assumptions of China's socialist system. Some. . . ponder larger issues. . . the fundamental characteristics of human nature, the basic contradictions between self and society, and the meaning of life -- issues that have intrigued philosophers in the West for centuries but were largely taboo in socialist China. . .
>
> Scholars may be tempted to compare this generation's sentiments to the general phenomenon of youthful discontent. . . Some may even compare these writers to the May 4th intellectuals, who cried out against the system that seemed oppressive to them. . . Ironically, what the young generation in China is protesting against now is precisely the new order that the May 4th intellectuals were striving to establish. (See X-C)
>
> (Siu: 2)

The government is taking these writers seriously. Much of their work has appeared in government-sponsored magazines such as China's Youth or Chinese Literature. Their art is shown in provinical art institutes. Nonetheless, renewed Party dialogue about the appropriate role of art in a socialist society and criticism of "bourgeois liberalism" is a reminder that such outspoken comment may invite a backlash.

One particularly poignant statement is a somber brown painting lightened only by a grey wash. The subjects are the young artist's parents, as they were in the late 1940s. Dressed in clothes of young soldiers, they are standing confidently in front of a wall. The whole painting is rent with two large cracks.

And, the following poem is representative of some of the literature.

My grandfather's worth
Was once the landlord's two measures of millet. . .
Am I scarcely more fortunate than grandfather
Worth two rivets, a machine. . .

Who says that life is a leaf
If it withers, the forest is still full of life
Who says that life is a spray
If it disappears, the ocean still churns on
Who says that after heroes have been conferred
posthumous honors
Death can be forgotten
Who says the future of mankind's modernization
Must offer life as a bloody sacrifice.

Shu Ting

(Note: Helen F. Siu, who wrote the introduction to Mao's Harvest: Voices from China's New Generation, edited and translated by Helen Siu and Zelda Stern, is the source quoted in this essay. Her comments and the poem appeared in an article in China Update, the newsletter of the Yale-China Association, March 1983. Copies of the newsletter which contains additional examples of the literature can be obtained by sending $1.00 to Yale-China Association, 905A Yale Station, 442 Temple Street, New Haven, CT 06520)

XI. G.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Religion

A brief review of the association between government and religion (See VIII-C, F and IX-G) indicates that, historically, religious practices were tolerated as long as they were not perceived as a threat by the state. During the first half of the 20th century many of the reform-minded Chinese adopted Christianity. By 1949 there were an estimated 750,000 Chinese Protestants and 3,275,000 Catholics.

The Chinese Christians, as well as other religious believers such as the Taoists, Buddhists and Moslems, had an uneasy relationship with the new government. Christianity, in particular, was associated with Western imperialism, and by the end of 1952 the foreign missionaries were expelled and church property reverted to the state. This was the beginning of a search for a truly Chinese Christian movement, independent of Western associations.

The Three-Self Patriotic Association was the Protestant solution. Building on self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation the association worked closely with the Religious Affairs Bureau of the government to establish a Christian movement based on love of church and love of country. Similarly, the Catholics organized the National Catholic Patriotic Association and claimed political independence of papal authority.

Confrontations between the church and state occurred sporadically over the next decade. The open break came with the Cultural Revolution. (See Politics and Government) Moslems, Buddhists, Taoists, but particularly Christians, were all victims of the Red Guards. Churches and mosques were destroyed. Religious figures and Bibles were burned. The clergy and monks were persecuted. Religion went underground to survive in secret.

Christianity became a major beneficiary of China's post-Cultural Revolution policy when Deng Xiaoping included religious groups in his United Front to combat China's underdevelopment. Now that struggle has been replaced by unity, the various religions in China are once again working out an accommodation with the government. There is a constitutional guarantee that citizens may enjoy the freedom of religious belief.

The Christian revival follows the earlier Three-Self and Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association Movements with one significant change. Both the Protestant and Catholic denominations have been allowed to establish a purely pastoral organization to work in tandem with the more political arm of the church. This more liberal policy has been accompanied by a number of other measures. Churches have been reopened; church property restored and rents paid to the church for the years during the Cultural Revolution when property had been confiscated. The YMCA and YWCA are starting programs for young people in the major cities. New Bibles are being printed in the simplified characters and in 1981 the Nanjing Union Theological Seminary was reopened to train future church leaders.

Chinese and Western observers alike have been surprised by the Chinese response. "Reports indicate that over a million Protestants are publicly worshipping in China today -- more than the 750,000 before the Cultural Revolution -- in 400 churches, largely in urban areas. About one-third of them are young people, while another third are new believers." (Bohr: 76)

Similarly, the Catholics are enjoying a revival -- particularly in Peking and Shanghai. The Catholics, however, face a doctrinal dispute with possibly serious implications for the future. The Vatican continues to claim authority over the Chinese Catholic Church and has not endorsed the fifty plus bishops elected and consecrated by the Chinese Catholic Church. Recently, the Chinese Church objected to the Vatican appointment of an archbishop of Guangdong (Kwangtung) province stating that this was interference in the Chinese church's internal affairs.

Two other potential problems are of some concern to the leaders of both the Chinese Christian and Catholic churches who have clearly determined that the survival of Christianity in China depends upon accommodation with the state. There are an unknown number of Chinese Christians who claim it is impossible to be loyal Christians and cooperate with the Communists whom they consider godless. Called "house Christians," they continue to worship in private and refuse to cooperate with the Chinese Christian church. Their cause is supported by some Christians outside China which, the Chinese Christians fear, may have an adversary effect on the present religious toleration.

There is also concern that the government may respond negatively to the growing number of young people who are seeking spiritual fulfillment in Christianity. "Should Christianity offer attractive alternatives to Marxist materialism, the limits of toleration may prove very narrow indeed." (Bohr: 83)

Other religions in China have had comparable experience. Buddhist and Taoist temples are being restored and opened for worship, study and as tourist attractions. Young men are being admitted to monasteries to train as novices and public celebrations of Buddha's birthday have drawn large crowds.

Visitors to far-off Xinjiang (Sinkiang) report on the reopening of the Moslem mosques and new copies of the Koran are being printed by the government. Similarly, the government has relaxed its policies in Tibet and the Buddhist monasteries are functioning as religious centers -- although on a scale drastically reduced from the pre-1959 days when Tibet had its own political system.

(Note: Most of the material in this essay was adapted from an article by Paul Richard Bohr, "Religion in the People's Republic of China: The Limits of Toleration," which appeared in China Briefing, 1982, Richard Bush, ed.)

Philosophy

There are two philosophical trends in the PRC today. One is official and the other spontaneous. The official orthodoxy began to be redefined in June, 1981, when the Party evaluation of Mao Zedong was released. The statement summing up the major historical events of the Party said that Mao's contribution to the Chinese revolution far outweighs his mistakes. Then having praised his pre-1949 record, the resolution identified his most serious mistake as initiating and leading the Cultural Revolution. Mao's rationale for starting the Cultural Revolution was misguided, the resolution states, because it didn't conform to the Chinese reality or to Marxist-Leninism. Mao became "arrogant and self-satisfied" and tried to accomplish too much too fast.

By referring to Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution as a mistake, rather than as a crime as was the case with Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing), the Party makes it possible to retain the image of Mao as a national hero for his pre-1949 record. To openly "DeMaoize" him, as was the case with Stalin in the Soviet Union, would not only question the revolution, but might jeopardize the support of the peasants and the army. Just as these two sectors of the society were the initial focus of Mao's revolution, they remain the bastion of his support today.

Mao Zedong Thought was retained as the party's guide to action with the emphasis on three aspects: seek truth from facts; the mass line (the idea that the Party encourages mass participation so the peoples' views can influence decision-making); and independence and self-reliance.

Since 1981 there has been ongoing dialogue about the role of Marxism during this period of "socialist economic construction." What is critical, according to CCP Chairman Hu Yaobang, is that "the universal truth of Marxism" has to be integrated with the reality of the conditions in the involved country. And, Mao continues to be given full credit for having "played an exceptionally important role" in the formation of this policy.

However, while continuing to reaffirm that Mao Zedong Thought is -- along with Marxist-Leninism -- the official orthodoxy, the Party is introducing another, not necessarily competing, focus. In July 1983 The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping were published and given high visibility. Deng believes, as did many of his historical predecessors, that good government depends upon reform of existing institutions. His comments, which stress the importance of seeking truth from facts, are directed to such matters as replacing elder statesmen with new blood; stopping the abuse of intellectuals who are fellow workers in the reconstruction process, and adapting Marxism to local conditions. With the publication of these speeches, another official school of thought has been introduced out of which may someday emerge a new synthesis.

Deng's works will be the main object of study in the fall 1983 Party rectification drive (See Politics and Government), but one aspect which warns against the loss of spiritual socialist values is already being discussed. Officials comment that "the success of China's modernization drive hinges not merely on the accumulation of material wealth but also on the heightening of people's communist consciousness and revolutionary spirit." It is all too easy for a person to turn "himself into a slave to material things, leading a rich yet spiritually meaningless life, a life which impels him to cheat, rob and kill." (Pang and Li: 17-18)

The other philosophical trend which is being watched with some interest by both Chinese and Western observers is confined to an extremely small segment of urban China. A few young Chinese in their twenties and thirties have become disillusioned about their own future and that of their country and are searching for a set of beliefs to replace the ones which they believe have failed them. Some of these people turned to political activism (see Politics and Government).

Others became involved in the new literature movement (see Art and Culture).

XI.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1983

Ashbrook, Arthur. "China: Economic Policy and Economic Results, 1949-1971." In People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment. Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Washington, D.C., 1972.

Baum, Richard. "Chinese Science After Mao." In The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 1983.

Beijing Review. "1982 Statistical Communique." Vol. 26, no. 19, May 9, 1983.

Beijing Review. "Introduction to Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping." Vol. 26, no. 28, July 11, 1983.

Bohr, Paul Richard. "Religion in the People's Republic of China." In China Briefing, 1982, edited by Richard C. Bush. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Bodde, Derk. Peking Diary. New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967.

Butler, Steven B. "Chinese Farmers Continue to Foot the Bill." In Asia magazine, May/June 1983.

_______. "Women in China: Doing the Dirty Work." In The Washington Post, October 19, 1980.

China Quarterly, no. 93, March 1983 and no. 94, June 1983. Quarterly chronicle and documentation.

Croll, Elisabeth. Feminism and Socialism in China. New York: Schocken Books, 1980.

Delia, Davin. Woman-Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Delfs, Robert. "An Incentive Socialism." In Far Eastern Economic Review, April 28, 1983.

Dernberger, Robert. "China: The Economy." Unpublished paper written for the Eudcation Department, The Asia Society, n.d.

Dreyer, June Teufel. "China's Military Power in the 1980s." In China Briefing, 1982, edited by Richard C. Bush. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Feder, Barnaby J. "A U.S. Course to Aid Chinese." In The New York Times, January 24, 1981.

Fingar, Thomas. "Energy in China: Paradoxes, Policies and Prospects." In China Briefing, 1982, edited by Richard C. Bush. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.

Fingar, Thomas, and Linda Reed. *An Introduction to Education in the People's Republic of China and U.S.-China Educational Exchanges*. Washington, D.C.: The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC and the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1982. Publisher: U.S. China Education Clearinghouse.

Friedman, Edward. "The Original Chinese Revolution Remains in Power." In *China From Mao to Deng*, edited by the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983.

Goodman, David, S.G. "The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger." In *The China Quarterly*, no. 87, September 1981.

Guillermaz, Jacques. *The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949-1976*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976.

Howe, Christopher. *China's Economy: A Basic Guide*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978.

Hinton, William. "Village in Transition." In *The Transition to Socialism in China*, edited by Mark Selden and Victor Lippit. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982.

Kaplan, Frederic M., Julian Sobin and Stephen Andors. *Encyclopedia of China Today*. New York: Harper and Row, Inc., 1980.

Klatt, W. "The Staff of Life: Living Standards in China, 1977-1981." In *The China Quarterly*, no. 93, March 1983.

Kulkarni, V.G. "Pragmatists Leap to Grandiose Conclusions." In *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 28, 1983.

Lampton, David. "Short-Run Socio-Political Obstacles to Long-Run Scientific and Technological Modernization in China." In *Occasional Paper #11, China's Scientific and Technological Modernization, Domestic and International Implications*. Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, 1982.

Mao Tse-tung. "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership." In *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Volume 3*. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965.

Meisner, Maurice. *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic*. New York: The Free Press, 1977.

Myers, Ramon. "Wheat in China — Past, Present and Future." In *The China Quarterly*, no. 74, June 1978.

Nathan, Andrew J. "The Chinese Citizen: A Different Democracy." Unpublished paper written for the Education Department, The Asia Society, 1979.

The New York Times, November 16, 1980.

Pan Yun Kang and Pan Naigu. "Urban Family Structure and Their Changes." In *Beijing Review*, Vol. 26, no. 9, February 28, 1983.

Pang Yongjie and Li Shanquan. "Building Socialist Spiritual Civilization." In Beijing Review, Vol. 26, no. 18, May 2, 1983.

Parish, William L. and Martin King Whyte. Village and Family in Contemporary China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Parks, Michael. "China Warns Industry to Curb Outlays." In The Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1983.

Parks, Michael. "China: The Rural Road to Prosperity." In The Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1983.

Prewitt, Kenneth. Research Opportunities in China For American Humanists and Social Scientists. Washington, D.C.: Social Science Research Council, 1982.

Selden, Mark, ed. The People's Republic of China, A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Schram, Stuart R. "To Utopia and Back: A Cycle in the History of the Chinese Communist Party." In The China Quarterly, no. 87, September 1981.

Siu, Helen F. "Mao's Harvest: Voices From China's New Generation." In China Update. New Haven: Yale-China Association, Inc., March 1983.

Tan, Manni. "Why New Marriage Law Was Necessary." In China Reconstructs, March 1981.

Wen Xiajie. "Secondary Education Reforms." In Beijing Review, Vol. 25, no. 42, October 18, 1982.

Witke, Roxanne. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977.

"Women and Work in China." In Notes from the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc., Fall, 1981.

Wu, Naitao. "Rural Women and the New Economic Policies." In Beijing Review, Vol. 26, no. 10, March 7, 1983.

Appendices

XII. A.

TEXTBOOK EVALUATION

This should not be considered a fair evaluation of the merits of each text as a world history or as a study of world cultures. Nor do we examine the texts within the context of their stated goals. As stated in Section I, we assume that many teachers who wish to teach about China will use existing texts. Therefore, our interest in the texts is limited to the information they contain on China. We rate the texts primarily on the basis of accuracy, scope, emphasis and the explanations given for events in China. The evaluation is designed to alert teachers to aspects which seem to us particularly noteworthy. The rating is on a scale of one to ten -- ten is the highest.

One general observation: Overall, the texts do little to establish a coherent relationship between traditional China and the society as it now operates under the People's Republic. There is little useful development of themes. All the texts suffer from too little information about people in the People's Republic and their lives and interaction with their government.

	VIII. Dynastic Past	IX. 1750-1911	X. 1911-1949	XI. 1949-1983
Beers	9 - A good, non-controversial straightforward approach. Well balanced and interesting.	7 - A brief satisfactory overview. Very little on social change. No identification of nationalism.	6 - Brief. Little on social change, role of Soviet Union. Little on Nanking decade or CCP program.	7 - Weak on explanations and operation of government but balanced overview.
Kolevzon	7 - Fails to relate a good geography section to develop- of China. Good section on social order.	6 - Brief account with inaccurate reasons for Opium War. Weak on reasons for 1911 Revolution.	6-7 - Simplistic account. Many omissions. Discusses Japanese invasion only as it relates to Japan. Good attempt at overview of economy.	7 - Discussion is disorganized but comprehensive. Role in Vietnam overplayed. Misinformation about family.

	VIII. Dynastic Past	IX. 1750-1911	X. 1911-1949	XI. 1949-1983
Kownslar	5 - A breathless dash from one super achievement to the next. Too brief to be of much value.	5 - Brief recitation of major events which neglects to discuss internal problems. Few explanations, many omissions.	Too brief to be of any value or to evaluate.	4 - One-dimension overview focusing on power politics. Misinformation on industrial policy and Cultural Revolution. Nothing on agriculture.
Leinwand	7 - Straightforward historical approach. Needs more emphasis on government and economics and less less on war.	6 - Inaccuracies in discussion of Opium War and U.S. policy. Self-strengthening is simplistic. No social change.	5 - Very few explanations or analysis. Misleading about Russian interest in China. Very weak on CCP.	4 - Emphasis is on a militaristic China. Inaccurate regarding family and Cultural Revolution.
Mazour (1975)	7-8 - An acceptable discussion marred by minor inaccuracies and too little on social and economic factors. Few explanations.	6 - Emphasis mainly on external events. Very little on Chinese reaction or social change.	6 - Nothing on social change. Inaccurate on reasons for Japanese invasion. Little on introduction of communism. Poor on Civil War and U.S. role.	5 - Non-controversial but too brief to have much value.
Mazour (1983)	9 - An obvious effort to improve on previous edition. Much more discussion of complex concepts.	6-7 - Marginally better than previous edition. More discussion of internal events.	6-7 - More on development of CCP. Japanese misinformation corrected. Otherwise much the same as earlier edition.	7 - A more detailed explanation of PRC goals. Little sense of people.

	VIII. Dynastic Past	IX. 1750-1911	X. 1911-1949	XI. 1949-1983
McNeill	7 - Uneven. Use with caution but it is interesting. Facts and dates suffer in imaginative presentation. Some speculations are questionable. Very good on relating geography and agriculture. Confusing regarding relationship of government to people.	7 - A factual recital. Needs more on self-strengthening and social change.	4 - Quite disorganized because China is peripheral to other themes. Very difficult to get any sense of chronology or issues.	4 - Deals only with foreign policy. Misleading depiction of China as exporter of revolution. Ignores reconstruction process.
Perry (1974)	6 - Few dates. Little on pre-Ch'in. Weak on social and economic aspects. Good on early perceptions of trade.	8 - A balanced, comprehensive account. Interpretation of Opium War is questionable.	8 - Includes most major elements. Is weak on Northern Expedition, KMT reforms and CCP program.	7 - Overestimates China as a major power. Differences between Soviet Union and PRC are misleading.
Perry (1983)	7 - Much better organized than previous edition but still weak on social and economic aspects and geography.	9 - Interesting presentation. Includes all major elements. Much better discussion of Opium War.	8-9 - Much more explanation of motivations. More on KMT reforms but still little on CCP programs.	6-7 - Same criticism as earlier edition. Discussion of Cultural Revolution more confused. Information on education is misleading. No sense of people.

	VIII. Dynastic Past	IX. 1750-1911	X. 1911-1949	XI. 1949-1983
Roselle (1976)	6-7 - An "old-fashioned" text with conventional recitation of ideas. Little on social and economic aspects. Few explanations.	5-6 - A brief disorganized overview which ignores China's response or any meaningful discussion of internal problems.	5 - Brief discussion of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen and account of major events. Attempts to discuss KMT and CCP programs misleading. Social and economic problems ignored.	6 - A cultural bias permeates this limited account.
Roselle (1981)	8 - This edition discusses concepts and provides explanations. Still suffers from too little on social and economic aspects.	6 - Not too much change from earlier edition. A little more analysis.	5-6 - A discussion of Mao is added to this edition which remains essentially the same as previous one.	6-7 - One-dimensional approach with few explanations.
Wallbank	6 - Questionable factual statements (e.g. Chou ministers selected for their intelligence) and misleading periodizations.	5 - A brief review of foreign penetration of China. Nothing on Chinese response. Misleading reasons for Opium War.	4-5 - Too brief to be of much value.	4-5 - Superficial overview with no explanations.

XII. B.

A SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL LIBRARIES

(Note: Please refer to books suggested in the essays in Section VII for additional suggestions.)

Bingham, Marjorie W. and Susan H. Gross. Women in Modern China and Women in Traditional China. Hudson, Wis.: Gem Publications, Inc., 1980. A major effort has been made to incorporate primary source materials about the historical and contemporary role of Chinese women with many suggestions for analysis and classroom use.

Bonavia, David. Peking. New York: Time-Life Books, 1978. Handsome photographs and a well-written text take the reader on an armchair tour of the capital of China.

Bonavia, David. The Chinese. New York: Lippincott and Crowell, 1980. The author, chief of the London Times' Beijing bureau, gives current information on different aspects of the economic, social and political scene in China.

Catchpole, Brian. A Map History of Modern China. London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1976. Maps, charts and diagrams illustrate 20th-century Chinese history.

Chen Yuan-tsung. The Dragon's Village. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. This autobiographical novel discusses the experience of an idealistic teenager who participated in the land-reform movement in Gansu province in 1949.

Chin, Pa. Family. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972. A Chinese classic written about four generations of an urban family facing the social change in 20th century China.

Cochran, Sherman and Andrew C.K. Hsieh with Janis Cochran, translators and editors. One Day in China: May 21, 1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. Mao Dun, one of China's leading 20th-century novelists, asked ordinary Chinese to write an account of their activities on May 21, 1936. More than 3000 people responded to his advertisement and in 1936 469 of these original pieces were published in China. The editors of this book have selected and translated 84 of these vignettes of everyday life in China. This book is an enormous contribution to our understanding of China in the 1930s.

Eberhard, Wolfram, editor. Folk Tales of China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. A rich collection of Chinese folklore with good explanatory notes.

Fairbank, John. The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, fourth ed. This classic study of traditional Chinese society and government, written by the Dean of China studies in the United States, includes a discussion of U.S.-China relations and of the continuing revolution since 1949.

Frolic, B. Michael. Mao's People. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. The author relies on scholarship and refugee accounts verified by his own research to compile 16 portraits which bring the policies and practices of the People's Republic of China to life.

Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of a Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. This highly acclaimed volume describes the process of land reform in North China during the late 1940s.

Hsiung Deh-ta. Chinese Regional Cooking. New York: Mayflower Books, 1979. Beautifully illustrated with magnificent photographs, this book is built around the reminiscences of the author as he describes the regional cooking of China.

Isaacs, Harold, editor. Straw Sandals. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974. Both the literary revolution and the trauma of early 20th-century China are portrayed through these translations of well-known Chinese stories.

Jenner, W.J.F., editor. Modern Chinese Stories. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. An excellent collection of modern Chinese stories written between 1919-1965. Most of these stories deal with social issues and would add greatly to a history class.

Kaplan, Frederic M, et. al. Encyclopedia of China Today. New York: Harper and Row, 1980. Prepared by China scholars, specialists, business leaders and trade consultants, this work provides a practical, concise and completely up-to-date reference guide to the People's Republic of China.

Lau, Joseph S.M., C.T. Hsia and Leo Ou-Fan Lee. Modern Chinese Stories and Novellas: 1919-1949. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. A good introduction and biographical sketches add to this rich collection of literature which illustrates the literary revolution following the May 4th Incident.

Liu Wu-chi and Irving Lo. Sunflower Splendor: Three Thousand Years of Chinese Poetry. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975. This volume presents new translations of Chinese poetry. It includes analysis and biographical material.

Luo Zewen, et. al. The Great Wall. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Photographs, text, charts and archaeological drawings combine to produce not only an historical study of the great wall but a military history of China.

Ma, Y.W. and Joseph S.M. Lau. Traditional Chinese Stories: Themes and Variations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Notes and explanations add to this anthology of fiction which illustrates values and customs in Imperial China.

Peck, Graham. Two Kinds of Time. New York: Sentry Printing Company, 1967. This intimate account of wartime China in 1940-1945 focuses on the daily life of the Chinese as well as on an unofficial account of the U.S. presence in China.

Posner, Arlene and Arne J. deKeizjer. China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. This guide begins with three short essays covering problems frequently encountered when teaching abobut China in the classroom and then proceeds with an excellent annotated listing of books, periodicals, films, filmstrips, and curriculum guides. Some of the items mentioned may now be out of date.

Pruitt, Ida. A Daughter of Han: The Autobiography of a Chinese Working Woman. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. Chinese history from the late 19th century through the coming of the Japanese in 1937 comes to life through the reminiscences of a peasant woman.

Siu, Helen and Zelda Stern, editors and translators. Mao's Harvest: Voices From China's New Generation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. These stories, essays and poems written by the first generation of writers to grow up under Mao Zedong provide an excellent window to the hopes, dreams and concerns of educated, committed Chinese.

Sive, Mary Robinson. China: A Multimedia Guide. New York: Neal-Schuman, Inc., 1982. Over 600 annotations of books, periodicals, films, maps, slides, filmstrips and materials produced since 1976. Very well organized, it should be an invaluable tool. Contains a list of resource centers, publishers, and regional China Councils.

Smedley, Agnes. Portraits of Chinese Women in Revolution. edited by Jan MacKinnon and Steve MacKinnon. Old Westbury: The Feminist Press, 1976. The editors select portraits of revolutionary Chinese women from the author's writings. They illustrate the relationship between women and the revolutionary movement in China as well as social change in the 20th century.

Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, 1961. Another classic, this account of Mao's life and the early years of the Chinese Communist movement comes to the reader through Mao's discussions with the author.

Spence, Jonathan. The Death of Woman Wang. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. Drawing on local histories, memoirs, and contemporary short stories, the author recreates life in a small village in 17th century China.

Sze Mai-mai. The Mustard Seed Garden Manual of Painting. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. This English translation of a 17th-century work by three Chinese painters is the original "how-to" manual on Chinese painting. It contains as much philosophical as technical advice.

Additional Resources: There are now many good audio-visuals and teaching resources which will enhance any classroom presentation. We urge teachers to refer to China: A Multimedia Guide (see Bibliography). Here we simply mention a few selections which may help illustrate some of the material in the previous pages. We urge you to refer to the Resource Center nearest your school (see C below) for additional information.

Asian Man: China. (Color, secondary and above, series of filmstrips by Encylopaedia Brittanica Educational Corporation, 1977)

1) China: The Middle Kingdom -- A broad introduction to traditional Chinese culture.
2) Confucius and the Peaceful Empire -- Shows how Confucianism served as the basis for the traditional Chinese political and social order.
3) Tao: The Harmony of the Universe -- The basic tenets of Taoism.

4) Buddhism: The Way of Compassion -- Discusses Buddhism and compares it with Confucianism and Taoism.
5) Ch'i: The Arts of China -- This survey of Chinese art over the centuries ends with a discussion of revolutionary art.
6) Wei-min: For the People -- A broad political, social and economic overview of China from the 19th century to the present.

This excellent series of filmstrips comes with audiocassettes, study guides, and supplemental readings. It can be used as a unit to introduce China to a class or the filmstrips can be used independently. Visually, the filmstrips are exciting and well-planned. The narration is excellent. The set includes a cassette with examples of Chinese language, poetry and songs played on the chin and pi-pa. Filmstrips vary from 12 to 20 minutes.

Chiliying: Life in a Rural Commune. (A workbook and teacher's guide which introduce rural China to junior high school students) Available from North Carolina State University's Office of Publications, School of Education, P.O. Box 5096, Poe Hall, Raleigh, NC 27650. $3.00 for student booklet; $ .50 for teacher's guide.

China in 1906. Sixty black-and-white slides taken by a Western visitor to China give a vivid portrayal of early 20th-century life. Comes with script. New York University, Asian Studies Curriculum Center, 635 East Building, Washington Square, New York, NY 10003. $24.00.

China: A Teaching Workbook. (1981) The most ambitious and comprehensive compilation of teaching suggestions, resources and general information about China available. Write East Asian Curriculum Project, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 for information sheet.

Contemporary Family Life in Rural China. (1982) A four-part unit which comes with 66 color slides illustrates rural life in Guangdong province. An excellent workbook gives additional information and suggests activities. BAYCEP, Center for Research in International Studies, Lou Henry Hoover Building, Room 200, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. $25.00. Ask for catalogue of additional resources.

Discovering Marco Polo. (1982) A comprehensive study of Marco Polo's experience in China designed to enrich the television series on Marco Polo. Good maps, readings, teaching suggestions and activities. Order from BAYCEP (see above).

Education in China. (1982) A 23-color-slide unit involves students in a discussion of the role of education in society. Encourages comparisons. Comes with a good guide. Order from BAYCEP (see above). $15.00.

XII. C.

RESOURCE CENTERS

(listed in zip code order)

Harvard University East Asian Educational Project, Children's Museum, 300 Congress Street, Boston, MA 02210 (617/426-6500).

Council on East Asian Studies, Yale University, 85 Trumbell Street, Box 13A, Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520 (203/432-4029).

East Asian Studies, Princeton University, 211 Jones Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544 (609/452-4276).

The Education and Communications Department of The Asia Society, 725 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10021 (212/288-6400). Publishes Focus on Asian Studies, a resource journal for elementary and secondary school educators that includes articles, book reviews, model curricula, multimedia teaching resources, graphics, and a calendar of major cultural events across the country. Subscription: $5.00 for three issues a year.

East Asian Curriculum Project, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10027 (212/280-4278).

Center for Teaching About China, U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Suite 111, Washington, DC 20005 (202/463-6199).

East Asian Language and Area Center, University of Virginia, 1644 Oxford Road, Charlottesville, VA 22903 (804/295-1808).

Office of International Programs, 403 Hamilton Hall 070A, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 (919/933-5091).

Global Education Program, Department of Social Science Education, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 (404/542-7265).

Department of International Studies, 308 Dulles Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210 (614/422-3838).

East Asian Studies Center Outreach Program, Indiana University, Woodburn Hall, Bloomington, IN 47405 (812/337-7587).

Project on East Asian Studies in Education, University of Michigan, 108 Lane Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (313/764-5109).

Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 (517/353-1680).

Institute of World Affairs, 668 Bolton Hall, The University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201 (414/963-4252).

Midwest China Center, 308 Gullixson Hall, 2375 Como Avenue West, St. Paul, MN 55108 (612/614-3238). Publisher China Update, a monthly newsletter that reviews recent events in China.

Center for Far Eastern Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 (312/753-2632).

Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis, MO 63121 (314/553-5753).

Center for Asian Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66502 (913/864-3849).

Texas Program for Educational Resources, University of Texas, Center for Asian Studies, SSB4.126, Austin, TX 78712 (512/471-5811).

Office of International Education, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309 (303/492-7741).

East Asian Studies Center, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 (602/626-5463).

Bay Area China Educational Program, 221 Lou Henry Hoover, Stanford, CA 94305 (415/497-1115).

World Affairs Council of Oregon, 1912 SW Sixth Avenue, Room 252, Portland, OR 97201 (503/229-3049).

East Asia Resource Center, School of International Studies DR-05, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 (206/543-1921).